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Author(s): Claude A. Buss

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Overseas Chinese and Communist Policy

By CLAUDE A. BUSS

THE situation in China itself is more and more reflected in the communities of the overseas Chinese in south-eastern Asia. Perhaps as many as ten million Chinese, who have in the past been identified with the agriculture, industry, and trade of the southern regions, are now prime targets in Mao Tse-tung's drive for power. Who are these Chinese? Under what local political conditions do they live? What are their relations with China? What are their opinions about the Kuomintang and the Communists? How is the Peking government seeking to utilize them as reserves in the accomplishment of the revolution?

A reasonable estimate of the overseas Chinese includes 3,000,000 in Thailand, 1,000,000 in French Indochina, 300,000 in Burma, 2,800,000 in Singapore and the Federation of Malaya, 2,000,000 in Indonesia, and 250,000 in the Philippines. Their numbers give no clue to their economic importance. Their activities range from hewing of wood and tilling of the soil to those of rubber kings, tin barons, and merchant princes. "Wherever you find three coconut trees you will find a Chinese trader." Chinese in southeast Asia control or have a large stake in the trade in rice, rubber, and tin; they own a large share of the capital investment; and they are usually the creditors of the less provident indigenous peoples.

Some Chinese are very poor, perhaps just a stage above the contract laborers; some are coolies and jinrikisha pullers; others are craftsmen or small shopkeepers; and a very few are multimillionaires. They are very clannish, tending to find their most intimate friends in

their own secret societies, trade guilds, and charitable organizations. Often they form a distinct, unassimilable portion of the local population. As conditions remain chaotic in China, the emigrants have less desire to return to the old country. It is becoming increasingly difficult to send remittances home or to take goods with them. Shipping charges and plane fares are going up, and accumulated wealth is risky in China. Furthermore, quotas and immigration laws and regulations make it more troublesome and often more costly for them to return from China to their adopted countries.

This growing identity of the Chinese with their country of domicile is obliging them to broaden their interests from economics to politics. In the past they have trimmed their sails to whichever political wind was blowing, and refused to make any decision which might jeopardize their hope of profits. Now they must watch closely the attitudes of local governments and appraise the progress of Chinese Communism. They must seek to take advantage of its prestige, even as the Peking government would seek to use the overseas Chinese. Each Chinese community faces a separate set of problems. Its own survival or welfare is at stake. Conversely, Peking has everything to gain in attracting overseas Chinese to its support.

IN THAILAND

In Thailand, the benevolent dictatorship of Pibul Songgram continues a twenty-year-old policy of discrimination against the Chinese. It has banned them from certain trades and commer-

cial activities. It has restricted remittances to China and has put clamps on immigration. Getting into the country and being able to stay in have become matters of adequate financial adjustments with the proper officials. The Thai have the usual arguments with the Chinese over dual citizenship. The Thai government thinks the Chinese have too many schools in Thailand, and accuses them of teaching the wrong things for the wrong purposes.

The government of Chiang Kai-shek generated a warm interest in overseas Chinese. It negotiated treaty rights for Chinese nationals in Thailand while it was in power, but it was never able to make substantial headway against the influence of Japan in the court at Bangkok. For a brief spell after the war, the Kuomintang flourished. Then the tide of opinion swung towards the Communists, leaving the residual Kuomintang position comparatively inconsequential.

Before the war, Communists in Thailand were underground as they are today. They became less secretive as they gained a measure of respectability through their anti-Japanese guerrilla achievements. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) now has a typical party apparatus, with a Central Executive Committee, a Standing Committee, and a Secretariat. It has a list of members whose names are well known, and it has open press connections, schools, and its own book shop. But most of its liaison work with its friendly ally, the Thai Communist Party, with Moscow, Peking, Calcutta, and other centers, and with the terrorists in Malaya, is carried on in secret.

The Chinese Communists have had a fertile area in which to sow their propaganda seeds. Pibul's rabid anti-Chinese policies nurture the Communists' claims. The Communists assert that it is useless to be law-abiding, that they

have been given no political rights, and that they will have no liberation from persecution until the inevitable victory over capitalism has been achieved.

Communist infiltration tactics are bringing results. The Communists have entered the wedge into the Central Labor Organization and have penetrated into the "prosperous, middle-aged, urbane" elite of the Chinese Chamber of Commerce. Some of the "young, lean, unhealthy-looking, wild-eyed fanatics who might have come straight from the Malayan jungles" have helped to make the Siamese press one of the most leftist in southeastern Asia. Mr. William Skinner says: "Actually, probably the majority of Chinese schools in Thailand are pro-Communist in the sense that the teachers are leftist and have introduced Communist textbooks and teaching methods."¹

Regardless of political inclinations, most Chinese like to see Peking gaining strength. A stronger Peking means more possible protection for them. It might even mean encouragement for the return of Pridi Phanomyong from his exile and a coup which would bring the reduction or the end of anti-Chinese discrimination. So much depends on Korea—and after.

IN FRENCH INDOCHINA

In French Indochina, nearly half of the Chinese are of Cantonese origin. The other half are from Swatow, northern Kwangtung, Fukien, and Hainan. Cholon is the largest Chinese city in southeastern Asia except Singapore. The Chinese regard the Vietnamese as cultural inferiors. The Vietnamese look upon the Chinese with mixed envy, admiration, and resentment. Bitter memories linger from the centuries-old struggle for independence, and from the looting by Chinese troops who

¹ *Report on the Chinese in Southeast Asia* (Ithaca, 1950), p. 8.

swarmed across the border to accept the surrender of the Japanese in 1945. The bitterness is compounded because of the Chinese grip on the economic life of French Indochina.

The Chinese appreciate the delicacy of their political status. They are living under the sovereignty of the French, to whom deference must be paid and thanks given for even the peace and stability which they enjoy. Official relations with China are still conducted through the Chinese National Government, which has active consulates in Saigon, Hanoi, and Haiphong. A pretty penny is likely to be made from American economic and military assistance. The Chinese press is discreetly pro-Kuomintang. The status of Chinese is still regulated by the 1946 treaty, which specifies equality of status as between French and Chinese and guarantees most-favored-nation treatment in matters of trade.

The Chinese cannot ignore the strength of Ho Chi-minh and Mao Tse-tung. Perhaps because of his Moscow training, or because of his experience with the revolution in China itself, Ho has never been particularly anti-Chinese. Even during the days of the Kuomintang, many refugees from French Indochina found asylum and hospitality in China. Ho, if victorious, can be expected to inaugurate economic measures which will weigh heavily upon the Chinese; but if on the other hand he has an understanding with Mao, it seems reasonable to some Chinese to expect better days under Ho than under the French. The ogre of Russian imperialism seems unreal. Here, as in Thailand, the Chinese are obliged to play it both ways. They pay the taxes to the French and the blackmail to the Viet Minh.

The Chinese Communists are approaching the situation in French Indochina with caution. They are vitriolic

in their propaganda attacks against the French and the Viet-Nam puppet, and they are extravagant in their praise of Peking. Inside the country, they work through the indigenous Communist Party. The successes of General Jean de Lattre de Tassigny increases Ho's need of Mao. Mao is not hampered by any theory of nonintervention, but he is handicapped by the costs of Korea. He apparently shies away from a two-front war at this time. He may send food, supplies, clothing, and arms to the Viet Minh; he may set up training programs for ground forces and artillery units; but he has much softening up to do before launching an overt campaign. He must be sure of the strength of his opposing forces. He must be confident that the pro-Communism of the Viet Minh will outweigh its anti-Chinese-ism. Virginia McLean Thompson (Mrs. Adloff) states her opinion "should the Viet Minh ally itself with the unpopular Chinese, appear to have become Soviet-dominated, or compromise with the French on issues of unity and sovereignty it may forfeit the mass support it now seems to enjoy."²

IN BURMA

Comparatively few Chinese have made their homes in Burma. Some have filtered over the land frontiers from Yunnan, and more have settled in the Irrawaddy delta. The Chinese in Burma engage almost exclusively in business, commerce, or industry. There are few laborers in their ranks, their degree of literacy is low, and their state of contentment is rather high. These circumstances are not propitious for the Communists. The Chinese mix well with the Burmans, and are less a minority problem than the Indians. The voluntary withdrawal of the British from

² *The Left Wing in Southeast Asia* (New York, 1950), p. 35.

Burma made it impossible for the Communists to exploit the issue of nationalism. Communists, badly divided as they are, are among the insurgent groups.

Burma was among the first to recognize the Peking regime. This policy was not prompted by sympathy, but rather by a desire to get along with a potentially dangerous neighbor. When the Ambassador from Peking arrived in Rangoon, he was enthusiastically welcomed by various representatives of the Chinese community. It has been reported that recently the embassy personnel have acted more as a Communist Party branch than as a diplomatic mission; that they have been more interested in furthering the Communist cause than in giving aid to Chinese nationals in Burma.

The Chinese Communists in Burma choose to work through a front organization, the Democratic League, rather than through the indigenous Burman Communist Party. With the help of the Chinese Embassy, they have made headway into the Chinese schools and they have captured a portion of the local Chinese press. But the field is by no means clear for them. The opposition is lively, and has taken more heart since the turn of events in Korea. The government has made progress against the assorted rebels and has taken decisive measures against the terrorists in Rangoon. It has elicited the assistance of both the United Kingdom and the United States in its anti-Communist stand.

IN SINGAPORE AND THE FEDERATION OF MALAYA

Singapore is a placid, feverish crown colony. With the present price of tin relatively as high as gold in 1931, and a booming rubber market, the Chinese are living high, wide, and handsome. "A Chinese will spend in one night

what it will take a British civil servant two months to earn." The quieter, wiser Chinese follow the traditional ways of life in their "tenement-lined streets where Chinese family laundry hangs like banners on long bamboo poles outside dingy upper story windows." If the press is any indication of their thought, they tend to be pro-Peking; but they are much more interested in the price of rubber than in the Korean war. They oppose the jungle war which has brought death to a thousand Chinese civilians since 1948. It is directly attributable to Communist policy. It has shattered local law and order, and it costs the taxpayers in the neighborhood of \$100,000 per day.

Shortly after the Comintern established the Far Eastern Bureau at Shanghai in 1920, Chinese Communists started to agitate in Malaya. The Malayan Communist Party has been 90 per cent Chinese, and its inner councils wholly so. It worked underground and made headway in the night schools, the craft guilds, and the trade unions. During the united front period, it attracted many Chinese by its vigorous patriotic, anti-Japanese appeals. When Singapore fell, the Communists took to the jungles and organized the Malayan People's anti-Japanese Army (MPAJA). When the war was over, the guerrillas emerged as heroes. They put in a strong bid for national power. They lost, but not before they had permeated the peninsula with front organizations like the ex-Service Comrades Association and the New Democratic Youth League. They produced no outstanding individual leader, nor did they apparently rely on imported Russian or Chinese agents.

In the face of British and Kuomintang opposition, the Malayan Communist Party lost prestige progressively until 1948. Then it re-established the MPAJA, set up jungle camps, and em-

barked on armed revolt. It launched a campaign of arson, strikes, and murder. It preyed on Kuomintang members among shopkeepers, school teachers, and labor foremen. Its victims also included European managers of rubber estates and tin mines.

The Central Executive Committee of the Malayan Communist Party issues directives to these guerrillas, who now call themselves the "National Liberation Army." The hard core of the army wears distinctive uniforms and issues its own propaganda. It is strictly regimented. It is assisted by a civilian underground which feeds and supplies the troops and provides shelter and intelligence. It could not continue without the active support of 300,000 squatters, or Chinese smallholders or plantation workers, who follow out the orders of the Communists in fear of their lives. This army is holding out against 18,000 regular troops, 70,000 police, and several squadrons of the Royal Air Force. It keeps constant pressure on British authorities. No one but insurgents travels or ventures outside after dusk. Every rubber estate is a virtual fortress, with barbed-wire entanglements, trenches, and floodlights. Passenger cars must be made of bullet-proof steel.

It took quite a time for the British to do something about the terrorists. They brought in more troops and supplies. They raided the camps, arrested and deported ringleaders, and undertook to remove squatters to resettlement areas. They gave displaced squatters (about 20,000 to date; they need more land and more money) adequate police protection against Communist blackmail.

Most important, the British struck at the roots of Communist strength. They imported trade union leaders from England to work against the Communist domination. They broke strikes without giving quarter, and they increased

their welfare activities among the Chinese. They scrapped their anti-Chinese misgivings because of the need for Chinese assistance. Most Chinese hesitated to commit themselves to a side which might lose eventually. But Tan Cheng Lock organized a Malayan Chinese Association with a slogan of "one country, one people, one government." He convinced many of his compatriots that the grievances against the British were meager compared to the dangers from the terrorists. He urged them to forget their resentment of British pro-Malay policies and to remember the blessings of low taxes, sanctity of contracts, and an ever rising level of living.

The Chinese businessmen never did like the Communists, but they could not afford to be caught short. Neither could they avoid a certain pride in the successes of Mao's Communist armies. Tan Kah Kee, a super-wealthy honorary justice of the peace in Singapore, agreed to accept an appointment to the People's Political Consultative Council in Peking. But progress of the British against the terrorists cooled the budding pro-Communist ardor. Aw Boon Haw, the Tiger Balm King, dismissed the slightly pro-Communist editor of his Singapore paper when the Communists seized his factory in Canton.

The Chinese blow hot, blow cold. Now anti-Communism is gaining. Coolness to Mao increases with the continuing slaughter of Chinese in Korea, evidences of entanglement with the Soviet Union, forced sale of Communist bonds, and deteriorating conditions on the Chinese mainland. The Straits Chinese British Association expressed a commonly felt sentiment in approving the closure of pro-Communist newspapers and in condemning the hasty recognition of the Peking regime by the British government. The Kuomintang retains a certain amount of prestige, but the Chinese have little use for

Chiang Kai-shek. But any interest in politics, whether local or in the homeland, is secondary to the fundamental fascination of making profits.

IN INDONESIA

Chinese are scattered throughout the length and breadth of the vast archipelago of Indonesia, but they are concentrated in urban centers. They are second to the Dutch in the large plantation, petroleum, and mining enterprises which call for large investments of capital, but they predominate in the occupations which put a premium on individual skills and small-scale operations.

Seventy per cent of the Chinese in Indonesia are native-born (Peranakans) and 30 per cent are immigrants (Totoks). These groups have completely different outlooks on life. The Peranakans are often more "native" than the Indonesians. They speak Malay or Dutch at home, they are illiterate in Chinese, their children get jobs as clerks or professional workers, and they are interested in Indonesian politics and Indonesian schools. They prefer to wait and see with regard to Mao Tse-tung. They do not like the idea of working twelve or fourteen hours per day as the Totoks do.

In the past, the Indonesians have never felt kindly towards the Chinese. The Chinese assented too easily to the Dutch, and they used their business acumen to the detriment of the Indonesians. In the memory of living man, Mr. Victor Purcell points out, the Chinese in Indonesia have appealed successfully to the protection of six foreign flags: three Chinese, Dutch, Japanese, and Australian. Immediately after World War II, bloody anti-Chinese uprisings marred the birth of the new Indonesian political regime. Resentment still smolders on both sides. It is aggravated by the knowledge that the Chinese have manipulated the black

market and that they alone have prospered while others have suffered during the recent disturbances.

Chinese Communists are making steady gains. No one knows certainly whether there are formal branches of the Chinese Communist Party in Indonesia. It makes little difference, because of very active front organizations, close co-operation with the Indonesian Communist Party, and active leadership by the Chinese Embassy. As in the case of Burma, Indonesia recognizes the Peking regime. The embassy staff devotes more of its time to direct action, to currying the favor of the trade unions, and to speeches against the United States than to the ordinary functions of diplomacy.

The local Chinese press is diverse and vigorous. It presents every point of view from the straight party line to the rabid pro-Kuomintang. The Chinese schools are gaining in enrollment and prestige since the decline of the Dutch. Most teachers are "China-born, young, and pro-Peking." The Chinese associations are split wide open, with the Communists gaining in strength and influence. Their successes have prompted the Indonesian government to pay much closer attention to Chinese affairs, to curb remittances to China, and to restrict immigration practically to the vanishing point.

The Indonesian situation underscores two dilemmas for Mao Tse-tung. How can he reconcile his advertised championship of national rights with the interests of the local Chinese? It is paradoxical for him to placate and encourage the national Indonesian government, while at the same time his propaganda machine castigates that government for its persecution of Chinese. As long as Western interests are vulnerable to attack, it would probably be gratuitous for Mao to denounce wealthy overseas Chinese as the capitalist exploiters of Asian peo-

ples. Mao has also the dilemma of reconciling his own national interests with those of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Mao's interest is in an economically prosperous Far East area; the interest of the U.S.S.R. is in the economic strangulation of any area which is of potential value to the United Nations.

IN THE PHILIPPINES

In the Philippines, when one thinks of the Chinese his first thought is likely to go back to the Chinese Consul General, Kuangson Young, and his staff who lost their lives when the Japanese were occupying Manila. Next, he is likely to think of the Chinese Red Cross, the Chinese Chamber of Commerce, or great institutions like the Chinese Banking Corporation or the Bank of Communications. Finally his attention will focus on distinguished gentlemen like the Sy Cip brothers, or just plain thousands of Chinese who seem to run everything from the hardware stores in Manila to the tiny *tiendas* in the lush countryside. The rural economy of the Philippines would collapse if the Chinese were eliminated from business. A surprising number of the wealthy and most prominent "Filipino" families (some prominent also in the political oligarchy) were originally founded by Chinese businessmen. The Chinese position in business and industry is second only to that of the Americans.

Anti-Chinese measures have been political footballs. The Chinese have been obliged to pay sizable registration fees and to keep business books in non-Chinese languages. They have been discriminated against in the trades, have been legally prevented from landholding even for residential purposes, and have been subjected to a legal but rigorous restriction of immigration. As elsewhere, the intensity of the law has been matched by the cost and the ingenuity

of the evasion. The Chinese, particularly the second-generation Chinese, are completely Filipino in outlook and have every desire to be incorporated into the political life of the islands. In the words of one Chinese:

They [the Chinese] meet their obligations to the Government and to society; they help build the country and develop its resources; extend the nation's commerce and strengthen its finances and economy. That is so because they are a part of the population, despite the difference in the pigmentation of their skin. Under that skin, the Chinese possess all the intrinsic characteristics of mankind. We appeal to the Filipino people for justice, equality and fraternity.

The Chinese Communists have made little headway in the Philippines. They were active temporarily right after the liberation, and it is probable that Luis Taruc has Chinese Communist assistance in the direction and operations of the Hukbalahaps. The Communists are completely underground, without even active front organizations (possibly because of the vigilance of the Un-Filipino Activities Committee). The Chinese schools steer clear of Communist-Kuomintang arguments. The press, which is free, independent, and "neutral," is strongly pro-Kuomintang, and highly critical of the Communists and the Peking regime. Perhaps Chiang Kai-shek's strongest overseas support comes from the Chinese in the Philippines.

This is easily accounted for by the make-up of the Chinese community, the nature of Philippine internal politics, and the relations of the Philippines with the United States and the United Nations. Largely because they are successful businessmen and because their own prosperity is so intertwined with that of the United States, leaders among the Chinese in the Philippines oppose Communism genuinely and bitterly. They make common cause with Americans

and Filipinos who are themselves rigidly anti-Communist at home and abroad.

PEKING POLICIES

Mao Tse-tung is aggressively dedicated to the protection and promotion of the legitimate rights and interests of Chinese residing abroad. He is likewise dedicated to the "impending extinction of the rotten capitalist world." On August 25, 1936, he said:

The day will come when 450,000,000 Chinese people will proudly raise the banner of the final victory of the national revolution in the East and will stretch forth a hand to all liberated people including the Japanese people who will throw off their imperialist yoke, in order to make the whole world beautiful and shining in the light of the new peace.

Mao realizes that ideologies are unimportant in the practical struggle for power—much less important than personalities or nationalism or disillusionment with the Kuomintang or desire for protection—but they do contain inner satisfaction for those who seek subjective explanation of the appeal of Communism to peoples in southeastern Asia.

The social, political, and economic underdevelopment of southern Asia invites change. The old social order is gone—kings, priests, rulers, and families. Its place will be taken by adaptations of democratic capitalism, state socialism, or communism. Communists have a head start because of the shortcomings of the old regime, the brashness of the Communist leaders, their readiness to use force (which is a heritage of their anti-Japanese guerrilla days), the inspiration of the alleged successes in China, and the ready-made ideological background.

SOVIET INFLUENCE

Lenin charted the basic objectives of the revolution in Asia. He advised concentration on anti-imperialism rather than on the class struggle and reliance

upon force. In *Rights of Toiling and Exploited Peoples*, January 1918, he wrote:

Wrest mankind from the clutch of finance capitalism and imperialism . . . break with the barbarous policy of bourgeois civilization, which has built the well-being of the exploiters of a few chosen nations on the enslavement of hundreds of millions of toiling people in Asia, in the colonies in general, and in the small countries.

Long contacts existed between the Comintern and French Indochina, Indonesia, and Malaya. From French Indochina alone, thirty-four revolutionists were trained in the Lenin school in Moscow in the period 1925 to 1934. The Comintern organized the Far Eastern Bureau at Shanghai, the Pan Pacific Trade Union, and the League against Imperialism for its own purposes. It sought to indoctrinate the "Oriental proletariat," particularly the trade unions, in Communist ideology. It relied upon underground procedures and counted upon nascent nationalism and indigenous poverty to provide the impetus for its success. It propagandized against foreign capitalism and imperialism, and for agrarian reform, planned industrialization (Soviet style), and economic equality. Before Stalin's accession to power there were constant rifts in Comintern doctrine, as, for example, over the role of the national bourgeoisie, the united front, the position of the Soviet Union in Eastern revolutions, the role of the peasants, and the treatment of religious convictions.

Subsequent Stalinist influence called for the recognition of the U.S.S.R. as the leader in the dictatorship of the proletariat and as the symbol of emancipation for the oppressed nationalities. Since theory "becomes immaterial if it is not connected with revolutionary practice," Stalin advised rigid adherence to long-range strategy, but maximum

flexibility in tactics. Manuilsky predicted that China would become a magnet for the whole Far East and that revolutionary China in alliance with the U.S.S.R. would become the greatest factor in world politics in the Far East. Mao Tse-tung's contributions to theory included emphasis on nationalism and a definition of the New Democracy. He wrote: "A Chinese Communist is a part of this great nation with the closest of blood ties. For such a Communist to talk of Marxism as removed from all national characteristics is merely empty abstraction."³ His *New Democracy* speaks lightly about the class struggle, emphasizes the importance of the peasants, and contains provision for the retention of the private capitalists, which is not unnoticed by the Chinese overseas.

The national policies of the U.S.S.R. in connection with the spread of Communism in southeastern Asia betray a realistic appraisal of the situation. They have everything to gain by giving Mao Tse-tung the initiative, offering him support and praise, but refraining from any apparent exercise of control. The Russians are wise to remain in the background and to avoid the appearance of a new imperialism. Even the commercial representatives are unostentatious, and feign an indifference to local Communist activities. It seems fair to suggest that they would not hesitate to sacrifice local—and perhaps even Chinese Communist—organizations for the accomplishment of their world objectives of weakening the United States and western Europe. Russian objectives and Chinese objectives are occasionally identical; they could conceivably clash.

CHINESE EXPANSION

The successes of the Communists in China cannot but influence the overseas Chinese, "with their wonderful flair for survival," to cast in their lot with the

³ *New Stage* (1938), p. 74.

winning side. Red China is the "sullen enigma—the brooding, ominous giant" that looms over the Asian rimlands and now shapes the destiny of the Orient. Historic drives underlie the expansion of China's Communism. Chinese in a certain sense have always been imperialists. Confucius spoke of the Great Unity. Chiang Kai-shek wrote in *China's Destiny* that "the frontiers of China lie in Tibet," and Chinese of all shades of opinion have approved the venture into Tibet. Mao can rely upon traditions which date from the Han Empire of two thousand years ago.

The Chinese regard themselves as the leaders of Communism throughout Asia. In December 1949, at the Asian Trade Unions Congress in Peking, Liu Shao-ch'i said, "We bear a special responsibility towards the colonial and semi-colonial countries of Asia and Australia." A more sanguine spokesman declared, "China's armies will continue their victorious march to Singapore."

ATTENTION AND PROPAGANDA

A national Commission on Overseas Chinese Affairs, which includes prominent southeast Asians, has been formed in Peking. In Fukien and Kwangtung, other agencies have been set up for special services and assistance to overseas Chinese and their families in the provinces. Local associations of returned overseas Chinese provide an excuse and a place for good fellowship and a center for propaganda. The Peking government encourages student exchanges, facilitates procedures for making remittances, grants tax-free privileges on articles brought in from overseas, and appeals for contributions and investments in China's homeland industries. On one occasion it ordered an investigating commission to investigate the atrocities to and brutal murders of Chinese in Malaya (!) and declared that it had "noted

imperialist brutality in Malaya and [would] not forget it."

Chinese Communist propaganda promises protection for Chinese capitalists and help for overseas Chinese in their struggles against the imperialist persecutors. Typical assertions are: "American war hysteria will expose you to even worse treatment than you are receiving in Malaya"; "for years Thailand has been a veritable hell for the Chinese people"; and "the annals of the struggles of the overseas Chinese may be considered to be written in blood."

Propaganda themes—broadcast by radio or circulated by the New China News Agency—emphasize common Chinese patriotism and the necessity for strong diplomatic and economic support from Peking. They blast all the southeastern Asian governments and say that foreign imperial capital investments are against the best interests of the Chinese. Their particular targets are the capitalist monopolies, the native capitalists (the usurers and the compradors who co-operate with the imperialists), military bases and military aid, low living levels, illiteracy, discrimination in government policies, and agrarian discontent. They use simple but charged words—

persecution, exploitation, oppression, pauperization, enslavement—and they usually indulge in some sentimentality for their brethren overseas.

In its editorial of January 5, 1951, the *New York Times* called this Chinese racism an echo of Hitlerism: "The Fuehrer wept many a crocodile tear over the trials and tribulations of Germans abroad. He organized powerful fifth columns among them and then rescued them from their supposedly dire fate."

OUR OPPORTUNITY

The current tactics of the Chinese Communist government pay only as they are opposed by inferior force, unclear thinking, or lack of conviction on the part of ourselves and our allies. The overseas Chinese have grievances, but they can be cured; they have hopes, and they can be fulfilled. There is no weapon in the Communist arsenal that is not available to us. The overseas Chinese are fence-sitting because they must look out for their own welfare. They may favor Peking, but they resist its Communist ideology. If we will exert the effort, we can keep them as vital and valuable cogs in the political and economic machinery of the free world.

Claude A. Buss, Ph.D., Stanford, California, is professor of history at Stanford University. He formerly taught at the University of Southern California following several years in China in the Foreign Service of the United States. He was executive assistant to the High Commissioner to the Philippines when the Japanese entered Manila in 1941. He has traveled widely in the postwar Far East and is currently engaged in field research in southeastern Asia. His numerous writings on Far Eastern subjects include War and Diplomacy in Eastern Asia (1941).