

9 CHO Chinese Overseas

# Networks beyond Empires

Chinese Business and Nationalism  
in the Hong Kong-Singapore Corridor, 1914-1941



Huei-Ying Kuo

BRILL

## Networks beyond Empires

# Chinese Overseas

HISTORY, LITERATURE, AND SOCIETY

*Chief Editor*

Wang Gungwu

*Subject Editors*

Evelyn Hu-DeHart, David Der-wei Wang, Wong Siu-lun

*Editorial Board*

Ien Ang, Shirley Geok-lin Lim, Liu Hong, Frank Pieke,  
Elizabeth Sinn, Jing Tsu

VOLUME 9

The titles published in this series are listed at [brill.com/cho](http://brill.com/cho)

# Networks beyond Empires

*Chinese Business and Nationalism in the  
Hong Kong-Singapore Corridor, 1914–1941*

By

Huei-Ying Kuo



BRILL

LEIDEN | BOSTON

*Cover Illustration:* Paul Yap (source), courtesy of the National Archives of Singapore. Street scene of South Bridge Road at the junction with North Canal Road, Singapore, 1925. On the center-left of the photo is the sales department of Tan Kah Kee & Co. The wall advertisement on the upper right is about sales of Shanghai textiles and silk as well as remittance service for Guangdong-Guangxi silver dollars of Fook On Company.

Kuo, Huei-Ying.

Networks beyond empires : Chinese business and nationalism in the Hong Kong-Singapore corridor, 1914–1941 / by Huei-Ying Kuo.

pages cm. — (Chinese overseas : history, literature, and society ; volume 9)

Includes bibliographical references and index.

ISBN 978-90-04-28108-0 (hardback : acid-free paper) — ISBN 978-90-04-28109-7 (e-book) 1. Business enterprises—China—Hong Kong—History—20th century. 2. Business enterprises—Singapore—History—20th century. 3. Chinese—China—Hong Kong—History—20th century. 4. Chinese—Singapore—History—20th century. 5. Merchants—China—Hong Kong—History—20th century. 6. Merchants—Singapore—Hong Kong—History—20th century. 7. Business networks—History—20th century. 8. Nationalism—Economic aspects—History—20th century. 9. Hong Kong (China)—Economic conditions—20th century. 10. Singapore—Economic conditions—20th century. I. Title.

HD2913.K86 2014

338.8'895109041—dc23

2014024425

This publication has been typeset in the multilingual 'Brill' typeface. With over 5,100 characters covering Latin, IPA, Greek, and Cyrillic, this typeface is especially suitable for use in the humanities. For more information, please see [brill.com/brill-typeface](http://brill.com/brill-typeface).

ISSN 1876-3847

ISBN 978-90-04-28108-0 (hardback)

ISBN 978-90-04-28109-7 (e-book)

Copyright 2014 by Koninklijke Brill nv, Leiden, The Netherlands.

Koninklijke Brill nv incorporates the imprints Brill, Brill Nijhoff, Global Oriental and Hotei Publishing.

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, translated, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior written permission from the publisher.

Authorization to photocopy items for internal or personal use is granted by Koninklijke Brill nv provided that the appropriate fees are paid directly to The Copyright Clearance Center, 222 Rosewood Drive, Suite 910, Danvers, MA 01923, USA. Fees are subject to change.

This book is printed on acid-free paper.

# Contents

Acknowledgements	vii
List of Figures and Maps	xi
List of Tables	xiii

Introduction	1
--------------	---

1 The Making of Chinese Overseas in the South Seas in Longue Durée	25
2 Chinese Overseas Bourgeoisie in the Emerging Anti-imperialist Nationalism	82
3 The Patriotic 1930s: Chinese Overseas Bourgeoisie in Nationalist Wings	130
4 Rescuing Businesses through Transnationalism	166
5 Whose National Interests? Selling Chinese Goods along the Hong Kong–Singapore Corridor	205
6 United Chinese Identity among Divided Homeland Ties	250
Conclusion	285
Bibliography	299
Index	328



## Acknowledgements

The completion of the book, which developed from my Ph.D. thesis at the Department of Sociology at State University of New York at Binghamton, cannot be possible without the support of many colleagues, friends, and family members. Above all, I have to thank the generous support of my mentors, as well as the networks of scholars that they introduced to me. Professor Mark Selden inspires my research from the years when I was a graduate student to the moment when the book was about to come out. Mark's work ethics have set up a high standard of being a dedicated teacher and a critical intellectual with great integrity. My interest in archival research started from taking Mark's courses. To motivate his students to regularly check the rich resources at the Olin Library of Cornell University, Mark would provide refreshments at his home in Ithaca to treat us after our library work. Our first visit was in the early autumn, when leaves just turned red but chilly winds have not reached the gorges of the Great Lakes area. Even today, I would somehow associate the squeaking noise from rolling microfilms with the crispy sounds of biting fresh apples and sipping apple cider. For many years, even after I graduated from Binghamton, Mark never fails to provide guidance to me. The feedbacks that he gave me on all my research ideas—from a paragraph of some very rough thoughts to a chapter of the book manuscript—are like a compass that guided my navigation in the academic ocean.

With Mark's introduction, I was able to visit the Centre of Asian Study at the University of Hong Kong between 2002 and 2003, where I benefited from the exchanges with Professors Elizabeth Sinn, Wong Siu-lun, James K. Chin, and Lee Pui-tak. Ms. Louise Mak provided me the essential administrative support for my stay in Hong Kong. Also through the recommendation of Mark, I got the opportunity to teach at the Division of Social Science at the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology in spring 2004, where I had great conversation with Alvin Y. So about textile industry in the Pearl River Delta in the early twentieth-century.

From my Binghamton time till today, Professor Dale W. Tomich keeps encouraging me to think broad and wide. Through him, I learn the importance of being both a tough teacher and a reliable friend with students. I was fortunate to take the last graduate seminar of the late Giovanni Arrighi in Binghamton, when his research interest turned to East Asia. Without the introduction of Professor Frederic Deyo, I would not have the privilege to participate in the seminars and workshops organized by the Southeast Asian Research Centre of City University of Hong Kong between 2003 and 2004. It was the

time when Professors Kevin Hewison and Vivienne Wee were initiating a series of cutting-edge research projects over there.

As my Binghamton years constituted the foundation of my scholarship, I have to acknowledge the inspiration from my supervisor of master thesis at National Taiwan University, Professor Ka Chih-ming. It was Ka who firstly showed me the way to study in Binghamton, his alma mater. Like Mark, Ka's advices guided me throughout the beginning to the end of the book project. In the years of my sojourning life after Binghamton, my home visit to Taiwan would not have been complete without paying a visit to Ka at the Academia Sinica. Each time I would get to learn more about his new research findings on Taiwan's development, amidst the rich aroma of Alishan tea that he brewed for his guests.

The other Binghamton alumnus who inspired this research is Po-Keung Hui. When I started to write my area paper of maritime China in Binghamton, both Mark and Giovanni recommended me to read Hui's doctoral thesis. I thus understand the importance of thinking Chinese overseas migration through the development of historical capitalism. I also benefited from Hui, albeit beyond his original plan, from his encouraging his younger peers at the Chinese University of Hong Kong to study in Binghamton. Among them, Hung Ho-fung embarked on the journey to the southern tier of Upstate New York in the same year as me. In the tri-city where Chenango River and Susquehnan River confluences, Ho-fung and I took several classes and attended different activities together. In one cold winter, when I was working on my very first paper on Hokkien business networks for the Princeton-Northwestern Junior Scholars' Workshop on Embedded Enterprise in Comparative Perspective, he drove me to Olin Library every day. To make the best use of our time, we left Binghamton at the dawn of the day before the sun rose, and returned from Ithaca at the twilight when the library closed. In our trips, Christmas lights illuminated the farmhouses, barns, and townships along the road. Ho-fung soon joined me for my home visits in Taiwan and meetings with Ka. In addition, Carina Bandhauer, Iris Huang, Tu Hyunh, Endo Masako, John Antonavich, Huang Yuling, and Young-Sun Kim, are also important friends from the Binghamton time.

I am grateful for the staffs and librarians at the Olin Library of Cornell University, Library of Congress at Washington DC, National Archives of Singapore, Hong Kong Public Record Office, Academia Historica, Taipei (Taipei Guoshi Guan), and the Second Historical Archives, Nanjing, the Hong Kong Collection and Fung Pin Shan Library at the University of Hong Kong, the Chinese Overseas Collection at the Library of the Chinese University of Hong Kong, the Chinese Library and the Singapore/Malaysian Collection at the Central Library of the National University of Singapore, as well as the archival

office of the Institute of Taiwan History and the Institute of Modern History at the Academia Sinica, Taipei, for their professional assistance.

Fellowships and grants from various sources were essential to my research trips and writing. They included Dissertation Year Fellowship at the SUNY-Binghamton, Awards of the Binghamton Foundation/Graduate School Travel Fund, the fellowship for Doctoral Candidates in the Humanities and Social Sciences at Academia Sinica, Taipei, Taiwan, Small Grant Program of the China and Inner Asian Council of the Association for Asian Studies, the Social Science History Association-Rockefeller Graduate Student Award, and Student Grant from the Urban China Research Network, SUNY-Albany. The Outstanding Scholar Award of Humanities and Social Sciences at the Rose-Hulman Institute of Technology sponsored my trip to Singapore in June 2010. The Social Science Research Council (SSRC) Postdoctoral Fellowship for Transregional Research: Inter-Asian Contexts and Connections sponsored my research trips to Nanjing, Hong Kong, and Taipei in the summer of 2012 and the teaching relief in fall 2012.

Thanks to all my old colleagues at the Department of Humanities and Social Sciences at Rose-Hulman Institute of Technology, including Maki Horitani, Scott Clark, Mary Miller Moon, Terrence Cassey, Caroline Carvill, Rebecca Dyer, Gustavo Garcia, Samuel Martland, Kevin Christ, John Gardner, Heidemarie Heeter, Richard House, Jong Hun Kim, Michael Kukral, Hans Lugenbielt, Steve Letsinger, Jessica Livingston, Andreas Michel, Mark Minster, Susan Smith, Corey Taylor, Annelisse Watt, and Julia Williams, for the friendship and support. When the subprime financial crisis hit the US economy and led to the rise of pragmatic thoughts, I was lucky to work with a team of idealist thinkers and educators. Together we consolidated our tenet to commit to liberal arts education in the highly commercialized world.

At Johns Hopkins University, the administrative staffs including Jessie Albee, Nancy Foltz, Nina Agopian, Linda Burkhardt and Terri Thomas, assisted me with the miscellaneous things that made the teaching and research at the new job easier. Kellee Tsai, Joel Andreas, Erin Aeron Chung and Tyree Powell from the East Asian Studies Program; Beverly Silver, Karl Alexander and Hao Lingxin from the Department of Sociology created a collegial environment. Rosemary Constance copy-edited my dissertation while Amy VanStee copy-edited the book manuscript.

At various conferences, workshops and seminars, I greatly benefited from the exchanges with Syed Muhd Khairudin Aljunied, Morris Bian, Peter Bol, John Chaffee, Cheng Yinghong, Chiu Peng-sheng, Chu Hong-yuan, Robert Culp, W. A. Demel, Leo Douw, Du Yongtao, Phillip Guingona, Derek Heng, Evelyn Hu-Dehart, Kang Jing-A, David Kenley, Rotem Kowner, Jeff

Kyong-McClain, Claire Seung-eun Lee, Lee Pui-tak, Lee Ying-hui, Lien Pei-te, Jason Lim, Lin Man-houng, Lu Xun, Murray Rubinstein, Leander Seah, Tan Chee Seng, Jeremy Taylor, Albert Tzeng, and Zhao Suisheng. It was my honor to present the first draft of the manuscript at the workshop for the first cycle recipients of the SSRC Postdoctoral Fellowship for Transregional Research in San Diego in spring 2013. Feedbacks from Professors Prasenjit Duara, Engseng Ho and Stefan Tanaka greatly helped me illuminate my arguments. All mistakes are mine.

The Oxford University Press generously allows me to use some data that have appeared in the article, "Rescuing Businesses through Transnationalism: Embedded Chinese Enterprise and Nationalist Activities in Singapore in the 1930s Great Depression," *Enterprise and Society: International Journal of Business History*, vol. Vol. 7, No. 1 (March 2006), 98–127. The Amsterdam University Press grants me the permission to reuse the data published in Chapter 6 of the edited volume, *Singapore in Global History* (edited by Heng and Aljunied, 2011), 111–134. I acknowledge the invitation from Brill's acquisition editor Ms. Qin Higley, who cited the kind words from Dr. Wang Gungwu about my dissertation, so I could have the confidence to further develop the thesis into the book. I also thank the assistant editor Mr. Thomas Begley and the production editor Paige Sammartino, for their patience and professional work. I thank the Asia Research Institute of the National University of Singapore for hosting my stay during the final stages of preparing the manuscript.

Last but not least, I am grateful to all my family members: I thank my parents, Kuo Yi-Shyong and Kuo Yang Su-Jen, for their unconditional love and trust. Although we no longer live in the same city, they never hesitate to offer their help or even just to come to be with me anytime and anywhere I need them. My sister Gwen Anes Kuo, an art curator, shows me the joy of enriching life through art and literature. Without my brother Kuo Wei-Chou, an investment consultant, for his being close with the family, I could not have the peace of mind to live and work outside Taiwan. My parents-in-law Hung Wing Kong and Wong Yuk Lan appreciate whatever I do simply because they trust me. My sister-in-law Hung Ching Yee takes most responsibilities to take care of my in-laws, for which I find no way to return her kindness. From the time when we were classmates, Ho-fung has shown me his wits and humor. And I am fortunate to know that the intelligent friend turns out to be an ideal teammate in parenting. The curious eyes and bright smiles of Henry and Helia are the best rewards for all those exhausted days. When the kids are old enough to read this book, I hope they can learn the importance of forging their own identity beyond the dictation of any authority, like the many Chinese overseas mentioned in the book, and like what my parents have exemplified to me, in their pride of sticking to their southern Taiwanese heritage, even in the years when Mandarinization was the norm. This book is dedicated to them.

# List of Figures and Maps

## FIGURE CAPTION

- |     |   |     |
|-----|---|-----|
| 2.1 | View from the Peak Looking East across the Mid-Levels, Causeway Bay and North Point, Hong Kong, 1924  | 120 |
| 2.2 | Lim Boon Keng, Teo Eng Hock, and Supporters of Sun's Second Revolution at Lim's Garden in Singapore, January 1914   | 123 |
| 3.1 | Advertisement for the "Tanaka Memorial" Brochure  | 138 |
| 3.2 | Tiger Trademarks<br>(1) Eng Aun Tong Company from Burma<br>(2) Tan Kah Kee & Co., Singapore<br>(3) Messrs. Hodgson & Simpson Co. Ltd. from Liverpool, England<br>(4) Lam Tong Kongsi from Penang<br>(5) Industrial Manufacturing Company, Singapore | 142 |
| 3.3 | The Nineteenth Route Army as Trademark of the Nanyang Brothers' Tobacco Company in Spring 1932  | 155 |
| 4.1 | Bell Trademark of the Tan Kah Kee & Co.   | 170 |
| 4.2 | Pineapple Trademark of the Tan Kah Kee & Co.  | 170 |
| 4.3 | Teo Eng Hock's Patent on a Rubber Vaccination Shield  | 171 |
| 4.4 | Trademark of Lim Kim Thye Tea Chop  | 184 |
| 4.5 | Advertisement of the Wei Sun Knitting Factory   | 202 |
| 5.1 | Application Form for the Certificate of Chinese National Goods, 1928  | 209 |
| 5.2 | Advertisement of Tan Kah Kee & Company, 1930  | 213 |
| 5.3 | Advertisement of Hong Kong Match Factory  | 217 |
| 5.4 | Trademark of the Lee Kung Ming Knitting Factory, Hong Kong, 1940  | 225 |
| 5.5 | Advertisement of the Sam Kwong Weaving Factory, Ltd., in Singapore, 1937  | 231 |
| 5.6 | Changes of Yearly Percentages of Japan's Export to Hong Kong and the Straits Settlements between 1927 and 1939 (with the Percentage of 1927 as the Base Year)   | 231 |
| 5.7 | Silk Stores on High Street, Singapore (circa 1924–1930)   | 237 |
| 5.8 | Japanese Business Streets, Hong Kong, late 1930s  | 243 |
| 6.1 | Houses of Mid-Levels, Hong Kong, 1937   | 255 |

<b>MAP</b>	<b>CAPTION</b>
1.1	Native-Places of Major Chinese Speech-Groups in the South Seas 36
1.2	Distribution of Speech-Groups Among the Chinese in the South Seas 41
2.1	Japan's Shipping Routes to the South Seas, 1916 94

# List of Tables

TABLE	CAPTION	
1.1	The Distribution of Chinese Speech-Groups in the South Seas	40
1.2	Chinese Population in Singapore in British Censuses	43
1.3	Members of the Chinese Advisory Board, Singapore, between 1921 and 1941	45
1.4	Major Chinese Speech-Groups in Hong Kong, 1911–1931, an Estimate	49
1.5	Chairpersons of the Singapore Chinese Chamber of Commerce, 1906–1940	60
1.6	Major Speech-Groups Represented in the SCCC Board of Directors	64
1.7	Major Officers of the Chinese General Chamber of Commerce, Hong Kong, 1919–1941	72
1.8	Chinese Justices of the Peace in 1922, Hong Kong	76
1.9	Tung Wah Hospital Positions Held by Leaders in the CGCCHK, 1913–1941	79
2.1	Expenses for Relieving the Rice Shortage in Hong Kong, 1919	92
3.1	Major Officers of the 1928 Shandong Relief Fund and Their Backgrounds	134
3.2	Major Leaders in the 1937 CGCCHK National Salvation Fund-raising Campaign (September 1937–May 1938)	159
4.1	Singapore Population, 1911, 1921, 1931, and 1947, by Ethnic Group and Birthplace	176
4.2	Imports of Rubber-soled Canvas Shoes and Other Rubber-made Shoes to British Malaya by Countries of Origin	177
4.3	Estimation of Retail Prices of Rubber-soled Canvas Shoes by Production Areas, 1931	178
4.4	Imports of Cotton Piece Goods from Britain and Japan to British Malaya, 1919–1931	181
4.5	Average Export Prices of Cotton Piece Goods from Japan to Singapore	182
4.6	Hong Kong's Import-Export Trade, 1921–1939	188
4.7	Chinese Compradors in CGCCHK, 1913–1941	191
4.8	Nam Pak Hong Merchants in Hong Kong, 1922	193

4.9	Kam Shan Chong Merchants Who Were Members of the CGCCHK, 1927	195
5.1	Commodities Displayed by Hong Kong and Singapore Firms in the sccc's First Grant Exhibition of Chinese National Products in 1935	220
5.2	Indexes of Taiwan's Baozhong Tea Exported to the South Seas and to the British Malaya, 1927-1934	228
5.3	The Economic Effectiveness of Chinese Boycotts of Japanese Piece Goods in Singapore, 1932	234
5.4	Textile Wholesalers and Retailers for Japanese Cotton Cloth, Sarong, Rayon in Singapore, 1933	236
5.5	Impact of the 1934 Importation of Textiles (Quota) Ordinance (Including Cotton and Silk Textiles) in British Malaya	239
5.6	Monthly Exports of Japanese Cotton Underwear to Singapore, 1936-1937	241
5.7	Imports of Japanese and Chinese Textiles in British Malaya in 1938 and 1939	242
5.8	Imports of Piece Goods and Textiles to Hong Kong by Country, 1932-1940	243
5.9	Hong Kong Textile Exports to the U.K. and British Malaya	247
5.10	Exports of Hong Kong Clothing Apparel by Destination, 1932-1940	248
6.1	Overseas Chinese Investments in Fujian and Guangdong, 1860s-1940s	257
6.2	Overseas Investment in the Real Estate Industry in Major Cities in Fujian and Guangdong, by Native Places of Speech Groups	258

# Introduction

Yesterday, some Min 閩 and Chao 潮 people banded together to smash all stores that carried Japanese goods. Today, the Yue 粵 sojourners claimed that most of those stores being devastated all belonged to them. The Yue people thus believed that the rioters were taking advantage of the event [the anti-Japanese boycotts] to serve their own interests. The Yue people thus planned to destroy the rickshaws that the Min people pulled. . . .

To be sure, those pulling rickshaws were northern Min, but those smashed stores yesterday belonged to the other group. It would not make sense to punish the Fuqing 福清 for the troubles that the other group created. . . .

—*LAT PAU* 叻報<sup>1</sup>



The above announcement was posted in an editorial column of the Chinese newspaper *Lat Pau*. Its title, “Yue people, please do not confuse,” mocked the way that Chinese anti-Japanese protests in Singapore in the aftermath of the May Fourth Movement were conducted. Yue, Chao and Min are three leading Chinese speech-groups in Singapore. The unrest they generated stormed the local social and economic order between June 18 and 20, 1919.

What triggered the wave of anti-Japanese movements in spring 1919 was Beijing’s failing to reclaim the Chinese sovereignty over Qingdao, Shandong. Beginning in 1898, Qingdao became a German concession, with the pretext of a Chinese attack on Christian missionaries. After the outbreak of World War I, in November 1914, Japan, with British support under the agreement of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance (1902–1923), expelled German powers in East Asia, including Qingdao, Shandong, as well as the Micronesians in the southern Pacific. Beginning in spring 1915, Japan began to urge Beijing to transfer the prewar German rights to Japan. The requests that Japan proposed, known as the “Twenty-One Demands,” referred to not only the Qingdao issue but also the interests in Southern Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia. Beijing yielded on May 9, 1915, and Chinese nationalists viewed the decision as a national humiliation. Anti-Japanese movements ensued, but when the Beijing government joined the Alliance in World War I, in 1917, Chinese nationalists began to expect that, with the victory of the war, China could seek international support

---

1 *Lat Pau* (Singapore): June 21, 1919.

to recover its sovereignty claim over Qingdao. Soon this high hope vanished, when the news of China's diplomatic failure in the Paris Peace Conference reached Beijing on May 4, 1919, Chinese intellectuals, workers, and shopkeepers in major cities around the country took to the streets to protest both the Beijing government and Japan.<sup>2</sup>

The protests in Singapore, as *Lat Pau's* column revealed, developed into fights between the Min and Yue people. The Yue people, or the Cantonese from the core of Guangdong province, tried to take revenge on the "other group," or the Min, the Fujian people, who had raided their stores and destroyed their goods made in Japan. The Cantonese were, however, confused by the distinction among different speech-groups from Fujian: those who were responsible for the raids were the Hokkien, or the southern Min people from Fujian's coast. The Hokkien allied with the Chao, or the Teochew people from eastern Guangdong, to punish the Cantonese for using and selling Japanese goods. The Cantonese, however, reacted by attacking the Hokchia (Fuqing) from northern Fujian. The latter constituted the majority of rickshaw pullers in Singapore.<sup>3</sup>

The delicate differences among Chinese speech-groups confused not only the Cantonese but also many British colonial administrators in Malaya and Hong Kong. In addition to the above-mentioned groups, other Chinese speech-groups in the region included the Hakka from the mountainous border between Fujian and Guangdong, as well as the Hainanese (Hailam) from Hainan Island. Except for the Hokkien and Teochew, the rest of these languages were mutually unintelligible. Frequent disputes and conflicts in the Chinese communities overseas challenged British law and order. In 1877, when the British launched the office of the Chinese protectorate in Singapore, William A. Pickering (1840–1907) identified the suppression of Chinese secret societies as the primary task. The other colonial administrator, Jonas Daniel Vaughan (1825–1891), however, questioned Pickering's approach as a "popular error." For Vaughan, conflicts among Chinese speech-groups were more dangerous than gangsters to the British. He therefore suggested that the colonial

---

2 On a study of the impact of the May Fourth Movement on modern China, see Vera Schwarcz, *The Chinese Enlightenment: Intellectuals and the Legacy of the May Fourth Movement of 1919* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986).

3 This manuscript uses Hanyu pinyin to Romanize most Chinese characters with the following exceptions: for the spelling of the names of speech-groups, prominent Chinese, or cities whose English spellings have been frequently used in historical archives, I keep the original spellings. These spellings are based on the languages widely used in the documentation of Hong Kong and Southeast Asia.

government “limit the immigration of Chinese to the Straits from one province in China.”<sup>4</sup> The British authority did not adopt Vaughan’s suggestion, and the Chinese communities in Malaya continued to be a cluster of different speech-groups.

Without a meticulous examination of the cleavages among Chinese speech-groups, existing studies on the May Fourth Movement in Singapore overlook the tenacious conflicts along speech-group lines underlying the overseas mobilization of Chinese nationalism. For example, James Warren cited the English newspaper *Singapore Free Press* to frame the unrests between June 18 and 20, 1919, as the manifestation of Chinese anti-Japanese nationalism: Chinese coolies at the dock went on strike because they refused to unload goods from Japanese ships. Stores that used to carry Japanese goods were closed to avoid the raids of Chinese patriots. No rickshaw puller could be found on the streets because most rickshaws they pulled were made in Japan.<sup>5</sup> The description from Constance Mary Turnbull is along the same vein: “Young Hokkiens who had been prominent in the 4 May 1919 movement in China came to Singapore to rally support, provoking a mass demonstration that led to violence. Japanese shops, factories, workshops and houses were looted, and even the most desperately poor rickshaw pullers refused to carry Japanese passengers.”<sup>6</sup>

Judging from the above historiography, one could understand the May Fourth Movement in colonial Singapore by Benedict Anderson’s theses of “imagined communities” and “long-distance nationalism.”<sup>7</sup> In Anderson’s words, nationalism became “a project for coming home from exile, for the resolution of hybridity, for a positive printed from a negative in the darkroom of political struggle.”<sup>8</sup> This did not necessarily mean a literal homecoming. For Chinese overseas in the South Seas (the region surrounding the present-day

---

4 Jonas Danile Vaughan, *The Manners and Customs of the Chinese of the Straits Settlements* (Singapore: the Mission Press, 1879), 96.

5 James Warren, *Rickshaw Coolie: A People’s History of Singapore (1880–1940)* (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 2003), 114–115.

6 Constance Mary Turnbull, *A History of Modern Singapore: 1819–2005* (Singapore: National University of Singapore Press, 2009), 142, fn. 7. A similar view is also presented in David L. Kenley, *New Culture in a New World: The May Fourth Movement and the Chinese Diaspora in Singapore, 1919–1932* (New York and London: Routledge, 2003), 49–53.

7 Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London: Verso, [1983] 1991).

8 Anderson, *Spectre of Comparisons: Nationalism, Southeast Asia and the World* (London and New York: Verso, 1998), 65.

South China Sea), the introduction of steamships plying between China and the South Seas and the circulation of Chinese vernacular newspapers all facilitated the rise of cultural re-Sinification in the early twentieth century.<sup>9</sup> The growing connections with China did not eradicate the boundary between the homeland and the overseas settlements. Neither did these connections create a unitary Chinese overseas space.

Anderson's argument is in resonance with Wang Gungwu 王賡武 thesis that Chinese overseas nationalism was "taught nationalism" transplanted from mainland China.<sup>10</sup> In this book, I further elaborate the different political dispositions among Chinese speech-groups. My concern over the overlapping boundary between the political dispositions and the native-place as well as speech-group ties adapts from the following studies: Lo Hsiang-lin 羅香林 (Luo Xianglin) has constructed the discourse about the centrality of Hakka in antiforeign struggles in modern China. The latter included the anti-Manchu resistance in the mid-seventeenth century, the engagements in the Taiping revolution in the mid-nineteenth century, leadership and support of the Republican revolution of 1911, rebels against the Japanese control of Taiwan between the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and, last but not least, the strength of Chen Jiongming's 陳炯明 (1878–1933) Guangdong Army, which rose to defend the Japanese aggression even after the downfall of Chen in the 1930s.<sup>11</sup> Though Lo's thesis that treats the Hakka identity as a fixed status related to one's ancestral root in the heartland of the Han Chinese civilization

---

9 Lea E. Williams, *Overseas Chinese Nationalism: the Genesis of the Pan-Chinese Movement in Indonesia, 1900–1916* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1960).

10 Wang Gungwu first proposed this notion in the article, "the Limits of Nanyang Chinese Nationalism, 1912–1937," which was originally published in the book, *Southeast Asian History and Historiography, Essays Presented to D. G. E. Hall*, edited by C. D. Cowan and O. W. Walters (London: Cornell University Press, 1976). This article was later collected in various other books. Here I cited from chapter 3 of *Community and Nation: China, Southeast Asia and Australia* (St. Leonards: Allen and Unwin Pty Ltd., 1992), 40–57. The concept "taught nationalism" has been elaborated in the research on Chinese overseas and the anti-Manchu revolution, such as the work of Yen Ch'ing-hwang 顏清煌, *The Overseas Chinese and the 1911 Revolution: With Special Reference to Singapore and Malaya* (Kuala Lumpur; New York: Oxford University Press, 1976). The idea has also been treated as a standard interpretation of Chinese overseas nationalism in prewar Southeast Asia in Philip A. Kuhn's *Chinese among Others: Emigration in Modern Times* (Lanham: Rowman, and Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2008), 239–282.

11 Lo Hsiang-lin, *Kejia yanjiu daolun* 客家研究導論 [An Introduction to the study of the Hakkas in its Ethnic, historical, and capital Aspect (original English title)] (Taipei: Nantian shuju, 1992), 157–173. The first version of the book was published in 1933.

in the Yellow River plains is not free from controversy,<sup>12</sup> Lo's idea about the centrality of the Hakka in modern Chinese revolutions nonetheless becomes a paradigm in the Hakka study. Leong Sow-Theng's research on the downhill migration of the Hakka from the late seventeenth century justifies Lo's claim that most southern nationalists were related to a Hakka root.<sup>13</sup> Along the same vein, Mary S. Erbaugh puts her argument upfront in the title of her article "The Secret History of the Hakkas: The Chinese Revolution as a Hakka Enterprise." In it, she attributes the predominance of Hakka leaders in modern Chinese revolutions to the Hakka's "stigmatized traits": their history of conflict, poverty, scholarship and open-mindedness, strong women, and military prowess.<sup>14</sup> Furthermore, focusing on Shanghai, Emily Honig argues that, in addition to the ascribed native-place of origin and dialect, economic achievement is also important to the construction of native-place boundaries and speech-group identity. Her study of Shanghai shows that immigrants from Jiangbei (the northern part of Jiangsu province) became aware of their Subei 蘇北 identity only after interacting with the city's privileged groups. These groups were represented by well-to-do immigrants from Jiangnan (southern Jiangsu and northern Zhejiang). The Jiangnan elites looked down on the Subei people because of their rural origins and their clustering in the city's undesirable jobs. The Subei people were thus placed in low-skilled jobs, which made them more prone to the mobilization of labor strikes.<sup>15</sup> In short, the divergent interests and related political dispositions among different speech-groups are not essential but are

- 
- 12 For example, he defines Sun Yat-sen as a Hakka based on the record of migration history of Sun's family. See Lo, *Kejia yanjiu daolun*, 263–266. Looking at the tangible ancestral root however neglects another dimension of identity making: social connections and linguistic as well as cultural adaptation. Chen Jiongming, another Hakka nationalist in Lo's listing, came from Haifeng in eastern Guangdong, where the Hakka, Teochew and Cantonese speakers lived side by side. His son Leslie Chen claims that his father's native language was Hokkien, the same as southern Fujian. At the same time, he could also speak Hakka, Cantonese, as well as Mandarin Chinese with a Hakka accent. See Leslie H. Dingyan Chen, *Chen Jiongming and the Federalist Movement: Regional Leadership and Nation Building in Early Republican China* (Ann Arbor, MI: Center for Chinese Studies, the University of Michigan, 2000), 10.
- 13 Leong Sow-Theng, *Migration and Ethnicity in Chinese History: Hakkas, Pengmin, and Their Neighbors* (edited by Tim Wright; Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1987).
- 14 Mary S. Erbaugh, "The Secret History of the Hakkas: the Chinese Revolution as a Hakka Enterprise." *China Quarterly* Vol. 132 (December, 1992): 937–968.
- 15 Emily Honig, *Sisters and Strangers: Women in the Shanghai Cotton Mills, 1919–1949* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1986); Honig, *Creating Chinese Ethnicity: Subei People in Shanghai, 1850–1980* (New Heaven, Connecticut, 1992). On speech-group ties and urban associations, see also William T. Rowe, *Hankow: Conflict and Community in a*

constructed through inter-speech-group interactions in different settings. I argue that the boundaries among different speech-group and native-place networks are not essential but are constructed in different sojourning conditions.

An understanding of these diverse political dispositions would reveal the agency of Chinese overseas in nationalism. To elaborate this point, I weave the historiography of overseas Chinese nationalism in the studies of the capitalist transitions in maritime East Asia. Chinese overseas responses to the mobilization of nationalism reflected the transformations of the capitalist economy in the early twentieth century.

### Chinese Overseas and Nationalism in Three Interfaces

I refer to those ethnic Chinese migrating out of the territorial boundary of the Chinese state by the term “Chinese overseas.” This is to distinguish from the Chinese official term *huaqiao* 華僑, which literally means Chinese sojourners. The official assumption is that the sojourning process would be provisional, and that connection with China would be essential and unalienable.<sup>16</sup> Existing studies on Chinese overseas and nationalism can be classified into three groups. Each emphasizes one dimension of the interface between Chinese overseas and nationalist mobilization.

The first group of research elaborates on the connections between Chinese overseas in the South Seas and their counterparts in South China—especially the Fujian and Guangdong provinces. Between the 1920s and 1930s, Chen Da 陳達 (1892–1975) pointed out the connections between Chinese overseas and their home provinces through remittances, investment, and marriage.<sup>17</sup> Along this line, most studies on the links between Chinese overseas and China focus on the migrants’ contribution to the development of their hometowns.<sup>18</sup> Scholars

---

*Chinese City, 1796–1895* (Two volumes) (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1986; 1989).

16 Yen, *The Overseas Chinese and the 1911 Revolution: With Special Reference to Singapore and Malaya*; Lee Ying-hui 李盈慧, *Huaqiao zhengce yu haiwai minzushuyi, 1912–1949* 華僑政策與海外民族主義 [Policies of Chinese sojourners and overseas nationalism] (Taipei: Academia Historica, 1997).

17 Chen Da, *Nanyang huaqiao yu minyue shehui* 南洋華僑與閩粵社會 [South Seas Chinese and Fujian and Guangdong societies] (Changsha: Shangwu chubanshe, 1938).

18 On the general remittances of Chinese overseas, see Lin Jinzhi and Zhuang Weiji 林金枝、莊為璣 eds., *Jindai huaqiao touzi guonei qiyesi ziliao xuanji, Fujian juan* 近代華僑投國內企業史資料選輯：福建卷 [Data collection of the history of modern Chinese overseas investments in homeland enterprises: Fujian section] (Fuzhou: Fujian Renmin

have noticed the involvement of politics among those Chinese overseas investors in China,<sup>19</sup> but how trade and politics intertwined remains unclear.

The second group of studies points out the transplantation of Chinese ethnic, language, and other cultural and social endowments from South China to the British “Far East.” In 1923, Song Ong Siang 宋旺相 (1871–1941), a third-generation Malay-assimilated Baba Chinese, entitled his monograph on the lineage of Chinese elites in Singapore *One Hundred Years of the Chinese in Singapore*. It details the intertwining marital connections and social networks among the elitist, British-entrusted “King’s Chinese” in Singapore. The periodization of the “one hundred years” of history also suggests that the making of the Chinese community in Singapore was related to the British colonial

---

chubanshe, 1985) and Lin Jinzhi and Zhuang Weiji eds., *Jindai huaqiao touzi guonei qiye-shi ziliao xuanji, Guangdong juan* 近代華僑投國內企業史資料選輯：廣東卷 [Data collection of the history of modern Chinese overseas investments in homeland enterprises: Guangdong section] (Fuzhou: Fujian Renmin chubanshe, 1989). Case studies on Chinese overseas investment in China, on the Taiwanese, see Man-houng Lin, “Taiwanese Merchants in the Economic Relations between Taiwan and China, 1895–1937,” in *Japan, China, and the Growth of the Asian International Economy, 1850–1949*, ed. Kaoru Sugihara (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 217–243; on Cantonese from North America, see Madeline Hsu, *Dreaming of Gold, Dreaming of Home: Transnationalism and Migration between the United States and China, 1882–1943* (Stanford University Press, 2000). See also the research of Cheong Fatt Tze 張弼士 (Zhang Bishi; 1841–1916) in Michael R. Godley, *The Mandarin Capitalists from Nanyang: Overseas Chinese Enterprise in the Modernization of China, 1893–1911* (Cambridge University Press, 1981); the Wing On and Sincere Companies in Wellington K. K. Chan, *Merchants, Mandarins and Modern Enterprise in Late Ch'ing China* (Cambridge, Massachusetts and London, England: East Asian Research Center, Harvard University, 1977), 28–31; “Personal Styles, Cultural Values and Management: The Sincere and Wong On Companies in Shanghai and Hong Kong, 1900–1941,” *Business History Review*, 70 (Summer 1996): 141–166. The most representative work of Tan Kah Kee 陳嘉庚 (Chen Jiageng; 1874–1961) is Yong Ch'ing-fatt, *Tan Kah Kee: The Making of an Overseas Chinese Legend* (Oxford University Press, [1987] 1989). On the “Tiger Balm King” Aw Boon Haw 胡文虎 (Hu Wenhū; 1882–1954), the recent scholarly research is Sherman Cochran, *Chinese Medicine Men: Consumer Culture in China and Southeast Asia* (Cambridge, Massachusetts, and London: Harvard University Press, 2006), Ch. 6. It is worth noting that in Yong's *Tan Kah Kee* has a revised edition published under the same title by World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd. in Singapore in 2014. The new version keep most of the original views on Tan's business achievement, social networking, political connections as well as charismatic leadership.

- 19 To raise but a few, Cheong Fatt Tze held an official title as the deputy consulate of Qing in Penang; the rubber tycoon Tan Kah Kee was the leader of the Chinese anti-Japanese nationalist campaign in Singapore; Aw Boon Haw had close ties with the Chinese nationalist government.

structure.<sup>20</sup> The prolific publication of Victor Purcell, based on his twenty-five years of service in the British colonial administration, furthers the paradigm. It looks at the influences from China as exogenous to the native Malay society but an inseparable part of the British colonial framework.<sup>21</sup> Likewise, Maurice Freedman's study of Chinese overseas also treated the latter as alien to the natives but a continuity of the Chinese in China.<sup>22</sup> Freedman considers China as a civilization, the Han Chinese *Tian-xia* 天下, "all-under-heaven." Its center rested in the hinterland of China Proper, from where it radiates to the frontier. At the frontier zone, such as the South Seas, foreign cultures would infuse or even replace the Chinese culture. In the early twentieth century, the attempt of re-Sinification of the Baba Chinese, in Freedman's words, manifested that "Chinese culture may die to be reborn again in a different guise."<sup>23</sup> The different guise was the Mandarin Chinese that the Baba Chinese picked up to replace the southern Chinese languages that they had lost through generations of overseas settlement. In the words of G. William Skinner, Freedman's approach looks at the Chinese in the South Seas as "a window on China proper."<sup>24</sup> Skinner explicated the correlation between the speech-group boundaries transplanted from China and the economic opportunities in the migrant communities. This is his notion "ethnic division of labor."<sup>25</sup> The thesis finds its resonance in the rich studies on colonial Singapore<sup>26</sup> and Hong Kong.<sup>27</sup>

- 
- 20 Song Ong Siang, *One Hundred Years' History of the Chinese in Singapore* (Kuala Lumpur: University of Malaysia Press, [1923] 1967).
- 21 For example, Victor Purcell, *The Chinese in Southeast Asia* (London, New York: Oxford University Press, [1951] 1965); and the posthumous publication *The Chinese in Malaysia* (Kuala Lumpur, London, New York: Oxford University Press, 1967). About Purcell's experiences as a colonial officer, see Purcell, *The Memoirs of a Malayan Official* (London: Cassell & Company Ltd., 1965), 160.
- 22 Maurice Freedman, *The Study of Chinese Society: Essays by Maurice Freedman (Selected and Introduced by G. William Skinner)* (Leland, CA: Stanford University Press, 1978).
- 23 Freedman, *The Study of Chinese Society*, 9.
- 24 G. William Skinner, "Introduction," in Freedman, *The Study of Chinese Society*, xiii.
- 25 Skinner first proposed this concept to analyze the Chinese communities in Southeast Asia in *Chinese Society in Thailand: An Analytical History* (Cornell University Press, 1957). The concept was later applied to reckon the dynamics in urban China; see Skinner, ed., *The City in Late Imperial China* (Stanford University Press, 1977); and Skinner, "The Structure of Chinese History," *Journal of Asian Studies* 44 (1985), no. 5: 271–292.
- 26 On Singapore, Lee Poh Ping scrutinized the making of the layered Chinese economy along the speech-group lines in the nineteenth century; Mak Lau Fong attributes the centrality of Chinese speech-group ties in that country to exclusive organization of the migrant economy between the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries; Carl A. Trocki's elaboration of the Chinese opium and spirit syndicate, the wellspring of the

Building upon the studies, I further tackle the divergent manifestations of the notion of Chineseness, especially its transformation or adaptation in the contexts of migration, local assimilation, and/or re-Sinification.

The focus of the third group of studies rests on the tactics in Chinese partisan activities and their effectiveness in Hong Kong and Singapore. The primary concern is about the overseas mobilization of Chinese political parties—above all the Guomindang (GMD; the Chinese Nationalist Party) and Chinese Communist Party (CCP). After nearly a decade of silence after the success of the Republican revolution in October 1911, Chinese partisan activities resurfaced when the first united front between the GMD and CCP coalesced in 1924. From this juncture until the Canton [Guangzhou] uprising in December 1927, the Canton–Hong Kong area was the center of the Chinese communist revolution.<sup>28</sup>

---

British revenue farming system, can also be read as the competition and negotiations among leading Chinese speech-groups (Hokkien and Teochew) over the balance of power and economic resources. Lee Pui-tak also considers the speech-group networks as one factor to explain the conflict between the two Singapore-based tycoons Aw Boon Haw and Tan Kah Kee. See Lee Poh Ping, *Chinese Society in Nineteenth Century Singapore* (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1978); Mak Lau Fong, *The Dynamics of Chinese Dialect Groups in Early Malaya* (Singapore: Singapore Society of Asian Studies, 1995); Carl A. Trocki, *Opium and Empire: Chinese Society in Colonial Singapore, 1800–1910* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1990); Lee Pui-tak, “Hua shang kuaiguo wangluo de xingcheng, yanshen han chongtu: yi Hu Wenhui yu Chen Jiageng jingzheng wei ge’an 華商跨國網絡的形成、延伸和衝突：以胡文虎與陳嘉庚競爭為個案 [The Expansion and Conflict of Overseas Chinese Merchant Network: The Case of Rivalry between Aw Boon Haw and Tan Kah Kee].” *The International Journal of Diasporic Chinese Studies*, v. 4 n. 1 (2012), 53–74.

- 27 Elizabeth Sinn points out the centrality of native-place associations in the operation of businesses and charities; Stephanie Po-yin Chung analyzes the tension between two groups of Cantonese elites in Hong Kong, the Sze Yap Cantonese from the western bank of the Pearl River delta vis-à-vis the Po On Cantonese from the Hong Kong area, over China’s transition from an empire to a republic. See Elizabeth Sinn, “A History of Regional Associations in Pre-war Hong Kong,” in *Between East and West: Aspects of Social and Political Development in Hong Kong*, ed. Sinn (Hong Kong: Centre of Asian Studies, the University of Hong Kong, 1990), 159–168. See also Sinn, *Pacific Crossing: Californian Gold, Chinese Migration and the Making of Hong Kong* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2013); Po-ying Stephanie Chung, *Chinese Business Groups in Hong Kong and Political Change in South China, 1900–25* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1998).
- 28 See the various works of Ming K. Chan, such as Chan, *Labor and Empire: the Chinese Labor Movement in the Canton Delta, 1895–1927* (Ann Arbor, Michigan: University Microfilms International, 1975); Ming K. Chan ed. *Precarious Balance: Hong Kong between China and Britain, 1842–1992* (Armonk, NY, and London: M. E. Sharpe, 1994); “The Realpolitik and Legacy of Labor Activism and Popular Mobilization in 1920s Greater Canton,” in Mechthid

Upon the end of the first united front, in 1927, the British arrested and detained Chinese people suspected of having radical, especially communist, political views. This nullified the earlier efforts of the CCP in Hong Kong.<sup>29</sup> Shortly after, in Singapore, the British likewise paralyzed both the GMD and CCP for a decade. The two parties regained strength only after the late 1930s, when the outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese War stimulated the rise of Chinese nationalist fever and Britain became preoccupied with World War II.<sup>30</sup> Given that the southern political leaders in Guangdong, Guangxi, and Fujian formed split regimes from GMD control in the first half of the 1930s,<sup>31</sup> I examine the partisan mobilization in Hong Kong and Singapore beyond the GMD-CCP divides, as well as the Chinese overseas engagements in the political changes in South China.

How to explain the asymmetrical relationship between the economic strength of Chinese bourgeoisie overseas and their political marginality in China? Did the connections with foreign colonial powers among overseas Chinese bourgeoisie affect the latter's engagements in Chinese nationalism? Wang Gungwu's notable thesis, the "limits of *Nanyang* (South Seas) Chinese nationalism," suggests that identity with British colonialism or local affairs would hinder the commitment to Chinese nationalism and Chinese affairs.<sup>32</sup>

---

Leutner, Roland Felber, Mikhail L. Titarenko and Alexander M. Grigoriev eds., *The Chinese Revolution in the 1920s: Between Triumph and Disaster* (Routledge Curzon, 2002), 187–212. See also the chapter on the communist mobilization in Hong Kong in its embryonic stage in Daniel Kwan, *Marxist Intellectual and the Chinese Labor Movement: A Study of Deng Zhongxia 1894–1933* (Seattle & London: University of Washington Press, 1997).

29 Chan Lau Kit-ching, *From Nothing to Nothing: The Chinese Communist Movement and Hong Kong, 1921–1936* (New York: St. Martin Press, 1999).

30 Akashi Yōji, *The Nanyang Chinese National Salvation Movement, 1937–1941* (Kansas: Center for East Asian Studies, the University of Kansas, 1970); Stephen Leong, "The Malayan Overseas Chinese and the Sino-Japanese War, 1937–1941." *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies*, vol. 10, no. 2 (Sept. 1979): 293–320; Yong Ch'ing-fatt and R. B. McKenna, *The Kuomintang Movement in British Malaya, 1912–1949* (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1990); Lee Ying-hui, *Huaqiao zhengce yu haiwai minzushuyi, 1912–1949*.

31 Diana Lary, *Region and Nation: The Kwangsi Clique in Chinese Politics, 1925–1937* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1974); Lloyd E. Eastman, *The Abortive Revolution: China under Nationalist Rule, 1927–1937* (Harvard University Press, 1974).

32 Wang classifies the political orientations of the Chinese in the region into three types: the A-type were born in China and committed to Chinese politics, the B-type were born in the South Seas and concerned with local Chinese politics in the societies where they resided, and the C-type paid attention to local politics, including those related to both Chinese and colonial affairs. Wang Gungwu, "Chinese Politics in Malaya," in *Community and Nation*, 251–280. The article was first published in *China Quarterly*, 43 (1970).

This thesis reflects scholarly interest in the influence of British colonial workings on Chinese overseas identity. It has further developed into the discourse of “collaborative nationalism” in the historiography of British colonial Hong Kong,<sup>33</sup> as well as the studies on the “King’s Chinese” in British Singapore.<sup>34</sup> The assumption that Chinese overseas in the two colonies were caught between the nationalist calling from China and the colonial demands of the Great British could not fully capture the dynamics of the region in the interwar years. Notwithstanding the significant impact of Japanese expansion in the region, which uprooted British power by spring 1942, few studies thus far have interrogated the impact of Chinese-Japanese collaboration on the Western colonial status quo prior to the outbreak of the Pacific War in 1941.<sup>35</sup>

Employing Japanese sources in the interwar years, the studies emphasize the divides in South Seas Chinese communities. Yoji Akashi 明石陽至 points out that Chinese anti-Japanese fundraising campaigns in the South Seas in the

- 
- 33 G. H. Choa, *The Life and Time of Sir Kai Ho Kai: A Prominent Figure in Nineteenth-Century Hong Kong* (Hong Kong: the Chinese University of Hong Kong, [1981] 2000); Carl T. Smith, *Chinese Christians: Elites, Middlemen, and the Church in Hong Kong* (Hong Kong: Chinese University of Hong Kong Press, [1985], 2005); Sinn, *Power and Charity: The Early History of the Tung Wah Hospital* (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1989); Tsai Jung-fang 蔡榮芳, *Hong Kong in Chinese History: Community and Social Unrest in the British Colony, 1842–1913*. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993); Tsai, *Xianggang ren zhi Xianggang shi, 1841–1945 香港人之香港史* [Hong Kong People’s History of Hong Kong, 1894–1945] (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 2001); John M. Carroll, *Edges of Empires: Chinese Elites and British Colonials in Hong Kong* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005).
- 34 Song, *One Hundred Years of the Chinese in Singapore*; Turnbull, *A History of Modern Singapore, 1819–2005*, 116.
- 35 Among the studies that focus on this oft-neglected subject, Lin Man-houng 林滿紅 and Peter Post, respectively, have pointed out that from the 1910s on, Japan attempted to expand its influence throughout the South Seas through incorporating the Hokkiens. The latter included both those in the South Seas and those from Taiwan, in the state-led direct trading system. Peter Post, “Chinese Business Networks and Japanese Capital in South East Asia, 1880–1940,” on *Chinese Business Enterprise in Asia*, ed. Rajeswary Ampalavanar Brown. London and New York: Routledge, 1995), 154–176; “The Formation of the Pribumi Business Elite in Indonesia, 1930s–1940s,” in *Japan, Indonesia and the War-Myths and Realities*, ed. Post and Elly Touwen-Bousma (Leiden: KITLV Press, 1997), pp. 87–110; Lin Man-houng, “Taiwanese Merchants, Overseas Chinese Merchants, and the Japanese Government in the Economic Relations between Taiwan and Japan, 1895–1945,” in *Ajia Taiheiyō Kenkyū 太平洋研究* (No. 4, 2001): 3–20; “Overseas Chinese Merchants and Multiple Nationality: A Means for Reducing Commercial Risk,” *Modern Asian Studies* (2001, vol. 35, no. 4): 985–1009.

1930s were more or less an enterprise of his own Hokkien speech-group.<sup>36</sup> This analysis is helpful to understand the stubborn growth of Chinese divides along speech-group lines underlying the active mobilization of Chinese nationalism overseas, though the strategy to sustain the paramount Hokkien influence is an issue yet to be explored. Horimoto Naohiko 堀本尚彦 delineates Chinese anti-Japanese boycotts in Singapore as the Chinese reaction to Japanese economic expansion.<sup>37</sup> Accordingly, the divides in Chinese communities manifested more than social cleavages transplanted from mainland China. Local business competition plays an important role to understand the tensions in Chinese overseas communities. Last but not least, Shimizu Hiroshi and Hirakawa Hitoshi delineate the Japanese attempt to take over the Cantonese business networks in the Japan–South Seas trade in the interwar years, which the Cantonese had established in the mid-nineteenth century.<sup>38</sup> These studies point out the importance of business competition between the Chinese and Japanese interests in the South Seas as the background of the surging Chinese overseas nationalism.

What yet to be completed is to scrutinize how nationalism and competition among business networks were connected. I argue that the local economic ties, embedded in the overseas context in the South Seas–South China region, are crucial to understanding the operation of Chinese nationalism. The transnational network thus constitutes my unit of analysis. Operation of these networks transgressed the boundary of a nation-state or an empire and mediated the pressures to constrain the activities within the territorially bounded nation-state as well as the drives to proliferate the connections along the imperialist expansion. Other than contributing to the modernization projects in China, these networks had facilitated the easternmost extension of the British empire between the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, as well as the Japanese expansion beginning in the Meiji era.

To delineate the transnational operation of trade and nationalist mobilization, this research crosschecks the historiography presented in the studies that employ British colonial archives, local Chinese sources in Hong Kong and

36 Akashi Yōji, *The Nanyang Chinese National Salvation Movement, 1937–1941*.

37 Horimoto Naohiko, “Shingaporru no kanin kōni undō to hihōn sō keizai dantai シンガポールの華人抗日運動と日本側経済団体 [Chinese anti-Japanese activities and Japanese-associated Economic Groups], in *Kindai ajia no nihonjin keizai dantai 近代アジアの日本人経済団体* [Japanese Economic Organizations in Modern Asia],” ed. Namikata Shōichi 波形昭一 (Tokyo: Dōbun-kan, 1997), Ch. 10, 237–256.

38 Shimizu Hiroshi and Hirakawa Hitoshi, *Japan and Singapore in the World Economy: Japan’s Economic Advance into Singapore, 1870–1965* (London and New York: Routledge, 1999).

Singapore, the GMD archives on Chinese overseas nationalism, as well as pre-war Japanese materials on the southward advance centered on Taiwan.<sup>39</sup> At the same time, the constraints prescribed in each set of materials should not be overlooked. These constraints include the notion of essential Chinese citizens in the GMD archives, the pragmatic merchants in the reports of local business and native-place associations, the colonial subjects in British reports, and the contested Chinese groups in the Japanese sources. To go beyond these constraints, it is important to look at the Chinese in British Hong Kong and Singapore as part and parcel of the transnational Chinese migration and business communities.

### Bourgeois Nationalism and Transnationalism in Interwar Hong Kong and Singapore

I focus on the bourgeoisie in the organization of the transnational networks. Here, the term “bourgeoisie” refers to those compradors, commercial, financial, and industrial capitalists. The choice of the research focus is for the following reasons: First, different from mainland China, in the Chinese overseas communities between the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, bourgeoisie but not intellectuals filled the top of the social hierarchy. Overseas mobilization of Chinese nationalism also tried to solicit support from the bourgeoisie. The focus on bourgeoisie can help illuminate the formations of dominant nationalist discourses and strategies in Chinese overseas communities. Second, the research of bourgeois nationalism in Hong Kong and Singapore would

---

39 About the background against which Taiwan became a center of Japan's intelligence work and commercial expansion to South China and the South Seas in the early twentieth century, see Chung Shu-min 鍾淑敏, “Rizhi shiqi nanjin yanjiu zhi huigu yu zhanwang 日治時期南進研究之回顧與展望 [Prospects and review of research on Japanese southward advance],” *Zhonghua minguo shi zhuanli lunwenji di si jie taolunhui, Vol. 2* 中華民國史專題論文集第四屆討論會卷二 [Conference proceeding of the fourth seminar on the history of Republic of China, Volume 2] (Taipei: Guoshiguan, 1998): 2063–2090; “Taiwan zongdufu ‘nanzhi nanyang’ zhengce zhi yanjiu: yi qingbao tixi wei zhongxin 台灣總督府「南支南洋」政策之研究：以情報體系為中心 [Research of ‘South China and Nanyang’ of the Office of the Government-General, Taiwan: A study on the intelligence systems].” *Zhongguo haiyang fazhan shi lunwenji di qi juan* 中國海洋發展史論文集第七卷 [Essays on the history of Chinese maritime development, Vol. 7] (Taipei: Institute of Sun Yat-sen Humanities and Social Sciences Center, Academia Sinica, 1999): 695–733.

engage in the studies of modern Chinese nationalism, which mainly focus on urban China especially Shanghai.

Mary Backus Rankin has detailed the engagements of Chinese bourgeoisie, radical intellectuals and social elites in Chinese nationalism in the Middle and Lower Yangzi areas.<sup>40</sup> The approach continues the paradigm of John King Fairbank's "Shanghaianders," in which Fairbank credited the Chinese coastal elites in Shanghai for spearheading China's modernization and Westernization.<sup>41</sup> Hao Yen-p'ing extends the category of Shanghaianders to all Chinese bourgeoisie in China's coastal cities and Hong Kong.<sup>42</sup> This perspective is further developed in Bergère's analysis about the making of the Chinese coastal civilization in the nineteenth century. In her words, "Chinese society in Shanghai and Canton was closer to that of the overseas communities of Singapore and Hong Kong, than to the rural world of the inland province. Now, just as the Empire, in one of those huge oscillations by which its destiny was marked, was beginning to turn away from its agrarian-bureaucratic, internally oriental tradition and to open up to the peripheral maritime influences, Chinese emigration assumed a historical role."<sup>43</sup>

Nonetheless, the space in the Chinese coastal civilization was not homogeneous. In her analysis of the tension behind Sun Yat-sen's 孫逸仙 (1866–1925) leadership in the revolutionary alliance between 1905 and 1911, Bergère reveals that, from the perspective of the Yangzi gentry-elites, the Chinese overseas could be donors to and followers of Chinese nationalism but not its leader. This prejudice stemmed from the overseas bourgeoisie's lack of Confucian literati training and gentry-elite background, as well as their pursuit of profit-driven trade in a foreign land.<sup>44</sup>

My emphasis on the bourgeois nationalism, at first glance, develops Takeshi Hamashita's thesis about the continuity of the China-centric order in maritime Asia after the rise of British imperialism. According to Hamashita, underneath the imposition of the British free-trade system in Asia, Chinese business networks continued to maintain economic influence from China to overseas

---

40 Mary Backus Rankin, *Early Chinese Revolutions: Radical Intellectuals in Shanghai and Chekiang, 1902–1911* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971).

41 John King Fairbank, *Trade and Diplomacy on the China Coast: The Opening of the Treaty Ports, 1842–1854*. Two Volumes (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1953), 7, 464–466.

42 Hao Yen-p'ing, *The Comprador in Nineteenth-century China: Bridge between East and West* (Harvard University Press, 1970), 54–59.

43 Marie-Claire Bergère, *The Golden Age of Chinese Bourgeoisie, 1929–1937* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, [1986] 1989), 43.

44 Bergère, *Sun Yat-sen* (Stanford University Press, 1998).

societies through the export of Chinese goods and the conversion of foreign currency into silver under China's silver standard. These are illustrated by the strength of Cantonese compradors in Hong Kong and bankers from Shanxi, China, in Korea.<sup>45</sup> But I also attempt to revisit Hamashita's thesis that places Chinese overseas trade and emigration within the framework of the Beijing-centric Chinese tributary system.

Examining the operation of Chinese nationalism from what Freedman considers the "frontier" of Chinese civilization in the South Seas, I point out that the Chinese overseas bourgeoisie manifested contingent and flexible identities in which loyalty to the territorially bounded nation-state of China constituted one, albeit a special one, among many allegiances. The shifting identity took place at a juncture where migration networks, family arrangements, and business investments between South China and the South Seas or even across the Pacific Ocean dispersed and decentered. This phenomenon is understood under the concept of transnationalism, which was originally an academic jargon describing the coexistence of various deterritorial identities due to the proliferation of back-and-forth migration.<sup>46</sup>

I apply the concept "nationalism in transnationalism" to revisit the discourse about the unification among different Chinese groups under the mobilization

---

45 Takeshi Hamashita, *Jindai zhongguo de guoji qiji: chaogong maoyi tixi yu jindai Yazhou jingji quan* 近代中國的國際契機：朝貢貿易與近代亞洲經濟圈 [The International Relationship of Modern China: Tributary Trade System and Modern Asian Economic Circle], translated by Zhu Yingui and Ouyang Fei 朱蔭貴、歐陽菲 (Beijing: Chinese Social Science Press, 1999); *China, East Asia and the Global Economy: Regional and Historical Perspectives*, edited by Linda Grove and Mark Selden (Routledge, 2008), Ch. 8 and Ch. 9.

46 Prasenjit Duara, "Nationalists Among Transnationals: Overseas Chinese and the Idea of China, 1900–1911," in *Ungrounded Empire: The Cultural Politics of Modern Chinese Transnationalism*, ed. Donald Nonini and Aihwa Ong (New York and London: Routledge, 1997), 39–60; Leo Douw, Cen Huang and Michael R. Godley eds. *Qiaoxiang Ties: Interdisciplinary Approaches to Cultural Capitalism in South China* (London and New York: Routledge, 1999). On transnationalism between China and the Americas, see Madeline Hsu, *Dreaming of Gold, Dreaming of Home: Transnationalism and Migration between the United States and China, 1882–1943* (Stanford University Press, 2000) and Adam McKeown, *Chinese Migrant Networks and Cultural Change* (University of Chicago Press, 2001); Sinn, *Pacific Crossing: Californian Gold, Chinese Migration and the Making of Hong Kong*. On a theoretical account of the concept, see, for example, Nina Glick Schiller, Linda Basch, and Cristina Blanc-Szanton eds. 1992. *Towards Transnational Perspective on Migration: Race, Class, Ethnicity, and Nationalism Reconsidered* (New York: New York Academy of Sciences, 1992); Ong, *Flexible Citizenship: the Cultural Logics of Transnationality* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1999).

of Chinese nationalism in the interwar years. The discourse was that, alongside the acceleration of the diplomatic and military clashes between China and Japan, Chinese nationalism surged in China as well as overseas communities like Hong Kong and Singapore.<sup>47</sup> Engaging the notion of transnationalism in the study of high Chinese nationalism in the early twentieth century, the historian Prasenjit Duara has emphasized the importance of applying transnational ideologies—such as redemptive religious thoughts, ethnic ties, and *jus sanguinis* citizenship—to understand the overseas mobilization of Chinese nationalism.<sup>48</sup> Whereas Duara's has contributed to the thesis of "transnationalism in nationalism," my framework "nationalism in transnationalism" examines the contests among the diverse Chinese speech-groups in each of their distinct responses to the overseas mobilization of Chinese nationalism, their negotiations with the various political powers in China as well as their tactics in responding to the interimperialist rivalry between the British and Japanese empires. The proliferation of patriotic fundraising and other campaigns for national salvation represented more than expressions of nationalism. Underneath the similar slogans for China's national salvation, different Chinese overseas groups mobilized different social networks and formed different political connections when launching their nationalist campaigns. Even those Chinese being labeled as traitors—like those choosing to continue their trade of Japanese goods in the 1930s—positioned themselves in relation to the upheavals of nationalist movements. Neglecting these differences would lead

47 This is the common thesis in most studies on prewar nationalist movements in Singapore: for example, S. Leong, "The Malayan Overseas Chinese and the Sino-Japanese War, 1937–1941;" Yong, *Tan Kah Kee*; Yong and McKenna, *The Kuomintang Movement in British Malaya, 1912–1949*; Lee Ying-hui, *Huaqiao zhengce yu haiwai minzushuyi, 1912–1949*. The scholars in the paradigm of collaborative nationalism in prewar Hong Kong have delineated the complicated rationales behind the Chinese overseas subscription to the anti-Japanese campaigns (best represented by Tsai's *Xianggang ren zhi Xianggang shi, 1841–1945* and Carroll's *Edge of Empires*). Lu Yan's recent article on Hong Kong in anti-Japanese nationalism however emphasizes only the unanimous support of the national salvation agenda across different economic, social and political backgrounds but not their divergent and sometimes mutually contradictory agendas. See Lu Yan, "Together with the Homeland: Civic Activism for National Salvation in British Hong Kong," *Modern China*, Vol. XX (X, 2013): 1–36.

48 Prasenjit Duara, *Rescuing History from the Nation: Questioning Narratives of Modern China* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995); "Nationalists Among Transnationals: Overseas Chinese and the Idea of China, 1900–1911;" "Transnationalism and the Predicament of Sovereignty: China, 1900–1945." *American Historical Review* (October 1997): 1030–1051; and "Transnationalism in the Era of Nation-states: China, 1900–1945," *Development and Change*, October 1998, Vol. 29 (4): 647–670.

to a misconception about the making of a unitary Chinese nationalist identity within and without China, between and beyond the cleavages of speech-group boundaries and business networks. Competition, negotiation, or even compromises among the diverse Chinese overseas networks over their divergent views on nationalism, that took place in their transnational mobilization of trade, social networks and politics, would create a momentum for the making of Chinese overseas autonomy beyond the dictation of official nationalism.

### Hong Kong and Singapore in the Three-layered South China–South Seas World-Economy

The interwar years in the South China–South Seas regions constituted a historical conjuncture that can be understood in terms of Giovanni Arrighi's notion of hegemonic transition.<sup>49</sup> The British power waned while the Japan-led East Asian New Order expanded. To theorize the roles of Hong Kong and Singapore in the hegemonic transition, I apply Fernand Braudel's thesis of world-economy to frame the space between South China and the South Seas. According to Braudel, a world-economy is a "fragment of the world, an economically autonomous section of the planet able to provide for most of its own needs, a section to which its internal links and exchanges give a certain organic unity."<sup>50</sup> The Sino-European silk-silver exchanges, convergence of multiple

---

49 According to Arrighi's periodization, the first capitalist world-economy was established in the northern Italian city-states during the long fifteen-sixteenth century (circa 1380–1640), followed by the Netherlands in the long seventeenth century (1560–1780) and Britain in the long nineteenth century (1740–1940), to the current United States system that rose from the British decline in the 1870s and began to enter its own phase of stagnation in the 1970s. Each stage is composed of two phases: The first phase, Money to Capital (M-C), was the period in which the hegemonic political force was able to endow with "ever-more extensive and complex organizational capabilities to control the social and political environment of capital accumulation on a world scale". Arrighi Giovanni Arrighi, *The Long Twentieth Century* (London: Verso, 1994), 14. The second phase, Capital to Money (C-M), was the period in which capital accumulated into the previous phase began to undermine the vitality of the system of accumulation itself. Competition among various capitalist organizations became a zero-sum game, thus challenging the hegemonic status of the incumbent regulatory leader. See also Arrighi, Po-keung Hui, Ho-fung Hung, Mark Selden, "Historical Capitalism, East and West," in *The Resurgence of East Asia*, ed. Arrighi, Hamashita and Selden (London and New York: Routledge, 2003), 259–333.

50 Braudel, *The Perspective of the World: Civilization and Capitalism, 15–18th, vol. III* (University of California Press, 1992), 22.

cultures and religions, and back-and-forth movement of merchants and tribute missions by sea have all contributed to the construction of the South China–South Seas space as an organic unity since the sixteenth century, if not earlier.<sup>51</sup>

I analyze the South China-South Seas world-economy by the following three levels: In the interwar years, the interimperialist rivalry between the British and Japanese empires dominated the first, or global, level of the South China–South Seas world-economy. The second, or regional, level can be seen as the political-economic changes in China following the success of the Republican revolution in 1911. The third, or provincial, level was the contested terrain where diverse Chinese speech-group networks conflated and competed.<sup>52</sup> What follows elaborates on the three levels of the South China–South Seas space in relationship to the organization of the chapters in the book.

### *Hegemonic Transition of East Asian Capitalism in the Early Twentieth Century*

At the global level, in the early twentieth century, the Sino-centric tribute trade system had ceased to function, while the British power that had dominated the region for two centuries began to realize that the challenges from Japanese expansion were imperative. Andre Gunder Frank has explained the making of British supremacy a century ago by the parallel developments between the decline of the East and the rise of the West. The demise of China in the late eighteenth century was a result of its internal crisis, especially the devastating impact of ecological burden due to the rapid population boom.<sup>53</sup> Frank's thesis

---

51 The pioneer study that applies Braudel's framework to research on Chinese overseas in maritime East Asia is the following dissertation: Hui Po-Keung, *Overseas Chinese Business Network: East Asian Economic Development in Historical Perspective* (Ph.D. Dissertation of Sociology Department, State University of New York at Binghamton, 1995). See also Linda Grove and Sugiyama Shinya, eds., *Commercial Networks in Modern Asia* (Routledge, 2001); Li Tana and Nicholas Cooke, *Water Frontier: Commerce and the Chinese in the Lower Mekong Region, 1750–1880* (Roman and Littlefield, 2004); Hamashita, *China, East Asia and the Global Economy: Regional and Historical Perspectives*; Eric Tagliacozzo and Chang Wen-chin, eds., *Chinese Circulations: Capital, Commodities, and Networks in Southeast Asia* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2011).

52 The three-level analysis is based on Braudel's framework of material life, market economy, and capitalism. Braudel, *The Structure of Everyday Life: Civilization and Capitalism, 15–18th, vol. I.* (University of California Press, 1992); *The Wheels of Commerce: Civilization and Capitalism, 15–18th, vol. II.* (University of California Press, 1992); *The Perspective of the World: Civilization and Capitalism, 15–18th, vol. III.*

53 Andre Gunder Frank, *ReOrient: Global Economy in the Asian Age*, 264.

tackles Paul A. Cohen's "China-centric thesis" by introducing the world-system paradigm to analyze the cyclical development of Chinese economy.<sup>54</sup> But Frank, however, does not investigate the impact of British as well as other Western imperialist inroads on Chinese maritime trade after the nineteenth century.

In chapter 1, "The Making of Chinese Overseas in the South Seas in Longue Durée," I delineate the history of China's southward migration and expeditions from Fujian and Guangdong. Chinese from the two southern provinces had long been in contact with foreign trade and cultures, and these activities were beyond what orthodox Confucianism would appreciate. The private seaborne activities also challenged the official operation of the Chinese tribute trade system, which incorporated Chinese foreign trade under Sino-centric diplomatic terms. In the nineteenth century, when the British gunboat policy forced China to terminate its tribute trade system, the Chinese state came to appreciate the potential contribution of the Chinese with foreign experiences. It was at this juncture that the Chinese state began to consider those residing abroad part of the Chinese citizens, *hua qiao*, literally means Chinese sojourners. With their strength in making profits through foreign trade, Chinese overseas bourgeoisie were responsive to the late Qing idea of economic nationalism, *shi ye jiu guo*: rescuing the nation through developing pragmatic industry.

In chapter 2, "Chinese Overseas Bourgeoisie in the Emerging Anti-imperialist Nationalism," I examine the responses of Chinese overseas bourgeoisie to the calls of Chinese anti-imperialist nationalism in the long 1920s. The Chinese anti-imperialist ideology became incorporated in nationalist agendas after the rise of the New Culture–May Fourth Movement between 1915 and 1919. This new ideology stormed the wave of anti-Japanese boycotts in the late 1910s and the anti-British strikes in the 1920s, but the bourgeoisie in both the British colonies remained committed to the earlier notion of economic nationalism. Moreover, the expansion of Japanese commercial influence in South China and the South Seas created a new platform for the Chinese overseas to consolidate their transnational networkings. This chapter revisits the studies of "collaborative nationalism" by emphasizing the autonomy of the Chinese bourgeoisie in British Hong Kong and Singapore. I highlight the limit of looking at nationalism as a top-down intellectual and partisan mobilization. The bourgeoisie rejected to be passive followers of either the anti-imperialist discourse of Chinese nationalism or the command of British colonial status quo; they proposed multifarious ways to express the ideas of nationalism.

---

54 Cohen, Paul A. *Discovering History in China: American Historical Writing on the Recent Chinese Past* (NY: Columbia University Press, [1984] 2000).

### *Contested State-Buildings in Modern China*

In terms of the regional level, chapters 3 and 4 of this book examine the overseas mobilization of Chinese nationalism when China was transitioning from an empire to a nation-state. John Fitzgerald emphasizes that in China's transition, the notion of China as a unitary state survived, but not the sense of the Chinese nation. The establishment of the GMD "could not settle comfortably into a sense of national self bounded by culture or people in China because events gave it little cause for complacency."<sup>55</sup> The following CCP, while trying to frame the nation as the proletarian class of the world by the presence of imperialist encroachments, likewise failed. Above all, the Marxist class discourse reduced the understanding of the diverse economic performance in different regions in China as these regions being in the different stages of inexorable and uniform development.<sup>56</sup> The thesis does not take into account the regional differences and economic cycles. For Chinese bourgeoisie in colonial Hong Kong and Singapore, political changes in China's southern provinces were more complicated than the GMD-CCP divides. Steve Tsang has pointed out that in the 1930s, the British allowed Hong Kong to be a "safe haven for dissents, political refugees, and officials who had lost power."<sup>57</sup> In South China, provincial leaders such as Chen Jiongming, Li Jishen 李濟琛 (1885–1959), Chen Jitang 陳濟棠 (1890–1954), and Chen Mingshu 陳銘樞 (1889–1965), were proposing distinctive blueprints for political changes. Their paths not taken in history pointed to the significant, albeit abortive, attempts that southern Chinese leaders and their overseas supporters had once embraced. Diana Lary has focused on the challenges against Chiang from Guangxi.<sup>58</sup> My objective for tackling the southern automatic movements in the Nanjing Decade (1927–1937) is to assess the political influence of Chinese overseas in China.

In chapter 3, "The Patriotic 1930s: Chinese Overseas Bourgeoisie in Nationalist Wings," I compare the operation of ad hoc Chinese anti-Japanese nationalist campaigns between Hong Kong and Singapore, which surged in the long 1930s from 1928 to 1941. I distinguish those under the command of the GMD government from those not. Most of the fundraising campaigns in Hong Kong, including those door-to-door campaigns organized by the Tung Wah Group of Hospitals and the Chinese General Chamber of Commerce, were

---

55 John Fitzgerald, "The Nationless State: The Search for a Nation in Modern Chinese Nationalism." *The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs* No. 33 (January 1995): 81.

56 Fitzgerald, "The Nationless State: The Search for a Nation in Modern Chinese Nationalism."

57 Steve Tsang, *A Modern History of Hong Kong* (London: I. B. Tauris, 2004), p. 80.

58 Lary, *Region and Nation: The Kwangsi Clique in Chinese Politics, 1925–1937*.

operated independently from the GMD government before 1937, when full-scale war between China and Japan broke out. In Singapore, the GMD penetration started as soon as the first of such fundraising campaigns was organized, in spring 1928, in the aftermath of the Jinan Incident (in which the Japanese Kwantung Army clashed with Chiang Kai-shek's Chinese Nationalist Army in Jinan, Shandong, in May 1928). I explain the difference by the divergent relationship between the Chinese state and leading bourgeois networks in each of the colonies.

In chapter 4, "Rescuing Business through Transnationalism," I analyze the connection between the operation of Chinese nationalist fundraising campaigns and the strategies of business survival amidst the economic downturn of the Great Depression of the 1930s. Continuing the commitment to the late Qing notion of economic nationalism, *shi ye jiu guo*, the overseas Chinese bourgeoisie strived to continue their transnational trade. But at the same time, after the infiltration of anti-imperialist discourse into mainland Chinese nationalism, the transnational connections of Chinese overseas had to be framed as exclusive Chinese interests, either in the ethnic Chinese markets in overseas communities or in the domestic Chinese economy.

#### *Parochial Identity in Transnational Networks*

Chapters 5 and 6 compare the organizations of transnational networks along different speech-group and native-place ties. The use of Chinese speech-group networks in establishing and sustaining the Chinese businesses in Hong Kong and Singapore affirms the sociologist Mark Granovetter's thesis of economic embeddedness.<sup>59</sup> Scholars have applied this concept to elaborate on the use of ethnic connections in the making of cultural or social capital in migrant communities.<sup>60</sup> An examination of the intertwining relationship between embedded trade and politics in Hong Kong and Singapore deepens the understanding of Granovetter's thesis.

---

59 Mark Granovetter, "Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problems of Embeddedness," *American Journal of Sociology* 91 (Nov. 1985): 481–510.

60 See, for example, Alejandro Portes and Julia Sensenbrenner, "Embeddedness and Immigration: Notes on the Social Determinants of Economic Action," *The American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 98, No. 6 (May, 1993), pp. 1320–1350; Min Zhou and Mingang Lin, "Community Transformation and the Formation of Ethnic Capital: Immigrant Chinese Communities in the United States," *Journal of Chinese Overseas* 1, 2 (Nov. 2005): 260–284.

Although the rise of anti-Manchu, anti-British, and anti-Japanese movements and the growing popularity of the standard Mandarin Chinese speech in the first three decades of the twentieth century created a platform for different networks to unify with each other, these networks remained separated by each of their divergent economic interests and connections with the different colonial or Chinese political powers. The rise of Chinese nationalism, with its claim for an all-encompassing identity, rather became a contested forum in which different overseas networks competed for their representation of the quintessential Chineseness.

In chapter 5, “Whose National Interests: Selling Chinese Goods along the Hong Kong–Singapore Corridor,” I highlight the making of the Canton–Hong Kong–Singapore industrial corridor against the backdrop of Nanjing’s protective economic policies during the long 1930s. The official “buy Chinese products” movement launched in Nanjing after 1928 was an attempt to protect the Lower Yangzi bourgeoisie. After the implementation of the British imperial preference system, in 1932, the emerging industrial capitalists in the Canton–Hong Kong area sought to cooperate with the traders in Singapore. In Singapore, the stable leadership of the Chinese anti-Japanese movements within the Hokkien circle reflected the sole domination of Hokkien in the city’s import-export trade with China and middlemen merchants of British goods. The Hokkien were thus primary victims of the collapse of the transregional global trade.

In chapter 6, “Divided Chinese Identity in United Homeland Ties,” I tackle the connections between Chinese overseas and the aborted attempts of southern state-builders in Fujian and Guangdong in the 1930s. I focus on the political agendas of the Guangdong Army, from Chen Jiongming’s legacy to the policies of the separate Southwest regime and the ephemeral Fujian People’s Government. Although these southern regimes could not effectively confront either the political legitimacy or the governances of Chiang Kai-shek’s Nanjing government, their successful enticing of Chinese overseas investments nonetheless points to the making of an alternative path in China’s state-building processes beyond the GMD-CCP divide. The semiautomatic space in South China, created in part by the geographical isolation of the southern provinces, in part by the tacit approval of the British colonial regime in Hong Kong, and in part by the regimes’ secret connections with Japan, manifested the fragmentation of the GMD state. The latter, while being recognized as the central government of the Republic of China, could only superficially and nominally claim its control in South China, never mind the Chinese communities overseas. Hong Kong became an important base for these southern leaders after their agendas failed. In Singapore, although the formation of the

second united front in 1937 helped expand GMD influence overseas, the Hokkien disagreement with the GMD governance in Fujian constrained the GMD's success. Through the networking and exchanges among intellectuals and bourgeois nationalists overseas between China and the South Seas, the Hong Kong–Singapore corridor channeled the organization of the “third force” in the early 1940s.

Through scrutinizing the three layers of political-economic context of the South China–South Seas region, this book weaves the historiography of overseas Chinese trade with the operation of nationalist movements. The thesis, which elaborates on the divergent political dispositions among the Chinese speech-groups, revisits what Bryna Goodman has claimed about the transcendence of parochial solidarity into national community. Based on her study of the tenacious development of native-place ties in Shanghai throughout the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, her observation can be summarized as follows: “The sojourning condition and sojourning networks enabled the transcendence of ‘localisms’ and the manner in which the imagined link to native place and native-place community, through the operation of synecdoche, permitted the imagining of national community.”<sup>61</sup> But the rise of nationalism did not program an automatic and smooth transition from Chinese speech-group and native-place identity to an all-encompassing Chinese solidarity.

The surging pan-Chinese movement did not create an imagined community that could accommodate diverse interests among the Cantonese, Hokkien, Hakka, and the like. Moreover, the shifting targets of Chinese antiforeign agendas in Chinese nationalism—from treating Japan as the primary enemy in the 1910s to the British in the 1920s and then back to Japan in the 1930s—tore the Chinese business networks into competing parochial ties. Native-place ties were not only a unit of nationalism but also a catalyst of its degeneration.

The contribution of the study is therefore twofold: First, it analyzes the dynamics of Chinese overseas nationalism along the framework of modern world-system analysis. Beyond the Chinese partisan mobilization overseas, Chinese bourgeoisie in British colonial Hong Kong and Singapore were striving to sustain their business and social networks in accordance with the hegemonic transition in the region, from British free-trade capitalism to the Japan-centric East Asian New Order. Second, it highlights the transnational nature of southern Chinese business networks, which drove the transformation of South

---

61 Bryna Goodman, *Native Place, City, and Nation: Regional Networks and Identities in Shanghai, 1853–1937* (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: University of California Press, 1995), 313–314.

China. These networkers mediated the foreign impacts on South China and facilitated the spread of Chinese political, cultural, and economic influences overseas. The development of South China should thus be understood beyond the dichotomy of “external challenges” (as in the Fairbank paradigm) or “endogenous dynamics” (as in Cohen’s China-centric approach). As catalysts of the transformations in South China in the early twentieth century, the Chinese overseas networks created an automatic space beyond the regulation of the contested Chinese state and the domination of either the British or the Japanese imperialist powers.

## The Making of Chinese Overseas in the South Seas in Longue Durée

... Tan Kim Ching 陳金鍾 (Chen Jinzhong) ... came from Haicheng, Fujian, and his family has settled in Singapore for several generations. The family made hundreds and thousands of fortunes, and both his grandfather and his father received prominent titles in Siam. He was pretty philanthropic and ... he also responded to Zuo Zongtang's 左宗棠 calling for supporting China's maritime defense. He donated ten thousands of gold to the project ... He is still dressed in Chinese clothes and hats. But because he does not speak Mandarin Chinese, we have to communicate through a translator. He claimed that he never forgot China, and would be very willing to do anything for China. I encouraged him and hoped that there will be future cooperation.

—XUE FUCHENG 薛福成 (1838–1894)<sup>1</sup>



In January 1890, in his capacity as the Chinese diplomat visiting England, France, Italy, and Belgium, the Chinese Mandarin Xue Fucheng stopped in Siam. He met the Singapore-born merchant Tan Kim Ching (1829–1892). But Tan and Xue had no common language with which to communicate. Xue was a Chinese Mandarin from Wuxi, Jiangsu, or the Lower Yangzi area in Central China, while Tan was born to a Baba Hokkien family from Malacca. Being an influential rice dealer in Saigon, Siam, and Hong Kong, Tan was a leader of the Hokkien community in the region. He also had been knighted by the Siamese King, Chulalongkorn.<sup>2</sup>

- 
- 1 Xue Fucheng, "Diary of January 22, 1890," from Zhong Shuhe 鍾叔河 ed., *Xue Fucheng: Chu shi Ying Fa i Yi si guo ri ji* 薛福成: 出使英法比義四國日記 [Xue Fucheng's diary of embassy missions to the four countries: England, France, Italy and Belgium] (Changsha, Hunan: Yuelu chubanshe, 1985), 81.
  - 2 Su Xiaoxian 蘇孝先 ed., *Zhangzhou shishu lu Xing tongxianglu* 漳州十屬旅星同鄉會 (Singapore: Qiaoguang chuban she, 1948), 58–59; Koh Kow Chiang 許教正 ed., *Who's Who in South East Asia* (Singapore: published by the author, 1965), A1–A2.

Xue Fucheng's meeting with Chinese overseas like Tan Kim Ching reflected the Qing empire's growing interest in the Chinese migrant merchants in the South Seas. By the sixteenth century, if not earlier, Chinese business networks had spread throughout major port-cities in maritime Asia. But the Chinese official interest in these Chinese residing abroad was new. The first official institute to protect these migrants, the Chinese Consulate in Singapore, was only established in 1877. Before this, the Qing (1644–1911) state, as well as its precursor, Ming (1368–1644), considered those departing China for profits abroad as deserters of the Chinese empire.<sup>3</sup> To apply the anthropologist Hill Gates' analysis of the two competing economic logics in late imperial China, the Chinese official policies that discouraged or even outlawed Chinese seaborne trade and migration represented the northern economic logic. The seaborne trade and migration was based on the southern logic.<sup>4</sup> Accordingly the Chinese official interest in southern Chinese and Chinese overseas in the late nineteenth century could be viewed as reconciliation between northern and southern economic logics. Nonetheless, the north-south tension remained to be the undertone of the newly synthesized economic motif.

In his pioneering study on the making of the economic zone between South China and the South Seas (known as Nanhai Trade) in *longue durée*, Wang has created the paradigm that scrutinizes the transnational connections in maritime Asia.<sup>5</sup> In the rest of the chapter, I highlight the importance of Chinese seaborne trade and migrants in the spread of European colonial settlements in the South Seas. In the nineteenth century, when Chinese nationalism became appealed to the Chinese overseas, the latter had constituted an inseparable part of the British colonial order in the region. The political leaders coming from the northern logic however viewed the versatile foreign connections established in southern transnational trade a threat to the stability of the

---

3 Wang Gungwu, "The Origins of Huaqiao," in *Community and Nation: China, Southeast Asia and Australia*, 1–11.

4 In Gates's terms, the north-south distinction is the difference between the petty commodity mode of production in South China vis-à-vis the tributary mode of production in North China. The former emphasizes household manufacture, cash crops, and transactions of land deeds; while the latter focuses on self-sufficiency, staple crops, and taxation. Revenues generated from trade and manufacture in coastal cities in South China had to be submitted to the political center in North China, which then redistributed the revenues to the hinterland areas. Hill Gates, *China's Motor: A Thousand Years of Petty Capitalism* (Cornell University Press, 1996).

5 Wang Gungwu, *The Nanhai Trade: Early Chinese Trade in the South China Sea* (Singapore: Eastern Universities Press, 2003). The original edition in 1958 by *Journal of the Malayan Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society*.

empire. Revolutions and various quests of southern automatic movements thus ensued after the collapse of the Qing empire in 1911.

### South China as China's Political Periphery and Economic Core

Maritime trade has long distinguished the two provinces Fujian and Guangdong from the rest of the Chinese empire. Prior to the Qin Dynasty's (221–206 BCE) annexation of the southern territories, the region was where the three Yue kingdoms—the Tong Ou in present-day Zhejiang, Min Yue in Fujian, and Nan Yue in Guangdong—were located. The Yue, above all the Nan Yue, were active in maritime trade along China's southeastern and southern coasts to northern Vietnam. In the first millennium, when a unifying empire in China collapsed, such as in the era of the North-South disunity (420–589) after the downfall of the Eastern Han (25–220) and in the period of Five Dynasties and Ten Kingdoms (907–960) following the decline of the Tang (618–907), southward migrants from the Yellow River valley filled the lands of south and southeast China. In these eras of disunity, the southern states established in the old lands of the Yues were active in maritime trade.<sup>6</sup> During the era of North-South disunity, the development of Canton paved the way for the operation of the *Guangzhou tonghai yidao* 廣州通海夷道 [the barbarian route from Canton to the sea]. It laid out the seaborne journeys between South China and the Red Sea taken by Arabic merchants. At about 714 CE or even earlier, the Tang Dynasty set up the first Superintendent of Maritime Trade (*Shibosi* 市舶司) in Canton, where the Arabic merchants came to trade in China.<sup>7</sup> These Arabic merchants later became teachers of southern Fujian merchants about maritime navigation in the Five Dynasties and Ten Kingdom. This gave birth to the rise of southern Fujian in Song and Yuan dynasties.<sup>8</sup>

6 Wang Gungwu, *The Nanhai Trade: Early Chinese Trade in the South China Sea*; see also Angela Schottenhammer, "Quanzhou's Early Overseas Trade: Local Politico-Economic Particulars During its Period of Independence." *Journal of Song Yuan Studies* 29 (1999): 1–41.

7 Though it remains unclear whether the Chinese traders also journeyed along the route with the foreigners, it is a fact that the navigation skills and shipbuilding technology shared by the Arabs contributed to the Chinese sailing as far as Sumatra. Chen Jia-rong 陳佳榮, *Zhong Wai Jiaotong shi* 中外交通史 [A History of Communication between China and Foreign Countries] (Hong Kong: Xuejin shudian, 1987); Chen Xiyu 陳希育, *Zhongguo fanchuan yu haiwai maoyi* 中國帆船與海外貿易 [*Chinese Junks and Overseas Trade*] (Xiamen, Fujian: Amoy University Press, 1991), 11–30.

8 Chang Pin-tsun 張彬村, "The Formation of a Maritime Convention in Minnan (Southern Fujian), c. 900–1200," in *From the Mediterranean to the China Sea*, edited by Galude Guillot, Denys Lombard and Roderich Ptak (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag, 1998), 143–155.

During the Song, China's economic center shifted irrevocably from north to south. According to Mark Elvin, the percentage of Fujian households in China rose from 3.1 percent in Tang in 806 and 6.3 percent in North Song in 1078 to 11.5 percent in the beginning of the Southern Song in 1131 and 12.6 percent in 1208.<sup>9</sup> With its capital in Hangzhou, a city close to the sea and the southeast coast, the Southern Song empire emphasized the development of shipbuilding technology and maritime navigation. Zayton, present-day Quanzhou, became a world business center for attracting merchants from the Red Sea, the Indian Ocean, and the South Seas.<sup>10</sup>

If the following Chinese dynasties could continue Song's open policy on foreign trade, the presentation of China in world history would not be misunderstood by statements such as the following: "The Chinese lacked range, focus, and above all, curiosity. They went to show themselves, not to see and learn; to bestow their presence, not to say; to receive obeisance and tribute, not to buy. They were what they were and did not have to change. They had what they had and did not have to take or make."<sup>11</sup> This perspective was partial, if not biased. From the following Yuan Dynasty (1279–1368), Chinese official policies on maritime trade began to shift between constraining maritime trade and lifting the ban until the Qing empire (1644–1911).<sup>12</sup>

In Yuan China, port cities in south China were important nodes of global trade and cultural exchanges. As recorded in Wang Daiyuan's 汪大淵 (ca. 1311–?) *Daoyi Zhilue* 島夷誌略 [A Brief Record of the Island Barbarians], "the travel

- 
- 9 Mark Elvin, *The Pattern of the Chinese Past: A Social and Economic Interpretation* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1973), 206. See also Billy K. L. So, *Prosperity, Region, and Institutions in Maritime China: The South Fukien Pattern, 946–1368* (Cambridge: Harvard University Asia Center, 2000).
- 10 Huff R. Clark, *Community, Trade, and Networks: Southern Fujian Province from the Third to the Thirteenth Century* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991); John W. Chaffee, "At the Intersection of Empire and World Trade: The Chinese Port City of Quanzhou (Zaitun), Eleventh-Fifteenth Centuries," in Kenneth R. Hall, ed., *Secondary Cities and Urban Networking in the Indian Ocean Realm, c. 1400–1800* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2008), 99–122.
- 11 David S. Landes, *The Wealth and Poverty of Nations: Why Some Are So Rich and Some So Poor* (New York and London: W. W. Norton & Company, 1998), 96.
- 12 About the swing between the official emphasis on tribute trade and encouragement of private trade between Song and Yuan, see Derek Heng, *Sino-Malay Trade and Diplomacy from the Tenth through the Fourteenth Century* (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 2009). On the general survey of maritime policies in late imperial China, see Ng Chin-keong, "Maritime Frontiers, Territorial Expansion and *Hai-fang* during the Late Ming and High Ch'ing," *China and Her Neighbors: Borders, Visions of the Other, Foreign Policy, 10th to 19th Century*, edited by Sabine Dabringhaus and Roderich Ptak (Harrassowitz Verlag, Wiesbaden, 1997), 211–258.

between China and these various countries and cities was just like journey across different administrative units in [China's] east and west."<sup>13</sup> It is worth noting that when Wang set off on his trips from Quanzhou to India, the Arabian Peninsula, and East Africa in the 1330s, the Arab-speaking Moroccan scholar Ibn Battuta (1304–1368 or 1377) also embarked on his pilgrimage from Tangier to Mecca for the Hajj. Ibn left North Africa in 1325 and returned home in 1349, after touring Egypt, Syria, Anatolia, the Central Asian steppe, India, the Maldives, and China.<sup>14</sup> The two travelers—one from the east and the other from the west—never met, but their journeys across different political and religious zones exemplified the importance of maritime routes between South China and the South Seas in the age that Janet Abu-Lughod has defined as the “thirteenth-century world-system.”<sup>15</sup>

In early Ming between 1405 and 1433, Zheng He embarked on seven maritime expeditions to the South China Sea and Indian Ocean to Africa. Records of the expeditions documented their encounters with Chinese communities that had been established in the South Seas. In Java and Palembang, most of the migrants were from Canton, Zhangzhou, and Quanzhou. They had adopted Islamic customs, and some were involved in local politics. The Ming empire, however, did not consider these Chinese overseas relevant to China. After Zheng He's adventures, the court was no longer interested in maritime expeditions. Chinese seaborne activities nonetheless continued.<sup>16</sup>

### Foreign Connections of Chinese Overseas Networks during the Long Sixteenth Century

The continuing operation of Chinese seaborne trade between the sixteenth and nineteenth centuries generated troubles for the Ming and Qing empires.

- 
- 13 Wang Dayuan's two trips might have taken place in 1330 and 1337. He dated the completion of his *Dao yi zhi lue* in 1349. See Su Jiqing 蘇繼廣 ed., *Dao yi zhi lue jiao shi* 島夷誌略校釋 [Editions and annotations of the brief history of the islands and the barbarians] (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 2000); Ross E. Dunn, *The Adventures of Ibn Battuta: A Muslim Traveler of the 14th Century* (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: University of California Press, 1989).
- 14 Dunn, *The Adventures of Ibn Battuta: A Muslim Traveler of the 14th Century*.
- 15 Janet L. Abu-Lughod, *Before European Hegemony: The World System A.D. 1250–1350* (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989).
- 16 Xiang Da 向達 ed., *Xi Yang Fanguo zhi, Zheng He hanghai tu, liang zhong haidao zhenjing* 西洋番國志、鄭和航海圖、兩種海道針經 [Barbarian countries in the West Seas, Zheng He's Navigation Maps, and Two Kinds of Compass Sea Routes] (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 2000), 6–12.

Collusion between coastal Chinese and foreign powers confronted official Ming policies on the maritime ban. The first of such challenges began in the raids of *wokou* 倭寇 (*wakō* in Japanese). Literally meaning “short bandits,” *wokou* is a derogatory way to indicate the Japanese origin of pirates. But studies to date have concluded that most *wokou* were Chinese from Fujian.<sup>17</sup> Against the backdrop of the formal tributary channel between the two countries in Ningbo closing after 1523, the *wokou* created an alternative channel for Sino-Japanese trade, as well as cultural and scientific exchanges.<sup>18</sup> Cooperation between Chinese and Japanese sea borne merchants, through informal or even illicit channels, also constituted the making of the formidable Lin Feng 林鳳 (Limahong in Spanish documents) group.<sup>19</sup> Lin attacked the Spanish Manila in 1574, and the Spanish crisis was only ended when another Chinese fleet, led by Wang Wangguo, came to rescue.<sup>20</sup>

In the long sixteenth century, Portuguese Malacca (1511) and Macao (1557), Spanish Manila (1565), Dutch Batavia (1619) and Formosa (Taiwan; 1624) were settlements of Chinese overseas. In 1567, the Ming government partially lifted the maritime ban by opening the port of Yuegang in Zhangzhou, Fujian, for registered Chinese junks to depart to and return from the South Seas. Yuegang 月港, literally meaning “the port under the moonlight,” had been taken by

- 
- 17 Sakuma estimates that in the second half of the sixteenth century, almost 80 to 90 percent of *wokou* were Chinese. Sakuma Shigeo 佐久間重男 *Nichi-min kankeishi no kenkyū* 日明關係史の研究 [Research on the History of Sino-Japanese Relation] (Tōkyō: Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, 1992), 19. This is an elaboration of earlier Chinese scholars' views such as Li Guangbi 李光璧, *Ming dai yu wo zhan zheng* 明代禦倭戰爭 [the war against the Wokou in Ming Dynasty] (Shanghai: Shanghai ren min chu ban she, 1956); Fu Yiling 傅衣凌, *Ming Qing shidai shangren ji shangye ziben* 明清時代商人及商業資本 [Merchants and merchant capital in Ming and Qing periods] (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1956).
- 18 Angela Schottenhammer, “Japan—the tiny Dwarf? Sino-Japanese Relations from the Kangxi to the Early Qianlong Reigns,” in Angela Schottenhammer, ed. *The East Asian Mediterranean—Maritime Crossroads of Culture, Commerce, and Human Migration* (Wiebaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 2006), 331–388.
- 19 Igawa Kenji 伊川健二 “At the Crossroads: Limahon and Wakō in Sixteenth Century Philippines,” in *Elusive Pirates, Pervasive Smugglers. Violence and Clandestine Trade in the Greater China Seas*, ed. Robert J. Anthony (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2010), 80.
- 20 Birgit M. Tremml, “The Global and the Local: Problematic Dynamics of the Triangular Trade in Early Modern Manila,” *Journal of World History*, Vol. 23, no. 3 (September 2012), 555–586.

Chinese smugglers for foreign trade in the years of the sea bans.<sup>21</sup> With the connection between the Chinese seaborne trade and the Spanish Manila galleon trade as well as the Dutch and Portuguese triangular trade along Nagasaki, Macao, and Batavia, silver flew to China. Four years later, the empire implemented the single whip system, which required all taxes to be paid in cash.<sup>22</sup>

The state, however, did not render any protection to the Chinese overseas. Zhang Xie's 張燮 (1574–1640) *Dong Xi Yang Kao* 東西洋考 [Surveys of the Eastern and Western Seas] documents that, in Manila, where “many Chinese frequently visited, usually stayed there for a long time without returning back [to China,]—the practice of ‘*ya dong*’ (壓冬; winter abroad)—more than 25,000 Chinese died and only 300 survived when anti-Chinese massacre broke out in 1603.<sup>23</sup> In Portuguese Malacca, “when Chinese junks refused to call at the port of Malacca, the Portuguese would attack the vessels and raid the cargoes.”<sup>24</sup>

The Manchu's Qing empire looked at Chinese residing abroad a threat to China. When the Ming Dynasty fell in 1644, the southern Chinese continued to be loyal to the Ming, and protected the fleeing Ming royal household. The most notable group of Ming loyalists in South China was the Zheng's family, founded by the seagoing merchant Zheng Zhilong 鄭芝龍 (1595–1661; alias Nicholas Iquan). Zheng Zhilong later surrendered to the Manchus, but his son Zheng Chenggong 鄭成功 (1624–1662, alias Koxinga 國姓爺) persisted. When the southward expansion of the Manchus became inevitable, Zheng Chenggong expelled the Dutch in Formosa in 1661 and took it as the new business and

21 Between 1589 and 1596, forty licenses were issued per year from Yuegang. Beginning in 1597, the number of licenses rose to 137, plus twenty prepared in case of emergency. The system also set up a buffering mechanism to suppress overseas trade whenever political turmoil was reported. For example, trade was halted during the years of the Japan-Korea war in 1593, the Dutch-Portuguese fights between 1622 and 1624, and the pirate invasions between 1628 and 1631. Tian Rukang 田汝康, *Zhongguo fanchuan maoyi yu duiwai guanxi shi luanwen ji* 中國帆船貿易與對外關係史論文集 [Essays of Chinese Junk Trade and International Relationship]; (Zhejiang: Renming Press, 1987), 39; Li Jinming 李金明, *Mingdai haiwai maoyi shi* 明代海外貿易史 [History of Overseas Trade in the Ming Period] (Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexueyuan chubanshe, 1990), 162; Ng Chin-keong, “Maritime Frontiers, Territorial Expansion and Hai-fang during the Late Ming and High Ch'ing.”

22 Dennis o. Flynn and Arturo Giráldez, “Born with a Silver Spoon: The Origin of World Trade in 1571,” *Journal of World History* 6, no. 2 (1995), 201–221.

23 Zhang Xie 張燮, *Dong Xi Yang Kao*, in Xie Fong ed. *Xi Yang Chaogao dian lu jiaozhu, Dong Xi Yang kao* 東西洋考西洋朝貢典錄校注, 東西洋考 [Annotations of Western tributary missions, Surveys of the Eastern and Western Seas] (Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju, 2000), 89.

24 Zhang, *Dong Xi Yang Kao*, 70.

political base. Zheng passed away one year after settling in Taiwan, but his followers continued to launch expeditions in South China with profits generated from Formosa's maritime trade. Before the fall of Taiwan in 1683, the Qing implemented strict maritime bans that not only prohibited any private junk trade but also quarantined the whole coastal line for residency.<sup>25</sup> The goal was to uproot the Zheng's business and political connections with coastal China so as to undermine its trade.

After the Dutch withdrew from Formosa, the Chinese-Dutch connections continued in Batavia. Between 1619 (the year the Dutch settlement was established) and 1740 (when a large-scale Chinese massacre occurred), Batavia was, in the words of Leonard Blussé, "economically speaking, basically a Chinese colonial town under Dutch protection."<sup>26</sup> This statement points out the predominant Chinese influence in the Dutch colonial city as well as the Dutch model of "co-colonialism" through incorporating the Chinese migrants.<sup>27</sup>

Following the Qing conquered Taiwan in 1683, the Qing opened four legal ports for Chinese maritime trade in Yuntaishan (Lianyungang, Jiangsu), Ningbo, Amoy (Xiamen), and Canton. In the words of Jennifer W. Cushman, "Chinese were permitted to go abroad without any reference to the tribute system, and their trade was administered under a different set of regulations from those pertaining to trade accompanying tribute envoys."<sup>28</sup> But with its privileging the tribute trade system, the Qing's attitudes on private seagoing trade fluctuated. Between 1717 and 1727, a ten-year maritime restriction was enacted. Chinese navigation to South Seas, particularly to Spanish Manila and Dutch Batavia, was prohibited. In 1728, another decree mandated that all Chinese who had settled abroad before 1717 would be granted amnesty if they returned to their native-places. Similar decrees were promulgated in the following years, but a proviso was later added that those who did not express willingness to

---

25 The quarantine policies were revised several times and the range of evacuation extended from ten to fifty then to eighty li in South China. Ng Chin-keong, "Maritime Frontiers, Territorial Expansion and Hai-fang during the Late Ming and High Ch'ing."

26 Leonard Blussé, *Strange Company: Chinese Settlers, Mestizo Women and the Dutch in VOC Batavia* (Dordrecht, Holland; Riverton, NJ: Foris Publications, 1986), 74.

27 Tonio Andrade coins this term to frame the Chinese-Dutch cooperation in the management of sugar plantations and trade of deer hides in Dutch Formosa between 1622 and 1661. See Andrade, *How Taiwan Became Chinese: Dutch, Spanish and Han Colonization in the Seventeenth Century* (Columbia University Press, 2008).

28 Jennifer W. Cushman, *Fields from the Sea: Chinese Junk Trade with Siam during the Late Eighteenth and Early Nineteenth Centuries* (Ithaca, NY: Southeast Asia Program, Cornell University, 1993), 139.

return to China would be regarded as deserters, for whom the empire would not offer any protection.<sup>29</sup>

The Chinese overseas networks were important to the rivalry between the British and Dutch in the South Seas in the eighteenth century. At the time when Japan entered its seclusion policy and restricted the outflow of silver, the Dutch sought alternative payment for the Chinese goods from products available in the South Seas. The soaring demand of these South Seas products generated new incentives for Chinese overseas migrants. The latter were active in tin mining and cultivation of tropical crops such as pepper and gambier.<sup>30</sup> Beginning in the 1730s, the British East India Company (EIC) started to recruit Chinese seagoing merchants on favorable terms of trade in every place “where a Dutch flag was not flying.”<sup>31</sup> These included Aceh, Kedah, Juala Selangor, and the Riau Archipelago. In the words of Carl Trocki, “The years between 1740 and 1780 mark an upsurge in the appearance of Chinese laborers’ settlements in the South Seas, particularly in areas outside of Dutch control.”<sup>32</sup>

When Britain’s strategies to expand its power east of the Straits of Malacca became aggressive after the British triumph in India in the Battle of Plassey, the Qing decided to close all Chinese maritime customs but Canton. Canton became the only legal trading port between 1757 and 1842.<sup>33</sup> To urge China to

---

29 Examining the implementation of these imperial ordinances, Lee Ying-hui argues that some Chinese who returned from abroad were actually punished by the government. For example, Chen Yilao 陳怡老 came back to China from Batavia, where he had worked for the Dutch as a Chinese leader (Captain China) for years. The officials in his hometown embezzled all his property to punish him for serving under a foreign political regime. Lee, *Huaqiao zhengce yu haiwai minzushuyi, 1912–1949*, 22. About the official policies on overseas Chinese, see also Ng Chin-keong, *Trade and Society: The Amoy Network: 1683–1735* (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1983), 184–212; Chen Xiyu, *Zhongguo fanchuan yu haiwai maoyi*, 232–233; 239–240.

30 Blussé, *Strange Company*, 131.

31 Blussé, *Strange Company*, 147.

32 Carl Trocki, *Opium, Empire and the Global Political Economy: A Study of the Asian Opium Trade, 1750–1950* (New York: Routledge, 1999), 44.

33 Chen Donglin and Li Danhui attribute the abolition of the multiple port system and the switch to the Canton system in 1757 to the infringement of Chinese customs regulations in Ningbo by British merchant James Flint. Ho-fung Hung, however, argues that the cause of the change was the competition between the Ningbo-based officials vis-à-vis the Canton-based officials, as well as the Qing empire’s concern over financial revenue. The Qing government favored the Cantonese because the Canton trade could generate more revenue: foreign trade in Canton was monopolized by a well-organized business guild (the Hong system); while in Ningbo trade with foreign merchants was in the hands of various unorganized merchants that made tax collection difficult. See Chen Donglin and

modify its foreign trade policy, between 1792 and 1834, the British dispatched three missions to China. The Qing court turned down all these requests.<sup>34</sup> Parallel to the attempt to seek a formal channel to negotiate with the Qing court, the EIC allowed “country traders,” nominally irrelevant to the EIC, to sail their clippers to smuggle Indian opium to China. It is estimated that one-third of the opium flew across the Straits of Malacca.<sup>35</sup> On the eve of the Anglo-Dutch Treaty in 1824, the EIC controlled the three leading ports in the Malay Peninsula: Penang (1789), Singapore (1819), and Malacca (1824). The British developed them into free ports for import, export and transshipment of cash crops, coal, rice, opium, and other products to global markets.<sup>36</sup>

Chinese migrants—both from China and from earlier established migrant communities such as Malacca—were crucial for British development in Singapore. Between 1825 and 1845, trade between Singapore and the countries of Burma, Cambodia, Cochin-China, and Siam increased from 0.7 million pounds to one million pounds. The amount further jumped to 8.7 million pounds in 1865.<sup>37</sup> Following the opening of the Suez Canal, in 1869, almost all European steamship lines en route to the Malacca Straits would call at the British free port. Before the establishment of direct trade between Hong Kong and many port-cities in the South Seas, exports from French Indochina, Cambodia, Siam, the Dutch East Indies, and its hinterland Malaya were shipped to Singapore before being distributed to the western markets.<sup>38</sup>

Qing China ceded the island of Hong Kong to the British after the Opium War (1839–1842). The British once regarded the colonization of Hong Kong as a mistake and expected to find another city-port close to the Lower Yangzi

---

Li Danhui 陳東林、李丹慧, “Qialong xianling Guangzhou yikoutongshang zhengce jiyingshang Renhonghui shijian shulun 乾隆限令廣州一口通商政策及英商任洪輝事件述論 [On the Qianlong Restriction of Trade to Guangzhou and the James Flint Incident]” *Lishi dangan*, Vol. XXV, 1987, 94–101; Ho-fung Hung, “Imperial China and Capitalist Europe in the Eighteen-Century Global Economy.” *Review: Fernand Braudel Center* XXIV (2001), no. 4: 473–513.

34 The three missions were the Macartney mission between 1792 and 1793, the Amherst mission in 1815, and the visit of Lord Napier, the first British superintendent of trade in China, in 1834. James L. Hevia, *Cherishing Men from Afar: Qing Guest Ritual and the Macartney Embassy of 1793* (Duke University Press, 2005).

35 Carl Trocki, *Opium, Empire and the Global Political Economy*, 56–57.

36 The three city-ports, including Dinding (now Manjung), were incorporated into the Straits Settlements in 1826 and became the British Crown Colony after 1867. The British implemented free-trade policies in the colony and secured its foothold in the “Far East.”

37 Wong Lin Ken, “Singapore: Its Growth as an Entrepôt Port, 1819–1941.” *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* IX (1978), no. 1: 55–56.

38 Wong Lin Ken, “Singapore: Its Growth as an Entrepôt Port, 1819–1941, passim.”

delta.<sup>39</sup> Within a few decades, however, Hong Kong however proved its economic significance. By the 1880s, 21 percent of China's total export trade and 37 percent of its import trade came from Hong Kong.<sup>40</sup>

### From Southern Chinese to Chinese Overseas in Colonial Asia

The majority of residents in British Hong Kong and Singapore were Chinese migrants from the two provinces in South China: Fujian and Guangdong. In G. W. Skinner's thesis of physiographical macroregions, Fujian belongs to the southeast coast while the majority of Guangdong is part of the Lingnan region. Before steamships became an option in coastal China in the nineteenth century, Chinese sailing vessels would depart from the southeast coast or Lingnan in the winter (mostly from November to March) by using northern or north-eastern monsoon winds to the insular South Seas (the Malay Peninsula, Sumatra, Java, and the Philippines). These sailors would then return to China in the summer (mostly from May to September) by using southern and south-western monsoon winds. Navigation from China to Japan and Ryukyu would take the other way around.


The northern part of southeast coast contains the drainage basin of the Min River, where the Hokchiu (Fuzhou 福州) and Hokchia speech-groups reside. In the southeast plain of the region, the Hokkien (Fujian 福建) live in the riverine plain of the Jin River (also called the Jiulong River). In the region's southernmost riverine delta, the Teochew (Chaozhou 潮州) live in the Han River plain. The Hokkien and Teochew are sometimes classified as the single Hoklo (Fulao 福佬) group, for they are the only two mutually communicable languages in the two regions. But politically, the Hokkien's homeland is administered under the Fujian province, while the Teochew is under the Guangdong province.<sup>41</sup>

The three leading Chinese ports to the South Seas from Song to Qing—Quanzhou, Yuegang, and Amoy—are all in the Hokkien homeland in south-eastern Fujian. Developing from their experiences of seaborne trade and migration, which developed as early as the tenth century through learning

39 G. B. Endacott, *A History of Hong Kong (second edition)* (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1964), 72–73.

40 Endacott, *A History of Hong Kong*, 194.

41 Xie Chongguang 謝重光, *Shezu yu keja fulao guangxi shi lue* 畬族與客家福佬關係史略 [A brief history of the relationship between the She people, the Hakka, and the Hoklo Xiamen] (Fujian Renmin chubanshe, 2002), Ch. 4.



MAP 1.1 *Native-Places of Major Chinese Speech-Groups in the South Seas*  
 SOURCE: THE ADMINISTRATIVE BOUNDARIES OF THE MAP ARE BASED ON THE 1911 COUNTY-BOUNDARY AND 1911 PROVINCIAL BOUNDARY OF CHINA, CHGIS VERSION 4. THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE SPEECH-GROUPS IN FUJIAN AND GUANGDONG PROVINCES IS BASED ON THE FOLLOWING SOURCES: LUO XIANGLIN 羅香林 (LO HSIANG-LIN), *KEJIA YANJIU DAOLUN* 客家研究導論 [AN INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE HAKKAS IN ITS ETHNIC, HISTORICAL, AND CAPITAL ASPECT (ORIGINAL ENGLISH TITLE)] (TAIPEI: NANTIAN SHUJU, 1992), 94–96; GONG BOHONG 龔伯洪 ED., *GUANGFU HUAQIAO HUAREN SHI* 廣府華僑華人史 [HISTORY OF CHINESE SOJOURNERS FROM THE CANTONESE-SPEAKING REGION]. GUANGZHOU: GUANGDONG GAODE JIAOYU CHUBANSHE, 2003), 2; CHANG KUAN-YU 張光宇, *MINKE FANGYEN SHIGAO* 閩客方言史稿 [HISTORICAL ACCOUNTS OF THE HOKKIEN AND HAKKA DIALECTS] (TAIPEI: NANTIAN SHUJU, [1996] 2003), 93–95; 213–219.

from the Arabs,<sup>42</sup> by the seventeenth century, the Hokkien constituted the earliest and most dominant group in Chinese seaborne trade. When the European mercantile groups came to Asia, the Hokkien business networks became indispensable to the trade in Portuguese Malacca, Dutch Batavia and Formosa, as well as Spanish Manila.<sup>43</sup> Blussé points out that the VOC allowed only the Hokkien but not other Chinese junks departing from Amoy to call at Batavia. This differential treatment was “probably because the Fujianese [i.e., the Hokkien] were found to be more easygoing than the Hakka or the

42 Chang, “The Formation of a Maritime Convention in Minnan (Southern Fujian), c. 900–1200,” 143–155.

43 Tonio Andrade, *How Taiwan became Chinese: Dutch, Spanish and Han Colonization in the Seventeenth Century*, Ch. 1.

Cantonese.<sup>44</sup> Instead of viewing “easygoing” as the Hokkien’s ethnic trait, one would well argue that this Dutch-Hokkien compatibility came from the Hokkien’s long-term engagement in foreign trade and maritime navigation.<sup>45</sup> When the Qing implemented the Canton monoport system in 1757, prominent Hokkien merchants also moved to Canton. They formed a monopolistic guild, which was composed of thirteen chartered *hong* 行 merchants and became the sole legal window of Chinese foreign trade. In the eighteenth century, the Hokkien influence also expanded to Siam and penetrated Siam’s tributary trade with China. The Hokkien merchants, above all those from the Tong’an area, dominated the Siamese tribute missions to China.<sup>46</sup>

The Teochews were active in agricultural migration from the late seventeenth to the eighteenth centuries.<sup>47</sup> They contributed to the development of rice paddies in Cochin China and the Mekong delta, as well as the urbanization there; Saigon became a town in 1772 and Bangkok in 1782.<sup>48</sup> This changed the pattern of South China–South Seas trade, which was no longer two-way traffic: the Chinese settled in Vietnam or Siam would also dispatch junks to ports in insular Malaya, Java, Sumatra, and Borneo.<sup>49</sup> Converging the agricultural

---

44 Blussé, *Strange Company*, 147.

45 According to James Kong Chin, the actual influence of the Hokkien maritime trade in the South Seas was greater than what can be estimated from the number of Hokkien junks that departed from these ports and registered in Southeast Asia. For example, to escape the strict regulations on junk size and trade destinations imposed by the Chinese court, many Hokkien traders would first stop at other Chinese coastal ports such as Suzhou, Ningpo, or Hainan Island to change cargoes, purchase new goods, or even rebuild junks before heading to Nanyang. The registration records on Chinese South Seas trade, therefore, undercounted the number of junks that actually belonged to Hokkien merchants. James Kong Chin, “The Junk Trade between South China and Nguyen Vietnam in the Late Eighteenth and Early Nineteenth Centuries,” in *Water Frontier: Commerce and the Chinese in the Lower Mekong Region, 1750–1880*, ed. Nola Cooke and Li Tana (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2004), 53–70.

46 Cushman, *Fields from the Sea*, 106–107.

47 Sarasin Viraphol, *Tribute and Profit: Sino-Siamese Trade 1652–1853* (Harvard University Press, 1977), 175; Leong, *Migration and Ethnicity in Chinese History: Hakkas, Pengmin, and their Neighbors*, 54–55.

48 Skinner, *Chinese Society in Thailand: An Analytical History*, 17; Pan Xingnong 潘醒農 ed. *The Teochews in Malaya* (Singapore: Nandao chubanshe, 1950).

49 Li Tana, “Rice from Saigon: Singapore Chinese and Saigon Trade of the Nineteenth Century,” in *Maritime China and Overseas Chinese Communities in Transition, 1750–1850*, ed. Ng Chin Keong (Germany, Harrassowitz Verlag, 2004), 261–270; Li Tana, *Nguyen Cochinchina: Southern Vietnam in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries* (Southeast Asian Program, Cornell University, 1998).

farming and the circulation of these goods, Siam became what the Teochews considered their second hometown.<sup>50</sup>

The other macroregion, Lingnan, covers most of the administrative boundary of Guangdong province except the Teochew's Han River basin. The five high mountains in Lingnan's northern tier, called *Nan Ling* 南嶺 (literally meaning "southern ranges"), border the region from the mid-Yangzi valleys. The alluvial plains of the Pearl River delta are the wealthiest core of the region, where the Yue speaking people resided. The Yue people, commonly known as Cantonese, identify themselves as *punti* 本地 (literally meaning "natives"). They can be further classified into at least two groups: the Guangfu 廣府 Cantonese are from the core region of the Pearl River delta (including the counties of Tung Kwun 東莞, Pun U 番禺, Nan Hoi 南海, Heung Sham 香山, Shun Tak 順德, Po On 寶安, and Sam Shui 三水), and the Sze Yap 四邑 Cantonese came from the western bank of the delta (including Yan Ping 恩平, Hoi Ping 開平, Toi Shan 台山 [San Ning 新寧], San Wui 新會, and Hok Shan 鶴山).<sup>51</sup>

Beyond the Pearl River delta, uphill of Guangdong province and its adjacent mountainous areas of western Fujian is the homeland of the Hakka (Kejia 客家, literally meaning guest households).<sup>52</sup> The term "Hakka" was coined from the perspectives of the Cantonese *punti*, implying that those uphill residents were unwelcome intruders. In the sixteenth century, the Hakka responded to the economic boom by migrating to mine-rich hills for zinc and lead. They also moved to coastal plains for cash-crop cultivation. However, these highly market-dependent businesses collapsed when the economy turned downward. Pillaging and banditry became part of the Hakka's survival strategy and generated conflicts with the plain residents, *punti*. The conflicts intensified during the Qing empire. After the Qing's conquest of Taiwan in 1683, the government encouraged the Hakka to move across their homelands to the coastal area. A wave of Hakka migrated to the west bank of the Pearl

50 Pan Xingnong, *The Teochews in Malaya*, 1.

51 Gong Bohong 龔伯洪 ed., *Guangfu huaqiao huaren shi* 廣府華僑華人史 [History of Chinese Sojourners from the Cantonese-speaking region]. Guangzhou: Guangdong gaode jiaoyu chubanshe, 2003), 2.

52 Luo Xianglin 羅香林 (Lo Hsiang-lin), *Kejia yanjiu daolun* 客家研究導論 [An Introduction to the study of the Hakkas in its Ethnic, historical, and capital Aspect (original English title)]. Published by Shi-Shan Library, Hsingning, Kwangtung, in 1933. Reprinted in 1992 in Taipei by the Nantian shuju. Chen Zhiping 陳支平, *Kejia yuanliu xinlun* 客家源流新論 (*New thesis on Hakka origins*; Nan'ning: Guangxi jiaoyu chubanshe, 1997).

River delta, where the Sze Yap Cantonese lived. Clashes between these two speech-groups became known as “*tu-ke* 土客” fights: the Cantonese as *tu*, the natives, and the Hakka as *ke*, the guest people.<sup>53</sup>

After the eighteenth century, tension between the Hakka and the Cantonese pushed both of them to seek fortunes abroad. The surging interests among native regimes in Malaya, Kalimantan, Siam, and Vietnam in mining and harbor dredging created new business opportunities for these new migrants from South China. For example, the Sultan of Sambas recruited a band of Chinese workers to mine gold in the jungles of west Borneo. These Hakka coal miners later established their own joint-venture company and policies with self-sustained militias.<sup>54</sup>

After the 1840s, the opening of foreign shipping along China’s coastal line from Canton to Shanghai devastated the overland transportation between Lingnan and the Yangzi basins. The presence of *yanghang* 洋行 (foreign mercantile houses) further indebted the peasants in the hinterland.<sup>55</sup> Economic hardship pushed the Hakka and Sze Yap Cantonese to look for new opportunities overseas.<sup>56</sup> Though not all were voluntary migrants, the introduction of Chinese labor to the Americas, Australia, and South Africa was channeled through diplomatic treaties such as the Anglo-Sino Peking Convention (1860), the Convention to Regulate the Engagement of Chinese Emigrants by British and French Subjects (1866), and the China-U.S. Burlingame Treaty (1868).<sup>57</sup> Some of these labor migrants, known as Chinese coolies, turned their trans-Pacific networks into long-distance trade. The exemplary model was the

53 Leong, *Migration and Ethnicity in Chinese History*, 43–68.

54 Wang Tai Peng, *The Origins of Chinese Kongsis* (Selangor Darul Ehsan, Malaysia: Pelanduk Publications, 1994); Yuan Bingling, *Chinese Democracies: A Study of the Kongsis of West Borneo, 1776–1884* (Leiden: Research School of Asian, African and Amerindian Studies, Universiteit Leiden, 2000).

55 Frederic Wakeman Jr., *Strangers at the Gate: Social Disorder in South China, 1839–1861* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1966), 127–131; Erbaugh, “The Secret History of the Hakkas: the Chinese Revolution as a Hakka Enterprise”; Yongding xian difongzhi bianji weiyuanhui 永定縣地方誌編輯委員會 ed. *Yongding xianzhi* 永定縣誌 [*Gazetteer of the Yongding county*]; Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue jishu chubanshe, 1994), 693.

56 It has been estimated that, in 1855, 16,107, or 41.6 percent, of Chinese migrants in the United States came from Sze Yap; 14,000, or 36.2 percent, from Heung Sham; and 10,500, or 18 percent, from the Guangfu district. Gong Bohong ed., *Guangfu huaqiao huaren shi*, 87.

57 Hsu, *Dreaming of Gold, Dreaming of Home*; Kuhn, *Chinese Among Others: Emigration in Modern Times*, 107–151.

TABLE 1.1 *The Distribution of Chinese Speech-Groups in the South Seas*

Chinese Speech-Groups*	Siam	British Malaya	Dutch East Indies	French Indochina	Philippines	British North Borneo
Hokkien	250,000 (10%)	812,211 (34%)	825,000 (55%)	100,000 (20%)	240,000 (80%)	498,000 (30%)
Cantonese	250,000 (10%)	573,326 (24%)	225,000 (15%)	250,000 (50%)	60,000 (20%)	116,200 (70%)
Teochew	1,500,000 (60%)	286,663 (12%)	150,000 (10%)	150,000 (30%)	—	—
Hakka	200,000 (8%)	429,994 (18%)	300,000 (20%)		—	—
Hainanese	250,000 (10%)	143,331 (6%)	—		—	—
Others	50,000 (2%)	143,332 (6%)	—	—	—	—
Total	2,500,000 (100%)	2,388,857 (100%)	1,500,000 (100%)	500,000 (100%)	300,000 (100%)	166,000 (100%)

\* Indicated as Chinese “races” in the original source.

Source: Taiwan Sōtōkufu gaiji-bu 台灣總督府外事部, *Kakyō keizai jijyō* 華僑經濟事情 [Economic situations of overseas Chinese] (Taihouku: Kōmyōsha shōkai, 1943), 11–14.

establishment of the Kam Shan Chong (Gold Mountain Guild). Based in Hong Kong, the Kam Shan Chong businesses turned the British colony into a nexus of trans-Pacific trade run by self-made Cantonese men.<sup>58</sup>

In the early 1940s, when all-important trading ports in the South Seas as well as in China’s Lingnan and southeast coast were under Japanese occupation, Japan completed a survey that detailed the distribution of Chinese speech-groups in major cities in the South Seas. It shows the concentration of Hokkien in most major cities in the region, followed by Teochew, Cantonese, Hakka, and the Hainanese (table 1.1).



MAP 1.2

*Distribution of Speech-Groups Among the Chinese in the South Seas*

SOURCE: IDE KIYATA 井出季和太, *NAN'YŪ KAKYŪ 南洋と華僑* (TŌKYŌ : SANSEIDŌ, 1941), 3.

COURTESY OF THE ARCHIVAL OFFICE OF THE INSTITUTE OF TAIWAN HISTORY, ACADEMIA SINICA, TAIPEI.

## British Colonial Classifications of the Chinese in Hong Kong and Singapore

In both Hong Kong and Singapore, the British dealt with the layers of Chinese population by the principle of “divide and rule.” In Censuses 1911, 1921, and 1931, the generic category that British applied to classify the Chinese speech-groups was “Chinese race.” It was further broken down by Chinese language groups, designated as “Chinese dialects”: Cantonese, Hailam, Hokkien, Kheh (Hakka), Teochiu (Teochews), and others. Baba Chinese was not among these groups, though its population may be gauged in the category of “Chinese who were Malay speakers.” Of this group, 17,882 were in the Straits Settlements in 1911.<sup>59</sup> A. M. Pountney, the superintendent of the 1911 census in the Federated Malay States, emphasized the importance of looking into the differences among the Chinese speech-groups: “Between what may be called the major dialects or, preferably, the principal languages of China, e.g., the Mandarin, the Cantonese, the Hokkien, etc., lies as great a difference as between European languages, and, though these major dialects range themselves into groups as do European languages, it is scarcely an overstatement to say that there are as many different languages in China, and as many different dialects of those distinct languages, as there are languages and dialects in Europe.”<sup>60</sup>

The supervision of the Census 1921, J. E. Nathan further divided the Chinese “race” by birthplace: “Chinese born in British Malaya” and “Chinese born elsewhere.” The latter category included those Chinese migrants born in China, Burma, Siam, the Netherlands, India, or elsewhere outside British Malaya.<sup>61</sup> As for the Malay-born Chinese population, Nathan considered those Malay-assimilated Baba Chinese as Hokkien-originated, but the creolization process made them an idiosyncratic speech-group: “Baba Malay differs from the language of the Malays, because it uses a number of Chinese words, mispronounces many Malay words, is ignorant of others, and employs a wonderful ‘pidgin’ idiom.”<sup>62</sup> However, in the report of Census 1931, the category of the Straits-born Chinese no longer existed. The registration of Baba Chinese was

---

59 Hayes Marriott, *Report of the Census of the Colony of the Straits Settlements, 1911* (Singapore: Government Printing Press, 1911), section of language, Table V.

60 J. E. Nathan, *The Census of British Malaya 1921* (London, Dunstable and Watford: Waterlow & Sons Limited, 1922), 78.

61 Nathan, *The Census of British Malaya 1921*, 95.

62 Nathan, *The Census of British Malaya 1921*, 77.

TABLE 1.2 Chinese Population in Singapore in British Censuses\*

(1) Censuses 1881, 1891 and 1901														
	Straits-born Chinese	Hokkien	Teo-Chews	Cantonese	Kheh	Hylams	Hok Chiu	Tribe not stated	Total					
1881	9,527	24,981	22,644	14,853	6,170	8,319		272	86,766					
1891	12,805	45,856	23,737	23,397	7,402	8,711		N/A	121,908					
1901	15,498	59,117	27,564	30,729	8,514	9,451	12,888	280	163,741					
(2) Census 1911														
	Straits-born	Hokkien	Teo-chiu	Cantonese	Kheh	Hailam	Hai-lo- hong	Hsing- hoa	Hok- chia	Hok- chiu	Kau-chiu	Lui-chiu	Mandarin	Total
1911	43,883	91,549	37,507	48,739	12,487	10,775	5	1,925	3,640	3,653	86	77	252	222,655

TABLE 1.2 (cont.)

(3) Censuses 1921 and 1931										
	Straits-born	Hokkien	Toe Chiu	Cantonese	Khoh	Hailam	Him Hoas	Hok Chias	Hokchius	Total
1921	79,686	136,823	53,428	78,959	14,572	14,547	1,659	3,845	5,000	388,519
		<b>Hokkien</b>	<b>Tiecchiu</b>	<b>Cantonese</b>	<b>Hakka</b>	<b>Hainanese</b>	<b>Kwongsai</b>	<b>Hokchiu</b>		<b>Total</b>
1931	N/A	180,108	82,405	94,742	19,317	19,896	742	6,539		421,441

\* To highlight the British changing systems in classifying the Chinese population, I adopt the original spellings of the speech-group names in each census. Sources: E. M. Merewether, Esq., *Report of the Census of the Straits Settlements, 1891*, 46-47; J. R. Innes, Esq., *Report on the Census of the Colony of the Straits Settlements Taken on the 1st March, 1901* (Singapore: Government Printing Press, 1901), 19-20; H. Marriott, Esq., *Report of the Census of the Colony of the Straits Settlements, 1911*. (Singapore: Government Printing Press, 1911), 62-64; 79. The population of total Chinese is based on birth-places, not on speech-groups; Nathan, J. E. *The Census of British Malaya* (Waterlow & Sons Limited, London, Dunstable and Watford, 1922), 79-83.

then merged with the category of Hokkien.<sup>63</sup> In the early 1940s, Japan also adopted this framework to classify the Chinese (map 1.2).

TABLE 1.3 *Members of the Chinese Advisory Board, Singapore, between 1921 and 1941*

Name	Speech Group	Years Taking the Position between 1921 and 1941
Lim Boon Keng	Hokkien	1921
Tan Kheam Hock	Hokkien	1921
Lim Chwee Chian	Hokkien	1921–1923
Lim Peng Siang	Hokkien	1921–1941
See Tiong Wah	Hokkien	1921–1941
Tan Sian Cheng	Hokkien	1921–1937
Tan Cheng Siong	Hokkien	1922
See Boo Ee	Hokkien	1922–1933
Chiong Tsui Phuan	Hokkien	1923–1935
Tan Kah Kee	Hokkien	1924–1941
Cheong Chee Hai	Hokkien	1929–1934
Lim Kim Tian	Hokkien	1931
Chua Kah Cheong	Hokkien	1932–1933
Yap Geok Twee	Hokkien	1933–1937; 1939–1941
Lim Keng Lian	Hokkien	1933–1935; 1939–1941
S. B. Tan	Hokkien	1934–1936
Gan Say Hong	Hokkien	1935–1937
Lee Kong Chian	Hokkien	1935–1941
K. I. Tan	Hokkien	1936–1940
Chua Keh Hai	Hokkien	1937–1939
Tan Chin Hean	Hokkien	1937–1939
Tan Ean Kiam	Hokkien	1937–1941
Ong Piah Teng	Hokkien	1939–1941
Chin Chye Fong	Hokkien	1940–1941

63 Changing classification of the Straits-born Chinese after 1921, see also Nirmala PuruShotam, “Disciplining Difference: Race in Singapore,” in *Southeast Asian Identities: Culture and the Politics of Representation in Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand*, ed. Joel S. Kahn (New York: St. Martin Press, 1998), chapter 3, 51–94.

TABLE 1.3 (*cont.*)

Name	Speech Group	Years Taking the Position between 1921 and 1941
Chee Peck Lian	Hokchiu	1928–1931
Li Seng Yu	Cantonese	1921–1926
Ng Seng Phang	Cantonese	1921–1941
Yau Ngan Pan	Cantonese	1921–1929
Chu Chuk Shan	Cantonese	1924
Cheng Kee Sun	Cantonese	1925–1941
Ho See Koon	Cantonese	1927–1933
Lam Mun Thin	Cantonese	1931–1941
Ng Sen Choy	Cantonese	1933–1941
Lau Long Teng	Teochew	1921
Liau Chia Heng	Teochew	1921–1929
Seah Eng Tong	Teochew	1921–1941
Tan Thuan Hian	Teochew	1921–1925
Heng Pang Kiat	Teochew	1922–1929
Tan Tsz Yew	Teochew	1924–1930
Tan Guan Chua	Teochew	1929–1941
Lee Wee Nam	Teochew	1930–1941
Lee Kim Soo	Teochew	1931–1934
Low Peng Soy	Teochew	1934–1938
Lim Soo Siam	Teochew	1938–1941
Then Tzin Khin	Hakka	1921–1923
Thong Siong Lim	Hakka	1921–1931
Low Ting Teng	Hakka	1924–1941
Sze Jin Chan	Hakka	1929
Yeong Yip Lin	Hakka	1932–1941
Ui Chiau Keng	Hainanese	1921–1923
Tan Khye Kok	Hainanese	1924–1941
Quek Shin	Hainanese	1939–1941
Lim Say Kwee	N/A	1931–1937
Lee Soon Ban	N/A	1937–1941

Sources: *Straits Settlements Government Gazettes (ssGG) 1921*, No. 269; *ssGG 1922*, No. 843; *ssGG 1923*, No. 164; *ssGG 1924*, No. 207; *ssGG 1925*, No. 234; *ssGG 1927*, p. 194; *ssGG 1928*, No. 517; *ssGG 1929*, No. 324; *ssGG 1930*, No. 245; *ssGG 1931*, No. 750; *ssGG 1933*, No. 1296; *ssGG 1935*, No. 3230; *ssGG 1939*, No. 1899.

Neither was there a seat to represent the Baba community in the organization of the Chinese Advisory Board (CAB) in Singapore.<sup>64</sup> Seats for various representatives were arranged in accordance with the quasi proportionate population of each speech-group: the Hokkien thus took the most seats, followed by the Cantonese, Teochew, Hakka, Hainanese, and Hokchiu.

The blurring boundary between the Baba and China-born Chinese was a result of the inevitable trend for the Baba to absorb new migrants from China to manage the revenue farming system in the nineteenth century. The British granted the Baba the initial rights to operate the revenue farming system, which involved various businesses such as harbor dredging, running pepper and gambier farms, and selling opium and liquor. In return, the farmers would submit a fixed proportion of the profits as British revenue.<sup>65</sup> These British-patronized revenue farmers became the leaders of the expanding Chinese communities through hiring migrants from China for farm and mining as well as harbor dredging work.

The leaders in the Hokkien circle were Baba Chinese from Malacca. In 1840, the Malacca Baba Tan Tock Seng 陳篤生 (Chen Dusheng), an investor in J. H. Whitehead's company, established the Thean Hock Keong 天后宮.<sup>66</sup> The temple soon became the center of Hokkien communal life and was the precursor of the Singapore Fujian Native-Place Association, which was formally registered under the Societies Ordinance in 1916. Before 1916, three generations of the Tan Tock Seng family led the association: Tan Tock Seng, his son Tan Kim

64 Lee Poh Ping, *Chinese Society in Nineteenth Century Singapore*, 99–112; Yen Ch'ing-hwang, *A Social History of the Chinese in Singapore and Malaya, 1800–191* (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1986), Ch. 5.

65 The operation of the system ran something like this: The British allowed Chinese merchants to bid for the exclusive economic rights to open fields in the two colonies through the operation of revenue farms. The "farms" included different kinds of economic ventures such as opening up jungles into farmlands, dredging harbors, running coal mines, opening gambling dens or brothels, and selling opium as well as liquor. As successful bidders, the revenue "farmers" had to furnish the capital to invest in trade, employ labor brokers for labor recruitment (mostly through shipping coolies from China), and submit the profits to the British. They were capitalists in the emerging colonial economy. In the nineteenth century, after 1819, 30 to 60 percent of local revenues in Singapore and other ports of the Straits Settlements came from opium revenue farms. Trocki, *Opium and Empire: Chinese Society in Colonial Singapore, 1800–1910*, Chapter 3; "Opium and the Beginning of Chinese Capitalism in Southeast Asia," *Journal of Southeast East Asia* 32, 2 (2002): 297–314.

66 Su Xiaoxian ed., *Zhangzhou shishu lu Xing tongxianglu*, 57.

Ching—whom the Mandarin Xue Fucheng met in Siam in January 1890, as mentioned in the beginning of the chapter—as well as his grandson Tan Boo Liat 陳武烈 (Chen Wulie).<sup>67</sup>

In the Teochew communities, the rise of the Seah Eu Chin 余有進 (She Youjin; 1805–1883) family pointed to the power of forming marital ties between the China-born and Straits-born Chinese communities. Seah was born in the Teochew area in China but left for Singapore in 1823, and in two decades, he became known as the king of pepper and gambier farms in Singapore, Johor, and Riau. In 1845, he coordinated with eleven other prominent Teochew merchants to found the Ngee Ann Kongsi 義安公司. It provided communal services including worship of Teochew deities, management of cemetery grounds, and loans.<sup>68</sup> Seah Eu Chin was also an effective broker in the constant fights that took place within the revenue farming system. In 1867, he became the first Chinese person honored by the British as a Justice of the Peace.<sup>69</sup> His brother-in-law Tan Seng Poh 陳成寶 (Chen Chengbao), born in a prominent Baba family in Perak, dominated the opium and spirit syndicate between Singapore and Johor, which coordinated with Seah's Teochew pepper and gambier farms.<sup>70</sup> Tan Seng Poh was appointed the Municipal Commissioner in 1870, becoming the first Chinese person with this title.<sup>71</sup> Seah Eu Chin's son, Seah Liang Seah 余連城 (She Liancheng), was a member of the Legislative Council from 1883.<sup>72</sup>

67 After 1860, the temple was reorganized as the Thean Hock Keong Hokkien Huay Kuan (Singapore Fujian Native-Place Association), which was formally registered under the Societies Ordinance in 1916. On the Thean Hock Keong Fujian Native-Place Association and the Hokkien communities in Singapore. Ko Mu Lin and Lim How Seng 柯木林、林孝勝 eds. *Xing hua lishi yu renwu yanjiu* 星華歷史與人物研究 [Research on the history and people of Singapore and Malaya Chinese] (Singapore: Nanyang xuehui, 1986), 68; Yen Ch'ing-hwang, "Early Fujianese Migration and Social Organization in Singapore and Malaya before 1900," in *Zhongguo haiyang fazhan shi lunwenji di wu ji* 中國海洋發展史論文集第五輯 [Essays on Development of Chinese Maritime Transportation, No. 5], ed. Chang Pin-tsun and Liu Shiji 張彬村、劉石吉 (Taipei: Sanminzhuyi yanjiusuo, Academia Sinica, Taipei, 1993), 679–740.

68 Pan Xingnong ed., *The Teochews in Malaya*, 78–83; Zhou Zhaojing 周昭京, *Chaozhou hui-guan shi hua* 潮州會館史話 [History and Anecdotes of the Teochew Associations] (Shanghai: Shanghai guji chubanshe, 1995), 125–167; Koh, *Who's Who in South East Asia*, A 52–54.

69 Song Ong Siang, *One Hundred Years' History of the Chinese in Singapore*, 39–41, 50–51; Pan ed. *The Teochews in Malaya*, 39–40; Trocki, *Opium and Empire*, 105–106; 112–113;

70 Trocki, *Opium and Empire*, 117–120; 134–148.

71 Song, *One Hundred Years' History of the Chinese in Singapore*, 132.

72 Song, *One Hundred Years' History of the Chinese in Singapore*, 213.

In 1900, these Anglicized Baba Chinese formed the Straits Chinese British Association (SCBA). It has been long considered as the formation of a distinctive “King’s Chinese” identity. In particular, the SCBA organized the Singapore Volunteer Infantry, which included both Eurasians and Straits-born Chinese to commit to military defense of the British government.<sup>73</sup> One of its founding members, Song Ong Siang, became the first Asian subject knighted in Singapore, in 1936.<sup>74</sup>

Unlike the British governance in Singapore, where different clusters of Chinese developed explicit boundaries among each speech-group, the majority of the Chinese migrants in Hong Kong came from nearby Guangdong province. According to the censuses of Hong Kong, the majority of the colony were Chinese migrants from Guangdong. In 1931, 65.04 percent of the total population of the Chinese “race” (821,429 people) were born in Guangdong, while 32.93 were Chinese-born in Hong Kong, the Kowloon Peninsula, and the New Territories. Altogether, 97.97 percent of the local population were from the Guangdong area, leaving 1.59 percent as Chinese from elsewhere in China.<sup>75</sup> The British censuses also classified the Chinese population by their native-place of origin at the county level, such as Tung Kwun, Pun U, Nan Hoi, Heung Sham, Shun Tak, Po On, Sam Shui, Yan Ping, Hoi Ping, San Ning (Toi Shan), San Wui, Hok Shan, Waichow 惠州, Ka Ying Chau 嘉應州, Tsang Sing 增城, Hoi Fong 海豐, Lok Fong 陸豐, and Chiu Chau 潮州. The majority were Cantonese-speaking counties, but some were Hakka or Teochew districts. To compare the distribution of speech-groups in Hong Kong with the British and Japanese surveys in Malaya, I organize the census data in Hong Kong according to the speech-groups as follows:<sup>76</sup>

73 Song, *One Hundred Years' History of the Chinese in Singapore*, 327–328.

74 Song, *One Hundred Years' History of the Chinese in Singapore*, 78–79.

75 Hong Kong Census Department, *Hong Kong Census Report, 1841–1941* (Xerox copy of reports from government publications and other sources, the Libraries of the Hong Kong University), the year of 1931, 129. It is worth noting that the category of “race” did not collapse with the category of “nationality.” First, among those 92.4% Chinese (or 758,606 people) claiming their Chinese nationality, some also held British, Dutch, or Japanese nationalities. According to the census, 13.4% (110,013) Chinese held British nationality, and 0.19% (1,591) were naturalized British subjects. In addition, 473 had the nationality of Portuguese, 446 American, 61 Japanese, 59 Dutch, and 53 German. See Hong Kong Census Department, *Hong Kong Census Report, 1841–1941*, the year of 1931, table 25.

76 On the boundaries of the speech-groups and their native-places of origin, see the above discussion.

TABLE 1.4 *Major Chinese Speech-Groups in Hong Kong, 1911–1931, an Estimate\**

	1911	1921	1931
Guangfu Cantonese	159,885	245,190	258,181
Sze Yap Cantonese	44,964	71,084	101,016
Hakka	20,115	28,961	31,034
Teochew	6,592	8,033	11,373

\* The data excludes native residents in the New Territories.

Source: Hong Kong Census Department, *Hong Kong Census Reports, 1841–1941* (Hong Kong: the Authority, 1965): section on 1911, Table VIII, 105–106; section on 1921, Table XXI, 204; section on 1931, 129.

Unlike Singapore, the revenue farming system did not produce a selected group of British-privileged Chinese in Hong Kong. The British in Hong Kong patronized those who had established reputations in the Chinese communities. For example, the Tung Wah Hospital 東華醫院, founded in 1869, provided free medical care and shelter, prevented human trafficking, and managed street lighting and rice distribution, among other social services. The board of directors of the hospital thus created a pool from which the British could recruit Chinese communal leaders.<sup>77</sup> Among the thirteen founders of Tung Wah, only one was from the opium business, and there was no sign of alliance or business coordination between the opium merchant and the other leaders<sup>78</sup> The key difference lay in the fact that the Chinese opium farms in Hong Kong did not connect with an ample demand from labor consumers, as the pepper-gambier economy in Malay did.<sup>79</sup> The making of Chinese bourgeoisie in Hong Kong was not grounded in the close-knit economic ties with the labor migrants.

Many leaders on Tung Wah hospital's board of directors had Qing official titles, through either purchasing or passing the official examination. Most of the Tung Wah leaders were recruited into the District Watch Force, Legislative Council, Po Leung Kuk, or other British establishments for Chinese affairs in Hong Kong. The British thus regarded the Tung Wah leaders as the "colony's

77 Smith, *Chinese Christians*, 103–171; Sinn, *Power and Charity*, 89–96.

78 Smith, *Chinese Christians*, 108–110; 119.

79 Christopher Munn, "The Hong Kong Opium Revenue 1845–1885," in *Opium Regimes: China, Britain and Japan, 1839–1952*, ed. T. Brook and B. T. Wakabayashi (California: University of California Press, 2000), 105–126.

governing body in all Chinese matters.”<sup>80</sup> In 1898, when the first advisory board of Tung Wah Hospital was organized, the British Commission supervised the whole process with the expectation that “it [the board] would facilitate its relations with the government and the public, and would secure continuity and uniformity in its arrangements.”<sup>81</sup> A list of the organization’s directors was announced annually in the “Report of the Secretary for Chinese Affairs” in the Hong Kong Administrative Report, as if they held official titles.<sup>82</sup>

### Chinese Overseas Entrepreneurship and Late Qing Economic Nationalism

Chinese overseas in both Hong Kong and Singapore played a crucial role in the formation of Chinese nationalism. The emergence of nationalist thought among Chinese overseas can be understood by the observation of Elizabeth Sinn, based on her study of Hong Kong: “It is no coincidence that several figures closely associated with modern Chinese nationalism had lived for some time in Hong Kong. . . . There they acquired Chinese national identity through living side by side with foreigners. There, they could observe China as outsiders, and in relation to other nations. They could conceive of China as more than a village or province, as one sovereign nation among many sovereign nations.”<sup>83</sup> The dedication of Chinese overseas to the interests of China in international competition nonetheless did not arise overnight. Victor Purcell points out that the Chinese in Singapore were indifferent to the outbreak of the Opium War in China.<sup>84</sup> In the middle of the Second Opium War

80 *Daily Press*: Oct. 7, 1871, cited from Sinn, *Power and Charity*, 83–84.

81 The Tung Wah Group of Hospitals Editorial Board, *Donghua san yuang fanzhan shi* 東華三院發展史 [Development of the Tung Wah Hospitals (1870–1960)] (Hong Kong: Tong Wah Group of Hospitals, 1961), 21.

82 The Tung Wah Group of Hospitals Editorial Board, *Donghua san yuang fanzhan shi*, English section, 17–47.

83 Sinn, “The Strike and Riot of 1884: A Hong Kong Perspective,” *Journal of Hong Kong Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society* 22 (1982): 91.

84 In Purcell’s words, “In May 1840 British troops intended for use in the First China War arrived and camped on the Esplanade, arousing no manifestation of hostility on the part of the local Chinese. In 1857, at the beginning of the Second China War, some ill will towards the British was shown by a section of the poorer classes, but when Lord Elgin arrived in Singapore on 6 June of that year, on his way to China as British High Commissioner and Plenipotentiary, he was presented with an address by the Chinese merchants in which they referred to *the great advantage the Chinese population was*

(1856–1860), the British colonial officer George Ferguson Bowen observed that “the Chinese coolie freely helped the British and French to attack Chinese positions.” The divide was in the 1880s, after the Sino-French War broke out, Chinese boatmen and merchants in Hong Kong refused to offer provisions to ships flying the French flag, and local Chinese elites offered protection for workers on strike.<sup>85</sup> The dedication to China’s survival among the Chinese bourgeoisie in Hong Kong and Singapore was thus not an essential but a contingent commitment, varied on different occasions and differing among networks.

The self-strengthening movement (1861–1895), or the Qing’s top-down reforms to assimilate China to the Western idea of interstate relationships, was one situation in which Chinese with overseas experiences could directly contribute to China’s official agendas. Among these Chinese contributors, Yung Wing 容闳 (1828–1912) was a Macao-born Cantonese who received his primary education at Protestant Robert Morrison Society School, founded by Dr. Robert Morrison, D. D. (1782–1834). Later, under the support of the school principal, Samuel R. Brown, Yung Wing pursued college education in America and became the first Chinese graduate of Yale University in 1854. Upon returning to Asia, he joined the staff of the British colonial government in Hong Kong and was once attracted by the anti-Manchu Taiping regime in Nanjing.<sup>86</sup> Between the 1860s and 1870s, he helped the Qing statesman Zeng Guofan establish China’s arsenal schools. He also organized the Chinese Education Mission to the United States that recruited motivated and talented pupils between twelve and fifteen-years old to study at Hartford, Connecticut. In 1872 and 1875, each year thirty boys were selected to join the program.<sup>87</sup>

From Yung Wing’s Cantonese Protestant circle also came Tong King-sing (唐景星; akas Tang Tingshu 唐廷樞; 1832–1892), the General Comprador of the British Jardine, Matheson & Co. Tang later served in Viceroy Li Hongzhang’s 李鴻章 two enterprises for the experiment of “official-supervision and merchant-management” style: first the China Merchants Steam Navigation Company and then the Kaiping Mines.<sup>88</sup> Li’s goal was to *shou hui li quan* 收回

---

*enjoying under British rule,”* See Victor Purcell, *The Chinese in Southeast Asia* (London, Kuala Lumpur, and Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, [1951] 1966), 253; my emphasis.

85 Lewis M. Chere, “The Hong Kong Riots of October 1884: Evidence for Chinese Nationalism?” *Journal of Hong Kong Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society* 20 (1980), 54–65; Sinn, “The Strike and Riot of 1884.”

86 Yung Wing, *My Life in China and America* (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1909), 113–136.

87 Yung Wing, *My Life in China and America*, 137–215.

88 Smith, *Chinese Christians*, 34–51.

利權 (recover the rights of making profits), to organize Chinese companies to take over the businesses that suffered from foreign competition after 1842. Zheng Guanying 鄭觀應 (1842–1921), a Heung Sham Cantonese comprador born in Macao, later worked for Li's China Merchants Steam Navigation Company, further developed the idea into the notion of *shangzhan* 商戰 (commercial war). In his words,

As the proverb goes, “a country should be wealthy before be strong; be strong then it can be wealthy.” It tells us that wealth is an indispensable condition of being strong, while being strong is crucial to sustain the wealth. Accordingly, wealth and power are inter-related. However, wealth is generated from business, and business is created from the three cooperative powers from intellectuals, farmers and workers. Therefore, Western countries can count on their merchants to become wealthy countries, and employ soldiers to protect the merchants. They do not only send soldiers for military purpose.<sup>89</sup>

Zheng emphasized the imperative role that the Chinese state played to promote entrepreneurship. He pointed out that the key for developing *shiye* 實業 (pragmatic industry) was to “learn from the West”—including Western languages, diplomatic and legal ideas, machines, weaponry and military training, and entrepreneurship—to *jiu guo* 救國 (save the state).<sup>90</sup> The idea of *shiye jiu guo* can be understood through the concept of economic nationalism, that is, the emphasis on state intervention in the market process for the wellbeing of the people.<sup>91</sup>

Economic nationalism tied the Chinese bourgeoisie in Hong Kong and Singapore with the Qing state. Starting in the 1870s, within the bourgeois circle

89 Zheng Guanying, *Sheng shi wei yan* 盛世危言 [Warning to an Apparently Prosperous Age] (Zhengzhou: Zhongzhou Guji Chubanshe, 1998), 297.

90 Zheng, *Sheng shi wei yan*, 303.

91 The classical theorists of economic nationalism are presented by Friedrich List and Alexander Hamilton. Christine Margerum Harlem, “A Reappraisal of Classical Economic Nationalism and Economic Liberalism,” *International Studies Quarterly* (1999) 43, 733–744. An application of such the thought to modern Chinese nationalism, see George T. Crane, “‘Special Things in Special Ways’: National Economic Identity and China’s Special Economic Zones,” in *Chinese Nationalism*, ed. Jonathan Unger (Armonk, New York and London: M. E. Sharpe), chapter 7. On an analysis of late Qing’s thoughts on entrepreneurship, see Chiu Peng-sheng 邱澎生, *Dang falu yu shang jingji: Ming Qing Zhongguo de shangye fa lu* 當法律遇上經濟：明清中國的商業法律 [When law and economy encounters: commercial laws in Ming and Qing China] (Taipei: Wunan tushu chubanyouxiang gongsi, 2008), Ch. 7.

in Hong Kong, Chinese vernacular newspapers such as *Wah Tsz Yat Po* 華字日報 (*Chinese Mail*) and *Tsun Wan Yat Po* 循環日報 (*Universal Circulating Herald*) became an important forum in which Chinese people exchanged ideas on Chinese affairs. Among the regular contributors to the commentaries in these newspapers, Ho Kai 何啟 (1859–1947) also came from the Cantonese Christian circle of the Morrison Society. Ho's grandfather worked for the Anglo-Chinese College in Malacca, erected in 1818 by William Miline under the supervision of Morrison (the very same Morrison who founded Yung Wing's school). In 1843, his father Ho Fuk-tong 何福堂 (alias Ho Tsung-shin 何善進 or Ho Yun-yeong 何潤養) returned Hong Kong, right after the city became a British colony.<sup>92</sup> Ho Kai became a Justice of the Peace as well as a member of the Sanitary Board in 1886. He inspired people with overseas backgrounds to help the late Qing's development. His son-in-law, Ng Choy 伍才 (alias Wu Tingfang 伍廷芳, 1842–1922), the first Chinese member of the Legislative Council in Hong Kong in 1880, also joined the staff of Viceroy Li Hongzhang at Tianjin with a degree in law from England. Ng was born to a Baba Chinese family in Singapore. In 1897, he was appointed the Chinese ambassador to the United States, Spain, and Peru. After the collapse of the Qing, in 1911, he continued serving his country for the rest of his life in other posts including Director of the Chinese Engineering and Mining Company and Director of the Shanghai Nanjing Railway Administration.<sup>93</sup> In all the above cases, the emphasis on adopting Western ideas for China's survival was key to enticing the Chinese overseas to support the Qing state. Commitment to China and allegiance to the British colonial order became two mutually complimentary goals.

For these advocates of Chinese nationalism, neither the dual Chinese and British commitment was at odds with the Japanese imperialist interest. In September 1898, supporters of Kang Youwei 康有為 and Liang Qichao's 梁啟超 aborted Hundred-Day Reform for constitutional monarchy, including Yung Wing and Zhang Taiyen, found Taiwan a safe haven. In his memoir, Yung Wing highlighted his gratitude to the protection provided by the Japanese Governor-General, Baron Kodama Gentaro 兒玉源太郎, when he was in exile in Taiwan 1901. In particular, he was grateful that Kodama understood what he once had done to prevent Japan from occupying Taiwan: on the eve of the Qing's cession of Taiwan to Japan, in 1895, Yung Wing tried to persuade Qing to sell Taiwan to any Western power so the island would not fall into the Japanese hands. Therefore, before his departure to Hong Kong, he "went in person to thank the

92 G. H. Choa, *The Life and Time of Sir Kai Ho Kai: A Prominent Figure in Nineteenth-Century Hong Kong*, 9–13.

93 Smith, *Chinese Christians*, 132; 151.

governor and to express my great obligation and gratitude to him for the deep interest he had manifested toward me.”<sup>94</sup>

### The Revival of Chineseness Overseas and the Anti-Dynastic Impetus

Around the same time the reformists were banished overseas, one of Ho Kai's patrons lost all hope in the Qing state. This disappointed nationalist was none other than the returned Chinese overseas from Hawaii, Sun Yat-sen 孫逸仙 (1866–1925). Born to a Cantonese peasant family in Heung Sham, Sun joined his family in Hawaii and spent most of his formative years there, becoming drawn to Christianity. He returned to South China in 1883, was baptized in Hong Kong, and obtained a license of medical practice from Ho Kai's Hong Kong College of Medicine for the Chinese (est. 1887), in 1892. It was from Ho Kai that Sun Yat-sen confirmed his political agenda of changing China. And among his international supporters were Japanese advocates of pan-Asianism such as Ōkuma Shigenobu 大隈重信 (1838–1922), who supported the anti-dynastic revolution. This revolutionary idea was further consolidated after combining with the thesis of Han racial lineage of Zhang Taiyan 章太炎, who switched his political goal to the revolutionary campaign after the 1900s. Zhang's nationalist discourse about destroying the Manchu's Qing state so as to rescue the Han Chinese nation stormed politics in Chinese overseas communities.<sup>95</sup>

As an attempt to reconstruct the place of China/Chinese in world history, Liang Qichao published an article that promoted the achievements of eight Chinese pioneer migrants from Fujian and Guangdong, who settled in Java, Siam, Borneo, Malaya, and the Philippines between the late fourteenth and early nineteenth centuries, as Chinese “colonial grandeurs.”<sup>96</sup> Liang's discourse twists the historical marginality of Chinese seaborne traders and migrants, but this interpretation nonetheless appealed to the nationalist taste.

Among others, Liang's nationalist view drew Baba Chinese such as Lim Boon Keng and Song Ong Siang to the pan-Chinese movement. The two Anglicized Chinese had organized the first Confucian association, Khong Kauw Hwe 孔教會 (Confucian Association), in Singapore in 1898. At the same

94 Yung Wing, *My Life in China and America*, 246.

95 Bergère, *Sun Yat-sen*, 143, 147–149.

96 Liang Qichao, “Zhongguo zhimin bada weiren zhuan 中國殖民八大偉人傳 [Biographies of the eight Chinese colonial grandeurs], in *Liang Qichao quan ji di san ce* 梁啟超全集, 第三冊 (Beijing: Beijing chubanshe, 1997), 1368.

time, Lim Boon Keng also pioneered the use of Mandarin Chinese to overcome the language barriers among different subethnic groups.<sup>97</sup> With Lim and Song's efforts and their credentials as high-profile leaders in the Baba Chinese circle, the Confucian revival movement soon spread to cities throughout the region to rally for Qing's reforms.<sup>98</sup> An exceptional case was Teo Eng Hock 張永福 (Zhang Yongfu; 1872–1957). Born to a Straits-born Teochew Baba family in Singapore, Teo allied with other Straits-born Chinese to support Sun's revolutionary agenda.<sup>99</sup> He also recruited his nephew Lim Nee Soon 林義順 (Lin Yishun; 1879–1936) and friend the Straits-born Hokkien Chan Chor Nam 陳楚楠 (Chen Chunan; 1884–1971) to join the campaign. Together they financed study groups for China's revolution and helped Dr. Sun develop Singapore as the center of anti-Manchu revolution in the South Seas until its success.<sup>100</sup> In addition, the third generation of the Tan Tock Seng family and the leader of the Thean Hock Keong Hokkien community between 1897 and 1916, Tan Boo Liat, also committed to the Republican Revolution.<sup>101</sup>

Facing competition from both the revolutionary and reformist campaigns, after 1904 the Qing state urged the Chinese overseas bourgeoisie to organize. Chinese chambers of commerce in major cities in China as well as in overseas Chinese settlements mushroomed. This was the backdrop of the establishment of the Singapore Chinese Chamber of Commerce 新嘉坡中華總商會

97 Beginning in 1898, he launched a campaign for the study of Mandarin Chinese. He also worked to break down the dialect barriers among Chinese schools, which took effect in mid-1909. Yen Ch'ing-hwang, *The Overseas Chinese and the 1911 Revolution: with Special Reference to Singapore and Malaya*, 288–289.

98 Many notable Confucian promoters in the South Seas were all Christian-converted Baba or Peranakans. Under their influence, Yoe Tjai Siang, also a Christian Chinese, promoted Confucianism in Java. Above all, Yoe promoted the publication of Malaya-translated Confucian canons in Java. Williams, *Overseas Chinese Nationalism*, 54–56; Yen, *The Overseas Chinese and the 1911 Revolution*, 264–267.

99 Teo's father, Teo Lee, part of the first generation of Straits-born cloth and grocery dealers as well as a property investor in Singapore, was considered one of the earliest "sons of the soil." Song, *One Hundred Years' History of the Chinese in Singapore*, 33–34. See also Yen Ch'ing-hwang, "Overseas Chinese Nationalism in Singapore and Malaya, 1877–1912." *Modern Asian Studies* (1982) 16, 3: 413–416.

100 C. F. Yong and R. B. McKenna, *The Kuomintang Movement in British Malaya, 1912–1949*, 8–21.

101 According to Yong Ch'ing-fatt, Tan Boo Liat's business began to decline in the early 1910s, and that loss might have been related to his financial support of Dr. Sun Yat-sen's revolution. Between 1913 and 1916, Tan posted several advertisements to sell his business interests before leaving for China. Yong, *Collected Papers on the Studies of Chen Jia Geng* (Beijing: Youyi chubanshe, 1988), 118–119.

(SCCC), in 1906. It could bypass the Chinese Consulate in Singapore and communicate directly with the Ministry of Agriculture, Industry, and Commerce. The SCCC was an association for Chinese “gentry merchants” in Singapore.<sup>102</sup> At the local level, the SCCC mediated local business affairs and labor disputes, as well as channeled grievances to either the local British regime or other business associations.<sup>103</sup> At the regional level, the SCCC sponsored projects of the late Qing’s economic reforms. These included the First Industry Soliciting Meeting in the South Seas (*Nanyang di yi ci quanye hui* 南洋第一次勸業會), organized by the Shanghai Chamber of Commerce in 1909,<sup>104</sup> and the Jiangnan Industry and Art Manufactory 江南工藝廠 in 1911. In addition, in his capacity as a SCCC member, Lim Boon Keng financed the founding of the China School of Industry (*Zhongguo shiye xuetang* 中國實業學堂) and the Fujian Mining Company.<sup>105</sup> Later, between 1921 and 1937, he became the principal of Amoy University in Fujian.<sup>106</sup>

To further consolidate its ties with Chinese overseas, in 1909, the Qing empire enacted the Chinese Nationality Law. It was based on the *jus sanguinis* principle, which allowed all Chinese descendants born overseas, if one of their parents was Chinese, to claim their Chinese nationality. This policy was reconfirmed in the Republican era in 1912, 1914, and 1929. Double or multiple nationalities were allowed.<sup>107</sup>

The official approval of double or even multiple nationalities set up a transnational framework of the operation of Chinese bourgeois networks overseas. These networks contributed to charities in both China and other parts of the British empire. For example, in November 1914, the SCCC connected with the China Red Cross to collect funds for famine in Shandong.<sup>108</sup> In December 1917,

102 SCCC, *Xinjiapo zhonghua zongshanghui daxia luocheng jinian kan* 新嘉坡中華總商會大廈落成紀念刊 [Souvenir of the Opening Ceremony of the Newly Completed Chinese Chamber of Commerce Building] (Singapore, 1964), 150.

103 Liu Hong, “The Singapore Chinese Chamber of Commerce and Industry and the Institutionalization of Chinese Business Networks in Asia,” in *Lishi yanjiu* 歷史研究, No. 263 (2000): 106–118; Sikko Visscher, *The Business of Politics and Ethnicity: A History of the Singapore Chinese Chamber of Commerce and Industry* (Singapore: National University of Singapore Press, 2007).

104 SCCC, Archives of the Minutes of Committee Meetings, March 19, 1909 (National Archives, Singapore).

105 SCCC, Archives of the Minutes of Committee Meetings, March 19, 1909; March 22, 1910.

106 Song, *One Hundred Years’ History of the Chinese in Singapore*, 5, 103, 112, 125, 129, 235, 238, 285.

107 Lee Ying-hui, *Huaqiao zhengce yu haiwai minzushuyi, 1912–1949*, 19–20; 102–109; 127.

108 SCCC, Archives of the Minutes of Committee Meetings: November 26, 1914.

the sccc organized a campaign for disaster relief after the Halifax explosion in British Canada.<sup>109</sup> In March 1918, the sccc launched a three-evening event to raise funds for refugees from a serious earthquake in Swatow.<sup>110</sup>

### Institutionalization of Chinese Speech-Group Divides in the British Lands

The sccc nonetheless retained an emphasis on speech-group distinction. The sccc's constitution stipulated a "*bang* system:" the presidency and vice-presidency were to be held by a person from "Fu *bang*" 福幫 (Fujian group) and a person from "Guang *bang*" 廣幫 (Guangdong group). Members could choose candidates only from their own *bang*.<sup>111</sup> To be sure, the category of Fu *bang* refers to all subethnic groups from Fujian province, including Hokkien (the most populous) from southeastern Fujian and Hakka from western Fujian, as well as Hokchiu and Hokchia from the northern part of the province. Members of the Fu *bang* in the sccc accepted Hokkien leadership.<sup>112</sup> The Hakka from western Fujian, however, were excluded from the core of the Fujian communities.

The Hakka belonged to the Guang *bang*, which included Teochew, Cantonese, and Hakka, as well as Hainanese. The second and third largest groups in Singapore—Teochew and Cantonese—had to compete for the chair-

109 Lim Boon Keng brought up the issue at the sccc, Archives of the Minutes of Committee Meeting on December 26, 1917. Tan Kah Kee chaired the relief campaign. sccc, Archives of the Minutes of Committee Meeting on Dec. 26, 1917.

110 sccc, Archives of the Minutes of Committee Meetings: March 11, 1918; April 15, 1918.

111 Yao Nan, Zhang Liqian and Xu Yunqiao 姚楠、張禮千、許雲樵 eds., *Xingzhou shi nian* 星洲十年 [The Tenth Annual of the Sin Chew Jit Poh] (Singapore: Xingzhou ribao she, 1940), 933–937.

112 For example, in 1923, the Hokkien leaders of the Fujian Native-Place Association, See Tiong Wah and Chan Xianjing, successfully mediated the fights between Hokchia and Hokchiu coolies Yong Ch'ing-fatt, *Collected Papers on the Studies of Chen Jia Geng*, 124. In addition, in January 1926, these two groups from northern Fujian fought with Cantonese café owners over prices. Again, the Fujian Native-Place Association settled the dispute. Furthermore, in May 1927, four northern Fujian workers and one Teochew worker were sentenced to death for murder. These workers, most in their teens, claimed their innocence. Their grievances were taken up by the chairperson of the sccc, See Tiong Wah. Together with the assistance of the two county-level Fujian native-place associations (Xinghua Native-Place Association and Anxi Native-Place Association), See Tiong Wah helped the workers to appeal. The court later revised the sentence from death to three to ten years in prison. See the news reports on *Nan Yang Siang Pao* 南洋商報 (NYSB, English title: Chinese Daily News of Commerce; Singapore): January 5, 1926; May 10, 1927.

manship to represent members from Guangdong. But the Teochew generally held the upper hand over the Cantonese. Between 1905 and 1941, only two Cantonese—Lam Wei Fong 林維芳 (Lin Weifang; 1909 chairperson) and Lam Mun Thin 林文田 (Lin Wentian; 1933–1934 chairperson, 1935–1936 vice-chairperson, and 1939–1940 vice-chairperson)—broke this pattern.<sup>113</sup>

The Hokkien and Teochew privileges were also apparent in the organization of the board of directors (table 1.6). The pattern usually was that the Hokkien had thirteen seats, the Teochew nine, the Cantonese five, the Hakka from eastern Guangdong three (two for the Hakka from Jiaying and one for the Hakka from Dapu), and the Hainanese two. Such an arrangement certainly privileged the Hokkien and Teochew because they were the most numerous groups in each province.<sup>114</sup>

The growing number of China-born Chinese began to marginalize and eventually replace the established Straits-born Chinese elitist class established by families of leading revenue farmers in the nineteenth century. In the Hokkien circle, the change started in 1915, when the China-born Hokkien pushed forward the proposal of reorganizing the Thean Hock Keong into the Thean Hock Keong Hokkien Native-Place Association 福建會館. After the departure of Tan Boo Liat in 1916, See Tiong Wah 薛中華 (Xue Zhonghua; also documented as See Teong Wah and See Tong Wah), a third-generation offspring of a Straits-born family and a comprador of the British Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation, strived to continue the Baba leadership until 1929. He became the SCCC president from 1919 to 1920, but his leadership in the Hokkien communities in Singapore faced constant challenges from their China-born counterparts. In March 1923, when he tried to run for the SCCC presidency again, critics pointed out that being a comprador for a British bank did not qualify him to be considered a company owner, which was a requirement for the presidency. The issue was solved when See obtained a public endorsement from merchants from the guild of Vietnamese trade 安南郊. In

113 Lam Mun Thin was born in Toi Shan, Guangdong. He came to Singapore at the age of sixteen. He first made his living as a steward. By the age of forty, he had become a rich merchant and owned the Chaun Tai Shen Dang pawnshops, with various branches throughout British Malaya. See Malaya Taishan huiguan lianhehui bianji weiyuanhui 馬來亞台山會館聯合會編輯委員會 [Editorial Board of the Federation of Toi Sun Association, Malaya], ed., *Malaya Taishan huiguan lianhehui jinian tekan, chuanguan hao* 馬來亞台山會館聯合會紀念特刊, 創刊號 [Commemorative Bulletin of the Federation of Toi Sun Associations, Malaya, Inaugural Issue] (Singapore: Malaya Taishan huiguan lianhehui bianji weiyuanhui, 1948), 4.

114 *NYSF*: Feb. 5, 1927; Feb. 27, 1929; Yao Nan et al., *Xingzhou shi nian*, 934.

TABLE 1.5 *Chairpersons of the Singapore Chinese Chamber of Commerce, 1906–1940*

Chairpersons			
NAME <sup>1</sup>	Years of Birth and Death <sup>2</sup>	Subethnic Background <sup>2</sup>	Note: Profession <sup>2</sup>
Goh Siew Tin 吳壽珍	1854–1909	Hokkien	Shipping, import-export trade with DEI
Tan Hoon Chew 陳雲秋	N/A	Teochew	Gambier trade
Chua Chu Yong 蔡子庸	1846–1915	China-born Teochew	Import-export trade of tobacco leaves, pots, rice, and sugar
Lam Wai Fong 林維芳	N/A	Cantonese	N/A
Teo Sian Keng 張善慶	1855–1916	China-born Hokkien	Import-export commission trade
Liau Chia Heng 廖正興	1874–1934	China-born Teochew	Import-export trade (Western piece-goods)
Lim Peng Siang 林秉祥	1873–1944	China-born Hokkien	The Ho Hong Group: banking, shipping, parboiled rice, oil mill, cement, coconut business
Tan Teck Joon 陳德潤	1859–1918	China-born Teochew	Import-export trade (Western piece-goods and Siamese goods), banker (the Four Seas Bank)
Tan Sian Cheng 陳仙鍾	?–1937	China-born Hokkien	banking business
Tan Jiak Ngoh 陳若愚	1866–1938	China-born Teochew	Garment store, Siamese rice trade, and bank
See Tiong Wah 薛中華	1886–?	Straits-born Hokkien	Banker (Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank)
Tan Keng Tong 陳敬堂	1856–1941	China-born Teochew	Pepper and gambier, harbor dredging (in Johore)
Lim Nee Soon 林義順	1879–1936	Straits-born Teochew	Rubber and pineapple, banking, insurance, and general commission business
Lim Chwee Chian 林推遷	1868–1923	China-born Hokkien	Shipping, mining, and plantation

The sccc		Other Communal Services	
Date of Service, Presidency in sccc <sup>1</sup>	Date of Service, Vice-presidency in sccc <sup>1</sup>	Appointment of the Chinese Advisory Board between 1921 and 1940 <sup>3</sup>	Office-bearers in the Nationalist Campaigns in 1928, 1932, or 1937 <sup>4</sup>
1906, 1908	1907	N/A	N/A
/	1906	N/A	N/A
1907	1908	N/A	N/A
1909	/	N/A	N/A
1910	1909, 1911, 1912	N/A	N/A
1911, 1912, 1914	1910, 1913	1921–34	–
1913, 1915, 1916	1914	1921–41	–
1917	1915, 1916	–	–
–	1912, 1917, 1918	1921–37	–
1918	1919	–	–
1919, 1920, 1923–1924	–	1921–41	–
–	1920, 1923–24	–	–
1921–22, 1925–1926	–	–	–
–	1921–22	1921–23	–

TABLE 1.5 (cont.)

Chairpersons			
NAME <sup>1</sup>	Years of Birth and Death <sup>2</sup>	Subethnic Background <sup>2</sup>	Note: Profession <sup>2</sup>
See Boon Ih 薛武院	N/A	Hokkien	Rubber and banking business
Lee Wee Nam 李偉南	1880–1964	China-born Teochew	Banker, import-export trade
Yeo Chan Boon 楊纘文	1881–?1967	China-born Teochew	Piece-goods and textile trade
Lee Choon Seng 李俊承	1888–1966	China-born Hokkien	Biscuit, rubber, and banking business
Lam Mun Thin 林文田	1873–1943	China-born Cantonese (Toi Shan)	Pawnshop owner, hospital manager
Lim Keng Lian 林慶年	1893–1968	China-born Hokkien	Tea trade, KMT member, graduate of Beijing University
Tan Chin Hian 陳振賢	1893–?	China-born Teochew	Banker (the Four Seas Bank)
Lee Kong Chian 李光前	1893–1967	China-born Hokkien	Manufacturer (rubber, pineapple), printing business, banker

## Sources:

<sup>1</sup> The list of chairmen of the sccc is based on sccc, *Xinjiapo zhonghua zongshanghui daxia luocheng jinian kan* 新嘉坡中華總商會大廈落成紀念刊 (Souvenir of the Opening Ceremony of the Newly Completed Chinese Chamber of Commerce Building; Singapore: sccc, 1964), 150–177.

<sup>2</sup> Personal backgrounds (ethnic groups and professions) are based on Song Ong Siang, *One Hundred Years' History of the Chinese in Singapore* (Kuala Lumpur: University of Malaysia Press, 1967); Su Xiaoxian 蘇孝先 ed., *Zhangzhou shishu lu Xing tongxianglu* 漳州十屬旅星同鄉錄 [Directory of migrants from the ten counties of Zhangzhou in Singapore] (Singapore: Qiaoguang chuban she, 1948); Pan Xingnong 潘醒農 ed., *The Teochews in Malaya* (Singapore: Nandao chubanshe, 1950); Victor Sim ed. *Biographies of prominent Chinese in Singapore* (Singapore: Nan Kok Publication Company, 1950); Koh Kow Chiang 許教正 ed., *Who's Who in South East Asia* (Singapore: published by the author, 1965); Yen Ch'ing-hwang, *Community and Politics: the Chinese in Colonial Singapore and Malaysia* (Singapore: Times Academic Press, 1995).

The sccc		Other Communal Services	
Date of Service, Presidency in sccc <sup>1</sup>	Date of Service, Vice-presidency in sccc <sup>1</sup>	Appointment of the Chinese Advisory Board between 1921 and 1940 <sup>3</sup>	Office-bearers in the Nationalist Campaigns in 1928, 1932, or 1937 <sup>4</sup>
1927–28	1925–26, 1929–30	1922–33	–
1929–30	1927–28	1930–41	1937
–	1931–32	–	1932, 1937
1931–32	–	–	1932
1933–34	1935–36, 1939–40	1931–41	1937
1935–36	1933–1934, 1937–38	1933–35, 1939–41	1937
1937–38	–	1937–39	1937
1939–40	–	1935–1941	1937

<sup>3</sup> Service on the Chinese Advisory Board is based on my documentation of *SSGG 1921*, No. 269; *SSGG 1922*, No. 843; *SSGG 1923*, No. 164; *SSGG 1924*, No. 207; *SSGG 1925*, No. 234; *SSGG 1927*, p. 194; *SSGG 1928*, No. 517; *SSGG 1929*, No. 324; *SSGG 1930*, No. 245; *SSGG 1931*, No. 750; *SSGG 1933*, No. 1296; *SSGG 1935*, No. 3230; *SSGG 1939*, No. 1899. Please note that the list of Chinese Advisory Board members was no longer released annually after 1932. Only replacements of old members or appointments of new members were posted in the gazettes.

<sup>4</sup> The list of office-bearers in the 1928 campaign is based on *NYSF*: May 19, 1928; in the 1932 campaign, see *NYSF*: Feb. 25, 1932; in the 1937 campaign, Yong, *Tan Kah Kee: The Making of an Overseas Chinese Legend* (Singapore: Oxford University Press, [1987] 1989), 205.

TABLE 1.6 *Major Speech-Groups Represented in the sccc Board of Directors*

Provincial Unit in Republican China	Fujian Province			Guangdong Province			
	Seats in sccc Board of Directors	13			3	9	5
Speech Group	Hokchiu and Hokchia	Hokkien	Hakka	Teochew	Cantonese	Hainanese	

Source: Yao Nan, Zhang Liqian and Xu Yunqiao 姚楠、張禮千、許雲樵 eds., *Xingzhou shi nian* 星州十年 [The Tenth Annual of the Sin Chew Jit Poh] (Singapore: Xingzhou ribao she, 1940), 934.

June, he was reelected as the president for another run (1923–1924).<sup>115</sup> He however could not catch up with the new issues advocated by his China-born counterparts. In 1927, the China-born Hokkien tycoon Tan Kah Kee rose to be a charismatic leader of the Singapore Hokkien community for his steering the agendas of incorporating Hokkien vernacular schools and charities under the Singapore Fujian Native-Place Association.<sup>116</sup> The reorganization plan was passed in March 1929, the year that the association elected Tan as the new chairperson. This marked the transition of power from the Baba to the China-born Hokkien in the Hokkien communities in Singapore.<sup>117</sup>

Similar reforms also took place in the Teochew community. A group of China-oriented Teochew (represented by the two China-born Teochews Lee Wee Nam and Yeo Chan Boon, as well as the Straits-born Chinese nationalist Lim Nee Soon) replaced the Seah family (then passed to Seah Liang Seng's son

115 sccc, *Xinjiapo zhonghua zongshanghui daxia luocheng jinian kan*, 162–169; sccc, Archives of the Minutes of Committee Meetings, March 5, March 9, and June 23. The original record did not put See's career at the Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank. The information is documented in Koh, ed., *Who's Who in South East Asia*, A6–A7.

116 Yong, *Collected Papers on the Studies of Chen Jia Geng*, 124; Su ed., *Zhangzhou shishu lu Xing tongxianglu*, 64.

117 Yong, *Collected Papers on the Studies of Chen Jia Geng*, 120–129; Yong, *Tan Kah Kee: The Making of an Overseas Chinese Legend*, 134–138.

Seah Eng Tong) to lead the Singapore Teochew community. In 1931, these reformers incorporated the Ngee Ann Kongsi under the Ngee Ann Kongsi (Incorporation) Ordinance. According to the ordinance, all activities and transactions related to the association had to be authorized by a steering committee, which was supervised by the Teochew community at large.<sup>118</sup> The challengers took the most seats in the committee. To further strengthen their leadership in the Teochew community, in 1929, they organized the Teochew Eight Districts Association to represent the interests of all Teochew people in Singapore.<sup>119</sup>

In Hong Kong, reflecting the rise of Chinese nationalism, the bourgeoisie organized the Hong Kong Wah Sheung Kun Kok 香港華商公所 (registered in English as the Chinese Commercial Union of Hong Kong). The outbreak of the Chinese anti-American movement in 1905 and the anti-Japanese boycott 1908 put the association's leaders in a vulnerable place because they were expected to deal with both the direct pressure of the British colonial regime and the expectation of echoing these Chinese antifoign movements.<sup>120</sup>

In 1905, the U.S. Congress voted to indefinitely extend the Chinese Exclusion Law, first proposed in 1882 to exclude Chinese laborers from entering the states for a ten-year period. Studies have pointed out that the anti-American movement was operated through transnational connections among major Chinese chambers of commerce in Shanghai, Canton, Hong Kong, and Singapore. Failing to formally negotiate with the U.S., the Qing government tacitly approved the anti-American boycott.<sup>121</sup> Internal documents of the Chinese Commercial Union in Hong Kong, however, showed that its leader, Fung Wah Chuen 馮華川 (Feng Huachuen), also a leader of Tung Wah Hospital, had planned to call off an ad hoc meeting about strategies to respond to the anti-U.S. boycott. This decision generated harsh comments from the Chinese

118 *SSG* 1932: No. 1800, The Ngee Ann Kongsi Ordinance, 1931.

119 Yen Ch'ing-hwang, "Power Structure and Power Relations in the Teochew Community in Singapore, 1819–1930," *Chaozhou xue guoji yantaohui lun wen ji, xia ce* 潮州學國際研討會論文集, 下冊 [International Symposium of the Teochew Study, vol. 2-2], ed. Zheng Liangshu 鄭良樹 (Guangzhou: Jinan daxue chubanshe, 1994), 685–732; Zhou Zhaojing, *Chaozhou huiguan shi hua*, 130.

120 Sinn, *Power and Charity*, 85–86.

121 C. F. Remer, *A Study of Chinese Boycotts: With Special Reference to Their Economic Effectiveness* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1933), 32–35; Wang Lixin 王立新, *Meiguo duihua zhengce yu zhongguo minzuzhiyi yundong, 1904–1928* 美國對華政策與中國民族主義運動 (1904–1928) [American China Policy and Chinese Nationalism] (Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe, 2000), 58–124; Wong Sin-kiong, "Die for the Boycott and Nation: Martyrdom and the 1905 Anti-American Movement in China," *Modern Asian Studies*, 35: 3(2001): 565–588.

public. They criticized Fung and other Chinese compradors as collaborators supporting U.S. trade. Fung Wah Chuen thus resigned from the association chairmanship.<sup>122</sup> Although the Chinese Commercial Union in Hong Kong agreed to the request of the Chinese Chamber of Commerce in Shanghai to support the anti-American boycott, the Hong Kong association also emphasized its concern about the incompatibility of such an economic boycott with British laws.<sup>123</sup>

A similar episode occurred three years later. In spring 1908, the Chinese Commercial Union faced another crisis related to pressure to support the Chinese anti-Japanese boycott. The event, called the Tatsu Maru Incident, started with the Chinese seizure of a Japanese steamboat, *Tatsu Maru II*, in the waters off Macao for shipping contraband arms and munitions, which were believed to support Sun Yat-sen's revolution. The ship was taken to Canton, with its flag changed from Japan to China. In March, Japan agreed to regulate future shipping of possible contraband but demanded that Qing China return the ship and pay 10,000 taels (silver dollars) in addition to demurrage for the indemnity related to the seizure. The Chinese were furious when their government yielded to these demands. A Chinese anti-Japanese boycott surged in Canton and Hong Kong, disturbing trade between China and Japan although no significant decline in trade was documented.<sup>124</sup> Anti-Japanese boycotts also broke out in Manila, Honolulu, and "other cities where Cantonese merchants were numerous."<sup>125</sup> But the Chinese Commercial Union in Hong Kong, which, once again, tried to avoid explicitly supporting the economic strikes, became the target of attacks. Its position made sense considering the involvement in Japanese trade by leading Chinese bourgeoisie in Hong Kong.<sup>126</sup>

Located adjacent to Canton, the political and economic core of Guangdong province, the Chinese communities in Hong Kong were entangled in the north-south divide in China, which began in the voluntary transition of power from Sun Yat-sen to Yuan Shikai 袁世凱, in March 1912. Though Sun Yat-sen and those veterans of the Republican Revolution such as Hu Hanmin 胡漢民 and

---

122 HKMS 163-1-1, minutes of meeting: August 14, 1905, and minutes of meeting, August 16, 1905. See also Tsai, *Hong Kong in Chinese History: Community and Social Unrest in the British Colony, 1842–1913*, 188–206. According to Tsai, the most vocal support of the anti-American boycott in 1905 were either businessmen seeking to take advantage to promote their own enterprises or revolutionaries who tried to use the movement to justify the antidynastic revolution.

123 Tsai, *Hong Kong in Chinese History*, 186.

124 Remer, *A Study of Chinese Boycotts*, 42–45.

125 Remer, *A Study of Chinese Boycotts*, 41.

126 Tsai, *Hong Kong in Chinese History*, Ch. 8.

Wang Jingwei 汪精衛 did not announce the establishment of a separate government in Guangdong before 1917, the preparation for the Second Revolution in 1914 and the organization of the Hu Guo Army by allying with the military groups in Yun'nan and Guangxi had long torn the politics of South China from Beijing's control.<sup>127</sup> The British "one China policy" recognized only the Beijing government, but some Chinese in Hong Kong, especially those in the Sze Yap Cantonese networks, considered Sun Yat-sen's Guangdong the sole legitimate power.

The British considered the Sze Yap leader, Li Yuk Tong 李煜堂 (Li Yutang; 1850–1936), a "gentleman whose actions will require watching" in correspondence between F. H. May, the British colonial governor in Hong Kong, and the Secretary of State in London, Lewis Vernon Harcourt, on January 22, 1913.<sup>128</sup> As a returned overseas Chinese from the Americas, Li was among those Kam Shan Chong merchants who used Hong Kong as his base of trans-Pacific trade. His son Li Zizhon joined Sun Yat-sen's revolutionary campaign in 1901. Li Yuk Tong's businesses in Hong Kong were important financial supporters of the anti-Manchu movement. After the revolution, between November 1912 and February 1913, when the British rejected the circulation of bills and coins issued in Guangdong, Sun's supporters in Hong Kong boycotted the tramway system. The British government noted that, behind the scenes, Li Yuk Tong was soliciting Hong Kong merchants to accept the depreciating Guangdong currency through his Society of Chinese Abroad for the Promotion of Patriotic Subscriptions.<sup>129</sup>

The British believed that Sun's support was crucial to Li's business after the success of the Republican Revolution. Li became the Provincial Treasurer of the Canton government, and "almost all the important positions under the new Provincial Government were given to Sze Yap men."<sup>130</sup> The historian Stephanie Po-yin Chung's research supports this speculation. Noting that Li's trans-Pacific trade was "at the brink of bankruptcy, but that he became the 'insurance King' of South China by the 1920s," the British suspected that there

127 Bergère, *Sun Yat-sen*, 246–269; Leslie Chen, *Chen Jiongming and the Federalist Movement*.

128 CO 129 (Original correspondence between British colonial office in Hong Kong and the Secretary of State for the Colonies in London during 1841 and 1943)/399, 267.

129 CO 129/399, 265–276; See also S. P. Chung, *Chinese Business Groups in Hong Kong and Political Change in South China*, 45.

130 Colonial Office 129: Original correspondence between British colonial office in Hong Kong and the Secretary of State for the Colonies in London during 1841 and 1943; Microfiche version, the Fu Ping Shan Library of the Hong Kong University; CO 129 thereafter): CO 129/339, 268.

was an unusual patronage relationship between Sun's Canton government and the Sze Yap merchants. These connections would eventually damage the British interest in South China.<sup>131</sup> Documents of the registration of Chinese companies in Hong Kong also affirm the expansion of Li's businesses after 1911 among the companies that remained under registration in 1942 with Li as either an initial subscriber or a founder: two companies established before the revolution, but four additional ones set up after 1911.<sup>132</sup>

The British were afraid that the fast expansion of Sze Yap power in Hong Kong would inspire other Chinese merchants to develop their own momentum of growth beyond what the British could control. To be sure, four years after the Sze Yap Chamber of Commerce was established, by 1913, sixteen other native-place associations were founded.<sup>133</sup> Organizing the Chinese communities in Hong Kong by excluding the Sze Yap Cantonese was the British strategy to check the Sze Yap force from further expansion. In 1917, when Sun Yat-sen was organizing the "*hu-fa*" movement to protest against Beijing's abolishing the provisional constitution of the Republic of China, the British also banned the Sze Yap Society based on its violation of the Societies Ordinance, 1911.<sup>134</sup> To counter the Sze Yap influence, the British counted on the influential Anglicized King's Chinese. But the British also realized that their old allies, the two Chinese unofficial members of the Legislative Council in Hong Kong, Wei Yuk and Ho Kai, were sympathetic with the Canton government. They thus were not able to stop the tramway strike.<sup>135</sup> In contrast, Lau Chu Pak 劉鑄伯 (Liu Zhubo; 1867–1922), from the Sanitary Board, "[took] a much more responsible view of his duties as a representative of the Chinese and is always very careful not to embarrass the government in any way."<sup>136</sup> In addition to Lau, the British pointed out the importance of working with the "newly elected chairman of the Tung Wah Hospital."<sup>137</sup> The British organized the young generation of Chinese leaders to found a new Chinese society in which "the control of this

131 S. P. Chung, *Chinese Business Groups in Hong Kong and Political Change in South China, 1900–25*, 47.

132 Based on HKRS 121: Registers of Hong Kong Companies Applying for Registration during the Japanese Occupation, 1944–1948 (HKRS 121 thereafter) (Hong Kong: Hong Kong Public Record Office); HKRS 122: Files and Papers of Companies Incorporated during the Japanese Occupation, 1943–1944 (HKRS 122 thereafter) (Hong Kong: Hong Kong Public Record Office).

133 CO 129/399, 268–269.

134 Hong Kong Government Gazettes, Oct. 12, 1917, Executive Council, no. 450.

135 CO 129/399, 265–276.

136 CO 129/399, 271.

137 CO 129/399, 273–274. The new chairman of Tung Wah Hospital refers to Yuen Ying-shan 袁英山 (alias Un Kam Wa).

central association shall be in the hands of the older members of the Chinese community who have a real stake in the colony.”<sup>138</sup> This was the background of the establishment of the Chinese General Chamber of Commerce, Hong Kong (CGCCHK), in November 1913. Lau Chu Pak was the first leader.<sup>139</sup> The CGCCHK was reorganized from the Hong Kong Wah Sheung Kun Kok 香港華商公局 [the Chinese Commercial Union of Hong Kong], an organization founded in 1900. It is worth noting that many leaders of the new CGCCHK such as Lau Chu Pak, Li Po Kwai 李葆葵 (Li Baokui), Li Yik Mui 李亦梅 (Li Yimei), Li Yau Tsun 李幼泉 (Li Youquan), and Lau Yuk Wan 劉毓芸 (Liu Yuyun) were members of the Hong Kong Confucian Society, which was founded by Lau Chu Pak in 1909 to promote the study of Chinese Confucian classics.<sup>140</sup> The CGCCHK focused on “all Chinese businesses affairs no matter they were based in Hong Kong, hinterland [mainland China], or foreign countries.”<sup>141</sup>

Lau Chu Pak, a comprador of the Douglas Lapraik & Co., belonged to the network of Po On Cantonese. Lau organized the Po On Chamber of Commerce in 1914. It included both local-born Anglicized Cantonese and Eurasian people.<sup>142</sup> The most notable local Po On leader was Chow Shou Son (Zhou Shouchen 周壽臣; 1861–1959). Born to an indigenous Cantonese family in Hong Kong, Chow was among the thirty pupils sent to study at Hartford in the U.S. under the Yung Wing’s study-abroad program in 1874. In 1881, when he got admitted to the Columbia University, the Qing court suddenly withdrew the program, and ordered the pupils to return back to China. In China, Li Hongzhang recruited these students in many projects of Qing’s economic reforms. Chow worked for Maritime Customs in Tianjin; Chinese Customs in Korea; Consul-General in Jinsen, Korea; the Chinese Merchants Steam

138 CO I29/399, 269.

139 The CGCCHK was registered as the Chinese General Chamber of Commerce between 1913 and 1935, but from 1935 to 1950 the title was changed to the Chinese Chamber of Commerce. Chinese General Chamber of Commerce, Hong Kong 香港中華總商會 (CGCCHK), *Xianggang zhonghua zongshang hui bainianshi* 香港中華總商會百年史 [The one hundred year history of the Hong Kong Chinese General Chamber of Commerce] (Hong Kong: Xianggang zhonghua zongshanghui, 2002), 29, fn7.

140 Au Chi Kin 區志堅, “Chan yang sheng dao, xi xie ju bo: Xianggang zun Kong huodong chu tan, 1900-jin 闡揚聖道, 息邪距諛: 香港尊孔活動初探, 1909 - 今) [Promote the sacred way, suppress the divergent views: an introduction of Confucian revival activities in Hong Kong, 1900–present],” *Ju jiao ju xue ju shang dui renlei de gongxian*, Proceedings of the 2nd Annual of International Confucius Global (Hong Kong, 2006).

141 CGCCHK, *Xianggang huashang zonghui banshi guize* 香港華商總會辦事規則 [Rules of the CGCCHK] (Hong Kong: CGCCHK, 1914).

142 S. P. Chung, *Chinese Business Groups in Hong Kong and Political Change in South China, 1900–25*, 49–50.

Navigation Company; and the Peking-Mukden Railway. In Korea, he became acquainted with Yuan Shikai, as well as Tong Shao Yi 唐紹儀, another Hartford pupil. After the fall of Qing, Chow returned to Hong Kong, but Tong stayed in Beijing. These Beijing connections later helped Chow lead the Chinese bourgeois communities to negotiate with political and military actors in China.

As for the Po On elites with Eurasian background, compared with the number registered in the 1911 census—only 250<sup>143</sup>—their influence was paramount. The most famous Eurasian families were the Hos, represented by Robert Ho Tung 何東 (He Dong; 1862–1956) and his brother Ho Fook 何福 (He Fu; 1863–1926), and the Los, represented by Lo Cheong Siu 羅長肇 (Luo Changzhao) and his son Lo Man Kam 羅文錦 (Luo Wenjin; 1893–1959). Both Robert Ho Tung and Lo Cheong Siu were compradors for the British Jardine, Matheson & Co. Robert Ho started his phenomenal career as a member of the Managers of the Imperial Chinese Maritime Customs in Canton in 1879. After serving as the comprador for the Jardine, Matheson & Co., beginning in 1894 he chaired the company's Chinese department. He was also trusted by the British: in 1889, he was appointed to a seat in the Justice of the Peace of Hong Kong, and in 1915 he became a British Knight Bachelor, later serving on the District Watch Committee and the Sanitary Board, among other official positions. The Hong Kong Chinese communities also recognized his leadership: he led most Chinese voluntary organizations in Hong Kong, including Tung Wah Hospital.<sup>144</sup> Lo Cheong Siu's son Lo Man Kam graduated from a school in England and was qualified as a solicitor in Hong Kong. In 1915, he opened the first law firm run by Chinese descendants in Hong Kong and soon became an influential community leader. He was appointed as Justice of the Peace in 1923.<sup>145</sup> The notable Ho and Lo families were connected by marriage: Lo Cheong Siu's wife was a niece of Ho Fook, Ho Fook's wife was Lo Cheong Siu's sister, and two of Robert Ho's daughters married Lo Cheong Siu's two sons (Lo Man Kim and Lo Man Hao).<sup>146</sup> Ho Sai Kwong 何世光 (He Shiguang; 1886–

143 The official census states that “the number of [Eurasian] persons who identify themselves as Eurasian gets fewer in every Census. In 1901 there were 267 and 228 in 1906. It was reported that most Eurasians in Hong Kong were brought up and live in Chinese fashion, thus they regarded themselves as Chinese” (Hong Kong Census Department, *Hong Kong Census Report, 1841–1941*, the year of 1911, 2).

144 Chan Tai Tung and Chan Man Yuen 陳大同、陳文元 ed., *Bainian shangye* 百年商業 [A Century of Commerce] (Hong Kong: Guangming wenhua shiye chubanshe, 1941).

145 He Wenxiang 何文翔, *Xianggang jiazu shi* 香港家族史 [History of prominent families in Hong Kong] (Hong Kong: Mingbao chubanshe, 1992), 76–87, 112–114.

146 He Wenxiang, *Xianggang jiazu shi*, 81–82.

1974) and Ho Sai Wing, of the second generation of the Ho Tung family, were also active leaders in the CGCCHK and other business associations.

Wealth and power were consolidated in the Po On circle. Lau Chu Pak and Chow Shou Son established the Ta You Bank (1914) and the Bank of East Asia (1918).<sup>147</sup> The latter became the most important bank established by Po On elites. In addition, Lau Chu Pak and Ho Tung set up the Sino-British Trade Association in 1922 to promote business in “all parts of the Republic of China, Hong Kong, Straits Settlements, and the Federated Malay State.”<sup>148</sup> The British appointed many of the Po On bourgeoisie to be Justices of the Peace. Chow Shou Son, Lau Chu Pak, and Ho Fook also became Chinese members in the Legislative Council. In 1926, the British selected Chow as the first Chinese member at the Executive Council, which he served for ten years.<sup>149</sup> Overall, most Justice of the Peace were Anglicized Chinese working as compradors or in the professions of law, insurance, banking, distribution of Western patented medicines, and the like.

The establishment of the CGCCHK did not replace Tung Wah Hospital's social functions; the hospital took the lead in philanthropic activities, and the CGCCHK handled business disputes. Generally speaking, the two associations cooperated in harmony. Their officers overlapped. Examining the following table, one may well find that the experience of serving on the Tung Wah Hospital board was an important rung on the ladder to the decision-making circle of the CGCCHK.

---

147 Major subscribers to the Ta You Bank included Lau Chu Pak, Ho Fook, Ho Kom Tong, Ho Tung, Lo Cheong Siu, and Chan Kai Mun. The bank was not registered in accordance with British company ordinances. The historian Po-yin Chung explains that established Chinese elites could easily get financial support or even official endorsement whenever their enterprises were in need. Registration was therefore not necessary. Founders of the Ta You Bank already had close business ties with the Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank, and the latter could provide more crucial financial support than what the company ordinance could provide. Without registering officially, these companies also could be exempted from publicly disclosing their accounts and investors. Chung, *Chinese Business Groups in Hong Kong and Political Change in South China, 1900–25*, 49–50; 54–55. See also Feng Bangyen 馮邦彥, *Xianggang Huazi caituan, 1848–1997* 香港華資財團 (1841–1997) (Hong Kong: Sanlian shudian, 1997), 78.

148 S. P. Chung, *Chinese Business Groups in Hong Kong and Political Change in South China*, 50.

149 Victor Zheng and Charles W. Chow, *Grand Old Man of Hong Kong: Sir Shouson Chow* (Hong Kong: the University of Hong Kong, 2010).

TABLE 1.7 *Major Officers of the Chinese General Chamber of Commerce, Hong Kong, 1919–1941*

Names (1)	Native-place (2)	Business (2)	1913–1914	1914–1921
Chow Siu Ki 周少歧	Tung Kwun	Insurance	Vice-treasurer	Vice-treasurer
Lau Chu Pak 劉鑄伯	Po On	Comprador	Chair	Chair
Un Ying Shan (or Yuen Ying San) 袁英山	Tung Kwun	Import-export trade (with Singapore)	Vice-chair	Vice-chair, 1914
Ho Fook 何福	Po On	Comprador		Vice-chair, 1915
Chan Kai Ming 陳啟明	Po On	Comprador		Vice-chair, 1916–1918
Lo Cheong Shiu 羅長肇	Po On	Comprador		Vice-chair, 1919–1920
Li Po Kwai 李寶葵	Sun Wui	Rice merchant	Treasurer	Treasurer, 1914–1920; Vice-chair, 1921
Ip Lan Chuen 葉蘭泉	Hok Shan	Insurance company	Chinese manager	Chinese manager
Hu Jiongtang 胡炯堂	Sam Shui	Barrister	English manager	English manager
Ho Sai Kwang 何世光	Po On	Comprador	–	–
Li Yau Tsun 李右泉	Nan Hoi	Pawnshop	–	–
Li Yik Mui 李亦梅	San Wui	Nam Pak Hong (rice and saltpeter)	–	–
Chau Yu Teng 周雨亭	Hailan	Comprador	–	–
Leung Put Yue 梁弼予	Shun Tek	Pawnshop proprietor	–	–
Au Lim Chuen 區廉泉	Nan Hoi	Precious metal business	–	–

1922– 1925	1925– 1929	1929– 1931	1931– 1933	1933– 1935	1935– 1937	1937– 1939	1939– 1941
–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Chair	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Manager	Manager	–	–	–	–	–	–
–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Vice-chair	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
–	Chair	–	–	–	–	–	–
–	Vice-chair	Chair	–	–	–	–	–
–	–	Vice-chair	–	–	–	–	–
–	–	Treasurer	–	–	–	–	–
–	–	Vice- treasurer	–	–	–	–	–

TABLE 1.7 (*cont.*)

Names (1)	Native-place (2)	Business (2)	1913–1914	1914–1921
Wong Kwong Tin 黃廣田	Nan Hoi	Estate developer	–	–
Ho Sai Leung 何世亮 (–1933)	Po On	Comprador	–	–
Philip Gock Chin 郭泉	Heung Sham	The Wing On Group of Co., Ltd.	–	–
Tong Wing Iu 湯榮耀	Toi Shan	Comprador for shipping business	–	–
Li Sin Ku 李星衢	Toi Shan	China Hong Nin Life insurance	–	–
Lui Yam Sun 雷薩蓀	Toi Shan	Kan Sham Chong	–	–
Doo Jack Man 杜澤文	Heung Sham	The Wing On Group of Co., Ltd.	–	–
Wong J. M. 黃茂林	Tung Kwun	Comprador (Watsons)	–	–
Chan Kam Po 陳鑑波	Po On	Comprador	–	–
Au Tse Sen 區澤森	San Wui	Vietnamese trade	–	–
Ng Chak Wah 吳澤華	Teochew	Chinese manager of the Java-China- Japan Lijn, N. V.	–	–



TABLE 1.7 (*cont.*)

Names (1)	Native-place (2)	Business (2)	1913–1914	1914–1921
Tung Chung Wai 董仲偉	Heung Sham	Banking	–	–
Yung Kon Man 容冠文	Heung Sham	Chinese Manager (Wo Kee Yanghang)	–	–

*Sources:*

<sup>1</sup> List of officers, see CGCCHK, *Xianggang zhonghua zongshang hui bainianshi* 香港中華總商會百年史 [The one-hundred year history of the Hong Kong Chinese General Chamber of Commerce, Hong Kong] (Xianggang zhonghua zongshanghui, 2002), 224–227.

<sup>2</sup> Native-place of origins and businesses: Jan George Chance, ed., *Xianggang zhonghua shangye jiaotong renming zhinanlu* (Directory for Hong Kong's commerce, transportation, and who's

TABLE 1.8 *Chinese Justices of the Peace in 1922, Hong Kong*

Name	Year of Appointment	Primary Concern
Wei Yuk 韋玉	1882	Comprador of Mercantile Bank of India
Robert Ho Tung 何東	1891	Comprador of Jardine, Matheson & Co.
Chan A. Fook 陳福	1892	Queen's Dispenser
Ho Fook 何福	1892	Comprador of Jardine, Matheson and Co.
Chau Siu Ki 周少歧	1903	Chuen On Insurance Co.
Lau Chu Pak 劉鑄伯	1903	Comprador of E. D. Sasson Co. and Douglas Lapraik Co.
Wei Wa Leen 韋華蓮	1903	N/A
Wong Kam Fuk 黃金福	1903	Hong Kong and Koloon Wharf and Godown Co.

1922– 1925	1925– 1929	1929– 1931	1931– 1933	1933– 1935	1935– 1937	1937– 1939	1939– 1941
–	–	–	–	–	–	Vice- treasurer	Treasurer
–	–	–	–	–	–	–	Vice- treasurer

who; Publisher unknown, 1915?); Publicity Bureau for South China, ed., *Anglo-Chinese Directory, Hong Kong, 1922* (Hong Kong: The Publicity Bureau for South China, 1922); CGCCHK, *Directory of Hong Kong 1927* (Hong Kong: Chinese General Chamber of Commerce, Hong Kong, 1927); Chan Tai Tung and Chan Man Yuen, ed., *Bainian shangye* 百年商業 (A Century of Commerce; Hong Kong: Guangming wenhua shiye chubanshe, 1941).

Name	Year of Appointment	Primary Concern
Ho Kom Tong 何棣生	1906	Comprador of Jardine, Matheson & Co.
Tong Lai Chun 唐麗泉	1906	Comprador of Jardine, Matheson & Co.
Ng Non Tsz 伍漢墀	1909	Hontsz & Co.
Lo Cheung Shiu 羅長肇	1915	Comprador of Jardine, Matheson & Co.
Li Po Kwai 李葆葵	1916	Po Hing Tai (rice trade)
Tong Yat Chun 唐溢川	1916	San Fat (trade of foreign goods)
Chow Shou Son 周壽臣	1917	Bank of East Asia
Ho Sai Wing 何世榮 <sup>1</sup>	1918	Comprador of Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank

TABLE 1.8 (cont.)

Name	Year of Appointment	Primary Concern
Robert H. Kotewall 羅旭和	1918	Comprador of the R. H. Kotewall Company
Tso Seen Wan 曹善允	1918	Barrister, 2 F., 26 Des Voues Road, Central
Kwok Shiu Lau 郭少流	1919	Comprador of Banque de Lindo-Chine
Sham Pak Ming 岑伯銘	1919	Comprador of Russo-Asiatic Bank
Ho Sai Kwong 何世光 <sup>2</sup>	1920	Comprador of E. D. Sasson & Co.
Li Wing Kwong 李榮光	1921	Wing Hing Hao (bank and remittance house)
Li Yik Mui 李亦梅	1921	Kwong Yik Cheung (saltpeter trade in the Nam Pak Hong)
Ip Lan Chuen 葉蘭泉	1921	China Fire and Insurance Co.
Yung Tsz Ming 容子明	1921	Comprador Dept. Chartered Bank
Mok Kon Shan 莫幹生	1921	Comprador Dept. Butterfield & Swire
Lo Man Kim 羅文錦	1921	Barrister (son of the comprador Lo Cheung Shiu)
Ho Sai Leung 何世亮 <sup>3</sup>	1921	Comprador of Jardine, Matheson & Co.
Li Ping 李炳	1921	Wing Tai Hao (agent of construction contractor)

Source: Publicity Bureau for South China, ed., *Anglo-Chinese Directory, Hong Kong, 1922*, pp. 2–3.

<sup>1</sup> Registered as Ho Wing in English and 何榮 in Chinese, but the Chinese name changed to 何世榮 in “List of the Justice of the Peace, Hong Kong: Non-official,” in *Directory of Hong Kong 1927* (Hong Kong: Chinese General Chamber of Commerce, Hong Kong, 1927), p. 37. The Chinese name changed to 何世榮 in “List of the Justice of the Peace, Hong Kong: Non-official,” in *Directory of Hong Kong 1927* (Hong Kong: Chinese General Chamber of Commerce, Hong Kong, 1927), p. 37.

<sup>2</sup> Registered as Ho Kwong in English and 何光 in Chinese, but the Chinese name changed to 何世光 in “List of the Justice of the Peace, Hong Kong: Non-official,” in *Directory of Hong Kong 1927*, p. 37.

<sup>3</sup> Registered as Ho Leung in English and 何亮 in Chinese, but the Chinese name changed to 何世亮 in “List of the Justice of the Peace, Hong Kong: Non-official,” in *Directory of Hong Kong 1927*, p. 37.

TABLE 1.9 *Tung Wah Hospital Positions Held by Leaders in the CCCHK, 1913–1941*

Name <sup>1</sup>	Native-place <sup>2</sup>	Tung Wah Hospital Position <sup>2</sup>	CCCHK Position <sup>1</sup>	Primary Business <sup>3</sup>
Li Yau Tsun	Nan Hoi	1897 Manager	1925–1929 Chair	Pawnshop owner (Quanxing ya)
Chow Siu Ki	Tung Kwun	1903 and 1914 Chair	1913–1921 Vice-Treasurer	Founder (Chun On Fire Insurance Co.; Hong Kong and Kowloon Land and Loan Co.)
Chow Yu Tin	Hailan	1903 General Manager	1929–1931 Vice-Chair	Owner of a mercantile house (Jei cheng yanghang)
Li Po Kwai	Sze Yap (Sun Wui)	1904 General Manager	Founder; 1913–21 Treasurer; 1922–25 Chair	Rice dealer (Po Hing Tai Rice Co.)
Lau Chu Pak	Po On	1909 Chair	1913–1921 Chair	Comprador (Lau Chu Pak & Son Co.)
Li Yik Mui	Sze Yap (Sun Hui)	1910 General Manager	1925–1929: Vice-Chair; 1929–1931 Chair	Nam Pak Hong merchant
Un Ying Shan	Tung Kwun	1912 Chair	1914 Vice-Chair	Import-export trade with Singapore
Ho Sai Kwong	Hong Kong	1919 Chair	1922–1925 Vice-Chair	Comprador (E. D. Sasson & Co.)
Wong Kwong Tin	Nan Hoi	1921 Chief General Manager	1931–1936 Chair	Estate developer (Kai Tack Land Investment Co.)
Li Sing Ku	Sze Yap (Toi Shan)	1921 Chief General Manager	1933–1935 Vice-Chair; 1935–1937 Vice-Chair; 1937–1939 Chair	China Life Insurance Co.
Philip Gock Chin	Heung Sham	1926 Chief General Manager	1931–1933 Treasurer; 1937–1939; Treasurer; 1939–1941 Chair	Founder of Wing On Group of Companies and Yu Mai Ti Shipping Co., etc.

TABLE 1.9 (*cont.*)

Name <sup>1</sup>	Native-place <sup>2</sup>	Tung Wah Hospital Position <sup>2</sup>	CCCHK Position <sup>1</sup>	Primary Business <sup>3</sup>
Lui Yan Sun	Sze Yap (Toi shan)	1926 General Manager	1933–1935 Treasurer	Kam Shan Chong (San Kwong Hop, Shing Lee Cheong) Hock Ong Insurance Co. Manager (Wing On Co.)
To Tse Man	Heung Sham	1927 General Manager	1933–1935 Vice-Treasurer	Comprador (Ho Kee)
Yung Kung-man	Heung Sham	1927 General Manager	1939–1941 Vice-Treasurer	Comprador (Wing Kee Shipping Co. [Japanese capital])
Tong Wing Yao	Sze Yap (Toi Shan)	1930 Chief General Manager	1931–1933 Vice-Treasurer	Comprador (Jardine- China Shipping Co.)
Ng Tse Wah	Teochew	1935 General Chief Manager	1939–1941 Vice-Chair	

*Sources:*<sup>1</sup> CGCHK, *Xianggang zhonghua zongshang hui bainianshi*, pp. 224–227.<sup>2</sup> The Tung Wah Group of Hospitals Editorial Board, *Donghua san yuang fanzhan shi*, pp. 14–28; the Tung Wah Group of Hospitals, *Donghua san yuan yibaisanshi nian* [One Hundred and Thirty Years of the Tung Wah Group of Hospitals] (Hong Kong: the Tung Wah Group of Hospitals, 2000), Appendix 1.<sup>3</sup> Jan George Chance, ed., *Xianggang zhonghua shangye jiaotong renming zhinanlu*; Publicity Bureau for South China, ed., *Anglo-Chinese Directory, Hong Kong, 1922*.

## Conclusion

This chapter has introduced the long-term development of Chinese seaborne activities from China's two southern provinces, Fujian and Guangdong. The southern provinces were peripheral to the political core of imperial China but were its economic wellspring, especially after the second millennium. From the long sixteenth century onwards, the southern Chinese business and migration networks to the South Seas became crucial to the establishment of European colonial settlements. These settlements in turn developed into nodes of southern Chinese migrant communities where trade, cultural and social exchanges as well as political negotiations took place beyond the official sanctions of the Chinese empire. By the turn of the twentieth century, the distinction between Chinese overseas and China, together with the experiences of cooperation and conflict through trading with and serving the European

colonizers in the South Seas, equipped the Chinese descendants residing abroad to engage in political reforms or in revolutionary movements in China. At the same time, Chinese settlements outside China, including British Hong Kong, Malaya as well as Japanese Taiwan, sheltered people like Yung Wing, Kang Youwei, Liang Qichao, Zhang Taiyan, Sun Yat-sen or other political dissents, to escape from the prosecution of the late Qing empire. Chinese bourgeoisie in Hong Kong and Singapore had proved that they both conformed to the British colonial status quo and committed to China's development. In the decades to come, the Chinese bourgeoisie overseas became the catalysts of China's nation-building and state-making projects as well as of the transition of hegemonic power in the South China-South Seas region.

## Chinese Overseas Bourgeoisie in the Emerging Anti-imperialist Nationalism

Frankly speaking, Chinese sojourners in the South Seas today do not really appreciate the Japanese... Because of the more skillful strategies of the European and American people, these Western powers were more popular among ordinary Chinese sojourners than the Japanese... Japanese way of interacting with Chinese sojourners should better be conducted along the following approach: while calculating the economic progress, Japan must also take care of the moral dimension to cultivate the emotional bondage. After all, to attract the emotional support [of Chinese sojourners to the Japanese], on the one hand we have to make progress on moral dimension, on the other hand, we have to make the cooperation fit the economic interest.

—KWIK DJOEN ENG 郭春秋 (Guo Chunyang; 1859–1935)<sup>1</sup>



In May 1919, the very same month as the Chinese mass protest against the Paris Peace Conference decision that approved Japan's control of the prewar German territory in Shandong, China, the Hokkien merchant Kwik Djoen Eng provided the above advice to Japanese leaders on the agenda of southward expansion. Kwik was an active merchant of Taiwanese tea and Javanese sugar, as well as a real-estate investor in Java, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Canton. Born in Tong'an county, Fujian, China, he left for Java at the age of sixteen. Between 1898 and 1906, he obtained overseas Japanese colonial citizenship from Taiwan (Taiwan *sekimin* 籍民).<sup>2</sup>

- 
- 1 Guo Chunyang, "Nanyō bōeki to kakyō 南洋貿易と華僑 [South Seas trade and overseas Chinese]," *Nanyō Kyōkai Zasshi* 南洋協會雜誌 (NKZ thereafter) Vol. 5, no. 5 (May 1919): 42–43.
  - 2 Lin Man-houng, "Overseas Chinese merchants and multiple nationality: a means for reducing commercial risk (1895–1935)," 985–1009; "Taiwanese Merchants, Overseas Chinese Merchants, and the Japanese Government in the Economic Relations between Taiwan and Japan, 1895–1945."

Kwik was an important consultant for Japan's southward expansion to the South Seas. His main suggestion, as excerpted above, was that Japan should win support from the Chinese overseas. In the same article, Kwik also pointed out that among all Chinese overseas in the South Seas, Japan should specifically work with those from Fujian province, not only because "most wealthy merchants in the South Seas came from the Fujian," but also because they "had the most special feeling toward the Japanese."<sup>3</sup> By this, Kwik was referring to the Hokkien speakers like himself.

Kwik's suggestion to cultivate Sino-Japanese solidarity in order to compete with the existing Chinese-Western collaboration in the South Seas shows the influence of the Japanese Pan-Asianist thought, which reflected Japan's dubious assessments of the Western presence in the region. During the period of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, Japan viewed the presence of Western colonial powers in the South Seas mainly as an economic problem, not a political one. Earlier on, in 1918, when Kwik established the Confucian learning and philanthropic campaign, the Confucian Sage's Great Way Association 孔聖大道會, in Taipei, he pointed out that the rationale of founding such an association was to check the growth of the "Western dangerous idea that was disseminating from Siberia to South China." Such an idea was taking hold because of its appeal to "the lower class with their destitute life and disgruntled view on economy."<sup>4</sup> The resort to Confucianism in Japanese Taiwan resonated with the booming Confucian revival movement among Chinese bourgeois circles in Hong Kong and Singapore in the early twentieth century (chapter 1).

The connection between British-patronized Chinese elites in Hong Kong and Singapore and the expanding Japanese interest was the background against which the bourgeoisie overseas responded to the rise of Chinese anti-imperialist nationalism. The latter competed and eventually replaced the earlier economic nationalist thought of *shi ye jiu guo*, to which the Chinese overseas bourgeoisie remained committed.

3 Guo Chunyang, "Nan'yō bōeki to kakyō," 43.

4 Anonymous, "Kaku Shun'ou-shi no keikaku seru Ni-Shi shinzen no daikyō 郭春秧氏の計画せる日支親善の大経 [Outlines for Guo Chunyang's plan to promote Japan-China friendship and goodwill]," *Taiwan Nichi-nichi Shin-pō* 台湾日日新報, April 28, 1920, from Shinbun kiji bunko gaikoku, Kobe University Libraries 新聞記事文庫, 神戸大学図書館 (digital files, accessed online at [http://www.lib.kobe-u.ac.jp/das/jsp/ja/ContentViewM.jsp?METAID=10126012&TYPE=IMAGE\\_FILE&POS=1](http://www.lib.kobe-u.ac.jp/das/jsp/ja/ContentViewM.jsp?METAID=10126012&TYPE=IMAGE_FILE&POS=1) on November 3, 2013).

## 1919 in Chinese Anti-Japanese Nationalism

In November 1915, after expelling the German power in Qingdao, Shandong, Japan began to urge Beijing to grant it special rights in China. The requests that Japan proposed, known as the “Twenty-One Demands,” referred to not only the Qingdao issue but also the interests in Southern Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia. Beijing yielded in May 1915, and Chinese nationalists viewed the decision as a compromise with Japan. Anti-Japanese movements surged. The agitation soon merged with the New Culture Movement. The latter, centered around Chen Duxiu’s 陳獨秀 (1879–1942) journal *New Youth*, spearheaded the campaign that criticized the Chinese Confucian traditions. In its search for a new ethos for the new China, the success of the Bolshevik revolution in October 1917 became an inspiration. The revolution manifested the imperative right for the exploited to stand up, based on the Marxist doctrine about capitalist exploitation of proletarians and peasants. It motivated Chinese intellectuals to frame China as a victim of the exploitative Anglo-American power and Japanese imperialism. The Karakhan Manifesto, which the Russian government voluntarily announced to relinquish all privileges that tsarist Russia enjoyed in China, further impressed the Chinese intellectuals.<sup>5</sup> The diplomatic setback in the Paris Peace Conference in 1919 further affirmed the victimhood of China for these Marxist-leaning intellectuals. Chen Duxiu and his peer leader of the New Culture Movement, Li Dazhao, under the advice of the Comintern, organized the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in Shanghai in July 1921.<sup>6</sup>

When Marxist ideas stormed the intellectual circles in urban China, the winds did not immediately reach the groups of Chinese bourgeoisie in British Hong Kong and Singapore. In Hong Kong, in response to the protest against Japan’s Twenty-One Demands, in May 1915, two Chinese members of the Legislative Council, Wei Yuk 韋玉 and Lau Chu Pak, presented to Governor Henry May a note about the importance for the British to help China defend from Japan’s aggression: “What Germany is now doing in Europe will, in course of time, be done by Japan in Asia, if she is now allowed a free hand in the Far East.”<sup>7</sup> In addition to the concern about China’s loss of sovereignty rights to Japan, the Chinese bourgeois elites in Hong Kong cared about European interests: “If Japan succeeds in her efforts, not only China will lose her sovereignty

5 Bruce Elleman, *Diplomacy and Deception: The Secret History of Sino-Soviet Diplomatic Relations, 1917–1927* (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1997), 24–26.

6 Arif Dirlik, *The Origins of Chinese Communism* (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1989).

7 CO 129/421: Japanese Demands on China, 293.

rights but also Japan's influence will so expand as to exclude, in the immediate future, all European interests from China."<sup>8</sup> These certainly included the British colonial status quo.

In February 1919, when the Chinese delegates were about to leave for Paris to negotiate for China's sovereignty claim over a prewar German concession in Qingdao, Shandong, the Chinese bourgeoisie in the CGCCHK refused to send words of support. The reason that the merchants provided shows the cautious attitude of the Chinese bourgeoisie in Hong Kong regarding political issues related to China: "This critical issue involving international questions is not what we should take care of. Unlike the Chinese Chamber of Commerce in the provincial capital [Canton], Hong Kong is a British colony . . ."<sup>9</sup> Later, in May 1919, when news of the mass protests in Beijing spread to Hong Kong, the Chinese bourgeoisie observed the anti-Japanese protests without taking any action.

Among these protests, the one conducted by high-school students is worth further elaboration. Beginning at 11:30 a.m. on June 3, 1919, nine students of Hong Kong's Tao Ying 陶英 High School walked through the bustling central district holding open black umbrellas. On that sunny morning, the attention of passersby was drawn to the two Chinese characters marked on the umbrellas: "*guo huo* 國貨 [national products]." This subtle gesture, which expressed only the students' expectation for restoring China's economy, was, however, beyond what the British colonial government in Hong Kong could tolerate. Police quickly arrested the students and charged them with not registering the parade in advance.<sup>10</sup> Reports of the event and subsequent charges against the students occupied the pages of Chinese newspapers in early June, but the Chinese bourgeoisie remained silent.<sup>11</sup> No word on the impact of the May Fourth

8 CO 129/421: Japanese Demands on China, 292.

9 *Wah Tze Yat Po* 華字日報 (English title: Chinese Mail, *WTYP* as follows; Hong Kong): Feb. 14, 1919, s1, p3.

10 *WTYP*: June 4–9, 1919.

11 It is worth noting that throughout the trials of these students, the court never explicitly charged them with violations associated with Chinese nationalism. The students were charged with "disturbing the peace." The patriotic parade was regarded a conventional Chinese social gathering, such as for a religious ceremony or wedding party. Because many gatherings were accompanied by musical performances, the authorities claimed that registration in advance was required. Defenders of the students argued that because they walked silently, they were exempt from registration. In the end, the police ruled that the walk violated the British rule. Each of the students was fined 3 silver dollars. They were also required to remove the words from their umbrellas. *WTYP*: June 9, 1919.

Movement appeared in the Justice and Peace section of “The Annual Report for 1919.”<sup>12</sup>

In Singapore, the top Chinese bourgeoisie endorsed the New Culture Movement through an acceleration of their Sinization process. The Chinese schools in Singapore responded to the Chinese New Culture Movement’s appeal for greater vernacularization by promoting the teaching of Mandarin Chinese in lieu of many dialects.<sup>13</sup> This continued the trend of the Baba Chinese Lim Boon Keng’s pan-Chinese movement a decade earlier (chapter 1). In 1916, the Hokkien’s Tao Nan School 道南學校 introduced the teaching of Mandarin Chinese.<sup>14</sup> The Mandarin language students received funds from Chinese associations, beyond the direct control of the British education authorities. In May Fourth Movement in Singapore, many demonstrating students came from these Mandarin language schools.<sup>15</sup>

What grew concomitant to the rise of China-oriented education was, however, the distance between bourgeois and mass nationalism. The bourgeoisie rejected, but the mass accepted, the new anti-imperialist agenda. In July 1918, the Makassar Chamber of Commerce and the National Salvation Corps for Shanghai Students in Japan inquired about the sccc’s position in response to Beijing’s secret deal with Japan. The response: “This issue matters to obscure domestic politics of China. It is not what an overseas Chinese commercial association like us [the sccc] could intervene. Also we have laid this kind of issues on the table for a long while. The only thing we can do is not to reply to these letters.”<sup>16</sup>

Between May and June 1919, angry Chinese youths went after households and stores to burn and destroy any Japanese product they found. The riots caused three deaths and eight injuries.<sup>17</sup> The Chinese business leaders neither initiated nor endorsed these incidents. The local Chinese newspaper *Lat Pau* points out that most of those involved in the anti-Japanese boycotts were students

12 *Hong Kong Blue Book 1919* (Hong Kong: the Government of Hong Kong): 1919 Annual Report.

13 Kenley, *New Culture in a New World*, 184.

14 Goda Miho 合田美穂, “Xinjiapo ji Xianggang de Fujian shetuan ji qi jiaoyu shiye de bijiao yanjiu 新嘉坡及香港的福建社團及其教育事業的比較研究 [Comparative study on the Fujian associations and schools in Singapore and Hong Kong],” paper presented in the International Conference of Institutes and Libraries for Overseas Chinese Studies, the Second Conference, 2003. Hong Kong: University Library System, the Chinese University of Hong Kong.

15 Kenley, *New Culture in a New World*, 72.

16 sccc, Archives of Minutes of Committee Meeting, July 27, 1918.

17 sggg, Supplement to 1919: “Secret Societies, etc.,” 14.

and workers.<sup>18</sup> The British police report confirmed this in greater detail: Most protesters were related to the Patriotic League and Chan She. The two associations had little, if any, influence in local society.<sup>19</sup> At the height of the disturbances, the British proclaimed martial law, on June 20, 1919. On the same day, *Lat Pau*, then managed by See Tiong Wah, announced that it would stop posting advertisements for Japanese commodities.<sup>20</sup> Nonetheless, between July and September, *Lat Pau* published notices and commentaries to defend Chien Chaonan 簡照南 (1870–1923), the founder of the Nanyang Brothers' Tobacco Company, for his Japanese identity.

Born in Nan Hoi, Guangdong, Chien started several different businesses in Hong Kong, Japan, Vietnam, and Burma but all failed. In 1905, he opened the Nanyang Brothers' Tobacco Company in Hong Kong. The company went bankrupt and shut down for one year in 1908, but after that it expanded quickly. In 1915, it registered in China as a Chinese domestic industry under the name of the Guangdong Nanyang Brothers' Tobacco Co., with branch offices in Shanghai and Hankou as well as an outlet in Singapore. In 1918, Chien reorganized the company as a limited company and moved its head office from Hong Kong to Shanghai. Chien labeled his cigarettes as the only "authentic Chinese goods" in Chinese markets, which were under the shadow of foreign cigarettes, especially the keen competition from products of the British American Tobacco Company. At the apex of the Chinese anti-Japanese insurgence in May 1919, Chien's competitors criticized him for faking the Chinese identity of his products: Chien himself should be considered a Japanese merchant, as he obtained Japanese citizenship in 1902. With this, his business competitors lobbied the Beijing government to cancel the registration of the Nanyang Brothers' Tobacco Company as a Chinese company. The government followed suit. Chien reacted by renouncing his Japanese citizenship, and Beijing resumed the registration status of his company in September 1919.<sup>21</sup>

18 *Lat Pau*: June 20, 1919.

19 ssgg Supplement to 1919: Annual Report on the Straits Settlement Police Force and on the State of Crime for the Year 1919, "Secret Societies, etc.," 14.

20 The announcement read as follows: "The newspaper from tomorrow will stop posting advertisements of one particular country." *Lat Pau* (Singapore): June 20, 1919. See Tiong Wah was Lau Pau's founder's nephew, see Yi Ruofen 衣若芬, "Xiyang yu aiguo: 'Wu si yundong' qianhou Nanyang Xiongdi Yancao Gongsì zai Xinjiapo Le Bao de guanggao 吸煙與愛國: 「五四運動」前後南洋兄弟煙草公司在新加坡《叻報》的廣告 [Smoking and patriotism: Advertisements of the Nanyang Brothers' Tobacco Company in Singapore *Lat Pau*, before and after the 'May Fourth Movement']," *Journal of National Taiwan Normal University*, Vol. 54, no. 2 (Sept. 2009): 65–106.

21 Luo Yixing 羅一星, "Jian Zhaonan yu Nanyang xiongdi yancao gongsì 簡照南與南洋兄弟煙草公司 [Chien Chaonan and the Nanyang Brothers' Tobacco Company],"

Reviewing the troubles, a *Lat Pau* commentary emphasized Chien's consistent loyalty to Chinese interests:

Chien's donations to charities were always generous...None foreign company's managers could compete with his philanthropy... The company set up cigarette manufactures in both Hong Kong and Shanghai. Our journalists have all witnessed the large number of workers, and the scale of the industry. These factories provided jobs for many Chinese workers. This alone was an important contribution to the society.<sup>22</sup>

The way the commentary gave Chien credit for Chinese nationalism was not through denying his foreign, especially Japanese, connections, but through emphasizing his contribution to the pragmatic industry, *shi ye*. Successful entrepreneurship, in the eyes of the overseas bourgeoisie, was equivalent to patriotism.

Chinese anti-Japanese activities sparked conflicts within Chinese communities in Singapore. The nationalists expected that the sccc would take a more sympathetic position. The association, however, chose to do otherwise. In the middle of June, the sccc published a statement advising the Chinese not to conduct "all actions tending to restrict the natural course of business or intercourse."<sup>23</sup> Local Japanese acknowledged the Chinese bourgeois associations such as the millionaire club Ee Ho Hean 怡和軒 (Yihe Xuan) and the Singapore Fujian Native-Place Association with restoring the social order.<sup>24</sup> Perhaps provoked by the sccc's lukewarm response, nationalist activists sent bombs packed in biscuit tins to two of its key leaders, See Tiong Wah and the Hokkien leader Lim Chwee Chian.<sup>25</sup>

---

*Guangzhou wenshi ziliao di san-shi-liu* 廣州文史資料 no. 36, ed. Zhongguo minzhu jiaoguo hui Guangzhou shi weiyuan hui, Guangzhou-shi gongshang ye lianhehui and Guangzhou-shi zhengxie wenshi ziliao yanjiu weiyuanhui (Canton: Guangdong renmin chuban she, 1986), 24–42; Sherman Cochran, *Big Business in China: Sino-Foreign Rivalry in the Cigarette Industry, 1890–1930* (Cambridge, Massachusetts and London, England: Harvard University Press, 1980); Yi Ruofen, "Xiyan yu aiguo: 'Wu si yundong' qianhou Nanyang Xiongdi Yancao Gonsi zai Xinjiapo Le Bao de guanggao," 65–106.

22 *Lat Pau*: September 4, 1919.

23 *Straits Times* (Singapore): June 23, 1919, 9; *Singapore Free Press And Mercantile Advertiser*: June 24, 1919, 5.

24 *NKZ* 5 9 (Tokyo, September, 1919): 39–49.

25 *SSGG*, Supplement to 1919: Annual Report on the Straits Settlement Police Force and on the State of Crime for the Year 1919, "Secret Societies, etc.," 14.

The May Fourth Movements in both Hong Kong and Singapore were thus Chinese nationalist events without the participation of the bourgeoisie. The latter did not lead the anti-Japanese boycotts. Some continued to handle Japanese goods. The souvenir pamphlet of the twenty-fifth anniversary of the Sincere Company, published in 1924, mentioned the great loss suffered by the company in the wave of anti-Japanese agitation in spring 1919. The report defended the company's decision to continue to carry Japanese goods: "As a department store, we committed to carry global merchandizes. These included the sales of Chinese and all kinds of foreign products." They also argued that "manufacturing goods in China had to count on the circulation of department stores. The more developed the industry of department store is the greater chances for China to export goods abroad."<sup>26</sup> The statement shows that the Sincere Company expected to continue the idea of *shi ye jiu guo*. But the strategies of entrepreneurship used by Chinese overseas—emphasis on international and middlemen trade—were what the anti-imperialists considered as evidence of treachery, betrayal, and disloyalty.

### The 1919 Rice Shortage

As bystanders of the anti-Japanese boycotts, the bourgeoisie remained concerned about Chinese communal affairs. In both Hong Kong and Singapore, the spring of 1919 witnessed waves of social unrest due to a rice shortage. The crisis was triggered by speculation in the Asian rice market after 1916, when Chinese merchants tried to dominate the export of rice from Indochina, Burma, and Siam when Austrian and German markets were closed because of the British trade embargoes in World War I. As rice prices slumped in 1917, in Burma, 40 percent of exportable grains remained unsold with the millers and dealers. Rice cultivators in Burma suffered. They held their grains off the market since supply was ample and the price was devastating. To store their unsold grains, many farmers had to mortgage their lands to build granaries. The Burmese government thus intervened in the rice trade. A commission was set up to stabilize rice prices and to arrange the supply of rice from Burma to India and other British colonies. The Straits Settlements responded to the reduction of the rice supply by prohibiting the transshipment trade of rice. The situation worsened after the crop failure in India in 1918. Allocation of rice from

26 Xianshi gongsi 先施公司 [the Sincere Company], *Xianshi gongsi ershiwu zhounian jinian ce* 先施公司二十五週年紀念冊 [Souvenir Publication for the Twenty Fifth Anniversary of the Sincere Company] (Hong Kong: Xianggang Xianshi gonsi, 1924), 4.

Burma to the Straits Settlements was reduced by 42 percent.<sup>27</sup> The Food Controller of the British Malaya thus turned to Siam and French Cochinchina for alternative sources of rice, with a scheme that excluded all ethnic Chinese rice dealers, even those naturalized British subjects, from engaging in the secret trade arrangement. The idea was to soothe competition from British colonies over the purchase of rice. Nonetheless, the British colonies still had to compete with Japan, the Philippines, and the Dutch East Indies over the supply of rice.<sup>28</sup>

Before the rice crisis affected Singapore, in December 1917, eighty Chinese rice dealers asked the SCCC to negotiate with the government to lift the ban on rice exports. The SCCC officers endorsed the appeal and filed a petition to the government, based on the rice dealers' guarantee that they would keep a three-month supply of rice in Singapore.<sup>29</sup> The merchants' guarantee turned out to be insufficient. Governmental intervention ensued. In December 1918, the Department of Food Control was established in Singapore to secure the supply of rice.<sup>30</sup> However, the situation did not improve. In May 1919, the supply of rice from Cochinchina proved to be unstable and insufficient. When the anti-Japanese boycotts started, the SCCC collected \$10,800 Straits dollars to purchase rice for the poor.<sup>31</sup> The government also attempted to assume total control of the rice supply. Beginning July 1, when rice riots broke out in Penang and Province Wellesley, the British officers in the Federated Malaya States implemented a scheme of rice control that lasted until 1921. With this, the government could regulate the importation of rice from Burma, Saigon, and Siam as well as its internal distribution in Malaya. The government also compensated the rice dealers for their existing stocks.<sup>32</sup>

In contrast to this high level of governmental involvement in Singapore, in Hong Kong, governmental intervention was limited and not effective. In the early morning on July 27, 1919, people gathered in the Wanchai district and looted their way to Sheung Wan (Upper Bazaar), the center of the rice wholesalers in Hong Kong. The district of Bonham Strand and Connaught Road

27 *The Singapore Free Press and Mercantile Advertiser*, Oct. 8, 1919, 12. (NL 1647, Lee Kong Chiang Reference Library).

28 Paul H. Kratoska, "The British Empire and the Southeast Asian Rice Crisis of 1919–1921," *Modern Asian Studies*, Vol. 24, no. 1 (Feb. 1990), 115–146.

29 SCCC, *Xinjiapo zhonghua zongshanghui daxia luocheng jinian kan* 新嘉坡中華總商會大廈落成紀念刊 [Souvenir of the Opening Ceremony of the Newly Completed Chinese Chamber of Commerce Building] (Singapore, 1964), 159.

30 *The Singapore Free Press and Mercantile Advertiser*, Oct. 8, 1919, 12 (NL 1647, Lee Kong Chiang Reference Library, Singapore).

31 SCCC, *Xinjiapo zhonghua zongshanghui daxia luocheng jinian kan*, 159.

32 Kratoska, "The British Empire and the Southeast Asian Rice Crisis of 1919–1921."

became the looters' target. Disturbances soon extended to Shau Kei Wan, the eastern end of Hong Kong Island, and then passed to the heart of the Kowloon Peninsula, Mong Kok, and Yaumati. Almost all the important commercial districts were damaged. Rioters attacked rice shops and helped themselves to rice. The Hong Kong government announced that all local rice trade would be placed under governmental control and the government would purchase rice from China.<sup>33</sup> But at this critical moment, the British colonial government in Hong Kong found it hard to compete with Japan to bid on rice from China.

Purchasing rice from China was a matter of not only money but also "extensive political networks" with key politicians in China.<sup>34</sup> In Hong Kong, those who had extensive political networks included the Po On leaders—Robert Ho Tung and Lau Chu Pak—as well as the Nan Hoi merchants, Chien Chaonan and Chan Lim Pak 陳廉伯 (1884–1945). With the support of Tung Wah Hospital, they organized the Guangdong Food Relief Association. It petitioned to the Beijing government to secure their purchase of rice from Anhui, to which Japan was also bidding for rice.<sup>35</sup> The Heung Sham merchants of modern department stores—the Sincere Company, Wing On Company, and Sun Company—were also main donors of this campaign.<sup>36</sup>

Like the Po On merchants, whose British connections and interwoven social networking were introduced in chapter 1, the two Nan Hoi merchants also had sophisticated transnational ties: Chien Chaonan held Japanese citizenship between 1902 and 1919, obtained in the process of operating in transnational trade, which, as mentioned above, caused him troubles during the wave of anti-Japanese nationalism. Chan Lim Pak was the grandson of the returned Hoi Nan Cantonese overseas from Vietnam, Chan Kai Uen 陳啟源 (Chen Qiyuan; 1834–1903), who established the first silk steam filatures in Guangdong in the 1870s.<sup>37</sup> He was also an alumnus of Queen's College in Hong Kong and a comprador for the Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank. In spring 1919, Chan Lim

33 "Preliminary report on the purchase and sale of rice by the government of Hong Kong during the year 1919," *Hong Kong Sessional Papers 1920* (Hong Kong, the government of Hong Kong, 1920), 2; David Faure, "The Rice Trade in Hong Kong before the Second World War," *Between East and West: aspects of social and political development in Hong Kong*, ed. Sinn (Hong Kong: Center of Asian Studies, University of Hong Kong, 1990), 216–225.

34 S. P. Chung, *Chinese Business Groups in Hong Kong and Political Change in South China, 1900–25*, 82.

35 WTYF, August 19, 1919.

36 S. P. Chung, *Chinese Business Groups in Hong Kong and Political Change in South China, 1900–25*, 81.

37 Alvin Y. So, *The South China Silk District: Local Historical Transformation and World-System Theory* (Albany: SUNY Press, 1986), 111–118.

Pak alone donated 50,000 Hong Kong dollars and secured a loan of 100,000 Hong Kong dollars from his employer to relieve the rice shortage.<sup>38</sup>

The Heung Sham Cantonese were known for the three leading fixed-price department stores: the Sincere Company, owned by the returned Chinese overseas from Australia Ma Ying Piu 馬應彪 (1864–1944); the Wing On Company, owned by other Heung Sham men with Australian experiences, the Gock brothers Gock Lock 郭樂 (1874–1956) and Philip Gock Chin 郭泉 (1875–1966);<sup>39</sup> and the Sun Company, owned by Choy Hing 蔡興 and Choy Chong 蔡昌 (1877–1951).<sup>40</sup> They developed the whole district along the Des Voux Road and Queen's Road Central in Hong Kong as the center of fixed-priced shopping, a new practice to China.<sup>41</sup> By 1927, eight out of a total of nine department stores in Hong Kong were located in the area.<sup>42</sup> These companies also expanded to Canton and Shanghai, and they turned the Nanjing Road in Shanghai into the most splendid street of the city by the 1930s.<sup>43</sup> Their

38 S. P. Chung, *Chinese Business Groups in Hong Kong and Political Change in South China, 1900–25*, 80–81.

39 Gock Chin sometimes registered his name as Philip Gock Chin, and his children would register their last name as Gock Chin. Gock Lock sometimes registered his name as James Gocklock and used Gocklock.

40 The opening of the three department stores followed each other. Ma Ying Piu first started the Sincere Department Store on Queen's Road Central in Hong Kong in 1900. In 1907, the Gock brothers opened the Wing On Department Store on the same street. In 1912, Ma's business partners Choy Hing and Choy Chong (1877–1951?) established the Sun Company on Des Voux Road Central in Sheung Wan, Hong Kong. In the following year, on the same street, the Sincere Company built a six-floor building, with the top floor opened to customers for views of the Victorian Harbor. The Wing On Company also launched a new branch that occupied a whole block of the Des Voux Road Central. See *Xianshi gongsi, Xianshi gongsi er shi wu zhounian jinian ce*; Yong An Youxian Gongsi 永安有限公司 [The Wing On Co., Ltd.], *The Wing On Co., Ltd. Hong Kong in Commemoration of 25th Anniversary 1907–1932* (Hong Kong: The Wing On Company, 1932); Shanghai shi dang'an guang, Zhongshan shi zhe xue she hui ke xue lian he hui 上海市檔案館, 中山市哲學社會科學聯合會 ed., *Jindai Zhongguo baihuoye xianqu: Shanghai sida gongsi dang'an hui bian* 近代中國百貨業先驅: 上海四大公司檔案匯編 [Compilation of archives of the top four department stores in Shanghai] (Shanghai: Shanghai shudian chubanshe, 2010).

41 Yong An Youxian Gongsi, *The Wing On Co., Ltd. Hong Kong in Commemoration of 25th Anniversary 1907–1932*.

42 The only exception was the Tai Lee Co., Ltd., at Nos. 30–40, Lee Tung Street. Publicity Bureau for South China, *Anglo-Chinese Directory, Hong Kong, 1922* (Hong Kong: the Publicity Bureau for South China, Hong Kong, 1922), 252–253.

43 On Wing On and Sincere, see W. K. K. Chan, *Merchants, Mandarins and Modern Enterprise in Late Ch'ing China*, 28–31; “Personal Styles, Cultural Values and Management,” 141–166.

donations to food relief did not exempt these stores from being targeted by the Chinese anti-Japanese movement, however.<sup>44</sup>

In addition to securing the supply of rice from China, the Hong Kong bourgeoisie also facilitated the distribution of scarce rice to Hong Kong. In August, when the first stocks of rice hit the colony, the coolies who were supposed to unload it instead looted it.<sup>45</sup> The coordinator of rice distribution was Ho Sai Kwong, Ho Tung's nephew and a comprador of Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank, who was also the chairperson of Tung Wah Hospital then. Hospital reports documented that Ho Sai-kwong personally distributed congee to people in need, and he "devoted his whole time to dealing with it," achieving efficient results. The following table shows the hospital's expenses for supplying food and distributing congee:

TABLE 2.1 *Expenses for Relieving the Rice Shortage in Hong Kong, 1919*

Unit: Hong Kong Dollars

Receipts	\$	Expenses	\$
Donations	145,747	Congee station expenses	40,307
Premium and coins	545	Cheap sale of rice and station expenses	21,721
Sale of rice bags	2,530	Donation to Tung Wah Hospital	20,000
Sundries	345	Donation to Kwong Wah Hospital	10,000
		Donation to New Maternity Hospital, West Point	20,000
		Balance	37,139
Total	149,167	Total	149,167

Source: *Hong Kong Administrative Report 1919*, Appendix C: Report of the Secretary for Chinese Affairs for the Year 1919, C. 38.

On the Sun Company, CGCHK's *Directory of Hong Kong 1927* (published by Hong Kong: Xianggang zhonghua zong shanghai) shows that the company had a branch in Shanghai. The following report, however, documents only the year of 1936, in which the company expanded its Shanghai office on the Nanjing Road. See Shanghai shi dang'an guang, Zhongshan shi zhe xue she ke xue lian he hui eds., *Jindai Zhongguo baihuoye xianqu*, 273–276.

44 Xianshi gongsi, *Xianshi gongsi ershiwu zhounian jinian ce*, 4.

45 WTYP: August 19, 1919.

## Chinese Overseas Bourgeoisie and Japan's Southward Expansion, 1910–1927

The outbreaks of anti-Japanese boycotts in the late 1910s occurred at the time when Japan started its systemic southward advance. After Japan settled its northern affairs with Russia in the Russo-Japanese War in 1905 and with Korea in 1910, Japan became active to expand its businesses in the south.<sup>46</sup> The outbreak of World War I created a golden opportunity for Japanese expansion to the South Seas. The Japanese charter bank in Taiwan, the Bank of Taiwan, opened the first overseas bank in Singapore in 1912. Between 1914 and 1918, it opened three other offices in Surabaya (1915), Semarang (1917), and Batavia (1918). All were in the Dutch East Indies.<sup>47</sup>

Extension of the Japanese banking system in the South Seas was accompanied by the establishment of regular shipping routes to the region. Beginning in 1912, Japan established the South Seas Mail Steamship, which operated on the shipping routes along Kōbe, Moji, Jilong (north Taiwan), Hong Kong, Singapore, Batavia, Semarang, and Surabaya.<sup>48</sup> In April 1916, the Japanese colonial Office of the General Governor, Taiwan (Jp. *Taiwan Sōtokufu*), mandated and sponsored ocean liners and tramps to connect the waterway between Jilong and Singapore via Java.<sup>49</sup> Taiwan became an important stepping-stone for Japan's southward advance (map 2.1).

From Taiwan via Java, Singapore was incorporated into the Japanese sphere of influence in the South Seas. As these were areas where most Chinese were Hokkien speakers (table 1.1), a centerpiece of the plan was to bridge Japan's connections with the Hokkien networks. In January 1915, Uchida Kakichi, Den Kenjirō 田健治郎 from the Japanese Diet, and other statesmen launched the Nanyō Kyōkai 南洋協会 (registered in English as the South Sea Association) in Tōkyō. The association established its first two overseas offices in Taipei (1915) and Singapore (1916). In 1918, the Department of Commerce and Industry, Tokyo, established the Singapore Commercial Showcase. It provided a showcase for Japanese commodities and offered apprenticeship for Japanese

46 Before this juncture, Japanese *zaibatsu* Mitsui Bussan Kabushiki Kaisha had set up its first branch office in the South Seas in Singapore in 1891. Yano Tōru 矢野暢, *Nanshūn no keifu* 南進の系譜 [Genealogy of Japan's Southward Advance] (Tokyo: Chuoōu kōron-sha), 68.

47 Taiwan Ginkō 台湾銀行, *Taiwan Ginkō shijūnenshi* 台湾銀行四十年史 [40 Years of the Bank of Taiwan] (Taihoku: Taiwan Ginkō, 1939).

48 Unekawa Shizuo 畝川鎮夫, *Kaiun kōkokushi* 海運興國史 [The history of maritime transportation and national prosperity] (Ōsaka: Kaiji Ihōsha, 1927), 311–313.

49 Unekawa, *Kaiun kōkokushi*, 368; 647; 649.



MAP 2.1 *Japan's Shipping Routes to the South Seas, 1916*

SOURCE: HOKI RIKICHI 保木利吉, *RANRYŌ HIGASHI'INDO NO BŌEKI OYOBI KAIUN* 蘭領東印度ノ貿易及海運 [TRADE AND MARITIME SHIPPING IN DUTCH EAST INDIES] (TAIHOKU: TAIWAN SŌTOKUFU MINSEIBU TSŪSHINKYOKU, 1916), 173.

COURTESY OF THE ARCHIVAL OFFICE OF THE INSTITUTE OF TAIWAN HISTORY, ACADEMIA SINICA, TAIPEI.

students to learn the languages, customs, and other skills of doing business in the South Seas. The first director, Kimura Masutarō 木村増太郎, assumed the position after a decade of work experience in Taiwan. He took part in the Old Customs Survey of the Japanese colonial Office of the General Governor, Taiwan, in 1909 and worked for the Department of Commerce and Industry at the Takushoku Bureau of the Japanese colonial Office of the General Governor, Taiwan.<sup>50</sup> According to the annual business reports of the *Nanyō Kyōkai*, between 1922 and 1936, the Japanese colonial Office of the General Governor, Taiwan, supported nearly half the budget of the *Nanyō Kyōkai*.

After the end of World War I, to sustain the expanding Japanese influence in the South Seas, the *Nihon Yūsen Kaisha* 日本郵船会社 (Japan Mail Steamship Company) and *Ōsaka Shōsen Kaisha* 大阪商船会社 (Ōsaka Mercantile Steamship Company) operated regular shipping routes in the South Seas. The Japanese colonial Office of the General Governor, Taiwan, also authorized and subsidized the monthly South Seas route of the Ōsaka Mercantile Steamship Company.<sup>51</sup> In April 1919, the Ōsaka Mercantile Steamship Company established a direct shipping line between Jilong 基隆, Taiwan, and Singapore.<sup>52</sup> Overall tramp tonnages from Japan to the South Seas increased from 52,501 in 1916 to 143,734 in 1919.<sup>53</sup>

Concomitant to its emphasis on shipping, the Japanese colonial Office of the General Governor, Taiwan, also sponsored the establishment of the *Ka'nan Ginkō* 華南銀行 (registered English name: China and Southern Bank) in 1919 and the *Nan'yō sōko kabushiki kaisha* 南洋倉庫株式会社 (Southern Godown Company) in 1920. The former was to provide financial support for midsized and small enterprises in the trade of Japanese goods in the South Seas. The latter was to facilitate the transshipment trade of Japanese goods in major port-cities in the South Seas and China. The Japanese strategy of recruiting the Taiwanese elites, most of them Hokkien speakers, to connect with the Hokkien tycoons in the South Seas was explicit.<sup>54</sup> These ad hoc ventures of southward

50 "Kimura Masutarō" in Taiwan Sōtokufu shokuin-roku 台湾總督府職員録, digital archival collection of the Institute of Taiwan History, Academia Sinica, Taipei, <http://who.ith.sinica.edu.tw/mpView.action> (access on July 28, 2012).

51 Unekawa, *Kaiun kōkokushi*, 533.

52 Unekawa, *Kaiun kōkokushi*, 651.

53 Unekawa, *Kaiun kōkokushi*, 384; 403–404; 503.

54 The idea became the principal of southward business expansion between the 1910s and early 1920s. See for example, Kanan Ginkō, *Nan'yō ni okeru konponteki hōjin hatten-saku toshite no ichi-kōsatsu* 南洋に於ける根本的邦人発展策として一考察 [Survey of the fundamental development], 1932) (Taihoku: Kanan Ginkō).

advance recruited people like Kwik Djoen Eng and other Hokkien elites such as those from the “big five families” in Taiwan: Lin Hsiung-cheng 林熊徵 (Lin Xiongzheng; 1888–1946) from the Lin family at Banqiao in northern Taiwan and Lin Hsien-tang 林獻堂 (Lin Xiantang; 1881–1956).<sup>55</sup>

By the early 1920s, the Japanese expansion did not face challenge from the Chinese bourgeois communities in the South Seas. In Singapore, in May 1923, mobilizing an anti-Japanese boycott on the annual National Humiliation Day of the 1915 Twenty-One Demands was “ineffective.”<sup>56</sup> In September 1923, when an earthquake destroyed Tokyo, the Chinese bourgeoisie in Singapore organized the 1923 Singapore Chinese Relief Fund for Earthquake Victims in Japan. The campaign, initiated by the Hokkien rubber tycoon Tan Kah Kee, received wide support from Chinese business elites across speech-group lines: the Teochew merchant Liau Chia Heng and the Hokkien industrialist and banker Lm Peng Siang as well as the sccc’s incumbent chair, See Tiong Wah.<sup>57</sup>

55 In the organization of the Southern Godown House, for example, the Bank of Taiwan contributed only 2,450 shares, or 5 percent of the total five million yen of the founding capital of the company. The rest came from forty-three independent investors based in Japan and Taiwan (57 percent), twenty-seven from Java (22 percent), thirty-one from Singapore (9 percent), and twenty-seven from Java (7 percent). Among them, seven leaders from the big five families of Taiwan held one thousand shares each. Kwik Djoen Eng’s Kwik Hoo Tong Trading Society and its members held two thousand shares, equivalent to one-fifth of the total 10,150 shares from overseas Chinese capital in Java. Nan’yō Sōko 南洋倉庫, *Nan’yō sōko kabushiki kaisha 15-nenshi* 南洋倉庫株式会社15年史 [History of the 15 years of the Southern Godown Company] (Kōbe: Nan’yo soko kabushiki kaisha, 1936), 12–21.

56 In the words of Kenley, “For the next four years [after 1919], Singapore did not witness any disruptions that could compare with those of 1919. Feelings of antagonism subsided enough to allow a semblance of normalcy to prevail in the city. During this time, intellectual discussions published in the daily papers took center stage from would-be demonstrators. Economic factors explain, in part, this apparent lull in public dissension. Since the end of the war, global prices for rubber had remained depressed. Leading Singapore merchants may have been unwilling to involve themselves in community disturbances and risk greater economic misfortune.” Finally, the boycott became “an ineffectual boycott.” Kenley, *New Culture in a New World*, 52–53.

57 OHC Report, No. 52, Transcript of Interview with Tan Keong Choon 陳共存, Reel 13, 119 (Singapore: National Archives of Singapore); *NYSF*: Sept. 28, 1923; sccc, Archives of the Minutes of Committee Meetings, Sept. 9, 1923. Public connections between Chinese and Japanese were sensitive, however. In May 1924, the Singapore Japanese Association invited sccc leaders for a banquet. The sccc declined for the following reason: “Diplomatic relationship is not necessarily presented in attending a banquet.” See sccc, Archives of the Minutes of Committee Meetings, May 13, 1924.

In Hong Kong, the Europeans' General Chamber of Commerce in Hong Kong, the CGCCHK, and the Tung Wah Hospital also launched a campaign to help the victims of the Tokyo Earthquake. The Bank of East Asia donated five thousand Japanese yen to kick off the fundraising event. It helped repatriate Chinese migrants in Japan back to Hong Kong.<sup>58</sup> The beneficence went both ways. In the following year, the Singapore Japanese Association organized a relief fund to assist victims of China's floods.<sup>59</sup> In early 1926, when the Po On bourgeoisie in Hong Kong suffered from the anti-British strikes, Kwik Djoen Eng proposed to donate his land to end the conflict (see the following sections of the chapter for details). Also, Tan Kah Kee became friends with Kwik and Lin Hsien-tang: in May 1927, when Lin visited Singapore to supervise the businesses of the Southern Godown Company there, he was received by both Kwik and Tan.<sup>60</sup>

Another indicator of the cooperative ties between Chinese overseas bourgeoisie and Japan in the 1920s was the organization of the *Nanyang minqiao jiuxiang hui* 南洋閩僑救鄉會 (South Seas Fujian Sojourners' Home Saving Association; NMJH hereafter).<sup>61</sup> Initiated by the Manila-based Hokkien merchant of lumber and import-export trader Dee Cheng Chuan 李清泉 (also known as Li Tien-tuwan or Li Qingquan; 1888–1940), the association was established in 1924. After a year of preparation, in March 1926, the association convened a grand meeting in Gulangyu, Amoy. The purpose was to collect funds to invest in Fujian, especially to build a railway connecting the mine-rich Longyan in Fujian's western mountains to the southern seaport of the province, Zhangzhou. The proposal received broad support from about thirty Hokkien tycoons from the Philippines, Java, Malaya, and Shanghai. Among them, the most notable participant was Lim Boon Keng, from Singapore, who was then the president of Amoy University. In his inauguration speech, Lim

58 *WTYP*: Sept. 8; Sept. 18, 1923.

59 About the Japanese relief fund, see *NYSF*: Sept. 11, 1924.

60 Lin Xiantang 林獻堂, *Guanyuan xiansheng riji, Vol. 1* 灌園先生日記第一卷 [Diary of Mr. Guanyuan, Vol. 1]. Taipei: Academia Sinica, 2000), Vol. 1, 121.

61 Although "Minqiao 閩僑" of the NMJH can be understood as either Hokkien sojourners or sojourners from the entire Fujian province, I choose to refer to Minqiao here as Hokkien sojourners for the following reason: the rationale of the association stated that "Many of our people from southern Fujian are sojourners. Our footprints reached throughout the islands of the South Seas. There are about three million of us. We dominate the commerce and lead the economy. We are therefore the important components of the Fujian people..." Cited from NMJH, *Nanyang minqiao jiuxianghui linshi dahui baogaoshu* 南洋閩僑救鄉會臨時大會報告書 [Report of the temporary meeting of the Nanyang Hokkien Sojourners Home Saving Movement] (Amoy, China: Nanyang Minqiao jiuxianghui linshi daibiao dahui, 1926), 1.

advocated that “today, only Chinese overseas can save the Fujian province.”<sup>62</sup> The category of “Chinese overseas” included those from a Western colony like Dee, those returned to China like Lim, as well as those with business connections with Japanese Taiwan, such as Ma Yiqian 馬亦錢 from Kwik Djoen Eng’s Semarang Tea Agent Association<sup>63</sup> and Oei Ik Tjoe 黃奕住 (Huang Yizhu; 1868–1945).<sup>64</sup> Oei was a China-born, Java-based merchant and a banker in Shanghai. He later became the largest Chinese shareholder of the Japanese Southern Godown Company.<sup>65</sup> He solicited the NMJH members to organize the Fujian Railway Company. The project had been initiated in 1905 but was soon aborted because of lack of funds. In the 1910s, Japan expressed interest in participating in the southern Fujian railway project, but the Chinese government did not approve of their proposal.

The NMJH campaign in the mid-1920s, with the support of both British and Japanese-connected Chinese bourgeoisie, lighted up hope of reactivating the railway project in southern Fujian.<sup>66</sup> One can well argue that the bourgeoisie’s foreign connections, in the age of high Chinese anti-imperialism in the 1920s, manifested the bourgeoisie’s commitment to *shi ye jiu guo*, or the notion of economic nationalism. As Hong Kong became the primary target of the Chinese anti-British imperialist movement in the 1920s, what follows will elaborate the making of the British-associated Chinese bourgeoisie in Hong Kong as enemy of Chinese nationalism in the decades.

### The Making of Enemies in the Surging Anti-Imperialist Movements, 1921–1924

The surging anti-imperialist ideology in China identified the British, as well as its Chinese business partners, as the enemies of China. The first anti-British strike was the Seamen’s Strike, led by So Siu Chin 蘇兆徵 (Su Zhaozheng;

62 NMJH, *Nanyang minqiao jiuixianghui linshi daibiao dahui*, 22.

63 NYSF: 20 Aug., 1926; Chen Tian-lai 陳天來, *Dōgyō kumiai taiwan chashō kōkai enkaku-shi* 同業組合台灣茶商公會沿革史 [History of the Guild of Taiwan Tea Agencies]. Taibeishi: Dōgyō kumiai taiwan chashō gōkai, 1938), 29, 37.

64 NYSF: July 28, 1924; 19 Jan. 1925; Nov. 29–30, 1925.

65 In 1935, Oei held 160 shares among the 394 shares of the Southern Godown Company from China. Nan’yō *sōko kabushiki kaisha 15-nenshi*, 12–21.

66 NYSF: July 28, 1924; Jan. 19, 1925; Nov. 29–30, 1925; Mi Rucheng 宓汝成 ed. *Zhonghua min-guo tielu shiliao, 1919–1949* 中華民國鐵路史料, 一九一九—一九四九 [Historical data on railways in Republic of China, 1919–1949] (Beijing: Beijing shehui kexue wenxian chubanshe, 2002), 225–229.

1885–1929). It broke out on January 12, 1922, as a result of “the climax of the first Chinese strike and unionization wave of 1920–1922.”<sup>67</sup> By late February, 120,000 joined the movement. In addition to the seamen, workers in other sectors such as transportation, sanitation, and restaurants also went on a sympathy strike.<sup>68</sup> The strike disrupted the flow of commerce in Hong Kong and damaged the business of big shipping companies. Coolies in Canton refused to load ships destined for Hong Kong.<sup>69</sup> The price of foodstuffs soared.<sup>70</sup>

The movement, that mobilized the ideology of class struggle, consolidated the connection between the Chinese bourgeoisie in Hong Kong and those in Canton. With the close economic ties between Canton and Hong Kong, the Seamen’s Strike hurt Canton’s business as well. Because the strike broke out on the eve of the Chinese New Year, the busiest business season of the year, the merchants all expected the incident to end quickly. In February 1922, the Canton government “adopt[ed] the attitude of the Hong Kong Chinese bourgeoisie and tried to make the strikers accept a compromise.”<sup>71</sup> Thirty Chinese business guilds in Hong Kong jointly requested the Tung Wah Hospital to intervene and end the movement.<sup>72</sup> After informing the Protectorate for Chinese Affairs, Tung Wah Hospital convened a meeting with representatives from the CGCCHK on February 8.<sup>73</sup> In the meeting, they decided to negotiate with the strikers, proposing that if they stopped boycotting the shipment of rice to Hong Kong, the ship owners would compromise on the workers’ wage demands.

Chinese bourgeoisie tried to mediate the negotiation between the capitalists of the shipping companies and the strikers, but in the end, the labor organizers

67 Jean Chesneaux, *Chinese Labor Movement, 1919–1927* (translated from the French by H. M. Wright) (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1968), 181.

68 Chesneaux, *Chinese Labor Movement*, 184.

69 Chesneaux, *Chinese Labor Movement*, 181; Chen Qian 陳謙, *Xianggang jiushi jianwen lu* 香港舊事見聞錄 [Records of historical Hong Kong] (Canton: Guangdong renmin chubanshe 1989), 292–298.

70 According to Deng Zhongxia, the price of one pound of rice was 0.13 dollars on January 10, but by January 24 it had reached 0.22 dollars. The price of pork rose by 30 percent and the price of beef rose 50 percent in the same period. Deng Zhongxia 鄧中夏, *Zhongguo zhigong yundong jianshi, 1919–1926* 中國職工運動簡史, 一九一九—一九二六 [A Brief History of Labor Movements in China, 1919–1926] (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe), 49–50.

71 Chesneaux, *Chinese Labor Movement*, 184.

72 These commercial firms covered almost all representative businesses in Hong Kong, such as the Nam Pak Hong 南北行, the Kam Shan Chong, the piece-goods guild, the Hong Kong Siamese rice guild, the Tokyo guild, the Lim Yip Hong, and so on. See Tung Wah Group of Hospitals Editorial Board, “Donghua yiyuan chuang yuan jiushi nian zhi yange,” *Donghua san yuang fanzhan shi*, 8.

73 HKMS 163-1-2, Minutes of Meetings of the CGCCHK, Feb. 7, 1922.

identified the bourgeoisie as representatives of the shipping companies. On February 15, the bourgeoisie invited major labor leaders including So Siu Chin to negotiate with the ship owners face-to-face in Hong Kong.<sup>74</sup> The Communist labor organizer Deng Zhongxia 鄧中夏 did not appreciate the efforts of the Chinese bourgeoisie in Hong Kong. In retrospect, Deng concluded that both the CGCCHK and Tung Wah Hospital were working on behalf of the British: he described the hospital as “an organization of ‘foreign slaves’ subjugated to imperialism,”<sup>75</sup> noting that Robert H. Kotewall of the CGCCHK even tried to “bribe” the strike leaders.<sup>76</sup> The latter referred to Hong Tung’s donation of 368,000 HKD as workers’ indemnity.<sup>77</sup>

From the standpoint of the labor organizers, the bourgeoisie’s attempt to quickly terminate the strike manifested the intention of the bourgeoisie and imperialists to defeat the Chinese working-class consciousness. In the end, it was Chow Siu Ki’s proposal that ultimately helped defeat the strike. Chow Siu Ki, an import-export trader, was among the top British-entrusted Chinese elite in Hong Kong: a Justice of the Peace, an unofficial member of the Legislative Council and an active member of the CGCCHK.<sup>78</sup> He proposed that the British government check the belongings of people leaving Hong Kong: they could not carry more than five dollars, and extra money would be confiscated. The goal was to discourage workers from joining the strike committee in Canton.<sup>79</sup> The British accepted his proposal. At one checkpoint in the New Territories, a conflict ended with the death of six workers and nearly one hundred injured.<sup>80</sup> In early March, a final settlement was reached in favor of the workers. Their wages would be raised between 15 and 30 percent, and the ship owners promised not to fire those involved in the strike.<sup>81</sup>

Behind the scene, the Seamen’s Strike that demonstrated the organizational power of labor in the Canton-Hong Kong district reflected the rise of leftist forces in Guangdong. Though the newly established CCP (founded in July 1921) did not directly lead the movement, the victory was widely understood

74 The Tung Wah Group of Hospitals Editorial Board, *Donghua san yuang fanzhan shi*, 8–9.

75 Deng, *Zhongguo zhigong yundong jishi*, 51.

76 Deng, *Zhongguo zhigong yundong jishi*, 54.

77 Chan Ming Kuo, *Labor and Empire*, 299.

78 On Chow Siu Ki’s business, see HKRS 122 (Files and Papers of Companies Incorporated during the Japanese Occupation, 1943–1944): HKRS 122-5-2; HKRS 122-5-5 (Hong Kong: Hong Kong Public Record Office).

79 Chen Qian, *Xianggang jiushi jianwen lu*, 296.

80 Deng, *Zhongguo zhigong yundong jishi*, 58; Chen Qian, *Xianggang jiushi jianwen lu*, 296.

81 Chesneaux, *Chinese Labor Movement*, 184; Chen Qian, *Xianggang jiushi jianwen lu*, 297–298.

as reflecting the impact of the new political organization.<sup>82</sup> The triumph also heralded the rising influence of the left in South China in the following years. In January 1923, Dr. Sun Yat-sen signed a manifesto with Adolph Joffe that opened the door for Soviet support of the GMD reorganization. In January 1924, the GMD entered a cooperative relationship with the CCP. In return, the Comintern offered substantial support for the establishment of a professional lieutenant school for the reorganized GMD. Sun attempted to mobilize the new military force to annihilate the various regional warlords. To raise more military funds, he enacted a series of policies that imposed onerous surtaxes on merchants in Canton.<sup>83</sup>

The surging leftist policies were contested by Chinese business and British interests. For example, on February 21, 1924, an editorial titled “Toward the Communist Way” criticized the Canton government.<sup>84</sup> Another report condemned the communist ideology behind Dr. Sun’s agendas.<sup>85</sup> Without a positive response, in May, the merchants in Canton launched a protest strike.<sup>86</sup> They also organized the provincial Guangdong Merchant Corps to protect themselves from the raids of the Yunnan-Guangxi allied army that Sun recruited to station in Guangdong—a declaration of their mistrust of the government.<sup>87</sup> In June, the Hong Kong comprador Chan Lim Pak, also the head of the city’s Canton Chamber of Commerce, was selected as the head of the

---

82 Chan Lau Kit-ching, *From Nothing to Nothing*, 21–26.

83 According to Michael Tsin’s documentation of the Canton newspapers, government gazettes, and other official records in the early 1920s, these fees were levied through the following measures: First, landlords and their tenants were periodically required to “donate” or “lend” the government one or two months’ worth of rent. Second, taxes for various trades were farmed out to different individuals, usually local notables with connections to the government, who in turn would squeeze their constituents for a profit. Third, temples and religious estates were expropriated as government properties. Last but not least, the government charged “construction fees” to shop owners whose stores were close to the roads under construction, because the government assumed that these owners would later benefit from the construction. The last procedure was met with strong resistance. Given the wide practice of dual ownership of small businesses in Canton—the separation between the owners of the shop (who owned the “shop front” [*pumian*] rights) and the tenants of the shop (who held the “shop bottom” [*pudi*] rights)—both tenants and owners refused to pay the fees. Michael Tsin, *Nation, Governance, and Modernity in China: Canton, 1900–1927* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999), 95–103.

84 WTYP: Feb. 21, 1924.

85 WTYP: March 5, 1924.

86 WTYP: May 27, 1924.

87 WTYP: May 28, 1924.

Guangdong Merchant Corps.<sup>88</sup> In the eyes of Sun's followers, Chan Lim Pak was no better than a running dog of British imperialism.<sup>89</sup> But Chan's credentials in representing the Chinese bourgeois interests in the Hong Kong–Canton area are worth noting: In July, the Guangdong Merchant Corps cosponsored a fundraising movement for the floods of three rivers (the West, North, and East tributaries of the river Pearl) with the CGCCHK and Tung Wah Hospital.<sup>90</sup> The Hong Kong Twenty-Four Merchants Guilds (香港廿四商行聯合會), led by Ho Sai Kwong, also hung a flag to salute the establishment of the Guangdong Merchant Corps.<sup>91</sup> Finally, in August, when the Canton government denounced the legitimacy of the Guangdong Merchant Corps and refused to let the Corps unload weaponry ordered from abroad, commentaries in Hong Kong criticized the Canton government:

After our Guangdong was occupied by the guest (allied) army, it suffered from soaring taxes, killing, looting, and raids . . . Now is the worse situation in Guangdong ever since the establishment of the province. When people were offended and disappointed, they should have the right to protect themselves. It is thus a legitimate response to purchase guns and organize militias . . . The seizure of weaponry [from the Guangdong Merchant Corps] should thus be viewed not as the conflict between the government and the merchants, but the competition between the guest army and the people, the struggle between communism and anti-communism. Merchants did not want to use the weapons to confront with the government, but to preempt the raids from the guest army, and to prevent the implementation of communism.<sup>92</sup>

The above perspective applied the dichotomy between Guangdong and “other provinces” to describe the merchants' disappointment to the Canton government: how could the Cantonese government not to protect the Cantonese merchants? This was in contrast to the anti-imperialist ideology that the Canton government upheld. The latter looked at the Chinese bourgeois interest in Hong Kong not as part of the Cantonese but as a collaborative force

88 WTPP: June 3, 1924.

89 Feng Xiaocai 馮筱才, *Beifa qianhou de shangmin yundong, 1924–1930* 北伐前後的商民運動, 一九二四–一九三零 [Merchants and Civic Movements before and after the Northern Expedition, 1924–1930] (Taipei: Commercial Press, 2004), 26–28.

90 WTPP: July 24, 1924.

91 WTPP: Sept. 18, 1923.

92 WTPP: August 16, 1924.

of the British power. With the different understandings, the public discourse in Hong Kong understood Sun's decision to seize the Merchant Corps' weaponry as the government's "declaration of war against the people."<sup>93</sup> With tensions mounting, a fight broke out on the evening of October 15, 1924. The Guangdong Merchant Corps was crushed. This event, later known as the Merchant Corps Incident, pitted anti-Sun merchants against the Canton government.<sup>94</sup>

After the military crackdown on the Merchant Corps, the Chinese bourgeoisie in Hong Kong were disappointed in Dr. Sun Yat-sen. When Sun's death in Beijing on March 12, 1925, was confirmed, an obituary posted in *WTYP* drew up this balance sheet:

Sun's life was full of ideas and adventurousness. Those were his good characteristics. But he was careless about doing things by whatever means was available, and sometimes went too far. Also, because he was too reckless, he was easily manipulated by others. Therefore, although he struggled for decades, his achievements were limited. I [the anonymous commentator] would say that what he destroyed exceeded what he accomplished. What a pity!<sup>95</sup>

The development in Guangdong, however, was beyond what the Hong Kong bourgeoisie could control. Under the legacy of Sun Yat-sen's agenda of forming a united front between the GMD and CCP, in July 1925, the Chinese Nationalist Government was established in Canton (the Canton government). The Committee of the Chinese Nationalist Government was composed of a sixteen-member board, with Wang Jingwei as the chairperson and the Comintern agent Mikhail Borodin as the principal advisor. The top agenda was to unify China by annihilating the Beijing government and other regional warlords in China. Among the sixteen members of the board of directors, Liao Zhongkai 廖仲凱 was sympathetic to the CCP's anti-imperialist cause, while Hu Hanmin was wary of the infiltration of Comintern power via the CCP in the GMD.<sup>96</sup>

93 *WTYP*: August 26, 1924.

94 S. P. Chung, *Chinese Business Groups in Hong Kong and Political Change in South China*, 107–124; Tsin, *Nation, Governance, and Modernity in China*, 103–110.

95 *WTYP*: March 13, 1925.

96 Cha Jiayu 查建瑜 ed., *Guomindang Gaizu pai ziliao xuanbian* 國民黨改組派資料選編 [Editorial volume of data on the reformed clique of the GMD] (Chansha: Hunan renmin chubanshe, 1986), 123–132.

### The General Guangdong-Hong Kong Strike and Boycott: “Target Only the British”

The consolidation of Chinese bourgeois interests between Hong Kong and Canton was a thorn in the eyes of the Canton government. In the Canton–Hong Kong General Strike and Boycott, between June 1925 and October 1926, the Canton government seized the opportunity to damage the interests of the British power in South China and to label the pro-British Chinese bourgeoisie, especially those of the Po On circles, as enemies of the Chinese.<sup>97</sup>

The momentum of labor unrest in the Canton-Hong Kong area in June 1925 was triggered by a shooting in Shanghai on May 30, known as the “May 30 Massacre,” when the British police fired on Chinese protestors on Nanjing Road, Shanghai. These protestors took on the street to protest against the killing of a Chinese worker in a labor dispute in a Japanese cotton-mill factory. By June, Chinese antiforeign movements had spread to other Chinese cities.<sup>98</sup> On June 8, a strike was called in Hong Kong, and longshoremen soon responded to it. Two days later, the general strike extended to Canton. On June 23, Chinese in Canton marched along the river opposite the special area the British leased from Canton and clashed with British police. The British colonial government in Hong Kong announced that they would stop shipping foodstuffs and fuel to Canton. By the end of June, more than 50,000 workers had left Hong Kong. Most of them were dock workers, factory workers, and employees in public transportation and public utilities, as well as craftsmen. On June 23, the Shameen district of Canton witnessed exchanges of fire between the GMD Whampoa cadets and British forces. This resulted in serious casualties among the Chinese—fifty dead and more than one hundred

---

97 To specify a particular date as the end of the Canton–Hong Kong General Strike and Boycott is challenging. The following discussion shows that, although a formal announcement of the end of the strike and boycott occurred in October 1926, the boycott’s effectiveness had declined against the backdrop of the coup of the right-wing forces of the Chinese Nationalist Party (under the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek) against the left-wing forces in the party. The latter lost power because of Chiang Kai-shek’s coup on March 20, 1926, and a meeting of the party’s Central Executive Committee on May 15, 1926. In April 1926, about 30,000 workers from Hong Kong still lingered in Canton. In June 1926, the Canton government made the decision to stop the strike and boycott against Hong Kong. See Chan Ming Kuo, *Labor and Empire: the Chinese Labor Movement in the Canton Delta, 1895–1927*.

98 C. F. Remer, *A Study of Chinese Boycotts: With Special Reference to Their Economic Effectiveness* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1933), 92–94; Chesneau, *Chinese Labor Movement*, 262–268.

wounded. According to the British, the high nationalism that motivated Chinese youths to “pose like martyrs” and to behave like “mobs” was responsible for the conflict.<sup>99</sup> The event, known as the Shameen Incident, justified the Chinese anti-British movements in the following months with a nationalist cause.

On July 3, nationalists in Guangdong organized the General Guangdong–Hong Kong Strike and Boycott Committee (hereafter, the Strike Committee). Its principal leader was Siu Chiu Chin. After staging the 1922 Seamen’s Strike, Siu had joined the CCP in spring 1925. In the Canton government, the most ardent support of the strike committee was Liao Zhongkai.<sup>100</sup>

At the beginning, the target of the movement was not clear. Disputes and even violence between local merchants and peasants as well as picketing of the Strike Committee ensued. Many of the incidents show the ambiguous understanding of the rationale for the political movement. For example, reports of the Canton government show that, in July, a member of the Wood Industry Association in Hong Kong accused a chief picketer of beating him almost to death, but the Hong Kong Carpenter General Association reported to the government that the accusation was fabricated.<sup>101</sup> In other cases, such as those that occurred in the Shan Jin village of the Po On and in Taiping, supporters of the strike and boycotts identified those merchants and civilian corps who were opposed to the movements as “running dogs of imperialism, comprador class, bad gentry and local tyrants.”<sup>102</sup> Moreover, though the strike and boycott were aimed at the British power and its Chinese collaborators, the immediate victims were the local peasants who lived on the Hong Kong border. On July 16, 1925, the picket fired on eight peasant women in Shenzhen (the Chinese town

99 “Communiqués and Statements in Connection with the Conference for Settlement of Chinese British Disputes in the Liang-Kuang Provinces,” *Hong Kong Sessional Papers 1926*, 86.

100 Daniel Y. K. Kwan, *Marxist Intellectuals and the Chinese Labor Movement: A Study of Deng Zhongxia (1894–1933)*, Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 1997, 48. Chan Lau Kit-ching, *From Nothing to Nothing*, 24; Lu Quan and Ta Qianhong 盧權、禰倩紅, *Shenggang da bagong shi* 省港大罷工史 [History of the General Canton-Hong Kong Strike and Boycott] (Guangzhoushi: Guangdong renmin chubanshe, 1997), 135.

101 Record group number 19, file number 174: Guanyu chaban Shenggang liangdi mintuan zhujun yu lieshen pohai jiuchadui qingxing 關於查辦省港兩地民團駐軍與劣紳迫害糾察隊情形 [About the inspections of the stationed troops in Guangdong and Hong Kong and the situations of bad gentry-elites’ harassing the picketers] (Nanjing: the 2nd Historical Archives).

102 Record group number 19, file number 174: Guanyu chaban Shenggang liangdi mintuan zhujun yu lieshen pohai jiuchadui qingxing.

bordering the New Territories of Hong Kong) when they tried to cross the river into British territory. One was killed at the site. Another was wounded and later died in her village. Two others jumped into the river and drowned. Among the four survivors, one carried her wounded mother back home, and the other three were taken to the Canton authority but were soon released. An investigation proved these women's innocence. They were trying to cross the river to pick up their baskets of lychees, which had been conveyed to the British side of the river. The Canton government documented the incident in detail but tried to hide the news from the public.<sup>103</sup> Reports about violence generated by the peasants' resentment toward the strike picket, however, were prevalent in the newly founded Chinese newspaper in Hong Kong, *Wah Kiu Yat Po*.<sup>104</sup>

Amidst of these conflicts, by July, the movement had devastated Hong Kong's economy. Communication between Hong Kong Island and the Kowloon district was cut off. The sewage system was broken. Hong Kong became a "stinky port."<sup>105</sup> Nonetheless, in early August, the Strike Committee noticed that the Beijing-supported military leader in southern Guangdong and Hainan Island, Deng Benyin 鄧本殷, was surreptitiously patrolling the shipment of food and groceries to Hong Kong. The Strike Committee identified itself as a just anti-imperialist campaign while Deng was the thief, the collaborator with the imperialist:

We 200,000 workers in Hong Kong and Guangdong went on strike to resist against the imperialists. In two months, Hong Kong has lost 200,000,000 dollars. Together with the strategies of closing the port and cutting the food supply, the prestigious and splendid Hong Kong would soon become a dismal and isolated island. Just about the time when the imperialists would soon surrender to us, Deng Benyin the thief dared to neglect the anger of the whole nation. He accepted the 800,000 dollars from the Hong Kong government and collaborated with the imperialists to support Hong Kong with food. This empowered the evil fire of the enemy nation. He even wanted to send troops to disturb our anti-imperialist movement in Guangdong. Alas! What was in the mind of Deng the thief?<sup>106</sup>

103 CO 129/489: Strike Situation, R. E. Stubbs to Amery, M. P., August 8, 1925, Enclosure 1: a copy of a police report regarding the shooting of women, 102–103.

104 See for example, *Wah Kiu Yat Po* 華僑日報 (English title: Overseas Chinese Daily News; *WKYP* thereafter; Hong Kong): Oct. 8, 1925; January 19, 1926.

105 *WKYP*: July 17, 1925.

106 Record group number 19, file number 168: Shenggang bagong weiyuan hui zhi Guangzhou Guominzhengfu han yuanjian de fuzhi zhaopian 省港罷工委員會致廣州國民政府函原件的附屬照片 [Original copies of the letter correspondences from the

The condemnation of Deng added the anti-imperialist tone of the movement with nationalist accent. As the British was taking advantage of China, those Chinese collaborating with the British, like Deng, would be considered as traitor of the nation.

On August 14, 1925, the Strike Committee announced that the movement “targeted only the British,” encouraging all non-British tramps and liners to ship directly to Canton and bypass Hong Kong. This policy was implemented under the following restrictions:

First, Canton citizens could apply for certificates to claim their goods if they were: (a) stored at English warehouses, not English products, and had been purchased by Chinese merchants; (b) not stored at English warehouses and not English products.

Second, Special Transport Permits would be issued for all products, with the following exceptions: English products, products shipped by English tramps or tramps bypassing Hong Kong. All certified products were allowed to be stored at non-English warehouses and to be loaded. Third, there were penalties for those unloaded goods shipped by tramps bypassing Hong Kong: (a) a 5 percent fine for food and medical supplies; (b) a 10 percent fine for other goods; (c) all English products would be confiscated.<sup>107</sup>

In other words, in the first two months of the movement, imports from Hong Kong to Canton continued, provided no British goods or British shipping was involved. The policy was, however, tightened at the end of the summer. On August 20, 1925, the key designer of the policy, Liao Zhongkai, was assassinated. Relations between Canton and Hong Kong soured, and the Strike Committee stopped issuing Special Transport Permits. After September 3, the new policy was that no goods from Hong Kong and Macao were allowed to dock in Canton; all English ships and all ships bypassing Hong Kong and Macao could not load at any port in Guangdong.<sup>108</sup>

---

General Guangdong-Hong Kong Strike Committee to the Guangzhou Chinese National Government].

107 Record group number 19, file number 168: Shenggang bagong weiyuan hui zhi Guangzhou Guominzhengfu han yuanjian de fuzhi zhaopian.

108 Zhongguo di er li shi dang'an guan 中國第二歷史檔案館 [Chinese 2nd Historical Archives], ed. *Wu sa yun dong yu sheng gang ba gong* 五卅運動省港罷工 [The May 30th Movement and General Guangdong-Hong Kong Strike and Boycott], Nanjing: Jiangsu guji chubanshe, 1985, 291.

It is worth noting that under Canton's policy of boycotting only British interests and any shipment from Hong Kong, the Canton government helped Chinese merchants continue their business with Japanese interests. For example, in September 1925, the Japanese Southern Godown House in Canton mandated that all merchants, if they wished to retrieve rice stocks stored in the warehouse, must hire coolies from among those who passed a background check. The Chinese merchants who stored merchandise in the Japanese warehouses found this regulation difficult to follow. Foo Ping-sheung 傅秉常 (Fu Bingchang), from the Guangdong Maritime Customs, also a son-in-law of Ho Kai, helped the Chinese merchants to negotiate with the Japanese Consulate in Canton.<sup>109</sup> The Guangdong government's expectation was that trade between Guangdong and Japan should continue as in normal times, for the sake of "friendly diplomatic ties between China and Japan."<sup>110</sup>

### Isolation of Top Chinese Bourgeoisie in Hong Kong

Citing the correspondence between the Governor R. E. Stubbs and Colonial Secretary L. S. Amery in the summer of 1925, John M. Carroll points to the aggressive policies of the British in reacting to the labor strikes. The most explicit example was the organization of the Labor Protection Bureau. It recruited about 150 men, most of them detectives or special police, to disguise themselves as workers. Their goal was to spy on the operations of the strikes and boycotts and strike fear among them. This practice, according to Carroll's analysis, proved to "intimidate the intimidators," meaning to create fear among the Chinese in Hong Kong who were sympathetic to Canton.<sup>111</sup>

But the British policies turned out to be ineffective. Above all, the British attributed the unrest to a political plot staged by the Comintern, but they failed to see the economic tension between Canton and Hong Kong. In the words of Stubbs, "The Communists in Canton, under their Russian leadership, are

109 Guo Tingyi 郭廷以 ed. *Fu Bingchang xiansheng fangwen jilu* 傅秉常先生訪問紀錄 [Transcripts of the interviews with Mr. Fu Bingchang] (Taipei: Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica, 1993).

110 Record group number 19, file number 305: *guangyu nanyang cangku gongsi liunan mishang cungu chusang xiang Ri lingshi jiaoshe qingxing* 關於南洋倉庫公司留難米商存穀出倉向日領事交涉情形 [Progress of negotiations for Chinese rice merchants over the hurdles imposed by the Southern Godown House], September 1925.

111 CI 128.488, July 10, 1925: Stubbs to Amery, 582; Carroll, *Edge of Empires*, 145–146.

determined to destroy Hong Kong.”<sup>112</sup> The British actions thus focused on tactics to differentiate the bourgeoisie from the rank-and-file Chinese. In the “All Hong Kong Citizens Meeting” called by the chairperson of the General Chamber of Commerce on July 27, 1925, British merchants proposed to adopt the following means of punishment to end the strike quickly: not issuing any June wages for striking workers, demanding that workers provide compensation for the losses caused by the strike, and advising the capitalists to not let strikers return to their posts.<sup>113</sup> Stubbs believed that Chinese bourgeoisie would agree with these revenge tactics: “a large majority of the merchants and better informed Chinese, both in Hong Kong and in Canton, would, I think, welcome any action which would have this generally desired result, more especially if it should be possible in the first instance by diplomatic action to make it clear that such action was directed against the Bolshevist administration of Canton and not against China or the Chinese.”<sup>114</sup>

The British kept faith with the Chinese bourgeoisie from the CGCCHK and Tung Wah circles, especially Chow Shou Son, Ho Tung, Ho Sai Kong, and Kotewall. On July 3, 1925, the CGCCHK held a meeting to respond to the unrest. Its chairperson, Li Yau Tsun 李右泉 (Li Youquan, 1861–1940), proposed organizing a merchant corps together with leaders from Tung Wah Hospital.<sup>115</sup> This idea was soon aborted. Two weeks later, however, prominent Chinese bourgeoisie including Ho Sai Kwong, Lo Man Kim, Li Yau Tsun, and Lu Huan-chu 盧煥初 organized the Bureau for Maintaining Commerce (商業維持會 *shangye weichi ju*), with Ho Sai Kwong as its leader.<sup>116</sup> In the first week of its operation, the organization assisted Hong Kong merchants in shipping products to Jiangmen (a port in the Sze Yap district), Shanghai, Singapore, Macao, and elsewhere.<sup>117</sup> In late July, the organization successfully lobbied the Hong Kong government not to impose limits on Hong Kong’s rice exports, a trade accounting for 6 million HKD in value each month.<sup>118</sup> One achievement was to

112 CO 129/489: Strike Situation, R. E. Stubbs to Amery, M. P., August 8, 1925, 100.

113 WKYP: July 29, 1925.

114 CO 129/489: Strike Situation, R. E. Stubbs to Amery, M. P., August 8, 1925, 100.

115 WKYP: July 3, 1925.

116 WKYP: July 17, 1925.

117 WKYP: July 20, 1925; July 31, 1925.

118 To avoid food shortages under the prohibition of rice shipments from Canton to Hong Kong, the Hong Kong government came up with a policy to constrain the export of rice. But rice traders argued that Hong Kong was only a transshipment stop in the long-distance rice trade from Siam and Vietnam to the destination markets of the Americas and Australia. All these areas were beyond the scope of influence of the Canton-initiated unrest. Furthermore, local demand for rice would not be a problem, given the ample stores on hand. In contrast, constraint of the trade would have a serious impact on the

ship the coals from Hong Kong to Toi Shan, where the returned Cantonese merchant from Seattle, Chen Yixi 陳宜禧 (1844–1929), was in the middle of building a railroad in his hometown.<sup>119</sup> Moreover, in August, nine Chinese bourgeois leaders including Chow Shou Son, Kotewall, Li Yau Tsun, Ho Sai Kwang and Ho Sai Yew met with the European General Chamber of Commerce, Hong Kong, to seek ways to stabilize the finance in Hong Kong and to formulate strategies of importing British piece goods to China.<sup>120</sup>

The agenda of restoring economic order in South China matched the British expectation but isolated the top Chinese bourgeoisie in Hong Kong. The latter requested assistance from the Chinese Chambers of Commerce in Shanghai, Tianjin, Beijing, and other major Chinese cities in their opposition to the strike and boycott. But the response was disappointing. Many Chinese and Hong Kong Chinese condemned the pro-British position taken by Chinese elites in Hong Kong: a cable claimed to be sent by “the whole body of Chinese residents in Los Angeles” on August 27, 1925, criticized the CGCCHK as “the hounds of our country’s traitors. Death will not expiate your crime. We have sworn to back up the nationalist government.”<sup>121</sup>

The confrontation between the Chinese bourgeoisie in Hong Kong and the Strike Committee in Canton reached its apex in August. The Chinese elites had explicitly expressed their resentment of Liao Zhongkai. After the news of Liao’s assassination was confirmed, in the evening of August 20, 1925, “merchants in Hong Kong cheered for the news. Some even threw banquets at Shek Tong Tsui Restaurant.”<sup>122</sup> On the following day, leaders of the top Chinese business associations including Tung Wah Hospital, the CGCCHK, and Hong Kong Twenty-Four Merchants Guilds, including Kotewall and Chow Shou Son, collectively

---

local economy. On August 14, the Inspector of the Import-Export Department informed the CGCCHK that twenty-five local rice wholesaling agents were allowed to export from Hong Kong. Most of these agents belonged to the Nam Pak Hong guild. But under the circumstances, with Hong Kong’s import-export trade becoming more difficult day by day, rice export was a critical issue with the government. It reissued the ban on rice exports in late August. Ho Sai Kwong and other local Chinese business leaders (including Lu Huanchu 盧煥初 and Li Koon Chun 李冠春 [Li Guangchuen]) protested, emphasizing that the amount of rice exported from Hong Kong constituted only a marginal portion of the total rice imported to Hong Kong. See *WKYP*: July 26; August 1, 1925; August 27, 1925.

119 *WKYP*: August 14, 1925. On Chen Yixi’s project, see also Hsu, *Dreaming of Gold, Dreaming of Home*, 156–175.

120 *WKYP*: August 7, 1925.

121 CO 129.489.45198, enclosures Nos. 4, 168; see also Tsai, *Xianggang ren zhi Xianggang shi*, 145–146.

122 *WKYP*: August 22, 1925.

signed a statement and cabled it to other Chinese native-place associations abroad. It read as follows:

The current event in Canton devastated almost all industries in both Canton and Hong Kong. The problem was initiated by the Canton government, which followed the red Soviet policies. Right now the Soviets control the Chinese navy and army. The Communist system was practiced in Canton, where all kinds of land and housing taxes as well as other policies were torturing people and causing serious problems for the entire province. If these problems could not be corrected, the influence of the communists would become stronger and stronger. In the long run the entire nation would be devastated and it would be too late for us to change it. We people in Hong Kong witnessed the tragedies, and have been truly concerned with the possibility that those overseas might not know the truth. The purpose of this cable is to state the truth. We hope everyone understands it. We sincerely hope that people will not be fooled, cheated, or mobilized by communist power any longer.<sup>123</sup>

This anticommunist position further consolidated the Po On bourgeoisie in Hong Kong. This solidarity, however, did not reinforce their ties with the British but consolidated their connections with middle-ranked merchants.<sup>124</sup> In October 1925, the British Foreign Office proposed to dispatch a Chinese agent to negotiate with Canton. The ideal candidate, from the British view, should meet the following two criterion: first, “a British subject of Chinese race: a man whose reputation, character and integrity are reported not only by the Cantonese but also by the Northern Chinese”; second, “a man of wealth, so that the Chinese would know that he was not working for any selfish ends but only in the interest of peace and good fellowship.”<sup>125</sup> The Chinese representative chosen was Robert Ho Tung, but he declined the mission.<sup>126</sup> Against this backdrop, the British called Cecil Clementi, a Sinolo-

123 WKYP: August 22, 1925.

124 The classification is based on Deng Zhongxia's view. Deng coined the category to differentiate these merchants from the top elites in the CGCCHK and Tung Wah Hospital including the Po On bourgeoisie Robert Kotewall, Chow Shou Son, and Ho Sai Kwong. Deng, *Zhongguo zhigong yundong jishi*, 243.

125 CO 129/491: Situation in China, Foreign Office to Secretary of State, London, October 4, 1925, 93.

126 CO 129/491: Situation in China, Foreign Office to Secretary of State, London, October 4, 1925.

gist known for his stern administrative style, to replace Stubb's position as the new governor of Hong Kong in November 1925.

### The Rise of the Middle-Ranked Merchants: Business People for Business Only?

After October, Chinese merchants across Hong Kong and Canton took the initiative to negotiate with the Strike Committee and the Canton government. Up to this point, the merchants had been disappointed in the ability of the British to handle the insurgence. When the strike began, the Secretary of State for the Colonies proposed to prepare 3 billion British pounds (about 30 million Hong Kong dollars) in loans for merchants in Hong Kong.<sup>127</sup> Many CGCCHK members were counting on these loans to survive the unrest.<sup>128</sup> But the rules for allocating the loans did not come out until October 21, 1925.<sup>129</sup> A month later, only 2,680,000 HKD (or 8 percent of the total funds pledged) had been lent to 45 of the 460 applicants; loan applications for the other 22,000,000 HKD were still pending approval.<sup>130</sup>

When the confidence in British and its associated bourgeois circle was in question, in October 1925, the middle-ranked merchants from the United Meeting of All Native-Place Chambers of Commerce (各邑商會聯合會; Ch. *Ge yi shanghui lian he hui*) rose to settle the crisis. Freed from the concern of jeopardizing their connection with the British, as they were not tied to the authority in the colony, they had more leeway to establish friendly terms with Canton.<sup>131</sup> Between September 28 and October 1, association members Wong Kwong Tin 黃廣田 (Huang Guangtian), Jei Shu Tang 謝樹棠 (Xie Shutang), Lui Yam Sun 雷蔭蓀 (Lei Yinsun), and Wong Kee Hi 黃季熙 (Huang Jixi) departed to meet with the merchants in Canton.<sup>132</sup> On October 1, they joined a discussion with the four major business associations in Canton (the General Chamber of Commerce in Canton, the Canton Municipal Chamber of Commerce, the Merchants and Citizens Association, and the United Association of Chambers of Commerce). Together they decided to organize the *Sheng Gang shanghui lianhe hui* 省港商會聯合會 (United Association for Merchants in

127 WKYP: Sept. 30, 1925.

128 WKYP: Oct. 6, 1925.

129 WKYP: Oct. 9, 1925.

130 WTYP: Nov. 19, 1925; Nov. 20, 1925; Nov. 22, 1925; Nov. 24, 1925.

131 WKYP: August 25, 1925.

132 WKYP: Sept. 28, 1924; Sept. 29, 1924; Sept. 30, 1924; Oct. 1, 1924.

Guangdong and Hong Kong). Its primary goal was to find solutions to settle the strike.<sup>133</sup>

The ad hoc newsletter for the Strike Committee, *Gongren zhilu tehao* 工人之路特號 [Special Issues of the Workers' Way], interpreted the Hong Kong merchants' gesture of reconciliation as a tribute to the committee.<sup>134</sup> Newspapers in Hong Kong, however, had a different interpretation. They emphasized the contrasting views between Hong Kong and Canton: the merchants in Hong Kong insisted on the principle of "business people for business affairs only," while the Strike Committee from Canton appeared to deal with the issue through political negotiations; their bottom line for bringing the movement to an end included abolishing China's unequal treaties, terminating extraterritorial rights, and restoring the leased territories.<sup>135</sup> One Chinese merchant from Hong Kong, Jei Shu Tang, revealed to the Hong Kong press how he responded to Canton's demands:

As soon as I heard the discussion [about their requests], I immediately stood up and stated sincerely that the reason the United Meeting of All Native-Place Chambers of Commerce came here [Canton] was to restore business and to promote amicable relations between workers and capitalists . . . Other issues related to international politics are beyond our authority. If this is the topic of the meeting, then the only thing we can do is finish a cup of tea and return to Hong Kong immediately.<sup>136</sup>

The meeting finally entered into a substantial discussion about the terms for ending the strike and boycott. Among the various requirements, the following three demands troubled the Hong Kong merchants most: first, Hong Kong should allow Chinese currency to circulate in the British colony again; second, for any factory with more than one hundred workers, the employers should provide meals and lodging; and third, the government and capitalists in Hong Kong should allow those being banished from Hong Kong as labor activists to return unconditionally.<sup>137</sup>

---

133 *WKYP*: Oct. 5, 1925; Oct. 8, 1925.

134 *Special Issues of the Workers' Way*, Oct. 1, 1925; cited from Lu and Ta, *Shenggang da bagong shi*, 204.

135 *WKYP*: Oct 5, 1925, Oct. 8, 1925.

136 *WKYP*: Oct. 8, 1925.

137 *WKYP*: Oct. 5, 1925; Oct. 8, 1925.

The middle-ranked merchants from Hong Kong refused to accept these conditions, believing that the Canton government was overlooking the merchants' interests from both the Hong Kong and the Canton side.<sup>138</sup> This shows that these merchants were not ready to identify with the anti-British nationalist discourse of the Strike Committee, which denied the legitimacy of considering the Hong Kong interest. At this point, these middle-ranked merchants decided to cooperate with the top Po On bourgeoisie from the CGCCHK, Tung Wah, and the Hong Kong Twenty-four Merchants Guild. Together they tried to establish a common ground with the four major business associations in Canton. In late October, on behalf of the United Meeting of All Native-Place Chambers of Commerce, Wong Kee Hi and Lui Yam Sun invited merchants from the four big business associations in Canton to meet with the top elite such as Ho Sai Kwong in Hong Kong.<sup>139</sup> A similar event took place again in November.<sup>140</sup> On November 20, when twenty representatives from Canton arrived, the top Chinese bourgeoisie in Hong Kong launched a welcome party. The representatives from Canton made it clear that they did not speak for nor were they messengers to either the Canton government or the Strike Committee. They emphasized that they were there to continue the reciprocal exchanges initiated by Jei, Lui, and Wong. The merchants from Canton also showed their expectation for a quick settlement of the strikes. Given that the movements were "totally for class struggles in the world," as merchants in Canton, they could seek consensus only with other merchants from Hong Kong.<sup>141</sup>

The notion of "business people for business only" turned out to be nothing more than rhetoric. Some representatives from Canton were involved in Canton politics. For example, Chien Chin-shi 簡琴石, a manager of the Nanyang Brothers' Tobacco Company, was a senior advisor to the Canton government. In the closing meeting on November 24, Chien tried to persuade the Hong Kong bourgeoisie to support the right-wing force in the Canton government. He argued that the latter was not a communist regime, and that "communism at this moment could never be implemented in China."<sup>142</sup> About a week later,

138 *WKYP*: Oct. 8, 1925.

139 In the meeting, the Canton merchants from Hong Kong emphasized that they represented the shared interests of merchants in Canton and Hong Kong. But Ho Sai Kwong noticed that these merchants did not have the full endorsement of the Canton Municipal Chamber of Commerce. *WKYP*: Oct. 26, 1925.

140 *WKYP*: Nov. 16, 1925.

141 *WTYP*: Nov. 21, 1925.

142 *WTYP*: Nov. 25, 1925.

Chien visited Hong Kong again and reported to the top bourgeoisie the Canton government's idea of recovering the Hong Kong–Canton trade. The Canton government, according to Chien, was satisfied with the merchants' reciprocal exchanges: because of the merchants' influence, newspapers in Hong Kong no longer criticized the strikers. The government decided to entice overseas Chinese investment back to Guangdong: "Returned Chinese overseas would receive double welcome from the government for engaging in government-merchant cooperation. If any gentry-merchants or wealthy people in Hong Kong would plan to visit Guangdong, I can serve as an introducer and would ask the government to try its best to protect them."<sup>143</sup>

Behind Chien's enthusiasm for Canton's support of the Hong Kong merchants was the rising right-wing leader Chiang Kai-shek in the GMD. In December 1925, Chiang claimed that it would take only three months to end the strike.<sup>144</sup> He made this comment when he was about to convene an ad hoc meeting with elected representatives of the four major business associations in Canton, including Chien, to discuss strategies to settle the strike.<sup>145</sup>

Through Chien's encouragement, the middle-ranked merchants in Hong Kong organized the Fraternity Party (*ken qin tuan* 懇親團).<sup>146</sup> Its participants included returned Chinese overseas from Australia and the Americas.<sup>147</sup> Its leader, Yang Sei Yan 楊西岩 (Yang Xiyan), was the very same person that the Canton government appointed as the liaison between Chinese bourgeois communities in Canton as well as Hong Kong and Macao. According to the Political Committee of the Chinese Nationalist Government, Yang's job had nothing to do with the settlement of the strike.<sup>148</sup> Nonetheless, the Hong Kong Chinese communities regarded his work as key to negotiating with the Strike Committee.<sup>149</sup>

The Fraternity Party left for Canton on December 26, 1925. Three hundred merchants participated, with two hundred and seventy from Hong Kong and thirty from Australia and the Americas.<sup>150</sup> It is worth noting that Heung Sham capitalists from the three leading modern department stores—Philip Gock

---

143 WTYP: Dec. 1, 1925.

144 WTYP: Dec. 1, 1925.

145 WTYP: Dec. 5, 1925.

146 WTYP: Dec. 11, 1925.

147 WTYP: Dec. 15, 1925.

148 WTYP: Dec. 15, 1925.

149 WTYP: Dec. 18, 1925; Dec. 19, 1925.

150 WTYP: Dec. 11, 1925; Dec. 15, 1925; Dec. 27, 1925.

Chin from the Wing On Company, Ma Wing Chan from the Sincere Company, and Choy Chong from the Sun Company—all joined the tour. When they landed in Canton, they received a warm welcome at the pier by leaders of the four major business associations as well as representatives from the Canton government, all levels of GMD offices, the Strike Committee, the Committee of Strike Picket, and the General Labor Union. In addition, the Strike Committee ordered four hundred model strike picketers, forty policemen, thirty detectives, and ten inspectors, all in uniform, to patrol the order. Representatives of the Fraternity Party were also received by a leader of the Canton government, Wang Jingwei, and the head of the Strike Committee, Su Chiu Chin.<sup>151</sup>

The Po On bourgeoisie in Hong Kong interpreted the response from Canton as a sign that the Canton government was ready to let the merchants from both sides settle the strike. On the same day the Fraternity Party arrived in Canton, on December 26, Kotewall and Chow Shou Son convened a meeting at the CGCCHK and elected ten representatives to be ready for a merchants' negotiation in Canton. Among the representatives were many incumbent leaders that the British trusted: the CGCCHK chairman Li Yau Tsun, Ma Tsui Chiu 馬敘朝 (then chairperson of Tung Wah Hospital), Li Sin Ku 李星衢 (a former chief general manager of the CGCCHK) and the Eurasian comprador Lo Man Kam.<sup>152</sup> The middle-rank merchant Jie Shu Tong from the United Meeting of All Native-Place Chambers of Commerce was also on the team. He, however, did not go with the CGCCHK leader—he had left for Hong Kong earlier with the Fraternity Party. On December 31, 1925, eight of the ten elected bourgeois representatives from Hong Kong arrived in Canton. In contrast to the visit of the Fraternity Party, the eight representatives from Hong Kong faced a lukewarm response from Canton. Only five people escorted their landing from the ship. Among them, the highest ranking official was C. C. Wu 伍朝樞 (1887–1934), a member of the Council of the Canton government.<sup>153</sup>

151 WYP: Dec. 27, 1925; Dec. 29, 1925.

152 WYP: Dec. 27, 1925; see also Tung Wah Group of Hospitals, Hong Kong 香港東華三院, *Donghua san yuan yibaisanshi nian* 東華三院一百三十年 [One Hundred and Thirty Years of the Tung Wah Group of Hospitals] (Hong Kong: the Tung Wah Group of Hospitals, 2000), Appendix 1; Chinese General Chamber of Commerce, Hong Kong (CGCCHK), *Xianggang zhonghua zongshang hui bainianshi*, 224–227.

153 In addition to C. C. Wu, the other four officials included Foo Ping-kun 傅秉坤 (brother of Foo Ping-sheung), two representatives from the four big merchants' associations, and two police officers. WYP: Jan. 1, 1926.

The CGCCHK leaders were over optimistic about the situation in Canton. As a matter of fact, a left-wing newspaper in Canton, the *Kwong Chow Kwok Man Yat Po* 廣州國民日報, greeted the arrival of these bourgeois representatives from Hong Kong in such an intimidating way that it called them “eight rebels” who represented the “cold-blooded foreign slaves and the compradors who have acted in the same way as jackals do for a tiger.”<sup>154</sup> Through the introduction of C. C. Wu, on the following day, January 1, 1926, the “eight rebels” got the chance to talk with Su Chiu Chin and other members of the Strike Committee. Su and his officers reminded the CGCCHK leaders about their responsibility for compensating for the loss of strikers’ salaries during the past months. The officers argued that, in addition to the political problems, material compensation was the precondition for ending the strike and resuming economic order. The bourgeoisie, however, declined to comment on this issue. The negotiation thus came to a standstill. The only consensus was that the Hong Kong bourgeoisie promised to forward the ideas of the Strike Committee to the British colonial government in Hong Kong.<sup>155</sup> But from the British view, Wu’s arranging the Hong Kong representatives to meet with Su was an obstructive tactic.<sup>156</sup> After all, the Strike Committee defined the movement as an anti-imperialist struggle in which the conclusion could be determined only by government-to-government negotiations, which merchants had little power to influence.<sup>157</sup> Facing critiques from both Canton and the British, in February, the CGCCHK leaders announced that in the future, there would be no arrangement for tours to Canton.<sup>158</sup>

From Canton’s view, the negotiation standstill benefited its political prospects. The confidence of the Canton government in the process of settling the anti-British strike was grounded in the following fact: Different from the limited territorial base of the left-wing power in Canton in the Seamen’s Strike in 1921, after January 1926, when most parts of Guangdong were under

154 CO 129/498/5, Translation: Extracts from the *Kwong Chow Kwok Man Yat Po*, Canton, Dec. 31, 1925: Warning to the rebels: the 8 rebels who came from Hong Kong yesterday, by (Chan) Fu Muk, 200–202.

155 *WTYP*: January 6, 1926.

156 The British believed that the key to the mission’s failure was the obstructive tactics of C. C. Wu. See CO 129/498/5: Canton Boycott: Report on Visit to Canton of Representatives of the Hong Kong Chinese Merchants, Jan. 06, 1926, pp. 137–204; see also *WTYP*: January 1, 1926.

157 *WTYP*: Jan. 6, 1926.

158 *WTYP*: Feb. 6, 1926.

the control of the GMD, picket lines against British cargoes were extended.<sup>159</sup> Hong Kong's embargo on the shipment of foodstuffs to Canton at that time would not cause much hardship, as Canton had alternative means of securing food. Therefore, while Hong Kong lost its transshipment role in the trade between South China and the South Seas, Canton's trade jumped dramatically in October, after a slight decline in July and September 1925.<sup>160</sup> The Chinese anti-British movement thus effectively boosted Canton's economic status: by November 1925, more than eighty foreign merchants had moved from Hong Kong or Shamian to Canton city, and about seventy members of the Kim Shan Chong guild (which engaged in import-export trade between China and the Americas) moved from Hong Kong to Canton.<sup>161</sup>

The British noticed that Canton was playing the "mass nationalist card" to isolate the top Po On bourgeoisie in Hong Kong. In late December, the newly appointed governor of Hong Kong, Sir Cecil Clementi, dispatched M. Fletcher to visit Canton. Escorted by T. V. Soong 宋子文 (Song Ziwen), a brother of the late Sun Yat-sen's widow, Fletcher was invited to talk with various GMD leaders of the Canton government about his ideas to settle the strike and boycott. These GMD leaders all claimed that they could command the Strike Committee to disband the strike picket, if the merchants in Hong Kong agreed to pay

159 Deng, *Zhongguo zhigong yundong jiashi*, 230–231; Chan Ming Kuo, *Labor and Empire*, 338.

160 Deng, *Zhongguo zhigong yundong jiashi*, 235–239; Chesneaux, *Chinese Labor Movement*, 308–309; Chan Ming Kuo, *Labor and Empire: the Chinese Labor Movement in the Canton Delta*, 327–328; Lu and Ta, *Shenggang da bagong shi*, 155–56; 166–192.

161 Lu and Ta, *Shenggang da bagong shi*, 188. Also, Deng Zhongxia documented the progress of Canton's revenues in 1925 with the following statistics (unit: Chinese Customs taels):

YEAR	1924	1925
July	229,523	70,711
August	281,816	150,180
September	289,632	232,407
October	242,078	306,125
November	319,835	337,532
December	282,564	304,838
<b>YEAR</b>	<b>1925</b>	<b>1926</b>
January	257,541	422,971

Source: Deng, *Zhongguo zhigong yundong jiashi*, 238.

the strikers with a *quid pro quo* for ending the boycotts.<sup>162</sup> This proposal was at odds with the anti-imperialist justification that the very same government had presented to the Chinese merchants from Hong Kong earlier on.<sup>163</sup>

Because of the Strike Committee's emphasis on economic compensation, Clementi believed that the only motivation for continuing the strike pickets was the workers' hope for substantial monetary rewards. For him, the political aspect was only a guise to request materialist gains. Without the strike picket, the Strike Committee would not exist. Had the Hong Kong government compromised with the Strike Committee in order to quickly end the unrest, the decision would be no different from "paying for blackmail." The Hong Kong government should therefore avoid entering any negotiations and should prevent any party in Hong Kong from talking with the Strike Committee.<sup>164</sup> In the eyes of the British, after months of holding a successful blockade against Hong Kong, the Strike Committee remained nothing but a puppet of the Bolsheviks: "The advisers of the Committee are Red Russians. The Colonial Government cannot possibly conduct negotiations with such a body. If such negotiations were begun our prestige would suffer to such an extent that the future good Government of the Colony would be imperiled."<sup>165</sup>

The British colonial government in Hong Kong viewed the Canton government as a better side to talk with than with the Strike Committee. But under the British "one China policy," which recognized the Beijing government, the Foreign Office viewed the Canton government as "a good illustration of the evils" inherent in the present regime because of the devastating boycott against Hong Kong and its foreshadowing of problems elsewhere.<sup>166</sup> Clementi was also suspicious of whether the Canton government could, as it claimed, fully control the Strike Committee. He began to have high hopes in the right-wing leader, the Zhejiang native Chiang Kai-shek, to "suppress the Strike Committee and abolish the strike pickets."<sup>167</sup>

With the expectation that Chiang's rise would eventually end the strike and boycott, the British government in Hong Kong declined an offer presented by the transnational Hokkien merchant Kwik Djoen Eng. In the early 1920s,

162 CO 129/498/4: M. Fletcher's Diary of Visit to Hong Kong, Dec. 20–Dec. 23, 1925, 119–136a.

163 CO 129/498/6, Canton Boycott: Conversation with Sun Sze Man, 205–212.

164 CO 129/498/4: Canton Boycott: Prospects of Regional Normal Conditions, Dec. 20–Dec. 24, 1925, 110–136a; see also *WTYP*: January 19, 1926; Feb. 1, 1926.

165 CO 129/498/3: Canton Boycott: Hostile Acts of Canton Government and Recommended Action, Feb. 6, 1926, 98.

166 CO 129/495: Chinese Special Custom Tariff Conference, Foreign Office to Secretary of State, Jan. 16, 1926, 458.

167 CO 129/498/4: Canton Boycott: Prospects of Regional Normal Conditions, Dec. 20–Dec. 24, 1925, 111.



FIGURE 2.1 *View from the Peak Looking East across the Mid-Levels, Causeway Bay and North Point, 1924*

SOURCE: PICTURESQUE HONG KONG, 08-03-004. COURTESY OF THE GOVERNMENT RECORDS SERVICE PUBLIC RECORDS OFFICE, HONG KONG.

Kwik purchased slots of land property and marine lots at North Point, Hong Kong (figure 2.1). His attempt to develop that area as a sugar factory, however, did not work because of surging labor movements.<sup>168</sup> In January 1926, Kwik volunteered a proposal to the British Council-General in Shanghai to end the strike and boycott in three months. Kwik reported that, with 12 million dollars, Wu Pei-fu 吳佩孚, the leader of the Beijing government, would send troops via Fujian, Jiangxi, and Hunan to attack the government of Guangdong. It should take three months for Guangdong to surrender. Kwik even laid out a financial plan for the British: if the Hong Kong government would purchase his property at North Point, which was valued at 13 million dollars, he would pay five

168 About the registration of Kwik's property in North Point, Hong Kong, see HKRS 58-1-91-25: Marine lot 526; HKRS 58-1-114-16: I.L. 2546 (Hong Kong Public Record Office). See also Lee Pui-tak 李培德, "Xianggang de Fujian shanghai yu Fujian shangren wangluo [Fujian business associations and networks of Fujian merchants in Hong Kong] 香港的福建商會與福建商人網絡," in *Jindai Zhongguo de shanghai wangluo ji shehui gong-neng* [Networks and Social Functions of Chamber of Commerce in Modern China] 近代中國的商會網絡及社會功能, ed. Lee Pui-tak (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2007), Ch. 7.

and a half million dollars to cover expenses for Wu's troops.<sup>169</sup> This proposal illustrated the overseas Chinese sympathies for Hong Kong's interests and the position that viewed the Canton government, but not the British, as the enemy. The British were suspicious of Wu Pei-fu's influence in the southern provinces, which would be key to the plan's success.<sup>170</sup>

Kwik's proposal was, however, one among many other possible military actions that Clementi was considering to deal with the anti-British forces in Guangdong. These possible military attacks generated tension in Canton. The Strike Committee continued its anti-imperialist campaign, while within the Canton government, some leaders sought opportunities to talk with Hong Kong. In March 1926, Wang Jingwei dispatched Foo Ping-sheung to form a secret meeting with Chow Shou Son and Robert Kotewall. The meeting yielded no concrete result. But the process helped the Chinese bourgeoisie in Hong Kong realize the factions in Canton politics. Beneath the GMD-CCP united front, certain political leaders in the GMD were at times inconsistent with the direction of the movement. The Canton government did not support the Strike Committee wholeheartedly.<sup>171</sup> In the GMD, Wang Jingwei, for example, was ready to form good terms with Hong Kong.<sup>172</sup>

In late March, Chiang Kai-shek and his right-wing forces began the process of staging a coup. Clementi saw this as a positive sign of the eventual collapse of the Strike Committee.<sup>173</sup> While Chiang started to mobilize armies in Guangdong to fight against northern warlords in the "Northern Expedition," formal negotiations between the British and the Canton government also took place. They began between July 15 and 22, 1926. The Chinese delegations, led by the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, Eugene Chen 陳友仁, emphasized the monetary "negotiation settlement," which was presented to the British as a "loan proposal." The British refused to take full responsibility for the Shameen Incident. The British also rejected the Chinese nationalist discourse that the anti-British strike and boycott in Canton were an extension of the labor strike in Shanghai, the May Thirtieth Movement a month before. But what determined the eventual liquidation of the Strike Committee was the presence of

169 The document does not disclose what currency was used in the estimation of the cost. CO 129/498/9, Enclosure 1: Copy of Decoded Telegram, from H. M. Consul-General, Shanghai, to Governor, Hong Kong, January 9, 1926, 254.

170 CO 129/489/9, Canton Situation: Rumor of Wu Pei-fu's Contemplated Attack on Canton, Suggested Measures for Improving Situation, 245–255.

171 Kwan, *Marxist Intellectuals and the Chinese Labor Movement*, 212–215.

172 Carroll, *Edge of Empires: Chinese Elites and British Colonialists in Hong Kong*, 151.

173 Deng, *Zhongguo zhigong yundong jiashi*, 245–246.

British naval power in the Pearl River in early September 1926. A month later, in October 1926, the sixteen-month strike and boycott ended. Trade and commerce between Hong Kong and South China resumed.<sup>174</sup>

### Singapore Chinese Bourgeoisie under British Imperialism, 1920s

While Hong Kong was becoming involved in the accelerating anti-imperialist struggles, no large-scale Chinese anti-British strikes or class struggle against the Chinese bourgeoisie broke out in Singapore. The difference can be understood by the follow two factors. The first factor is the different social foundations of the making of Chinese bourgeois class between the two cities. As elaborated in chapter 1, the British handpicked the Chinese elites in Hong Kong from those successful merchants and philanthropists. However, the making of Singapore Chinese bourgeoisie was tied to development of labor-intensive revenue farming system, in which new migrants would be absorbed into the tight-knit speech-group networks led by earlier, mostly locally assimilated, Baba Chinese. Though in the early twentieth century, the Baba leadership gave way to China-born Chinese, the framework of the social networking continued. The second factor is the incorporation of Hong Kong into Guangdong's confrontation with Beijing after 1912 (chapter 1). But, as what follows will elaborate, the Chinese bourgeoisie in Singapore however did not feel the pressure to take sides in the north-south tension before the national unification in 1927.

In July 1913, when the southern provinces, including Guangdong and Fujian, under the influence of Dr. Sun Yat-sen, declared independence from Beijing's control, the SCCC announced its support of the Beijing government.<sup>175</sup> But at the same time, veterans of the Republican revolution, Teo Eng Hock and his nephew Lim Nee Soon, kept faith with Sun's agenda. After the Second Revolution in August 1913, Chen Jiongming, then Sun's follower, went into exile in Malaya, and met with other anti-Yuan leaders to plan for the next step in the revolution.<sup>176</sup> Figure 2.2 is a photo captured on one of the occasions when the politicians from southern China met with Lim Nee Soon and Lim Boon Keng.

In 1921, when Dr. Sun Yat-sen was planning to inaugurate himself as the Extraordinary President of the Guangdong Military Government, the SCCC

174 "Communiques and Statements in Connection with the Conference for Settlement of Chinese British Disputes in the Liang-Kuang Provinces," *Hong Kong Sessional Papers 1926*, 90–91.

175 SCCC, Archives of the Minutes of Committee Meetings: August 3, 1913; August 11, 1913.

176 Leslie Chen, *Chen Jiongming and the Federalist Movement*, 63–64.



FIGURE 2.2 *Lim Boon Keng, Lim Nee Soon, and Supporters of Sun's Second Revolution at Lim's Garden in Singapore, January 1914*

*Note: Lim Boon Keng (standing left), Lim Nee Soon (standing right), Li Liejun 李烈鈞 (sitting left), Chen Jiongming 陳炯明 (sitting middle), and Zhang Ji 張繼 (sitting right).*

SOURCE: LIM CHONG HSIEN COLLECTION, COURTESY OF NATIONAL ARCHIVES OF SINGAPORE.

decided not to jeopardize Beijing's trust while greeting Sun's political movement. The chairperson, Lim Nee Soon, used the metaphor of a sibling fight to comment on the political tension between north and south China: "Now the north and south divide in China's politics was like feuds between older brother and younger brother. As the third brother, we should be sympathetic with both the south and the north. Also the businesses of our association require frequent contacts with the southern government. There must not be a lack of greetings from us."<sup>177</sup> The majority of the members agreed to have a flag-raising ceremony and to decorate the association with banners. But regarding whether they should send words of support to the Guangdong government on behalf of the SCCC, one member, Chen Xiting 陳喜亭, expressed his disagreement as follows:

177 SCCC, Archives of the Minutes of Committee Meetings: April 28, 1921.

Our association should be fully for the interests of overseas merchants. We should abide by the agenda of national unification. We are not just an ordinary society for general purpose. The Central [Beijing] Government issued us the seal of Chinese General Chamber of Commerce to us on September 11, 1917. Now in the era of unification, but a new president is elected in Guangdong. About the chair's [Lim Nee Soon] suggestion to celebrate for [the new president], my humble opinion is that Sun's political move would only make people suffer. There should be no reason to celebrate.<sup>178</sup>

Also,

although the Guangdong people would be under the full control of the southern government, we should not think solely for the Guangdong people. Now Fujian is still under the control of the central [government], we should also consider the interest [of the Fujian people].<sup>179</sup>

The divergent political views—as presented in Lim Nee Soon's support of Sun and the southern leaders vis-à-vis Chen Xiting's emphasis on the respect of Beijing—did not generate tension in the Chinese communities in Singapore. The primary reaction to the Chinese New Culture Movement in Singapore was the emphasis on Chinese vernacular education.<sup>180</sup> This approach, albeit apolitical, became a thorn in the Britons' side. In 1920, the British implemented the Registration of Schools Ordinance, aimed at putting all these schools and teachers under British surveillance. The government also mandated that the schools should receive governmental funding.<sup>181</sup> Jin Peigao 金佩皋 was among the Chinese activists protesting against the British regulation and was banished because of her actions. After her banishment, she made public speeches in Beijing, Shanghai, and Amoy calling for Chinese attention to the British suppression of Chinese education in Malaya. Newspapers in Singapore covered her activities. The SCCC, however, denied her legitimacy in representing the voice of Singapore Chinese communities. At an officers' meeting of the SCCC, one proposed that “our association should report to the British

178 SCCC, Archives of the Minutes of Committee Meetings: April 28, 1921.

179 SCCC, Archives of the Minutes of Committee Meetings: April 28, 1921.

180 Kenley, *New Culture in a New World*, 107–138.

181 Li Enhen 李恩涵, *Dongnanya huaqiao shi* 東南亞華僑史 [History of the Chinese sojourners in Southeast Asia] (Taipei: Wunan chubanshe, 2003), 570–571. Before 1941, the British revised the ordinance six times to tighten the control of Chinese schools.

government that this person does not speak for us and we do not endorse her inappropriate behavior." All participants agreed with the motion.<sup>182</sup>

The emphasis on economic *shi ye jiu guo* and cultural Chineseness distinguished overseas Chinese bourgeoisie in Singapore from the core intellectual discourse of the New Youth leaders. In 1926, Amoy University, founded by the Hokkien rubber tycoon Tan Kah Kee, established the Institute of Sinology. It signed a two-year contract to invite the leading writer from the campaign of the New Culture Movement, Lu Xun 魯迅, to join the academy. Lu was amazed by the stubborn belief of Confucianism and Confucian education that the university president, Lim Boon Keng, was promoting. Lu responded to these conflicting cultural views by leaving the school after a few months.<sup>183</sup>

Between June 1925 and October 1926, when the General Canton–Hong Kong Strike and Boycott broke out, the Chinese bourgeoisie in Singapore did not take any action to endorse the movement. The Sze Hai Tong Bank in Singapore, a Teochew bank, refused to help the Chinese General Chamber of Commerce in Pontianak 坤甸, Kalimantan, wire a thousand dollars of Hong Kong bills to Guangdong to support the movement. The delivery of the funds was postponed. In January 1927, after the strike and boycott ended, the Chinese Chamber of Commerce in Canton finally received the money via the Chinese Commercial Bank.<sup>184</sup>

The most explicit anti-British action in Singapore in the 1920s took place on March 12, 1927. This event, later called the Kreta Ayer Incident 牛車水事件, occurred during the second memorial ceremony for Dr. Sun Yat-sen, in the Happy Valley Stadium. Unlike the first memorial ceremony for Sun, which took place on April 12, 1925, the sccc was not involved in the 1927 ceremony.<sup>185</sup>

Some Chinese participants violated the rules by making public speeches. The hosts failed to stop them. The language barrier might have been an issue: the speakers were Hainanese, while the hosts were Cantonese. Police interven-

182 sccc, Archives of the Minutes of Committee Meetings: January 30, 1921.

183 Wang, Gungwu. "Lu Xun, Lim Boon Keng and Confucianism." *Papers on Far Eastern History* 39 (March 1989): 75–91.

184 Record group number 19, file number 180: *Yue sheng ji hai wai huaiqiao yuanzhu Sheng Gang bagong juan kuan* 粵省及海外華僑援助省港罷工捐款 [Financial support from Guangdong and overseas Chinese to the General Guangdong-Hong Kong Strike and Boycott], July 1925–November 1926.

185 In March 30, 1925, two weeks after the death of Sun Yat-sen, thirteen members of the sccc including Teo proposed that the Chinese communities in Singapore should close their business to attend a memorial ceremony for Sun. The Chinese Consulate in Singapore as well as hundreds of native-place and business associations all agreed with this proposal. sccc, *Xinjiapo zhonghua zongshanghui daxia luocheng jinian kan*, 163.

tion resulted in a Chinese demonstration against the police. Seven Chinese people were killed.<sup>186</sup> Agitated Chinese boycotted the tramways, and more and more Chinese gathered on the street to condemn the British.<sup>187</sup> Leaders of the SCCC attended Chinese street gatherings and called for sustaining law and order. On one occasion, See Tiong Wah (then the president of the SCCC) was “mistakenly” struck by the police. It remained unclear why the mistake was made, because See chose to keep a low profile to prevent stimulating Chinese anti-British sentiments. This strategy worked. Chinese communities were pacified within a month. In addition, SCCC leaders decided not to involve themselves in the judicial procedures surrounding the charges by Chinese victims against the British police. Not even an ad hoc meeting was held by the SCCC to discuss the issue. It was left to the Chinese Consulate in Singapore to handle the case.<sup>188</sup>

The British viewed the Kreta Ayer Incident as a sign of the growing strength of Chinese communist forces in Singapore. The local communists tried hard to recruit recent Hainanese immigrants. To check the further infiltration of left-wing forces, the British officially banned all branches of the GMD in Singapore in 1925.<sup>189</sup> But the GMD in Malaya (GMDM) continued to expand. By 1927, it is estimated that eighteen branches of the GMDM had a total membership of 14,000.<sup>190</sup> The Kreta Ayer Incident further radicalized the left wing of the GMDM, prompting the British to enact stricter regulations to suppress China-oriented political activities in the Straits Settlements.<sup>191</sup>

What concerned the British was the spread of leftists in China to Hong Kong and Singapore, so as to escape the Chiang purge. In China, prominent

186 The number of casualties is controversial. Here I cite the number from *NYSF*: April 13, 1927.

187 Ku Hung-ting, “Kuomintang’s Mass movement and the s Incident (1927) in Malaya.” Institute of Humanities and Social Sciences, College of Graduate Studies, Nanyang University, Occasional Paper Series No. 13 (1976); Leung Yuen Sang, “The Singapore Hainanese and Their Political Orientation during the Inter-War Period.” In *Overseas Chinese in Asia between the Two World Wars*, ed. Ng Lun Ngai-ha and Chang Chak Yan (Hong Kong: The Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1989).

188 The SCCC decision is read as follows: “The Consulate could take the full responsibility. No need to convene a meeting at the SCCC.” *NYSF*: March 12–30 and April 7–14, 1927; SCCC, *Xinjiapo zhonghua zongshanghui daxia luocheng jinian kan*, 165.

189 Turnbull, *A History of Modern Singapore, 1819–2005*, 134–135; Heng Pek Koon, *Chinese Politics in Malaysia: A History of the Malaysian Chinese Association* (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), 21–25.

190 Turnbull, *A History of Modern Singapore, 1819–2005*, 42.

191 Yong and McKenna, *The Kuomintang Movement in British Malaya, 1912–1949*, 111–115.

left-wing leaders included Wang Jingwei, Deng Yandai 鄧演達 (1895–1931), Song Qingling 宋慶齡 (the widow of Sun Yat-sen), and He Xiangning 何香凝 (the widow of Liao Zhongkai). They questioned the legitimacy of Chiang's government. Though Wang soon compromised with Chiang and cooperated in the anti-leftist purge, the end of the first united front tarnished the reputation of Chiang's power in GMD.<sup>192</sup>

Support of right-wing GMD leaders nonetheless caused the SCCC trouble. In February 1928, the GMD right-wing officers Hu Hanmin, Sun Fo 孫科 (son of Dr. Sun Yat-sen), and C. C. Wu visited Singapore in an attempt to restore overseas Chinese support. The SCCC launched a welcome party to receive the Chinese leaders. Among the three politicians, Hu and Sun decided not to attend the banquet at the last minute. Their absence was meant to express discontent with the fact that the SCCC did not change the Chinese national flag from the five-color style (used by the northern warlord government) to the "blue sky and white sun" one (used by the Chinese Nationalist Government in Nanjing). Their absence saved them, as an assassin fired on three people he thought to be the politicians from China. The attempt to murder the GMD leaders occurred before the guests walked into the banquet. Wu and two other SCCC officers (Lim Boon Keng and Lim Nee Soon) were gunned down.<sup>193</sup>

The police force in Singapore tried to identify any local connections to the killer, Zhang Yujie 張玉階, but to no avail. Zhang, a Cantonese in his late twenties, had arrived in Singapore from Shanghai two weeks earlier. He claimed that he plotted the attack alone. He believed that the three politicians were traitors to China. Throughout the investigation, he showed no regret, except for having mistakenly wounded Lim Boon Keng.<sup>194</sup> The British, however, believed that Zhang was related to a larger plot of communist expansion in Singapore. Handbills found in early March and circulated in places where Hainanese people gathered confirmed their suspicion. The handbills disclosed that Zhang was beginning to organize a provisional committee for the CCP in the South Seas. But without evidence, it was difficult to arrest others who

192 Olenik, J. Kenneth, "Deng Yanda and the Third Party," in Roger B. Jeans ed. *Roads not Taken: The Struggle of Opposition Parties in Twentieth-Century China* (Boulder, San Francisco and Oxford: Westview Press), 111–134; Yang Tianshi 楊天石, "Bei fa shiqi zuopai liliang yu Jiang Jieshi de maodun yu douzheng 北伐時期左派力量與蔣介石的矛盾與鬥爭 [Contradictions and conflicts between the leftwing force and Chiang Kai-shek in the Northern Expedition]," in Yang, *Guomindang ren yu qianqi Zhonghua minguo* 國民黨人與前期中華民國 (Beijing: Zhongguo renmin daxue chubanshe, 2007), 492–520.

193 *NYSF*: Feb. 9, 1928; Feb. 10; Feb. 23, 1928.

194 *NYSF*: Feb. 10–23, 1928.

might have been involved in the murder attempt.<sup>195</sup> The only thing known for sure was that Zhang was a member of the South Seas Provisional Committee of the CCP, an underground organ of the Chinese communists that began after they were purged from the GMD in 1927.<sup>196</sup> This incident could therefore be viewed as an indicator of a CCP attempt to revenge the right-wing purge under Chiang's order.

The CCP organization in Singapore did not operate well. A few days later, on the third anniversary of the death of Dr. Sun Yat-sen, on March 12, 1928, no Chinese nationalists paid public tribute to the founding father of the Republic of China. No formal ceremony was organized. Only communist handbills were found on the streets. In a theater, three unidentified gunshots were heard. No one was hurt.<sup>197</sup>

### Conclusion

This chapter delineates the rejection of anti-imperialist ideology among the Chinese bourgeoisie in Hong Kong and Singapore between 1919 and 1927. In response to the growing influence of the Chinese anti-Japanese ideology in nationalist movements, the bourgeoisie in both colonies remained to commit to their version of nationalism, *shi ye jiu guo*. Sustaining their status under the British colonial status quo was crucial to reach the goal. And when the Japanese southward expansion appeared to be about commerce, the top bourgeoisie—including the leaders of the sccc in Singapore and the Tung wah and CGCCHK leaders in Hong Kong—did not confront with Japan. For the bourgeoisie in Hong Kong and Singapore, anti-imperialism should not be the sole position in Chinese nationalism. Like what the Hong Kong bourgeoisie had experienced in the Merchant Corps Incident and the General Guangdong-Hong Kong Strike and Boycott, launching an anti-imperialist movement was like waging war against the Chinese business people. The war would damage enterprises among the overseas bourgeoisie, as well as the economic growth of China.

---

195 NYSP: March 2–8, 12–15, 1928.

196 Png Peng-seng, "The Kuomintang in Malaya," in Trengonning ed. *Papers on Malaya History* (Singapore: Journal South-East Asian History, 1962), 214–225.

197 NYSP: March 13, 1928.

## The Patriotic 1930s: Chinese Overseas Bourgeoisie in Nationalist Wings

No Chinese person is unpatriotic . . . but my humble opinion is that one single cable would not have any practical purpose . . . I also consulted with the Hong Kong authority, which responded that Hong Kong is a neutral place and it is not appropriate for us to send such a cable.

—LI YAU TSUN 李右泉<sup>1</sup>



In May 1928, when news of the Jinan Incident was confirmed, in Hong Kong, the CGCCHK received many letters demanding it to send a cable to show support for the Chinese Nationalist Government in Nanjing (Nanjing government). Most of these letters were addressed anonymously with “signatures” such as “a full-hearted Chinese man,” “one of the Chinese people,” “self-help associations of Chinese civilians,” and “national salvation group of Hong Kong people from all walks of life.”<sup>2</sup> The association’s initial response was to refuse these requests, however, for the reason excerpted above.

Around the same time, in Singapore, the Chinese General Consulate issued the following statement: “All overseas Chinese should keep calm and be patient. The Chinese government will work for justice. As for economic boycotts, we believe that these are spontaneous, patriotic and peaceful activities. People undertake them out of conscience. But except for economic boycotts, please do not overreact and do not violate law and order.”<sup>3</sup> Published in major newspapers in Singapore, the statement confirmed the anti-Japanese feelings of the Chinese overseas in the city, though it also warned against violence. The position ushered in a variety of nationalist activities, including fund-raising campaigns led by the bourgeoisie. Anti-Japanese boycotts broke out, which resulted in a heavy slump in Japanese exports to Singapore in particular and British Malaya in general. From that juncture until the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, in July 1937, the China-born Hokkien rubber tycoon Tan Kah Kee rose

1 HKMS 163-1-4: Minutes of Meetings of the CGCCHK, May 16, 1928.

2 HKMS 163-1-4: Minutes of Meetings of the CGCCHK, May 16, 1928.

3 NYSP: May 9, 1928.

to be the paramount Chinese nationalist leader, endorsed by both the British and the GMD.<sup>4</sup>

Given the significant donations of Chinese overseas to the GMD's war expenses, especially in the earlier years of the Pacific War,<sup>5</sup> most studies focus on the incorporation of Chinese overseas bourgeoisie in Chiang's state.<sup>6</sup> I however emphasize the difference between the quick response of the Chinese bourgeoisie in Singapore vis-à-vis the deliberate hesitation of those in Hong Kong, as mentioned above, in order to reflect the different positions taken by the two groups concerning the rising power of Chiang Kai-shek in the GMD after the Northern Expedition. Between 1926 and 1927, backed by the support of the Whampoa Military Academy and the reorganization of southern and southwestern military groups, Chiang purged the leftists in the south and conquered the warlords in the north. In November 1926, the GMD moved the capital in Wuhan, In April 1927, Chiang Kai-shek, with the support of Hu Hanmin, established the Nanjing government. Beneath the formal allegiance to the new Nanjing government of Chinese overseas, mobilization of the parochial level of state-builders, especially those based in Guangdong divided the Chinese overseas by their different connections with the different factions in GMD. Between April and August 1927, Wang Jingwei denied the legitimacy of the Nanjing government and confronted Chiang over the latter's purge of the leftists. Although the conflict, known as the split between Wuhan and Nanjing, was soon resolved after Wang also turned against the communists, the confrontation among Wang, Hu, and Chiang continued throughout the 1930s.<sup>7</sup> Chinese overseas bourgeoisie, however, found it hard to remain bystanders of

4 Akashi, "The *Nanyang* Chinese Anti-Japanese and Boycott Movement, 1908–28: A Study of Nanyang Chinese Nationalism," *Journal of South Seas Society* (Vol. XXIII, 1968): 69–97; Yong, *Tan Kah Kee*, Ch. 6; Yen Ch'ing-hwang, "The Response of the Overseas Chinese in Singapore and Malaya to the Tsinan Incident, 1928," in Ng Lun Ngai-ha and Chang Chak Yan eds. *Overseas Chinese in Asia between the Two World Wars* (Hong Kong: Overseas Chinese Archives and Centre for Contemporary Asian Studies, the Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1989), 263–282.

5 Lee Ying-hui, *Kang Ri yu fu Ri: huaqiao, Guominzhengfu, Wang zhengquan*, 138, fn. 109.

6 Akashi, *The Nanyang Chinese National Salvation Movement, 1937–1941*; S. Leong, "The Malayan Overseas Chinese and the Sino-Japanese War, 1937–1941." *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies*, vol. 10, no. 2 (Sept. 1979): 293–320; Yong and McKenna, *The Kuomintang Movement in British Malaya, 1912–1949*; Lee Ying-hui, *Huaqiao zhengce yu haiwai minzushuyi, 1912–1949*.

7 Li Zongren and Tang Degang 李宗仁、唐德剛, *Li Zongren huiyi lu xia* 李宗仁回憶錄下 [Memoir of Li Zongren, volume 2] (Taipei: Yuanliu chubanshe, 2010), 487–491; 565–570; Guangdong dang an guan 廣東檔案館, *Chen Jitang yanjiu shiliao* 陳濟棠研究史料

the GMD's political cleavages in China. With the development of Guangdong as a base for the anti-Chiang campaign in China, Hong Kong, once again, became involved in the contested diplomacy among the British, Nanjing, and Canton. But unlike what occurred in the 1920s when the Canton regime was antagonistic to the British, the Canton force in the 1930s took a conciliatory turn.<sup>8</sup> At the same time, Nanjing's improving relationship with bourgeois leaders in Singapore also made the latter an important base for overseas mobilization of the GMD. The amicable relationship between the British colonial government in Hong Kong and Guangdong as well as the cooperative ties between Nanjing and Singapore thus constituted the backdrop against which the new form of Chinese bourgeois nationalism, developing from but also transcending the earlier *shi ye jiu guo*, evolved from the late 1920s and stabilized in the 1930s.

### The Rise of Tan Kah Kee, the Legendary Chinese Nationalist from the South Seas

The right-wing GMD force connected with the Chinese bourgeois communities in Singapore after 1927 through the liaison of the Chinese Consulate in Singapore. The mouthpiece for the Nanjing government advocated the official policies to the Chinese in Singapore as well as reported to Nanjing the concerns of Chinese overseas. On May 11, in response to the call for patriotic donations from the Chinese Consulate of Singapore for the Shandong victims, Tan Kah Kee and the Ee Ho Hean posted an announcement calling Chinese people to a meeting at the SCCC office to respond to the "national tragedy."<sup>9</sup> Establishing a fund-raising campaign for victims of the tragedy, the Shandong Relief Fund was the bourgeoisie's answer to the Sino-Japanese clash in Shandong. The campaign was organized about a week after the event.

The 1928 Shandong Relief Fund became Singapore's first and foremost business-led Chinese nationalist campaign with anti-Japanese tone. Its primary goal was to collect funds to help Chinese victims of the Sino-Japanese

---

[Historical materials about the research of Chen Jitang] (Guangzhou: Guangzhou dang an guan, 1985), 30–37.

8 Norman Miners, "From Nationalistic Confrontation to Regional Collaboration: China-Hong Kong-Britain, 1926–41," in *Precarious Balance: Hong Kong between China and Britain, 1842–1992*, ed. Ming Kuo Chan (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1994), 61.

9 *NYSF*: May 11, 1928; Ko and Lim eds. *Xing hua lishi yu renwu yanjiu*, 75–90.

conflict. It has been documented that the campaign “swept Singapore’s Chinese communities like a brush fire.”<sup>10</sup> The campaign appealed to all ranks of Chinese, including shop owners, teachers, students, cooks, and coolies, all of whom donated to the nationalist cause. Donors’ names were published in local newspapers, with the endorsement of T. V. Soong, the Minister of Finance of the Chinese Nationalist Government, for receiving their funds.<sup>11</sup> Total donations amounted to 134 million Straits dollars by January 1929,<sup>12</sup> of which 104 million Straits dollars were collected in the first four months of the campaign.<sup>13</sup>

The Shandong Relief Fund reinforced the ties between the SCCC and Nanjing. In December 1928, the association, which had been hesitant to publicly endorse Nanjing earlier that year (chapter 2), decided to adopt the GMD’s national flag and hang it during special ceremonies. The SCCC also proposed that the government of the Straits Settlements designate the Double-Tenth Day as a public holiday.<sup>14</sup>

It is worth noting that many of the officers of the 1928 campaign had been associated with the 1923 Singapore Chinese Relief Fund for Earthquake Victims in Japan. The fund-raising campaign should, therefore, be viewed as a turning point in the relationship between Japanese and Singapore Chinese business-people (table 3.1).

The 1928 Shandong Relief Fund thus reflected the new anti-Japanese position taken by Chinese overseas bourgeoisie. Before that, the NMJH had been set up as a platform for Japan-related Hokkien and other Hokkien from Western colonies to work together for Fujian’s development (chapter 2). Tan Kah Kee had been a friend of the Japanese-associated Hokkien merchant Kwik Djoen Eng and the Taiwanese Hokkien elite Lin Hsien-tang. Lin’s diary discloses that when he visited Singapore to supervise the businesses of the Southern Godown Company in May 1927, he was received by both Kwik and Tan.<sup>15</sup> Tan also admitted that before the Jinan Incident, he used glass bottles from Japan to pack his medical products.<sup>16</sup>

10 Yong Ch’ing-fatt, *Tan Kah Kee*, 186; Yen Ch’ing-hwang, “The Response of the Overseas Chinese in Singapore and Malaya to the Tsinan Incident, 1928.”

11 See for example, *NYSP*: June 27, 1927.

12 Yong, *Tan Kah Kee*, 186.

13 *NYSP*: Sept. 26, 1928.

14 SCCC, *Xinjiapo zhonghua zongshanghui daxia luocheng jinian kan*, 167.

15 Lin Xiantang, *Guanyuan xiansheng riji, diyijuan*, 121.

16 *NYSP*: 20 June, 1928.

TABLE 3.1 *Major Officers of the 1928 Shandong Relief Fund and Their Backgrounds*

Major Committee Officers <sup>1</sup>	Posts in the SCCC, 1927–1928 <sup>2</sup>	EEH Members <sup>3</sup>	Singapore Chinese Relief Fund for the September 1923 Tokyo Earthquake <sup>4</sup>
President:			
Tan Kah Kee 陳嘉庚	–	E	Honorable President
Vice President:			
Tan Chiew Cha 陳秋槎	Treasurer	E	Honorable President
Chief-Treasurer:			
Lee Chin Tian 李振殿	–	E	Honorable President
Treasurer:			
Chia Thian Hock 謝天福	–	E	–
Treasurer:			
Lim Kim Tian 林金殿	–	E	Honorable President
Treasurer:			
Ng Sing Phang 吳勝鵬	Treasurer	E	Honorable President
Treasurer:			
Low Peng Ser 劉炳思	–	–	–
Treasurer:			
Wooi Woo Yan 黃有淵	Treasurer	E	Honorable President

*Sources:*

<sup>1</sup> Only positions of president, vice-president, and treasurer are listed here. The list is based on *NYSF*: May 19, 1928.

<sup>2</sup> Positions in the SCCC from 1927 to 1928 (the 16th board), see *NYSF*: Feb. 5, 1927.

<sup>3</sup> Member list of the Ee Ho Hean Club is from Yong Ch'ing-fatt, *Tan Kah Kee: The Making of an Overseas Chinese Legend* (Oxford University Press, 1987), 183.

<sup>4</sup> List of the Singapore Chinese Relief Fund for the September 1923 Tokyo Earthquake is cited from *NYSF*: Sept. 28, 1923.

Tan's embrace of Chinese nationalism and his commitment to the British status quo accounted for his rise to leadership in Chinese nationalist activities in Singapore. As a Hokkien born in China, Tan's status as a naturalized British subject seemed to soothe the tension between his China-oriented campaign and the British. The GMD accepted Tan because of his impeccable communal leadership in dealing with critiques from his challengers. Before organizing the Shandong Relief Fund, Tan was appointed as a Justice of Peace in 1924 and

from then on served on the CAB as a representative of his dialect group, the Hokkiens.<sup>17</sup> After 1928, he played an important role in the SCCC's constitutional reform.<sup>18</sup> To acknowledge his support, the Chinese Nationalist Government recruited Tan Kah Kee and his son-in-law, the GMD veteran Lim Nee Soon (one of Tan's daughters married Lim's son in 1923), to a twenty-four member national fund-raising committee of the Chinese Nationalist Government.<sup>19</sup>

Nanjing's mobilization of Chinese overseas bourgeoisie effectively checked the expansion of the left-wing organization—the Nanyang Communist Party, formed in 1927, later developed into the Malay Communist Party (MCP) in 1930.<sup>20</sup> Throughout the 1930s, although the MCP tried to make use of the surging Chinese anti-Japanese sentiment to recruit more members, they could not compete with the business-led nationalist fund-raising campaigns in winning the support of the general Chinese community.<sup>21</sup> The actors in GMD partisan affairs in Singapore in the early 1930s were well-to-do Chinese bourgeoisie. To be sure, in the elite circles of Chinese business communities in Singapore to which Tan belonged, Lim Nee Soon and Lim's uncle Teo Eng Hock were involved in the surreptitious organization of the Head Branch of the GMD in Malaya (GMDM). In 1930, their activities resulted in a reinforcement of the 1925 ban against all partisan activities related to China affairs.<sup>22</sup> Core members of the GMDM were antagonistic to left-wing forces and eventually weeded them out. In the process, they sought support from the central power of the Chinese Nationalist Government. For example, in February 1930, when the widow of Liao Zhongkai, He Xiangning 何香凝, visited Singapore, Teo Eng Hock's Tongde Reading Society 同德書報社 reported to the Nanjing

17 On Tan's appointment as a J. P., see SSGG 1924: June 4, 1924, 953. On the CAB, see SSGG 1924: Feb. 1, 1924, 176.

18 NYSF: Feb. 4, 1929; see also Yong, *Tan Kah Kee*, 145–47.

19 Guomin zhengfu files: 001-032107-048, *Zhankuan weiyuanhui pinren huiyuan shixiang, zhankuan weiyuanhui weiyuan changwei mishu zhang deng renmian* 賑款委員會聘任會員事項, 賑款委員會委員常委祕書長等任免 [Affairs on appointment of members of fund-raising committee, appointment and dismissal of chiefs of the secretary of the fund-raising committee], Oct. 9, 1928–Jan. 23, 1929.

20 Yong and McKenna, *The Kuomintang Movement in British Malaya*, 86–89.

21 N. Parmer, "Attempts at Labor Organization by Chinese Workers in Certain Industries in Singapore in the 1930s," in Trengonning ed. *Papers on Malayan History* (Singapore: Journal South-East Asian History, 1962), 239–255.

22 Yong and McKenna, *The Kuomintang Movement in British Malaya, 1912–1949*, 83–133.

government that He was sabotaging the operation of the GMDM, and that the Chinese consulate in Singapore, Tang Liu, did nothing to stop her.<sup>23</sup>

For the British, the rise in Chinese partisan activities—be it a right-wing force or a left-wing power—was a threat to the colonial status quo. On February 5, 1930, Sir Cecil Clementi assumed his new position as the Governor and Commander-in-Chief of the Straits Settlements. He was furious to learn that important GMD leaders were holding a three-day convention. Because of his experiences while governing Hong Kong during the anti-British Canton–Hong Kong General Strike and Boycott in 1925–1926, Clementi was wary of Chinese organized political activities. In particular, the Singapore bourgeoisies' connection with the Chinese partisan activities puzzled Clementi. How could these British subjects develop an allegiance to China while at the same time pledging loyalty to the British? Clementi thus called a meeting to communicate with prominent GMD partisans in Malaya. In the meeting, he interrogated the naturalized British subject Teo Eng Hock with the following question:

You have . . . been British for two generations, and no doubt if you went to China you would claim British protection, you would register yourself in British Consulates in China as a British subject, and yet here in Singapore, you become a member of a Chinese political society, the Kuomintang. So you endeavor to have a double allegiance. There is a Chinese phrase for this. They call it *Leung t'au sha*, “double-headed snake.”<sup>24</sup>

With his knowledge of Chinese affairs, Clementi was aware of the fact that being a “double-headed snake” was legal and acceptable under the *jus sanguinis* principle of the Chinese Nationality Law. This principle, enacted in 1909 and reconfirmed in 1912, 1914, and 1929, allowed overseas Chinese to claim double or multiple nationalities. At the same time, according to the British Nationality Law, ethnic Chinese born in British colonies such as British Hong Kong and Singapore could automatically become British nationals, but this

23 Record group number 2 (2), file number 440: *Xinjiapo lingshi Tang Liu zhichi He Xiangning zai gai pu congshi geming huodong bei kong* 新嘉坡領事唐榴支持何香凝在該埠從事革命活動被控 [Accusation of the Chinese consulate in Singapore, Tang Liu, for his support of He Xiangning's revolutionary activities in Singapore], Feb. 1930 (Nanjing: the 2nd Historical Archives).

24 FO 371/14728/2083, Government House meeting between Sir Cecil Clementi and 17 office-bearers of the British Malaya Head Branch of the Chinese Nationalist Party, 20 February 1930; cited from Yong and McKenna, *The Kuomintang Movement in British Malaya*, Appendix B, 251.

status was effective only in the colony. Some elite Chinese in these British colonies applied to become naturalized British subjects, a category recognized in all British territories.<sup>25</sup> A naturalized British subject could also claim Chinese nationality if one of his or her parents was of Chinese origin.<sup>26</sup> Many Chinese citizens who were naturalized British subjects, such as Tan Kah Kee, Teo Eng Hock, and Lim Nee Soon from the SCCC, as well as those active Po On members in Hong Kong, played a critical role in shaping the trajectories of overseas Chinese bourgeois nationalism in the interwar years. Clementi thus responded to the GMD organization in Malaya by reimposing the 1925 ban against all party activities. Many active leaders of the GMDM were banished, including the Hokkien activist Teh Lay Seng 鄭螺生 (Zheng Luosheng). The British denied Teh's reentry to Malaya with the pretext that there was no proper countersign on his British passport.<sup>27</sup> The Chinese Nationalist Government reacted to this British policy by appointing Teh an inspector of overseas Chinese affairs.<sup>28</sup>

What Clementi might not have known about, but what this chapter and the following one demonstrate, is the flexible political allegiance among the overseas Chinese bourgeoisie. While actively organizing Chinese nationalist fundraising campaigns in the 1930s, they continued to emphasize their place in the British empire, entitled to trading rights by the British protective tariffs and the opportunity to expand their trade to British markets.

For Tan Kah Kee, who became a naturalized British subject in 1916,<sup>29</sup> commitment to Chinese nationalism jeopardized the trust of the British. Tan transgressed what Clementi considered as reasonable engagement in China affairs. In November 1931, Tan publicly promoted sales of the brochure "Tanaka Memorial," published by Shanghai World Publisher, to call Chinese attention

25 Lee Ying-hui, *Huaqiao zhengce yu haiwai minzushuyi, 1912–1949*, 127.

26 Lee Ying-hui, *Huaqiao zhengce yu haiwai minzushuyi, 1912–1949*, 19–20; 102–109.

27 Teh was a naturalized British subject, as well as a J. P. and CAB member from Perak. See Yong and McKenna, *The Kuomintang Movement in British Malaya*, 134–171.

28 Record Group Number 2 (1) (Minguo shiqi Xinjiapo dang an), file number: 2605: *Xinjiapo xiu gai luli kedai huaren zhizhi huaqiao hui ji kang ri juan kuan* 新嘉坡修改律例苛待華人制止華僑匯寄抗日捐款 [Changing rules in Singapore that created troubles to the Chinese and prohibited the Chinese from remitting money for anti-Japanese cause] (Nanjing: the 2nd Historical Archives).

29 The Executive Council of the Straits Settlements granted Tan Kah Kee's father, Tan Kee Peck, the status of naturalized British subject, which was a marker of social prestige. Yong, *Tan Kah Kee*, 23. Tan Kah Kee changed his nationality from China to a naturalized British subject in 1916. See Christine Suchen Lim, *Hua Song: Stories of the Chinese Diaspora* (San Francisco: Long River Press, 2005), 233.

受好武快小説者起見，全註明收明符號元，此種細微圖畫多，所定金額多，不可不  
 查。

△注意▽

正集附五彩寫真插圖二百幅  
 續集附五彩寫真插圖二百幅

田 中 奏 章

死生關頭 人人應論

田中此書，神人共憤，但願愛國同胞，羣皆閱讀，廣為宣傳，如將此  
 書轉贈親友，能知此做去，定卜多子多孫，福壽綿綿，否則家破人亡  
 、死無葬身之地也。勿謂國之興亡，毋預匹夫事也。

△如各團體、各學校、各機關，大批採購，每百本祇收回成本洋四元  
 。寄費奉贈。

總發售處 上海世界書局  
 THE WORLD BOOK Co., Ltd. 11, P. O. Box No. 480, Singapore.  
 馬六甲瓜哇街 門牌八號 分發售處 上海世界書局  
 The World Book Co., 7, Java Street, Malacca.

FIGURE 3.1 Advertisement for the "Tanaka Memorial" Brochure  
 SOURCE: NYSP: NOVEMBER 19, 1931.

to Japan's military ambition—"The crucial moment between extinction and survival," as the title of his advertisement phrased it. It pointed out that Japan's expansion would eventually eliminate China if the Chinese did not respond to the crisis immediately (figure 3.1).

Clementi was furious about Tan's open critique of Japan. In the following two years, Tan was advised to keep a low political profile but he continued to raise funds for the Nanjing government. It was then that the Manchurian and Shanghai incidents broke out.<sup>30</sup> With Tan retreating from the front line, the 1932 nationalist campaign in response to these two incidents was chaired by sccc president Lee Choon Seng 李俊承 (Li Juncheng). Lee was also a GMD

30 Turnbull, Constance Mary, "Sir Cecil Clementi and Malaya: The Hong Kong Connection." *Journal of Oriental Studies* Vol. XXII (1984, No. 1): 33–60; Ko Mu Lin and Lim How Seng eds., *Xing hua lishi yu renwu yanjiu*, 85–86.

member. Under his leadership, many influential GMD partisans rallied to the campaign, including Teo Eng Hock and Lee Chin Tian 李振殿 (Li Zhendian).<sup>31</sup> And according to Teh Lay Seng, who was communicating with prominent overseas Chinese leaders from China, Tan Kah Kee was a key organizer who instructed all major Chinese associations in Malaya to remit funds to a special account set up for the Chinese Nationalist Government in Shanghai.<sup>32</sup> By September 10, 1932, when Singapore had not yet recovered from the economic downturn of the depression, the campaign had collected 200,000 Straits dollars plus 56,701 Chinese currencies.<sup>33</sup> The success of the 1932 campaign troubled Clementi. He arrested six Chinese from the GMD-related Chongwen Club 崇文俱樂部 in Kuala Lumpur and closed the Fu Rong Reading Society 芙蓉書報社. He even implemented a new ordinance that prohibited all remittances from being sent directly to the Chinese Nationalist Government.<sup>34</sup> After Clementi's antagonism against the GMD, the latter reinforced its connection with Tan. In 1935, the GMD bestowed on Tan the Order of Brilliant Jade (Second Honor) to honor his generous financial support of Amoy University during the Great Depression.<sup>35</sup>

In response to the British suppression of GMD partisans in the Straits Settlements, in 1933, Teo Eng Hock accepted an appointment to the Overseas Chinese Committee of the Chinese Nationalist Government in Nanjing.<sup>36</sup> Between 1934 and 1935, he assisted Wang Jingwei, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, in approaching Siam for stipulating diplomatic ties. The substantial proposal that Teo submitted to the Overseas Chinese Committee was to demand the Siamese government to allow China to set up an embassy in Siam, as surging Thai nationalism had generated an anti-Chinese movement there.<sup>37</sup> In contrast with Teo, Tan chose to stay in Singapore and continued to lead

31 *NYSB*: Feb. 25, 1932.

32 Record group number 2 (1), file number: 2605: *Xinjia po xiu gai luli kedai huaren zhizhi huaqiao hui ji kang ri juan kuan*.

33 *NYSB*: Sept. 10, 1932.

34 Record group number 2 (1), file number: 2605: *Xinjia po xiu gai luli kedai huaren zhizhi huaqiao hui ji kang ri juan kuan*.

35 Guomin zhengfu files: 001-035100-0055, *Huaqiao yougong renyun xunjiang* 華僑有功人員勳獎 [Honors the overseas Chinese worthy of merits].

36 Guomin zhengfu files: 001-032117-004, *Qiao wu weiyuan guanyuan renmian* (4) 僑務委員會官員任免(四) [Appointments and dismissals of officers of overseas Chinese Committee, 4] August 1933–December 1939.

37 Waijiao bu files 外交部檔 [Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs]: 020-010402-0015: *Zhong Xian dingyue* 中暹訂約 [Diplomatic ties between China and Siam], Sept. 1932–May 1935 (Taipei: Guoshi guan).

Chinese nationalism in the South Seas. This meant that Tan had to deal with not only the pressure from Clementi, but also constant attacks from other business competitors. Tan had experienced the latter's attacks prior to his rising to lead the Chinese bourgeois nationalism. In March 1928, through the solicitor Chan & Eber, Tan Kah Kee & Company registered a tiger trademark for various products including preserved pineapples, soaps, hair lotion, cosmetics, toothpaste, confections, biscuits, chocolates, and candies.<sup>38</sup> This generated a commercial dispute with Aw Boon Haw, who was known as the Tiger Balm King for his Chinese patent medicines with a tiger trademark. Though tiger was a popular image used by various different companies as their business trademarks, Aw nonetheless accused Tan of copying his tiger image.<sup>39</sup> The following figures show the different styles of tigers, including those registered by Aw's Eng Aun Tong 永安堂 (Yong'an Tang) and the tiger trademark of Tan Kah Kee & Co. (figure 3.2).

At the same time, Aw's newspaper, *Sin Chew Jit Poh* 星洲日報, posted an article that used such descriptive slurs as "a dog of Shu [present-day China's Sichuan province], a misty region, barked at the sun" (*Shu quan fei ri* 蜀犬吠日) to satirize how Hokkien people promoted the Shandong Relief Fund and to challenge the conventional understanding that the Hokkien people were the most patriotic Chinese speech-group. Hokkien people ignored this confrontation, although Chinese from Shu (present-day Sichuan) protested being associated with dogs in Tan's newspaper, *NYSP*.<sup>40</sup>

Tan's Shandong Relief Fund Campaign also became a target of his competitors. The conflict was about the disposal of 80,000 Chinese national dollars, the remaining funds of the campaign. Of the total remaining funds, 60,000 was from the Singapore Chinese Rubber Dealers' Association through the rubber surtax, which was not collected until June 1929. The association split into

38 ssgg: March 14, 1928.

39 Yong Ch'ing-fatt frames Tan Kah Kee's investment in medical products as an insignificant episode in his business expansion, especially compared to rubber and pineapple manufacturing. In 1929, Tan Kah Kee attempted to register all his medical products, biscuits, canned pineapples, bath soaps, hair lotion, cosmetics, toothpaste, candies, and other articles of everyday life under a "tiger" trademark, with which Aw Boon Haw's medical products had been widely associated for decades. Tan's request for the tiger trademark was rejected, so his products retained their bell trademark. But he continued his competition with Aw's products. See Yong Ch'ing-fatt, *Tan Kah Kee*, 65–66.

40 Literally, this slang means an ignorant person making a fuss about something that he alone finds strange. *NYSP*: March 5, 1929.


(1)



(2)



(3)



(4)



(5)



FIGURE 3.2 *Tiger Trademarks*

- (1) Eng Aun Tong Company, from Burma
- (2) Tan Kah Kee Company, Singapore
- (3) Messrs. Hodgson & Simpson, Ltd., from Liverpool, England
- (4) Lam Tong Kongs from Penang
- (5) Industrial Manufacturing Company of Singapore

SOURCES: (1) SSGG: AUGUST 3, 192; (2) SSGG: MARCH 22, 1928; (3) SSGG: NOVEMBER 6, 1923; (4) SSGG: MAY 12, 1922; (5) SSGG: APRIL 11, 1924.

two groups: one decided to collect the funds for Tan, the other refused.<sup>41</sup> After more than a year of negotiation, the Singapore Chinese Rubber Dealers' Association decided to send a check to Tan Kah Kee's Shandong Relief Fund.<sup>42</sup> But under the influence of Aw Boon Haw's ally Lim Kim Tian 林金殿 (Lin Jindian; 1879–1944), and the Ho Hong Bank, which issued the check, decided that it was “uncredited” and “unwanted.” Lim claimed that the Shandong Relief Fund no longer existed, so the check should be kept by the Supreme Court. Both the Singapore Chinese Rubber Dealers' Association and the Shandong Relief Fund Campaign litigated the bank. In July 1931, the Court ruled against the bank, and Lim Kim Tian accused the leaders of the Shandong Relief Fund Campaign, including Tan Kah Kee, of misconduct.<sup>43</sup> Although the final judgment of the Supreme Court was in favor of the Shandong Relief Fund, the latter was nonetheless responsible for the tens of thousands of dollars of fees involved in the lawsuit.<sup>44</sup> In retrospect, the association assessed the whole affair as a “groundless sacrifice.”<sup>45</sup>

The conflict developed into feuds between the Hokkien and Hakka. In 1931, Aw's newspaper *Sin Chew Jit Poh's* second annual publication posted articles that commented bitterly on Hokkien customs, education, women's rights, politics, and the like.<sup>46</sup> In June, the Singapore Fujian Native-Place Association convened other Fujian associations in the South Seas to protest against the report. Together they made six demands to the *Sin Chew Jit Poh*, including firing the article's author and the newspaper's general editor.<sup>47</sup> Initially, Aw Boon Haw refused to respond to the criticism.<sup>48</sup> Two months later, on August 16, 1931, the Singapore Fujian Native-Place Association called for a meeting with all Fujian associations in Malaya.<sup>49</sup> Aw Boon Haw then agreed to compromise. The dispute

41 *NYSP*: March 4, 1929; March 23, 1929; June 14, 1929; June 24, 1929; see also Yong, *Tan Kah Kee*, 188.

42 *NYSP*: Nov. 1, 1929; Nov. 14, 1929; Oct. 22, 1930; April 8, 1932.

43 *NYSP*: July 12, 1932.

44 *NYSP*: August 6, 1932.

45 Singapore Rubber Dealers' Association, *Xinjiapo shujiao gonghui nianjian* 新嘉坡樹膠公會年鑑 [Annual report of the Singapore Rubber Dealers Association] (Singapore: Singapore Rubber Dealers' Association, 1957), 34; see also *NYSP*: March 14, 1932; August 23, 1932; 1989: 165–166.

46 Sin Chew Jit Poh, *Xingzhou ribao liang zhounian jinian tekan* 星洲日報兩週年紀念特刊 [Xingzhou ribao's 2nd annual] (Singapore: Sin Chew Jit Poh, 1931), section f.

47 *NYSP*: June 8, 1931.

48 *NYSP*: June 25, 1931, June 23, 1931, July 27, 1931, August 5, 1931, August 10, 1931.

49 *NYSP*: August 17, 1931.

was finally settled by an apology printed in major Chinese newspapers in Singapore, Kuala Lumpur, Penang, Hong Kong, Amoy, and Shanghai.<sup>50</sup>

In contrast to his marginal influence in the Fujian communities in Singapore, Aw had been active in Hakka affairs in Hong Kong and the South Seas since the late 1920s. Born in Rangoon, Burma, to a Hakka immigrant merchant from Yongding, Fujian, Aw moved the base of his business of Chinese patent medicine Eng Aun Tong to Singapore in 1923. From then on, Aw Boon Haw established his reputation as both an entrepreneur and a philanthropist. Most of the charities that he engaged in were related to the Guangdong, but not Fujian, province.<sup>51</sup> Nonetheless, regardless of Aw's handsome contribution to the reform of the Singapore Fujian Native-Place Association during 1927 and 1929, he remained outside its core leadership.<sup>52</sup> Around this time, he turned his attention to cultivating ties with the Hakka in the South Seas. In April 1927, he founded the *Nanyang Dingzhou tongxianghui* 南洋汀洲同鄉會 (Association of South Seas Chinese from the Eight Counties of Dingzhou, Fujian).<sup>53</sup> In 1928, he financed the organization of the *Nanyang keshu zonghui* 南洋客屬總會 (Khek Community Guild Singapore) and became its first president.<sup>54</sup> In the

50 *NYSF*: August 19, 1931; Sept. 3, 1931.

51 For example, in August 1924, when floods devastated various provinces in China, Aw solicited the support of notable Hokkien businesspeople including Tan Kah Kee, Lee Choon Seng, See Tiong Wah, and Lim Peng Siang, the Teochew Lim Nee Soon, and the Cantonese Loke Yan Kit 陸寅傑 in raising funds for victims. Donations were given to the Shanghai Chinese and Western Charitable Committee (*NYSF*: August 30, 1924). In September 1926, Aw chaired a campaign to channel funds for Fangbian Hospital in the Guangzhou city (*NYSF*: Sept. 18, 1926). In January 1927, Aw donated 4,000 dollars to the Singapore Haitian Club 新嘉坡海天俱樂部 (a club for the Cantonese) for victims of the floods in British Malaya, the largest single donation of the campaign (*NYSF*: Jan. 28, 1927). In November 1927, when the sccc received a cable from Guangdong province informing them that civil war had devastated Canton, Hu and his brother Aw Boon Par soon wired 3,399 Straits dollars to the Guangzhou General Chamber of Commerce. Though the sccc also tried to collect funds on behalf of the same affair, the Aw brothers' donation was not channeled through them but through the CGCCHK (*NYSF*: Nov. 20, 1927). In January 1928, to raise funds for victims of the Canton Uprising of December 11, 1927, Aw organized a philanthropic Chinese opera performance. The campaign was also supported by Tan Kah Kee and Loke Yan Kit, among other business elites (*NYSF*: Jan. 5, 1928).

52 Yong, *Tan Kah Kee*, 145–47.

53 *NYSF*: April, 23, 1927.

54 Nanyang Khek Community Guild ed. *Nanyang keshu zonghui 35–36 zhounian jinian tekan* 南洋客屬總會三十五至三十六週年紀念特刊 [Souvenir publication of the 35 and 36 years of the Nanyang Khek Community Guild] (Singapore: the Nanyang Khek Community Guild, 1967), A1.

same year, he was recognized as an important sponsor to help construct a building for the *Xianggang Chongzheng Zonghui* 香港崇正總會 (Hong Kong Tsong Tsin Association). Established in 1921, it became the center of global Hakka communities, linking up Hakka associations in the South Seas with those in the Americas and Europe.<sup>55</sup> The global Hakka networks converged in Hong Kong helped the Hakkas consolidate their influence to counter the paramount Cantonese influence in Hong Kong as well as the Hokkien domination in most port-cities of the South Seas.<sup>56</sup> Above all, as what will be elaborated in chapter 6, after the outbreak of the Marco Polo Bridge Incident in July 1937, Aw Boon Haw's Hakka's base in Hong Kong effectively prevented the spread of Tan Kah Kee's Hokkien influence from Singapore to Hong Kong.

After the Marco Polo Bridge Incident in July 1937, the British allowed Tan to lead Chinese nationalist activities. The idea was to let the Chinese take care of their own battles with the Japanese, as the British power in the Far East dwindled. Although both the GMD and MCP also tried to make use of the war to restore their powers from the British decline, these partisan forces could not compete with Tan for supreme leadership in Singapore Chinese communities.<sup>57</sup> Tan's charisma turned Singapore into a center of Chinese anti-Japanese nationalism in the South Seas. In a year, the Singapore China Relief Fund collected 11,000,000 Chinese national dollars for the Chinese Nationalist Government and helped it sell 10,000,000 national dollars of Chinese national bonds. The government thus appointed Tan to chair a region-wide fund-raising campaign,<sup>58</sup>

- 
- 55 Xianggang chongzheng zonghui [Hong Kong Tsung Tsin association] ed. "*ke shu haiwai ge tuanti zhi zushi yu fazhan* 客屬海外各團體之組織與發展 [Organization and development of overseas Hakka associations]," in *Chongzheng zonghui sanshi zhounian jinian tekan* 崇正總會三十週年紀念特刊 [Thirty years of Tsung Tsin Association] (Hong Kong: Xianggang Chongzheng Zonghui, 1950), 2–3.
- 56 About the Hakka connections in Hong Kong, see Lee Pui-tak, "Xianggang de Fujian shanghui yu Fujian shangren wangluo [Fujian business associations and networks of Fujian merchants in Hong Kong] 香港的福建商會與福建商人網絡," *Jindai Zhongguo de shanghui wangluo ji shehui gongneng* 近代中國的商會網絡及社會功能 [Commercial networks in modern China and their social functions], ed. Lee Pui-tak (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press [year]), 131–146.
- 57 Pang Wing Seng, "The 'Double-Seventh' Incident, 1937: Singapore Chinese Response to the Outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War," in *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* 4, 2 (1973), 269–299; Yong and McKenna, *The Kuomintang Movement in British Malaya, 1912–1949*, 185–186.
- 58 President Chiang Chung-cheng files 蔣中正總統檔 (Chiang files thereafter): 002-060100-00129-003, Shilue gaoben—Min guo er shi qi nian liu yue 事略稿本—民國二十七年六月 [Manuscript of June in the 27th year of the Republic of China] (Taipei: Guoshiguan).

the *Nanyang Hua Qiao Chouzhan Zuguo Nanmin Shangbing Daibiao Dahui* 南洋華僑籌振祖國難民傷兵代表大會 [Campaign of South Seas Chinese for the Motherland's Refugees and Soldiers; NQZH thereafter], launched on October 10, 1938.<sup>59</sup> One hundred and sixty delegates from all major business associations in the South Seas attended the first convention.

The NQZH functioned as more than a charity. Its influence reached wide and far. Beyond its financial support of the GMD, it also became a vehicle to channel the political views among Chinese overseas to the CCP and the third-force party in wartime China (chapter 6).

### Hong Kong Bourgeois Nationalism in the Guangdong-Nanjing Tension, 1929–1937

In Hong Kong, the predominant Cantonese speech-group did not generate a nationalist legend or a consolidated leadership of Chinese nationalism during the long 1930s. The political tensions in the Nanjing decade accounted in part for the decentralization of Chinese bourgeois nationalism in Hong Kong.

The leaders in Guangdong during the Nanjing decade were Li Jishen, Chen Mingshu and Chen Jitang. Some scholars considered them as part of the Hakka clique.<sup>60</sup> But a more straightforward way to look at the common background among these generals were their connections with the First Division of the Guangdong Army, which Chen Jiongming established in 1920 to help Dr. Sun Yat-sen stabilize his power in Guangdong. But Chen and Sun soon found their political goals diverged. In the midst of the conflict between Sun's plan to wage war against Beijing and Chen's goal of building a federalist China by coexisting with northern warlords, on March 22, 1922, the chief Teng Keng was assassinated. In the resulting reorganization of the troops, Li Jishen, a native of Guangxi, rose to power. In the Northern Expedition, Li Jishen led the Fourth Army, reorganized from the First Division of the Guangdong Army, which won

59 Guominzhenfu files, 001-067140-0012: *Nanyang huaqiao juankuan* (4) 南洋華僑捐款(四) [Donations of overseas Chinese from the South Seas, 4]. See also Yang Chien-cheng 楊建誠, ed. *Nanyang huaqiao kangri jiuquo yundong shimo*, 1937–1945 南洋華僑抗日救國運動始末 [The beginning and end of the Chinese anti-Japanese and national salvation movements in the South Seas, 1937 and 1945] (Taipei: Zhonghua xueshu yuan nanyang yanjiusuo, 1983), 91.

60 Lo, *Kejia yanjiu daolun*, 248–276; Leong Sow-Theng, *Migration and Ethnicity in Chinese History*, 88–92. See the discussion on Hakka and modern China in the Introduction.

the reputation of being the “iron army” for its triumphant victories over Wu Peifu’s troops.<sup>61</sup> After the Northern Expedition, some leaders of the Fourth Army joined the CCP’s Red Army, but Li helped Chiang complete his antileftist purge in Canton.<sup>62</sup> By 1928, Li had obtained the titles of the Chairperson of the Guangdong Provincial Government, the Minister of the Military Department of the Guangdong Provincial Government, the Vice-president of the Whampoa Military Academy, and the leader of the Fourth Army of the Chinese Nationalist Army. But Li’s plan to coexist with the Guangxi clique cost him his political career under Chiang: in March 1929, because Li rejected Chiang’s order to annihilate the Guangxi clique, Chiang put him under house arrest at Tangshan, Nanjing.<sup>63</sup>

From Chiang’s arrest of Li in March 1929 to his successful suppression of the revolt of Guangdong and Guanxi in July 1936 marked the period of the Guangdong-Nanjing tension. After the downfall of Li, Hu Hanmin and Wang Jingwei went to Canton and organized the anti-Chiang forces in Guangdong and Guangxi. Public opinion in Hong Kong was sympathetic to Li Jishen. To be sure, the rise of Li Jishen in Guangdong in 1928 smoothed the relationship between Hong Kong and Canton. In March 1928, the governor of Hong Kong, Clementi, went up to Canton to pay a visit to Li. Two months later, in May 1928, Li came to Hong Kong to meet with Clementi.<sup>64</sup> That was the first official exchange of visits since the revolution of 1911. In 1929, various newspapers circulating in Hong Kong printed harsh critiques of Chiang’s decisions to jail Li Jishen and to wage war against the south. These papers included Ching Po

---

61 In the Fourth Army of the Chinese Nationalist Army, prominent leaders under Li’s command included Chen Mingshu of the Tenth Division, Chen Jitang of the Eleventh Division, Zhang Fakui of the Twelfth Division, Ye Ting of the Independent Brigade. See Jiang Jian and Wang Qinghua 姜建、王慶華, *Li Jishen yu Zhongguo Guomindang gemming weiyuanhui* 李濟琛與中國國民黨革命委員會 [Li Jishen and GMD Revolutionary Committee] (Guangdong: Guangdong renmin chubanshe, 2004), 3–15.

62 Between November and December 1927, when the leftists in the Fourth Army, Zhang Fakui and Ye Ting, under the support of Wang Jingwei, allowed the Comintern to stage a riot in Canton, Li Jishen expelled both Ye and Zhang (Zhang was the chief of the Twelfth Division and Ye led the Independent Brigade).

63 Li and Tang, *Li Zongren huiyi lu xia*, 487–491; Guangdong dang an guang, *Chen Jitang yanjiu shiliao*, 30–37.

64 Chan Lau, Kit-ching, *From Nothing to Nothing: the Chinese Communist Movement and Hong Kong, 1921–1936*.

正報,<sup>65</sup> Tim Sun 點心,<sup>66</sup> Tan Hoi Teng 探海燈,<sup>67</sup> *Half-weekly Commentary* 半週評論,<sup>68</sup> Chin Po 真報 as well as Zhengyi Bao 正義報.<sup>69</sup> The Nanjing government claimed that these newspapers were “reactionary” and misleading and should be banned in China markets.<sup>70</sup>

In the aftermath of the Jinan Incident in May 1928, when the CGCCHK was hesitant to render substantial support to the Shandong people, the Shandong Native-Place Association in Hong Kong started to collect funds on their own.<sup>71</sup> Their influence in Hong Kong was limited, however. These Shandong sojourners thus approached Tung Wah Group of Hospitals for help.<sup>72</sup> The Tung Wah directors decided that the time was not right to organize an ad hoc campaign for this event, because “what really happened in Shandong is not quite clear yet.”<sup>73</sup> They went on to say that they would raise funds when “the scale and range of the disaster in Shandong was fully surveyed.”<sup>74</sup> What Tung Wah leaders would do was to help circulate the information and collect donations on behalf of the Shandong Native-Place Association in Hong Kong.<sup>75</sup> Three months later, in mid-August, Shandong representatives arrived in Hong Kong and reported the situation to the Chinese elites. Finally, Tung Wah leaders began to collect funds.<sup>76</sup>

65 HKMS175 (Selected Microfilm Records from the Second Historical Archives of China relating to Hong Kong, 1896–1950)–1–35: *Guomin zhengfu guanyu chajin Xianggang “Zheng bao” de wenjia* 國民政府關於查禁香港「晨報」的文件 [Documents about banning the Chen Bao newspaper in Hong Kong], 07.1929–08.1929.

66 HKMS175-1-29: *Guomin zhengfu guanyu chajin Xianggang “Dianxin xiaobao” de wenjia* 國民政府關於查禁香港「點心報」的文件 [Documents about banning the Dian Xin Bao newspaper in Hong Kong], 07.1929–12.1929.

67 HKMS175-1-32: *Guomin zhengfu guanyu chajin Xianggang “Tanhai deng xiaobao” de wenjia*, 07.1929–08.1929.

68 HKMS175-1-34: *Guomin zhengfu guanyu chajin Xianggang “Banzhou pinglun” de wenjia* 國民政府關於查禁香港「半週評論」的文件 [Documents about banning the Half-weekly Commentary in Hong Kong], 08.1929–09.1929.

69 HKMS175-1-36: *Guomin zhengfu guanyu chajin Xianggang “Zhen bao” ji “Zhengyi bao” de wenjia* 國民政府關於查禁香港「真報」及「正義報」的文件 [Documents about banning the Half-weekly Commentary in Hong Kong], 08.1929.

70 HKMS175-1-34: *Guomin zhengfu guanyu chajin Xianggang “Banzhou pinglun” de wenjia*.

71 WTYP: May 28, 1928.

72 WTYP: May 30, June 1, June 8, 1928; HKMS 163-1-4: Minutes of Meetings of the CGCCHK, June 21, 1928.

73 WTYP: June 2, 1928.

74 WTYP: June 4, 1928.

75 WTYP: July 13, 1928.

76 WTYP: August 18, 1928.

These considerations can be seen first in the CGCCHK's and Tung Wah Group of Hospitals' insistence that the fund-raising be conducted as a charity program rather than as a nationalist campaign. Donations should be wired directly to the Red Swastika Society rather than the Nanjing government (the recipients of the Singaporean Shandong Relief Fund campaign).<sup>77</sup> Second, Chinese bourgeoisie in Hong Kong tried to downplay the political implications (the Sino-Japanese conflict) of the event. Li Yau Tsun reiterated that the Jinan Incident was only one among many Chinese disasters that required charitable support. In his words, "Things have priority. Now the Hainan Island, Haifeng and Lufeng areas in Guangdong were devastated by the communists. Many merchants and people were killed. These tragedies in South China also needed our help."<sup>78</sup> The implication was that relief to Chinese victims in the Sino-Japanese military clashes in Shandong did not take priority over the needs of others. Third, Chinese bourgeoisie in Hong Kong took the initiative to decide how much money would be sufficient and how the donations would be collected. In August 1928, when the Shandong representatives arrived in Hong Kong, they were disappointed in the amount collected (6,000 HKD), given that Hong Kong was a "prosperous port" where "many millionaires gathered."<sup>79</sup> They therefore called on Tung Wah Group of Hospitals to launch a door-to-door fund-raising campaign. The hospital, however, agreed only to coordinate the donations collected spontaneously by individual groups.<sup>80</sup>

Regardless of the deliberate hesitation and careful scrutiny before any action could be taken, the relief fund campaign for the Chinese victims of the Jinan Incident that the Tung Wah Group of Hospitals organized in August 1928 was the first time after the May Fourth Movement that the Hong Kong Chinese business community responded to a Chinese political event positively. And like the Shandong Relief Fund in Singapore, this campaign became the model response that would be followed by the Chinese bourgeoisie in Hong Kong throughout the 1930s.

In the aftermath of the Manchurian Incident in September 1931, Chinese anti-Japanese sentiment in Hong Kong ran high. Newspapers stopped accepting advertisements for Japanese products.<sup>81</sup> The Mid-Autumn Festival held on September 26 resulted in chaotic riots. Disturbances first broke out in Kowloon

---

77 On Hong Kong's 1928 campaign, see *WTYP*: June 4, June 5, June 12, July 6, August 15, 1928; on Singapore, see *NYSF*: July 3, 1928.

78 *WKYP*: August 18, 1928.

79 *WKYP*: August 20, 1928.

80 *WKYP*: August 18, 1928; August 21, 1928.

81 *WKYP*: Sept. 26, 1931.

after 6 p.m., when people stoned the police and looted stores. The riots could not be stopped even after the police opened fire. Disturbances accelerated. In the Tsang Foo Villa 曾富別墅, a Japanese gardener, Yamashita, and his five family members were murdered.<sup>82</sup>

The British responded to the Tsang Foo murders by offering comprehensive protection to the Japanese in Hong Kong and declaring martial law. Wan Chai, the district where Japanese stores were concentrated, was placed under tight security. For two weeks, business in the area was suspended.<sup>83</sup> The British also forwarded to the Japanese Consul in Hong Kong an *ex gratia* payment of 15,000 HKD to surviving members of the Yamashita family,<sup>84</sup> and the Hong Kong governor contacted the Portuguese government in Macao to ensure that, in case of emergency, Japanese people could be sheltered there.<sup>85</sup> At the same time, the British intentionally ignored signs of Japanese military activity. On September 29, 1931, the Japanese gunboat *Saga* was reported to be in Hong Kong waters. This could have been interpreted as an aggressive act toward the British colony.<sup>86</sup> But the British accepted Japan's explanation that the gunboat was there only to obtain provisions and that such visits were not at all unusual.<sup>87</sup>

The Chinese bourgeoisie in Hong Kong however took the initiative to respond to the Shanghai Incident, in which Japanese planes bombed the Hongkou district of Shanghai on January 28, 1932. The support from Hong Kong was under the leadership of Chan Lim Pak, the very same Nan Hoi Cantonese comprador who disappeared from the public eye after the collapse of the Merchant Corps Incident in 1924.<sup>88</sup> His business position was now listed as the manager of the Nanyang Brothers' Tobacco Company.<sup>89</sup> In 1931, he ran for the position of chairperson of Tung Wah Hospital, but lost the election by a small margin. However, one year later, Chan Lim Pak became Tung Wah's

82 WKYP: Sept. 27, 1931; CO 129/536/6: Enclosure 1: Report on Anti-Japanese Disturbances in Hong Kong, September 23 to 28, 1931.

83 WKYP: Oct. 5, 1931.

84 CO 129/539/6: anti-Japanese riots at Hong Kong, 30.

85 CO 129/539/6: anti-Japanese riots at Hong Kong, F 1218/1/10, No. 4: Sir John Simon to Sir Cland Russell in Lisbon.

86 CO 129/536/6: Japanese at Hong Kong.

87 CO 129/539/6: anti-Japanese riots at Hong Kong.

88 His resumption of power and influence became a hot topic for gossip. It was rumored that he won a lottery of thousands of dollars when he disappeared. Chen Qian, *Xianggang jiu shi jian wen lu*, 284–285.

89 HKMS 164-1-29: Registration Book of Individual Members, the Chinese General Chamber of Commerce, Hong Kong, No. 968.

chair.<sup>90</sup> The Tung Wah leaders were thus involved in the 1932 campaign to relieve victims in the Shanghai Incident.

On February 11, 1932, Chan convened the first conference at the Tung Wah board meeting to respond to the tragedy.<sup>91</sup> The campaign hewed to British guidelines, and all charities focused on the relief of the Hong Kong sojourners in Shanghai while suppressing any anti-Japanese activity. Before the Tung Wah leaders initiated the fundraising campaign, the Po On bourgeoisie including Chow Shou Son, Robert H. Kotewall, and Chow Tsun Nin 周竣年 (1893–1971; son of Chow Siu Ki) had sought the British approval about this plan. The British endorsed the hospital's leadership role in organizing a fund-raising campaign, but all activities were to be exclusively charitable.<sup>92</sup> On the first day, the Chinese bourgeoisie collected fifty thousand Hong Kong dollars.<sup>93</sup> In February, Tung Wah officers led the fund-raising campaign by soliciting door-to-door. The response was quite positive. For example, on February 17, 1932, twenty-six thousand dollars in Hong Kong bills was raised.<sup>94</sup> By February 20, 1932, the door-to-door campaign alone had collected two hundred thousand dollars.<sup>95</sup>

Tung Wah's campaign generated wide attention among the Chinese in Hong Kong. The Hong Kong St. John Ambulance dispatched volunteers to Shanghai.<sup>96</sup> Restaurants, the YWCA, Chinese schools, trade agents, banks, department stores, British and German residents in Hong Kong, and even beggars all donated handsomely to the campaign.<sup>97</sup> Rice dealers in the Hong Kong–Canton area even developed a long-term donation plan to assist the Shanghai tragedy via the Bank of East Asia.<sup>98</sup> One month later, the CGCCHK decided to support Tung Wah Group of Hospitals' charitable campaign.<sup>99</sup> Twenty thousand HKD were donated immediately.<sup>100</sup> The Tung Wah campaign coordinated with the Shanghai Guangzhao gongsuo 上海廣肇公所 [Association for

90 In the election in 1931, Ngan Shing Kwan 顏成坤 (Yan Chengqun) got thirteen votes while Chan received twelve. The Tung Wah Group of Hospitals Editorial Board, "the 90 years of history," in *Donghua san yuang fanzhan shi*, 12.

91 WKYP: Feb. 10, 1932.

92 The Tung Wah Group of Hospitals Editorial Board, "relief work report," *Donghua san yuang fanzhan shi*, 28.

93 WKYP: Feb. 11, 1932.

94 WKYP: Feb. 18, 1932.

95 WKYP: Feb. 20, 1932.

96 WKYP: Feb. 12, 1932.

97 WKYP: Feb. 17, 1932; Feb. 18, 1932; Feb. 19, 1932; Feb. 22, 1932.

98 WKYP: March 8, 1932.

99 WKYP: Feb. 20, 1932.

100 HKMS 163-1-6: Minutes of Meetings of the CGCCHK, Feb. 24, 1932.

Guangdong and Zhaoqing], the association for Cantonese sojourners in Shanghai. The total funds that the Tung Wah Group of Hospitals sent to the Shanghai Guangzhao gongsuo reached 41,000 HKD within the year.<sup>101</sup>

The campaign emphasized its philanthropic ideas while avoiding any anti-Japanese rhetoric. The Cantonese networks along the Hong Kong, Canton, and Shanghai corridor channeled the supply of provisions and repatriation of Cantonese sojourners in Shanghai. Some Chinese in Hong Kong, however, questioned the flow of funds. Given that the Hongkou district in Shanghai had a large Japanese population, some wondered whether the funds were also used to support Japanese people who were inadvertent victims of the Shanghai attack. To clarify the issue, Chan Lim Pak announced that the Guangzhao gongsuo in Shanghai did not offer financial support to “people from one particular nation,” meaning Japan.<sup>102</sup> The discrimination against Japan marked a sharp contrast with the Hong Kong Chinese bourgeoisie’s humanitarian ties with the Japanese, as manifested in the relief-fund campaign for victims of the Tokyo Earthquake in September 1923 (chapter 2). With substantial donations, comprehensive relief work, and the handling of the sensitive issue of Sino-Japanese conflict, the relief effort was deemed successful. Certainly the campaign helped the Po On merchant Chan Lim Pak burnish his public image.

The responses from Hong Kong, however, can be better understood as the Cantonese support of Cantonese sojourners in Shanghai, rather than Hong Kong’s endorsement of Nanjing’s official nationalist agenda. First, Hongkou was in the International Concession of Shanghai where Japanese residents and Cantonese sojourners concentrated. When the Macao-originated jurist, Lu Xingyuan 盧興原 (1885–?), who initiated the fund-raising activities in Shanghai reported to Tung Wah about the Japanese bombings in Hongkou, he emphasized that the victims were “more than ten thousand Cantonese.”<sup>103</sup> Tung Wah Group of Hospitals provided shelter and medical care for the victims, and sixteen thousand of them were repatriated back to Guangdong. Shipped to Hong Kong, they were then returned to their native-places with travel allowances offered by the hospital.<sup>104</sup> Chan Lim Pak also used 60,000 HKD

101 The Tung Wah Group of Hospitals Editorial Board, “Relief work report,” *Donghua san yuang fanzhan shi*, 29.

102 To avoid the censorship, the news report referred to the Japanese by “people from one particular nation.” See *WKYP*: March 18, 1932.

103 The Tung Wah Group of Hospitals Editorial Board, “Relief work report,” *Donghua san yuang fanzhan shi*, 28.

104 The Tung Wah Group of Hospitals Editorial Board, “Relief work report,” *Donghua san yuang fanzhan shi*, 29.

of the budget to establish the Craft Workshop for Cantonese Sojourners in Shanghai. The title specified its service to the Cantonese.<sup>105</sup>

Second, comparing the close connections between Chiang Kai-shek's Nanjing government and prominent Chinese bourgeois nationalists in Singapore, one finds the absence of such allegiance from Hong Kong Chinese bourgeoisie like Chan Lim Pak. By running the 1932 Tung Wah fundraising campaign, Chan Lim Pak supported Chen Mingshu and the Nineteenth Route Army. The latter was led by Jiang Guangnai 蔣光鼐 (1888–1967) and Cai Tingkai 蔡廷鍇 (1892–1968). Chen, Jiang, and Cai sided with Chiang Kai-shek by 1932, but their relationship was not precarious. The precursor of Nineteenth Route Army was Chen Mingshu's Tenth Division of Fourth Army of the Chinese National Army in the Northern Expedition, and the Fourth Army's head was Li Jishen, whom Chiang arrested in 1929.<sup>106</sup>

Tension between the Guangdong leaders and Chiang Kai-shek accelerated in 1931. After the downfall of Li Jishen in 1929, Chiang appointed Chen Mingshu as one of the two successors in Guangdong. The other was Chen Jitang. Chen Mingshu was appointed as the chairperson of the Guangdong provincial government, while Chen Jitang was in charge of the army. In February 1931, when Hu Hanmin renounced Chiang's plan to set up a constitution, Chiang put Hu under house arrest. Chen Jitang seized the opportunity to break up with Chiang in Nanjing and to hollow out Chen Mingshu's power in Guangdong. Realizing that Chen Jitang was supplanting his power in Guangdong, Chen Mingshu left to Nanjing in April 1931. Lim Yun Koy 林雲陔 (Lin Yungai; 1881–1948) succeeded the position as the new chairperson of the Guangdong provincial government till the downfall of Chen Jitang in July 1936. In Nanjing, after the Manchuria Incident, Chiang faced criticisms for failing to defend the Japanese aggressions in Manchuria. To win his support from the Guangdong generals, Chiang released both Hu Hanmin and Li Jishen. The Guangdong side did not fully compromise (chapter 6). At this juncture, in October 1931, Chan Lim Pak made a public appearance with Chen Mingshu in Hong Kong.<sup>107</sup>

105 WKYP: Feb. 25, 1932; The Tung Wah Group of Hospitals Editorial Board, "The 90 years' history," *Donghua san yuang fanzhan shi*, 13.

106 The Fourth Army later expanded to the Eleventh Army, but in 1927, many generals did not agree with Chiang's anti-leftist purge and joined the CCP's Red Army. Jiang, Cai and Chen were those stayed with Chiang. Chiang organized the faction under their leadership as the Nineteenth Route Army, and dispatched it to join the antibanditry war against the communists in Jiangxi. Li Zongren and Tang Degang, *Li Zongren huiyi lu xia*, 487–491; Guangdong da an guan, *Chen Jitang yanjiu shiliao*, 30–37.

107 WKYZ: Oct. 6, 1931.

Connection between the 1932 Tung Wah campaign in Hong Kong and Chen Mingshu as well as the Nineteenth Route Army was thus explicit. Chan Lim Pak made use of the transnational operation of the Nanyang Brothers' Tobacco Company to spread the heroic image of the Nineteenth Route Army. The company registered an image of the army in combat as a trademark of its cigarettes in the Straits Settlements (figure 3.3).

Chan Lim Pak remained to be a supporter of the Nineteenth Route Army when it declared the independence of Fujian in November 1933. Chiang Kai-shek's followers discovered that Chan had helped collect 2,000,000 Chinese national dollars each month for the Army's political insurgence.<sup>108</sup> In December 1933, Chiang ordered the mayor and the garrison commander of Shanghai, Wu Tien-cheng 吳鐵城 (1888–1953), to urge the general office of the Nanyang Brothers' Tobacco Company to dismiss Chan immediately.<sup>109</sup> Chiang's resentment to Chan did not affect the latter's popularity in Hong Kong, however. In spring 1934, Chinese factory owners in Hong Kong formed the Chinese Manufacturers' Union, Hong Kong (CMHK).<sup>110</sup> Chan Lim Pak was elected to chair this association.<sup>111</sup>

Chan did not assume the chairpersonship of the CMHK.<sup>112</sup> He was involved in a commercial allegation: Wang Songxian 王頌獻 (1895–?), the largest stockholder of the Nanyang Brothers' Tobacco Company also a CGCCHK member

108 Chiang files: 2080200135007, *Jiang Hanqing dian Jiang Zhongzheng Beiping Mei shiguan xiaoxi Chen Mingshu Li Jisheng qiande Chen Lianbo zizhu meiyue daichou liang baiwang yuan ji Bai Yuheng de mou zai huabei fadong shigu shengyuan de* 江漢清電蔣中正北平美使館消息陳銘樞李濟琛前得陳廉伯資助每月代籌二百萬元及白逾桓等謀在華北發動事故聲援等 [Cable from Jiang Hanqing to Chiang Kai-shek: news from American consulate in Beijing that Chen Mingshu and Li Jishen received funds from Chan Lim Pak 2 million dollars a month and Bai Yuheng and other people are staging a coup in North China], Nov. 24, 1933.

109 Chiang files: 2090300010302, *Jiang Zhongzheng dian Wu Tiencheng xian ling Shanghai Nanyang zong gongsi ji gechu Chen Lianbo foze fengbi zongchang tingzhi gai gongsi zhi yingye* 蔣中正電吳鐵城限令上海南陽總公司即革除陳廉伯否則封閉總廠停止該公司之營業 [Chiang Kai-shek's cable to Wu Tiencheng: order the Shanghai Nanyang General Company to fire Chan Lim Pak immediately or the company would have to cease to operate], Dec. 15, 1933.

110 WKYP: March 11, 1934.

111 CMHK, *Xianggang zhonghua changshang chupin zhinan* 香港中華廠商出品指南 [Directory of Hong Kong Chinese manufactures] (Hong Kong: Chinese Manufacturers' Union, 1936), section ding, 2.

112 CMHK, *Xianggang zhonghua changshang lianhehui xinxia kaimu qingdian tekan* 香港中華廠商聯合會新廈開幕慶典特刊 [Souvenir Issue of the Establishment of the New Building of the Chinese Manufacturer's Union, Hong Kong], July 1964, 29.



FIGURE 3.3 *The Nineteenth Route Army as Trademark of the Nanyang Brothers' Tobacco Company in Spring 1932*

SOURCE: SSGG, 1 APRIL 1932: 576.

from Nan Hoi, sued Chan over the latter's misconduct in the company's businesses.<sup>113</sup> On June 6, 1934, Chan was released from court on bail. He never returned to the court, becoming a fugitive from the police. The CGCCHK cancelled his membership.<sup>114</sup> His whereabouts became mysterious in the following years. Information in Nanjing pointed out that he took part in the investment in an anti-Chiang regime in the Guangdong-Guangxi area.<sup>115</sup> Sporadic reports from Chinese newspapers in Hong Kong provided contradictory information:

113 On Wang, see HKMS 164-1-29: No. 1152.

114 HKMS 163-1-7: Minutes of Meetings of the CGCCHK, May 1, 1935.

115 Chiang files: 2080200442080, *Zhong Jianchu de dian Jiang Zhongzheng xinan yuanlao pai yu shili pai shuang fang yiding dui wu quanhui gongtong zhuzhang you xin Guomindang zai hu huodong fei you Li Xiaosheng fuze choucuo bing zhuangxiang Chen Lianbo shang jie de wen dian ri bao bia* 中檢處等電蔣中正西南元老派與實力派雙方議定對五全會共同主張又新國民黨在滬活動費由李曉生負責籌措並轉向陳廉伯商借等文電日報表 [Central Inspection Department and others cable Chiang Kai-shek about the mutual agreement between the veteran clique and the pragmatic clique about their consensus over Fifth General Meeting. Also, Li Xiaosheng was taking care of the expenses

some said that he went to Vietnam, while others said that he stayed in Shanghai. The story, however, took a surprise turn in July 1937. Wang withdrew the case, telling the court that his misunderstanding with Chan had been resolved. Chan returned to Hong Kong. His attorney, Lo Man Kim, threw a banquet to celebrate his return. The banquet became a gathering of top Chinese bourgeoisie in Hong Kong, including Robert H. Kotewall, Chow Tsun Nin, Li Yau Tsun, and Guo Zan 郭贊. Chan explained his experiences during the past three years: he had stayed in Guangxi and founded two gold-mining companies there.<sup>116</sup> It is worth noting that between 1933 and 1936, leaders of Guangdong and Guangxi were running their provinces as a semi-automatic zone from Nanjing's direct control (chapter 6).

### GMD Mobilization and Chinese Bourgeois Nationalism in Hong Kong, 1937–1941

When the Marco Polo Bridge Incident broke out, Chinese bourgeoisie of both the CGCCHK and Tung Wah Group of Hospitals were collecting funds door-to-door for famine victims in nine provinces in northwestern China.<sup>117</sup> In response to the accelerating Sino-Japanese warfare, in August 1938, Tung Wah leaders made a donation of 10,000 HKD to the Shanghai Guangzhao gongsuo.<sup>118</sup> Various other fund-raising activities were conducted. To mention but a few, on July 30, 1937, Toh Kee-cheung 杜其章 (Di Qizhang; 1891–1942) from a notable Hokkien business family in Hong Kong put on a show on behalf of the Relief Fund Campaign of All Kowloon Associations (*Jiulong shetuan zhanzai hui* 九龍社團賑災會).<sup>119</sup> Toh later worked with the principal of the Shanghai Art School, Wang Jiyuan 王濟遠, to organize fund-raising art fairs in places such as Singapore, Saigon, Phnom Penh, and Battambang for the support of the

---

related to activities of the new GMD in Shanghai and the funds were borrowed from Chan Lim Pak], Oct. 19, 1934.

116 *WKYP*: July 6, 1937; July 8, 1937; July 23, 1937.

117 *WKYP*: July 14, 1937.

118 Tung Wah Group of Hospitals Editorial Board, "The 90 years' history," *Donghua san yuang fanzhan shi*, 20.

119 *WKYP*: July 31, 1937. Toh Kee Cheung was a manager with Tung Wah Hospital in 1935. See Tung Wah Group of Hospitals Editorial Board, "Donghua sanyuan jiushi nian lai lijie zongli fangming 東華三院九十年來歷屆總理芳名 [directory of previous chairpersons of the Tung Wah Group of Hospitals]," in *Donghua san yuang fanzhan shi*, 22. His father, Toh Sze Tuan 杜四端 (1859–1940), was the leader of the Fujian business communities in Hong Kong.

Fifth Route Army (organized by the Guangxi clique).<sup>120</sup> The CMUHK and sixty-two other associations also promised to raise funds for a year.<sup>121</sup> Movie stars, film directors, and other members of the film industry organized a permanent committee to shoot nationalist movies.<sup>122</sup> In August, the popular Cantonese opera star Ma Sze Tsang 馬師曾 departed for the South Seas to raise money for the war effort.<sup>123</sup> The owners and entire staff of the cosmetic company Kwong Seng Hang volunteered to donate one month's wages to support the war.<sup>124</sup> Moreover, news of the Singapore-based tycoons the Aw Boon Haw brothers' 30,000 HKD donation to the Chinese Nationalist Government was highly regarded.<sup>125</sup>

Initiated by the CMUHK, eleven associations in August 1937 collectively requested the CGCCHK and Tung Wah Hospital to work together in all fund-raising endeavors.<sup>126</sup> Leaders of the two associations consulted with the British. The British allowed them to organize a joint campaign for the Chinese nationalist cause, but they demanded that it be run by an ad hoc organization.<sup>127</sup> Tung Wah Hospital, however, refused to work with the CGCCHK. For one thing, the hospital board members questioned the CGCCHK's handling of the funds for the famine victims in northwestern China.<sup>128</sup> For another, hospital leaders, anticipating that the fund-raising campaign for the Sino-Japanese war would be heavily involved in Chinese politics, emphasized that the hospital was an important charitable association and should not be guided by other organizations. The Chinese Advisory Board endorsed the hospital's decision.<sup>129</sup> In the end, the CGCCHK took the lead. Almost all its officers agreed to the plan.<sup>130</sup>

120 Record group number 2(1), file number 10372: *Wang Jiyuan Du Qizhang zai Xingjiapo yi jiu zai mingyi kai meishu zhanlanhui mukuan baoru sinang an* 王濟遠杜其章在新嘉坡以救災名義開美術展覽會募款飽入私囊案 [A case on Wang Jiyuan and Toh Kee Cheung (Du Qichang) for their making profits from organizing art fairs in Singapore under the name of fund relief], 1938. The GMD was not happy with Toh's support of the Guangxi clique. See chapter 6.

121 WKYP: July 31, 1937.

122 WKYP: July 31, 1937.

123 WKYP: August 3, 1937.

124 WKYP: August 1, 1937.

125 WKYP: August 1, 1937.

126 WKYP: August 3, 1937.

127 WKYP: August 5, 1937.

128 HKMS 163-1-10: Minutes of Meetings of the CGCCHK, October 11, 1938.

129 Tung Wah Group of Hospitals Editorial Board, "Relief work," *Donghua san yuang fanzhan sh*, 29–30.

130 HKMS 163-1-12: Minutes of Meetings of the CGCCHK, August 5, 1937.

On September 7, the CGCCHK launched an ad hoc campaign, the 1937 CGCCHK National Salvation Fund-raising Campaign, to support China's military defense against Japan, marking a major break in its former approach to charitable giving in support of victims of individual incidents.<sup>131</sup>

Between August 1937 and 1939, the chairperson of the CGCCHK, Li Sin Ku, directed the campaign.<sup>132</sup> Other CGCCHK officers also participated.<sup>133</sup> Among the officers in the campaign, Tam Woon Tong and Lau Yuk Wan had business connections with pioneering Sze Yap revolutionary Li Yuk Tong's companies.<sup>134</sup> In addition, the Hakka members also held important posts in the campaign: Wong Mao Lin and Hing Yuke Ming were vice-chair and committee member, respectively (table 3-2).

The CGCCHK campaign involved almost all the important native-place associations in Hong Kong. Between September 1937 and May 1938, 580,000 HKD was collected. Together with the funds collected by other native-place associations, 800,000 HKD was raised.<sup>135</sup> For the one-dollar donation movement, in December 1938, the CGCCHK put donation boxes in the offices of all important native-place associations and business guilds. Participants could donate the minimum amount of one dollar between January 1 and 31, 1939.<sup>136</sup> In May 1939, patriotic stage shows were organized to collect funds for victims in South China. All organizations were responsible for collecting one hundred dollars or donating that amount themselves.<sup>137</sup>

131 HKMS 163-1-9: Minutes of Meetings of the CGCCHK, September 7, 1937.

132 Li Sin Ku was a Toi Shan merchant and also a nephew of Li Yuk Tong. The rise of Li Sin Ku in the leadership circle of the CGCCHK marked the success of China-oriented Sze Yap merchants in the 1930s. See S. P. Chung, "Zhengfu dang an chu huazi zhuze gongsi jilu jian jie 政府檔案處華資註冊公司記錄簡介 [An introduction of the files about registered Chinese companies at the Public Record Office]," *South China Research Resource Station Newsletter*, no. 2 January 1996), 9–10.

133 HKMS 163-1-9: Minutes of Meetings of the CGCCHK, September 7, 1937.

134 Tam Woon Tong and Lau Yuk Wan were managers of the Lun Yick Mutual Fire and Marine Insurance Co. Ltd. (1903) (HKRS 122-5-6), China Hon Nin Life Insurance Co. Ltd. (1910) (HKRS 122-5-9), Cannaught Aerated Water Company Ltd. (HKRS 122-5-30), and Lun Tai Finance, Savings and Mortgage Co. Ltd. (1933) (HKRS 122-5-110).

135 CGCCHK, *Xianggang huashang zonghui chouzhanhui yu muji jiuguo gongzhai zhengxinlu* 香港華商總會籌賑會與募集救國公債徵信錄 [Fund-raising campaign of the Hong Kong Chinese General Chamber of Commerce and the public record for collecting national salvation bonds] (Hong Kong: Xianggang huashang zonghui, 1938).

136 HKMS 163-1-10: Minutes of Meetings of the CGCCHK, December 31, 1938.

137 HKMS 163-1-10: Minutes of Meetings of the CGCCHK, April 14, 1939.

TABLE 3.2 *Major Leaders in the 1937 CGCCHK National Salvation Fund-raising Campaign (September 1937–May 1938)*

Organization of the Campaign <sup>1</sup>		Native-Place <sup>2</sup>	Business <sup>2</sup>
Chair	Li Sin Ku 李星衢	Sze Yap (Toi Shan)	Banking and insurance: The Lun Yick Mutual Fire and Marine Insurance Co. Ltd. (1903) The China Hon Nin Life Insurance Co. (1910); the Luen On Fire & Marine Insurance Co. Ltd. (1915)
Vice-Chair	Wong Mao Lam 黃茂林	Tung Kwan (Hakka) <sup>3</sup>	Comprador Luen Fook Hong Ltd. (1934)
Treasurer	Philip Gock Chin 郭泉	Heung Shan	The Wing On Group of companies
Vice-Treasurer	Tung Chung Wai 董仲偉	Heung Shan	Banker
Committee Member	Yung Kung Man 容冠文	Heung Shan	Comprador
	Lui Yam Suen 雷蔭蓀	Sze Yap (Toi Shan)	Estate developer and California trade: the Shing Lee Cheong Co. Ltd. (1916); the Sun Kwong Hop Co. Ltd. (1937; registered under the Companies Ordinance 1911–1915 as an unlimited company)
	Lau Yuk Wan 劉毓芸	Sze Yap (Sun Wui)	Finance, banking, and life insurance: The China Hong Nin Life Insurance Co. Ltd. (1910); the Luen On Fire and Marine Insurance Co. Ltd. (1915)

TABLE 3.2 (cont.)

Organization of the Campaign <sup>1</sup>	Native-Place <sup>2</sup>	Business <sup>2</sup>
Tam Woon Tong 譚煥堂	Sze Yap (Toi Shan)	Insurance, canned food: The China Hong Nin Life Insurance Co. Ltd. (1910); the Lun Yick Mutual Fire and Marine Insurance Co. Ltd. (1911); Cannaught Aerated Water Company Ltd. (1921); Lun Tai Finance, Savings, and Mortgage Co. Ltd. (1933); the Kwong Chua Hotel Co. Ltd. (1940)
Au Chak Sham 區澤森	Sze Yap (Sun Wui)	Subscriber of the Sun Wui Commercial Society of Hong Kong (1935); Vietnamese trade
Chiu Chew Fan 趙超凡	Sze Yap (Sun Wui)	Estate investor; subscriber of the Sun Wui Commercial Society of Hong Kong (1935)
Chow Sing Chi 周星池	Sze Yap (Sun Wui)	Hostel (Cheung Fatt Chan 長發棧旅館)
Hing Yuke Ming 幸玉銘	Heung Shan Hakka) <sup>3</sup>	Wing Fook Company (the sole agent for A. S. Watsons & Co., Ltd., and Asia Exports Co.)
Lau King Tsing 劉景清	Dongguan	Nanyang Shipping Co.; insurance
Doo Jack Man 杜澤文	Heung Shan	The Wing On Group of companies
Chung Kit Hing 鍾傑卿	Sze Yap (Sun Wui)	Subscriber of the Sun Wui Commercial Society of Hong Kong (1935)

Organization of the Campaign <sup>1</sup>	Native-Place <sup>2</sup>	Business <sup>2</sup>
Cheung Lan-chau 張瀾洲	Sze Yap (Sun Wui)	Xinan High School
Lam Pui-sang 林培生	Hoi Shan	Owner of the Cheong Fat Boarding House, Chung Kwok Boarding House, and Chung Yuen Boarding House in Hong Kong. Also owned the Chung Yuen Hotel in Canton.
Liu Xize 劉希澤	N/A	N/A
Wong Kam Ying 黃錦英	Huiyang (Hakka) <sup>3</sup>	Chum Kee (7, Pottinger St.)
Kao Bingguang 高炳光	N/A	N/A
Li Zhigong 李志公	Heung Shan	N/A

*Sources:*

<sup>1</sup> CGCCHK, *Xianggang huashang zonghui chouzhanhui yu muji jiuguo gongzhai zhengxinlu* 香港華商總會籌賑會與募集救國公債徵信錄 [Fundraising campaign of the Hong Kong Chinese General Chamber of Commerce and the public record for collecting national salvation bonds] (Hong Kong: Xianggang huashang zonghui, 1938).

<sup>2</sup> Publicity Bureau for South China ed., *Anglo-Chinese Directory, Hong Kong, 1922* (Hong Kong: The Publicity Bureau for South China, 1922); CGCCHK, *Directory of Hong Kong 1927* (Hong Kong: Chinese General Chamber of Commerce, Hong Kong, 1927); *Nanshi Nanyó* 南支南洋 (April 1939), 19–22; HKRS 121: Registers of Hong Kong Companies Applying for Registration during the Japanese Occupation, 1944–1948 (Hong Kong: Hong Kong Public Record Office); HKRS 122: Files and Papers of Companies Incorporated during the Japanese Occupation, 1943–1944 (Hong Kong: Hong Kong Public Record Office).

<sup>3</sup> The Hakka status is based on their being listed as officers of Xianggang Tsung Tsin Association 香港崇正總會 ed., *Chongzheng zonghui sanshi zhounian jinian tekan* 崇正總會三十週年紀念特刊 [Thirty years of Tsung Tsin Association] (Hong Kong: Xianggang Chongzheng Zonghui, 1950).

Like Tan Kah Kee's NQZH, the CGCCHK campaign was heavily involved in GMD politics. From October 1937 onward, the Ministry of Finance of the Chinese Nationalist Government authorized the CGCCHK fund-raising campaign to promote the sale of national saving bonds.<sup>138</sup> As soon as the proposal was laid on the table, CGCCHK officers immediately purchased 3,000 HKD worth of bonds.<sup>139</sup> In spring 1938, officers of the CGCCHK organized door-to-door fund-raising teams to promote the sale of these bonds.<sup>140</sup> To recognize his contribution in the CGCCHK campaigns, the GMD endorsed Philip Gock Chin as the Hong Kong representative in the Chinese National Assembly scheduled for November 1937.<sup>141</sup> In July 1939, Gock Chin was appointed to chair the CGCCHK. He also led the association's fund-raising activities.<sup>142</sup> He initiated a new task of raising funds for families who suffered in the Japanese bombings in the Battle of Shanghai on August 13, 1937.<sup>143</sup> In February 1940, he accepted Lui Yim Sun's 雷蔭孫 proposal that support would be extended to victims in northern Guangdong as well.<sup>144</sup>

But unlike the Chinese bourgeoisie in Singapore, the CGCCHK could not be compared to Tan Kah Kee and the Singapore Fujian Native-Place Association under Tan's leadership. In addition to its failing to receive support from Tung Wah Hospital, other Chinese people in Hong Kong criticized the CGCCHK officers' door-to-door fund-raising team: the latter solicited donations from the

138 HKMS 163-1-9: Minutes of Meetings of the CGCCHK, October 12, 1937; Lee Yinghui points out that the GMD set up the Overseas Department in 1938 to specialize in the organization of fund-raising movements and the sale of Chinese national bonds in overseas Chinese communities. The participation of the CGCCHK and Singapore bourgeoisie in these movements should thus be viewed within this general framework. Lee Yinghui, *Kanri yu furi: huaqiao, guominzhengfu, Wang zhengquan*, 74–78; 85–92.

139 HKMS 163-1-9: Minutes of Meetings of the CGCCHK, October 12, 1937.

140 HKMS 163-1-10: Minutes of Meetings of the CGCCHK, January 17, 1938; Minutes of Meetings of the CGCCHK, January 11, 1938.

141 Gock became the final representative from Hong Kong through three rounds of election. In the first round, three candidates—including Hu Hongcheng, Philip Gock Chin, and Wong Mao Lim—were selected. In the second round, on July 6, 1937, the nationalist government in Nanjing selected two among the three winning first-round candidates. They were Hu and Gock Chin. In the third round, the Hong Kong Chinese businesspeople voted for Gock Chin. To acknowledge this support, Gock Chin announced promotional sales in his Wing On department store. Because of the Marco Polo Bridge Incident and the following Chinese-Japanese military confrontation, the National Assembly was postponed. It finally opened on November 15, 1946. *WKYP*: July 6, 1937; *WKYP*: July 23, 1937; see also Lee Ying-hui, *Huaqiao zhengce yu haiwai minzushuyi, 1912–1949*, 168–173.

142 HKMS 163-1-11: Minutes of Meetings of the CGCCHK, July 25, 1939.

143 HKMS 163-1-11: Minutes of Meetings of the CGCCHK, October 4, 1939.

144 HKMS 163-1-11: Minutes of Meetings of the CGCCHK, February 23, 1940.

public but not among themselves. This critique was well grounded. An internal discussion within the CGCCHK showed that more than seventy officers failed to purchase one hundred dollars of national bonds as they had promised.<sup>145</sup>

Nonetheless, the CGCCHK's efforts in raising funds for Chongqing, where the Chinese Nationalist Government was based between 1938 and 1945, manifested the success of the GMD overseas mobilization in Hong Kong. After the fall of Amoy in May 1938 and the surrender of Canton in October 1938, the British colony became the sole outlet through which the GMD government in Chongqing could connect with Chinese overseas. At first, the Bank of China in Hong Kong collected overseas purchases of Chinese national bonds by each individual case. For example, bond purchases from Singapore would go through the Overseas Chinese Banking Corporation (OCBC; the leading Hokkien bank in Singapore). It would wire money to its Hong Kong office, which would send the payments to the Bank of China in Hong Kong for the bonds.<sup>146</sup> In Hong Kong alone, between 1938 and 1941, 12 million dollars of Chinese national bonds were sold.<sup>147</sup> In May 1941, the Chongqing government dispatched Wu Hanzhen 吳涵真 as the Hong Kong and Macao representative of the Committee of Wartime National Salvation Bonds of the Chinese National Government. Wu's first task was to help establish the Hong Kong branch of the Committee of Wartime National Salvation Bonds. It was the first campaign to coordinate the purchase of Chinese national bonds in Hong Kong. All committee members were also members of the CGCCHK or CMUHK. The support from Po On bourgeoisie was explicit: the director was Chow Shou Son, and the registered office address was the Bank of East Asia.<sup>148</sup> All these were to consolidate the connection between the GMD and the bourgeois circles in Hong Kong.

On the surface, the GMD was pleased with the mobilization in Hong Kong. In June 1941, the Committee of Wartime National Salvation Bonds of the Chinese National Government declared the CGCCHK's 1937 fund-raising campaign as

145 HKMS 163-1-10: Minutes of Meetings of the CGCCHK, March 15, 1938.

146 HKMS 175-1-113: *Xianggang huaqiao Yinhang Xingzhou zonghang jing shoukuan yi jiao Zhong hang ruzhang qing fa zhaipiao*, 10. 1938 香港華僑銀行星洲總行經收款以交中行入帳請發債票 [Received payments for the purchase of national bonds from the Overseas Chinese Banking Corporation, Limited, Hong Kong, please issue receipts, 10. 1938], 117.

147 HKMS175-1-177: *Zhanshi gongzhai quanmu weiyuanhui zhugang tepai yuan Wu Hanzhen hanbao Xianggang mujuan banfa ji jinzhan qingxing*, April–November, 1941 戰時公債捐募委員會駐港特派員吳涵真函報香港募捐辦法及經手情形 [Report of Hong Kong representative of the Committee of the Wartime National Bonds, Wu Hanzhen, about the fundraising methods and development in Hong Kong, April–November, 1941], 20.

148 HKMS175-1-177: *Zhanshi gongzhai quanmu weiyuanhui zhugang tepai yuan Wu Hanzhen hanbao Xianggang mujuan banfa ji jinzhan qingxing*, April–November, 1941, 69–71.

the most successful of all Chinese merchant fund-raising campaigns.<sup>149</sup> In October 1941, on the eve of the Japanese takeover of Hong Kong, the campaign donated 20,000 Chinese national dollars in tribute to Chiang Kai-shek for his battlefield triumph in northern Hunan.<sup>150</sup>

Problems with the GMD mobilization in Hong Kong lingered, however. In a memo dated on May 23, 1941, Wu states that “the situation here is unique, so there has not yet developed a standard method of fundraising. Moreover, Chow Shou Son was aging and sick. Other managers, perhaps because of their other commitments, could not fully devote to promotion of the sales of the bonds.”<sup>151</sup> As for the CGCCHK, “after several hard and soft negotiations, it just sent a letter mentioning that it will launch a meeting to discuss the details of the campaign tomorrow.”<sup>152</sup> Different from CGCCHK’s understanding about its importance in the movement, Wu considered the Hong Kong Tsong Tsin Association to be the most cooperative business association in Hong Kong.<sup>153</sup> Though he had to deal with the request of Tsong Tsin Association’s Aw Boon Haw about discount rates on the national bonds.<sup>154</sup> Wu’s private memo on July 11, 1941, pointed out that “the CGCCHK had launched the campaign of purchasing national bonds on May 29. 40 days later, none of what the committees had agreed to do, including publicity, propagandas, advertisements on public transportation, etc., was ever accomplished!”<sup>155</sup> In addition, in June, in a private letter to Deng Yiren, the general manager of the Bank of Canton, Wu noted the “lukewarm attitude among the bankers in Hong Kong, which was in contrast to the fervent response of the campaign for soliciting purchases of national bonds in Chongqing. And the phenomenon had aroused the special concern of the leader [i.e., Chiang].”<sup>156</sup>

149 HKMS 163-1-11: Minutes of Meetings of the CGCCHK, June 10, 1941.

150 HKMS 163-1-12: Minutes of Meetings of the CGCCHK, October 8, 1941.

151 HKMS 175-1-177: *Zhanshi gongzhai quanmu weiyuanhui zhugang tepai yuan Wu Hanzhen hanbao Xianggang mujuan banfa ji jinzhan qingxing*, April–November, 1941, 67.

152 HKMS 175-1-177: *Zhanshi gongzhai quanmu weiyuanhui zhugang tepai yuan Wu Hanzhen hanbao Xianggang mujuan banfa ji jinzhan qingxing*, April–November, 1941, 67.

153 HKMS 175-1-177: *Zhanshi gongzhai quanmu weiyuanhui zhugang tepai yuan Wu Hanzhen hanbao Xianggang mujuan banfa ji jinzhan qingxing*, April–November, 1941, 42.

154 HKMS 175-1-177: *Zhanshi gongzhai quanmu weiyuanhui zhugang tepai yuan Wu Hanzhen hanbao Xianggang mujuan banfa ji jinzhan qingxing*, April–November, 1941, 172.

155 HKMS 175-1-177: *Zhanshi gongzhai quanmu weiyuanhui zhugang tepai yuan Wu Hanzhen hanbao Xianggang mujuan banfa ji jinzhan qingxing*, April–November, 1941, 146.

156 Deng Yiren was also the confidential secretary of T. V. Soong. HKMS 175-1-177: *Zhanshi gongzhai quanmu weiyuanhui zhugang tepai yuan Wu Hanzhen hanbao Xianggang mujuan banfa ji jinzhan qingxing*, April–November, 1941, 87.

To be sure, in late July, Wu also recognized the problem of overmobilization from Chongqing, On July 23, Ho Tung sent his assistant to explain to Wu that most of his businesses had failed in recent years, so he could purchase only 40,000 dollars of national bonds.<sup>157</sup> The national goal established in July was to raise ten million dollars of bonds in Hong Kong, however.<sup>158</sup> Therefore, learning that the GMD government was launching another fund-raising activity, the “one-dollar donation for an airplane” campaign, Wu commented that, “when one fundraising campaign is still underway, the other one has already started.”<sup>159</sup>

### Conclusion

In the 1930s, Chinese bourgeoisie in both Hong Kong and Singapore were involved in the political mobilization of the Chiang Kai-shek's GMD government and other provincial-level state-builders such as Li Jishen and Chen Mingshu. This chapter compares the making of Chinese bourgeois nationalists in Hong Kong and Singapore in the 1930s, above all the comparison between the concentration of power in Tan Kah Kee in Singapore and the dual leadership between the Tung Wah Hospital and CGCHK in Hong Kong. It points out the different levels of political involvements between the two colonies' bourgeois communities. As with the overseas bourgeoisie's commitment to the idea of *shi ye jiu guo*, their organization of Chinese nationalist fund-raising campaigns was without anti-imperialist rhetoric. But unlike the earlier style of bourgeois nationalism, organizing a fund-raising campaign required not only spontaneous patriotism and dedication to entrepreneurship, but also transparent political connections in which the donations raised in a British colony could be sent to different levels of state-builders in China. The variant political connections among Chinese bourgeoisie in Hong Kong and Singapore, with the support of Chiang's GMD as one option, manifested the multifarious political space beyond the control of the central government. These activities also transcended the concern over the territorially bounded nation-state of China and created a transnational zone of the Chinese overseas.

157 HKMS 175-1-177: Zhanshi gongzhai quanmu weiyuanhui zhugang tepai yuan Wu Hanzhen hanbao Xianggang mujuan banfa ji jinzhan qingxing, April–November, 1941, 173.

158 HKMS 175-1-177: Zhanshi gongzhai quanmu weiyuanhui zhugang tepai yuan Wu Hanzhen hanbao Xianggang mujuan banfa ji jinzhan qingxing, April–November, 1941, 121.

159 HKMS 175-1-177: Zhanshi gongzhai quanmu weiyuanhui zhugang tepai yuan Wu Hanzhen hanbao Xianggang mujuan banfa ji jinzhan qingxing, April–November, 1941, 147.

## Rescuing Businesses through Transnationalism

Previously we have ordered tea stocks from Taiwan. Now these inferior stocks [*sic*] are gone, but we decided not to abandon our previous trademark as it has been used for years. We will keep the same Thye Chuan Yellow bottle-gourd trademark, but the content will be replaced by tea imported from our Amoy head office. These tea stocks were all collected from [China's] Wuyi Mountains . . .

—LIM HO THYE TEA CHOP 林和泰茶莊 (Lin Hetai cha zhuang)<sup>1</sup>



In July 1928, around the time when Tan Kah Kee's Shandong Relief Fund stirred up anti-Japanese feelings among the Chinese, the Lim Ho Thye Tea Chop posted the above announcement. Its owner, Lim Pun Tao 林本道, later organized the Singapore Tea Merchants Association and became its first chairperson.<sup>2</sup> It aimed to promote the trade of Chinese tea and boycott any tea imported from Japanese Taiwan or by Taiwanese.<sup>3</sup> In the previous chapter, we learned that with the Jinan Incident, in May 1928, as the watershed, leading Chinese bourgeoisie in Singapore identified Japan as their enemy. The exclusion of Taiwanese interests, based on different colonial backgrounds rather than on shared speech-group ties, challenged Japan's agenda of southward advance. In Hong Kong, though the Chinese bourgeoisie did not support the wave of anti-Japanese boycotts after 1928, leading business associations began to collect funds to relieve Chinese war victims and refugees from the Japanese aggressions. Why did the leading Chinese bourgeoisie in Hong Kong and Singapore, who were lukewarm in responding to the anti-Japanese calls of the May Fourth Movement and confronted the Chinese anti-British imperialist movements in the 1910s and 1920s, choose to take an active role in the anti-Japanese movements after 1928 and throughout the 1930s? Why did Tan Kah Kee and his circles form the charismatic leadership of Chinese bourgeois

1 NYSP: July 28, 1928.

2 Chen Kezhan 陳克振 ed., *Anxi huaqiao zhi* 安溪華僑志 [Gazetteer of overseas Chinese from Anxi, Fujian] (Xiamen: Amoy University Press), 242.

3 NYSP: 26 June, 28 July, 27 Sept., and 5 Oct., 1928.

nationalism in Singapore, while the movements in Hong Kong lacked such a consistent leadership?

This chapter reveals the bourgeoisie's changing positions in relation to the impact of the Great Depression of the 1930s. The timing of Chinese bourgeois involvement in nationalist movements in both Hong Kong and Singapore, as well as their making Japan the primary target, can be explained by the accelerating business competition between British-associated and Japanese-related interests. The concentration of leadership in Tan Kah Kee and his Hokkien and Teochew circle in Singapore vis-à-vis the shift from the sole leadership of the Po On bourgeoisie to the coleadership between the Po On elite and other rising Heung Sham and Sze Yap merchants in Hong Kong after the 1930s reflected the different political dispositions among the business networks. In Singapore, the leading Hokkien and Teochew business sectors in which the bourgeoisie engaged—including rubber plantations, rubber-soled shoe manufacturing, and import-export trade of British goods—inevitably declined after the 1930s because of the global economic downturn as well as Japanese competition. In Hong Kong, the Po On bourgeoisie had to share power with the rising middle-ranked merchants. This was because of the decline of Euro-Asian trade, which devastated the compradors' business, as well as the growth of middle-ranked merchants investing in China.

### **Challenges to British-associated Interests in Singapore**

Businesses of the Chinese bourgeois nationalists in Singapore in the 1930s can be classified into two groups: first, the manufacturers and import-export traders whose interests were tied to the British regulatory powers in the global economy, and second, bourgeoisie whose merchandise faced direct competition with similar products shipped from Japan. Bourgeoisie in the first category were represented by the rubber manufacturers, most of them Hokkien. Bourgeoisie in the second category included import-export traders of British piece goods, mostly Teochew, as well as merchants of Chinese tea, most of them Hokkien.

### **The Chinese Rubber Manufacturing Sector**

The Chinese rubber manufacturers rose to dominate Chinese business communities around the time of the revenue-farming system's demise. After the rubber plantation was introduced in Singapore, in the early 1900s, many

Chinese entrepreneurs soon invested in the industry. In March 1910, at a meeting of the SCCC, Lim Boon Keng recommended that the association found a rubber plantation enterprise, exclusively open to SCCC members as stockholders.<sup>4</sup> Though the SCCC leaders could not reach this goal of establishing a joint-stock rubber company, among the representatives who investigated the plan's feasibility, some soon profited from the nascent industry. These included Lim Nee Soon, Tan Kah Kee, and Teo Eng Hock. In 1930, when the trade suffered, the SCCC also organized the Singapore Rubber Planters Association to assist its rubber investors in handling their businesses.<sup>5</sup>

Overall, rubber plantations multiplied in the years after 1910. Up until 1921, approximately 92 percent of total rubber production in the world came from Asia, of which about one-third was from Chinese estates in the Malay Peninsula.<sup>6</sup> On the eve of the 1930s, as much as 40 percent of the world's rubber was exported from Singapore, including one-third produced in the Malay Peninsula and another 10 percent of transshipped rubber.<sup>7</sup> Between the Western and Chinese rubber planters, although Western rubber enterprises tended to hold larger estates, smaller Chinese rubber farms were more productive. In 1929, annual average yields were 424 lbs. per acre for Western estates and 480 lbs. for smallholdings. In 1934, the former was 383 lbs. while the latter was 530 lbs.<sup>8</sup> Rajeswary Brown argues that the efficiency of the Chinese smallholdings rested on "the density of planting and tapping . . . cheap labor, [and] a flexible response to the market and low overhead costs."<sup>9</sup>

Chinese investors diversified their rubber businesses in planting, manufacturing, and export. Different from the Western rubber companies that focused on the international rubber trade, such as shipping rubber from Singapore to European and U.S. markets, the Chinese rubber capitalists dominated the local rubber trade. This included sheer export of raw materials, local and export-oriented manufactures, and rubber milling. The rise of the Chinese rubber

---

4 NA 007, the Singapore Chinese Chamber of Commerce, minutes of the executive committees (NA 007 thereafter), March 22, 1910 (Singapore: National Archives), 16. In the meeting, Lim Boon Keng also proposed that the Hokkien people of the SCCC organize a mining company in Fujian.

5 NA 007: February 22, 1930 and March 22, 1930.

6 John A. Fowler, *Netherlands East Indies and British Malaya: A Commercial and Industrial Handbook* (Washington D.C.: United States of America, Department of Commerce, 1923), 100–101.

7 W. G. Huff, *The Economic Growth of Singapore: Trade and Development in the Twentieth Century* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 75.

8 Rajeswary Ampalavanar Brown, *Capital and Entrepreneurship in South-East Asia* (New York and London: St. Martin Press, 1994), 103.

9 R. A. Brown, *Capital and Entrepreneurship in South-East Asia*, 103.

industry also led to the growth of the pineapple industry. Pineapples were planted as a cash crop between rubber saplings while waiting for these to mature.<sup>10</sup> Rubber milling horizontally integrated the import of raw rubber from the Dutch East Indies and export of processed rubber to London and New York. Prior to the 1930s, rubber millers in Singapore processed almost all the rubber from smallholders in the Dutch East Indies. Rubber plantations in the Dutch East Indies thus contributed to the growth of rubber millers in Singapore, and the Chinese ran most of them. Though the Dutch colonial regime tried to catch up with the milling technology and develop a direct rubber trade with London and New York, in the late 1930s, about one-fifth of its wet rubber was still processed in Singapore.<sup>11</sup>

The Chinese nationalist leader from Singapore, Tan Kah Kee, started his business in 1905, running a rubber plantation. He established the Tan Kah Kee & Co. in 1919, which included rice mills, rubber plantations, rubber mills, rubber manufacturing, shipping, brickworks, and a biscuit factory, among other traders. Products of the Tan Kah Kee & Co. penetrated markets in Straits Settlements and in Federated Malay States, Unfederated Malay States, Dutch East Indies, Siam, French Indo-China, India, Ceylon, Burma, and China.<sup>12</sup> His rubber-soled shoes with their bell trademark were popular throughout the region (figure 4.1). It was estimated that in 1927 and 1928, 36,000,000 pairs of these rubber-soled shoes were exported to China.<sup>13</sup> At the same time, Tan Kah Kee & Co. was also known for the plantation of pineapples and production of canned pineapple and other packed fruits. Pineapple thus became another image in the trademark (figure 4.2).

The other Chinese nationalist leader and rubber tycoon was Teo Eng Hock. As one of the four SCCC representatives of the Chinese rubber business, Teo became a founding member of the Asiatic Rubber Planters' Association of Malaya, in March 1925.<sup>14</sup> His People's Rubber Goods Manufactory was ranked only second to the Tan Kah Kee & Co.<sup>15</sup> Teo's company achieved important technological innovations. In 1922, he obtained a patent on a rubber vaccination shield. According to a photo of the product, it seems to be a rubber shield

10 R. A. Brown, *Capital and Entrepreneurship in South-East Asia*, 100–105; Huff, *The Economic Growth of Singapore: Trade and Development in the Twentieth Century*, 206.

11 Huff, *The Economic Growth of Singapore*, 205–207.

12 *NKZ* 27, 8 (August 1941): 13–18.

13 *NKZ* 17, 5 (May 1931): 47–52.

14 The other three representatives were See Tiong Wah, Shi Huanzhang 石煥章, and Lee Kong Chian. Lee Kong Chian worked for the Tan Kah Kee & Co. and became Tan's son-in-law in 1920. NA 007: 15th Members Meetings, no. 4, April 22, 1925.

15 *NKZ* 19, 3 (March 1933): 9–17.



FIGURE 4.1 *Bell Trademark of the Tan Kah Kee & Co.\**  
*\*The Chinese character inside the trademark is zhong 中, which can be understood as an initial for Zhongguo (China).*  
 SOURCE: SSGG, NOV. 18, 1927, 2150.



FIGURE 4.2 *Pineapple Trademark of the Tan Kah Kee & Co.*  
 SOURCE: SSGG: NOV. 9, 1928, 1842.

especially designed to protect skin after vaccination (figure 4.3). Two years later, Tan was granted sixteen years of exclusive rights to his improved methods of manufacturing rubber tires and rubber-soled shoes.<sup>16</sup>

The two rubber tycoons—Tan a China-born Hokkien and Teo a Straits-born Teochew—were connected by marital ties. In 1923, Tan's daughter married Lim Chong Kuo, son of the Singapore “pineapple king,” Lim Nee Soon. These

16 SSGG 1924, 549, 793.




FIGURE 4.3 *Teo Eng Hock's Patent on a Rubber Vaccination Shield*  
SOURCE: SSGG 1922, 60.

three nationalist leaders and rubber tycoons thus belonged to the same family networks.<sup>17</sup>

With four wives and at least eighteen children, Tan's social networks through marriage bonds covered the topmost business and social elites of Singapore. In addition to his connection with Lim Nee Soon and Teo Eng Hock's family, in 1920, he arranged for his daughter Tan Ai Lay to marry a staff member of Tan Kah Kee & Co., Lee Kong Chian (1893–1967). Lee later founded the Lee Rubber Company (1927) and Lee Pineapple Company (1930) and became an important banker in the OCBC.<sup>18</sup> Another daughter married Chew Pek Leong,

17 About the family connections among Lim Nee Soon, Teo Eng Hock and Tan Kah Kee, see Song Ong Siang, *One Hundred Years' History of the Chinese in Singapore*, 34, 516–7; Yong Ch'ing-fatt, *Tan Kah Kee*, 111–112; Leung Yuen Sang 梁元生, "Chao xing, chao luo: zao qi Xinjiapo Huaren shehui zhongliang ge chao ren jiazuzhi lishi kaocha 潮興、潮落：早期新嘉坡華人社會中兩個潮人家族之歷史考察 [the rise and fall of the Teochews: historical surveys on two Chinese families in Singapore's early days]," in Zheng Liangshu ed., *Chaozhou xue guoji yantao hui lunwen ji xia ce* 潮州學國際研討會論文集下冊 [Proceedings of the International Conference of the Teochew Study, Vol. 2-2], ed. Zheng Liangshu 鄭良樹 (Guangzhou: Jinan daxue chubanshe, 1994), 822–840.

18 In the 1930s, Lee Kong Chian's Lee Rubber Shoe Manufacturing rose to become the top rubber manufacturer. It even set up a sales office in New York in the late 1930s to break

a son of a member of the SCCC Rubber Association, Chew Hean Swee.<sup>19</sup> One of Tan's sons married a daughter of the banker Yap Gok Twee.<sup>20</sup>

Tan's business networks thus linked up with important leaders in the Hokkien and Teochew Chinese banking sector. Lim Nee Soon was a vice-chairperson of the Chinese Commercial Bank. Lee Kong Chian served on its board of directors and later as vice-chairperson; he was also the second chairperson of the Overseas Chinese Bank. After these banks were amalgamated in the OCBC (1932), Lee was a key person in this organization as well. Yap Gok Twee became the first managing director of the largest Chinese bank outside China.<sup>21</sup> The significance of the OCBC can be found in the following comparison: in 1936, the OCBC had 40,000,000 shares of capital, while the Lee Wah Bank had 10,000,000 shares and the Szi Hai Tong Bank 2,000,000 shares.<sup>22</sup>

These connections were valuable to business. According to Lee Seng Gee 李成義, a son of Lee Kong Chian and Tan Ai Lay, his father established the Lee Rubber Company through the assistance of Lim Nee Soon. "He [Lim Nee Soon] owed them [the bankers] money and he could not pay back the loans, so the bank basically controlled the factory. But Mr. Lim Nee Soon was able to lease it out to my father."<sup>23</sup> As a leading banker in Singapore Chinese communities, Lee Kong Chian also maintained close economic ties with the British Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank. The latter became the largest creditor of Tan Kah Kee & Co. in the 1930s. In January 1931, when Tan's company registered losses of \$1.57 million, the Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank funneled huge loans to rescue the company from liquidation.<sup>24</sup> In 1933, the bank forced the company to reorganize as a limited company with \$2.5 million equity, of which \$1.5 million was fully paid up. Other loans included the amount of \$2.3 million from

---

the dominance of Western dealers in the export of rubber from Singapore to London and New York markets. Huff, *The Economic Growth of Singapore*, 206.

19 About Chew Hean Swee's engagement in the rubber association, see NA 007: February 22, 1930, 73–74.

20 Yong Ch'ing-fatt, *Tan Kah Kee*, 2.

21 Kikaku-in chōsa-bu 企画院調査部 ed., *Kakyō kenkyū shiryō* 華僑研究資料 [Research materials on Chinese Sojourners] (Tokyo: Kaikuin chōsa-bō, 1939), 51–52.

22 "Bank report of the OCBC," "Bank report of the Lee Wah Bank," "Bank report of the Szi Hai Tong Bank," in *SSGG*: June 1936.

23 OHC Synopsis Report, No. 40: Interview of Lee Seng Gee, Reel 1, 14.

24 Rajeswary A. Brown indicates that the involvement of Chinese anti-Japanese activities accounted for Tan's isolation from the Chinese community at large. In particular, the political commitment jeopardized his economic ties with other local Chinese companies and trade networks when various Chinese rubber producers were competing for the same financial source. R. A. Brown, *Capital and Entrepreneurship in South-East Asia*, 108–110.

Chinese banks. But the balance sheet for the company still showed a loss of \$3.1 million up to the middle of the year.<sup>25</sup>

After the liquidation of the Tan Kah Ke & Co. in 1934, Tan's family networks secured Tan to remain on top of the Chinese communal leadership. Lim Nee Soon chaired the sccc from 1931 to 1936, and Lee Kong Chian assumed the chairmanship of the sccc in the late 1930s (chapter 1). The marriages boosted the status of the whole family and cemented the connections among the most glittering layer of Chinese business elites. In the words of Lee Seng Gee, it was "very common . . . I suppose my grandfather must have been quite impressed with my father's work and his general knowledge. It would be quite natural for him then to arrange the marriage."<sup>26</sup>

The network centered on Tan and Teo's family-business ties, or the Singapore Hokkien network, was embedded in the rubber trade and global finance. The rise and fall of the capitalist market thus crucially affected the economic prospectus of the network. To accommodate their interests against the fluctuation of the global market, the Chinese rubber tycoons would have to maintain their connections with the British. For one thing, connection with the British banking system was crucial. Rajeswary A. Brown estimates that the clientele of the British Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank in Singapore rose from 40 percent Chinese in the 1920s to 60 percent in the 1930s.<sup>27</sup> For another, the rubber investors would expect British governmental intervention to regulate rubber prices. A decade after the rubber boom, in the 1920s, overproduction of rubber triggered a decline in price. To stabilize it, the British enacted the Stevenson Scheme in 1922 to control the supply of raw rubber from British Malaya and Ceylon.<sup>28</sup> The scheme, however, could not regulate the dumping of rubber from the Dutch East Indies. Therefore, in November 1928, the British abandoned the Stevenson Scheme and the global rubber market collapsed. Many rubber investors declared bankruptcy. Concomitantly, the labor market in British Malaya was in trouble, given that the rubber industry absorbed one-third of the working population. A series of immigration restriction ordinances were enacted to prohibit adult male Chinese immigrants from Singapore.<sup>29</sup>

25 R. A. Brown, *Capital and Entrepreneurship in South-East Asia*, 107; Huff, *The Economic Growth of Singapore*, 221.

26 OHC Synopsis Report, No. 40: Interview of Lee Seng Gee, Reel 1, 7.

27 R. A. Brown, *Capital and Entrepreneurship in South-East Asia*, 158.

28 Ian Brown, *Economic Change in South-East Asia, c. 1830–1980* (Kuala Lumpur and New York: Oxford University Press, [1997] 1999), 48–49.

29 The immigration restriction ordinances imposed quotas on adult Chinese males but not on Indians. Discrimination against Chinese immigrants became an explicit practice when

In response to the collapsing rubber markets, the SCCC organized Chinese rubber planters and traders to request that the British take action. In particular, they asked the British government to work on new international rubber regulations to check the unlimited production in the Dutch East Indies. These Malaya Chinese rubber entrepreneurs also proposed cooperation with the London Rubber Planters Association to constrain Malaya rubber output through measures such as ceasing harvest for a month.<sup>30</sup> A fundamental solution to the rubber crisis, however, did not take effect until the enactment of the International Rubber Regulation Agreement (IRRA), in June 1934. The agreement set limits on new planting and replanting in existing farmed areas. Most important, this new regulation covered 98.7 percent of world rubber exports, including the Dutch East Indies. The global rubber market was finally stabilized.<sup>31</sup>

For many Singapore Chinese elites, the IRRA came too late. Many Chinese enterprises associated with the rubber industry had been heavily damaged between 1928 and 1934. This was reflected in the financial crises that befell three Singapore Hokkien banks: the Chinese Commercial Bank (1912), the Ho Hong Bank (1917), and the Overseas Chinese Bank (1919). The crisis was later relieved by the intervention of Lim Peng Siang 林秉祥 (1872–1948), a China-born Hokkien and the founder of the Ho Hong Bank and the Ho Hong conglomerate. He led a successful merger of the three banks and established the OCBC in 1932.<sup>32</sup> However, his Ho Hong conglomerate was never again as prosperous as it had been before the Great Depression. In 1934, he had to liquidate his Ho Hong Cement Factory, which was recorded as “the greatest loss in [Singapore] Chinese manufacturers.”<sup>33</sup> And the surrender of the Ho Hong Steamship Company to the Straits Steamship Company (founded mostly

---

the Alien Ordinance came into force in 1933. Primary targets were Chinese immigrants, while the Indians were considered British subjects. Constance Mary Turnbull, *A History of Modern Singapore, 1819–1988*, 146.

30 NA 007: February 22, 1930 and March 22, 1930.

31 I. Brown, *Economic Change in South-East Asia, c. 1830–1980*, 50.

32 Lim Peng Siang was born in China and later joined his father and took over his company in Singapore. With his father's support, Lim Peng Siang was able to both receive a good Chinese education in China and attend the British St. Joseph Institution in Singapore. His bilingual skills in English and Chinese prepared him to become an important Chinese leader in Singapore. See Song Ong Siang, *One Hundred Years of the Chinese in Singapore*, 113–116, 331, 353, 389, 507, 509; Yong Ch'ing-fatt, “Leadership and Power in the Chinese Community of Singapore during the 1930s,” *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* (Sept. 1977), 103–116.

33 *NYSF*: Jan. 25, 1934.

by British capital) left no Chinese-owned steamers navigating between Singapore and China.<sup>34</sup>

The Great Depression of the 1930s also hit Tan Kah Kee & Co., along with other Chinese rubber manufactures in Singapore. Two factors devastated the business: first, the decline of the low-end market in rubber-soled shoes, and second, the expansion of Japanese rubber products. The latter became promising after 1927, when the Singapore Improvement Trust enacted an ordinance to prohibit people from walking barefoot in urban streets. Wearing shoes became mandatory. A pair of rubber-soled shoes became an appealing choice for those who had not had shoes before.<sup>35</sup> Had all people followed the ordinance, the market might have expanded another 40 percent.<sup>36</sup>

Most of those who needed their first pair of shoes were new immigrants. Prior to the Great Depression, the continuing influx of Chinese and Indian immigrants to Singapore propelled population growth in the colony. Census data shows that during the period between 1911 and 1931, less than half of the Chinese population in Singapore was born in British Malaya and less than one-fifth of Indians were locally born. The Chinese and Indian population constituted 80 percent of the population of Singapore, and immigrants were predominantly from their home countries (table 4.1).

---

34 According to Tan Keong Hee 陳恭喜—an employee of Lim Peng Siang's Ho Hong conglomerate in the 1930s—Lim Ping Siang did not sell his shipping company to the Straits Steamship Company. The only change in the 1930s of the Ho Hong Steamship Company was its cooperation with the Western company. The latter did not intervene in the management of the Ho Hong Steamship Company because "our steamers navigated in the places where Chinese resided in, the westerners had no idea about how these Chinese settlements were like. The westerners had to rely on Chinese to manage the business. They could not intervene into what we were doing." OHS Synopsis Report, No. 735: Interview of Tan Keong Hee, Reel 4, 40–41.

35 The Singapore Improvement Trust was an organization set up in 1925 and reconstituted in 1927. The main object of the trust was to improve the hygiene and living standards of Singapore. Reference File 57: Singapore Improvement Trust (Singapore: National Archives of Singapore).

36 A survey conducted in the late 1920s suggested that 40 percent of the population in British Malaya did not have the habit of wearing shoes. Compared to easily broken cloth shoes or expensive rubber-soled shoes, inexpensive, mass-produced rubber-soled shoes became ordinary people's first pair of footwear. *NKZ* 17, 5 (May 1931): 47–52.

TABLE 4.1 *Singapore Population, 1911, 1921, 1931, and 1947, by Ethnic Group and Birthplace*

	Chinese Population in Singapore		Indian Population in Singapore		Total Population
	Chinese born in Malaya Peninsula	Chinese born elsewhere	Indian born in Malaya Peninsula	Indian born elsewhere	
1911 <sup>1</sup>	42,883 (20%)*	178,772 (80%)	4,564 (16%)	23,426 (84%)	
		221,655 [71%]**		27,990 [9%]	312,524
1921 <sup>1</sup>	79,686 (25%)	237,805 (75%)	5,535 (17%)	26,921 (83%)	
		317,491 [75%]		32,456 [8%]	425,891
1931 <sup>2</sup>	150,033 (35.6%)	271,408 (64.4%)	9,041 (17.7%)	42,038 (82.3%)	
		421,441 [74%]		51,079 [9%]	566,631
1947 <sup>2</sup>	437,243 (59.9%)	292,712 (40.1%)	25,018 (36.3%)	43,902 (63.7%)	
	729,955 [78%]		68,920 [7%]		941,237

\* Percentages in parentheses ( ) indicate the percentage of the total ethnic group.

\*\* Percentages in brackets [ ] indicate the percentage of total population in Singapore.

Sources:

<sup>1</sup> Data on 1911 and 1921: J. E. Nathan, *The Census of British Malaya 1921* (Printed by London, Dunstable and Watford: Waterlow & Sons Limited, 1922), 94–97.

<sup>2</sup> Data on 1931 and 1947: M. V. Del Tufo, *A Report of the 1947 Census of Population, Malaya: Comprising the Federation of Malaya and the Colony of Singapore* (Printed by the authority of London, 1947), 84–85.

But the potential customer base stopped growing after 1930, when immigration was restricted. In August 1930, a proclamation was enacted to limit the migration of adult male labor from China to Malaya. The quota was set at approximately one-third of the previous rate (based on the amount in the previous three months, i.e., 6,016 persons).<sup>37</sup> In December of that year, the

37 J. I. Miller, *Malaya Administration Report: Department of Statistics, Straits Settlements and Federated Malay States, for the year 1930* (Singapore: Authority in Singapore, 1931), 26–27.

Immigration Restriction Enactment of 1930 went into effect. It attempted to check the flow of immigrants from China. Together with the discouragement of Indian immigrants because of the economic downturn, it has been estimated that between 1931 and 1934, Malaya's population shrank by 400,000.<sup>38</sup> The decreasing population of new immigrants led to more aggressive competition in the low-end shoe market.

The market also witnessed competition in rubber-soled shoes among imports from Japan, Hong Kong, and China, as well as those produced by local Singapore Chinese manufacturers.<sup>39</sup> Japanese-made shoes constituted 34.5 percent of total shoes imported to the Singapore market in 1927 and 82.2 percent in 1931 before declining slightly to 78.7 percent in 1934. That is to say, after 1929, more than half of the rubber-soled shoes imported in Singapore came from Japan (table 4.2).

TABLE 4.2 *Imports of Rubber-soled Canvas Shoes and Other Rubber-made Shoes to British Malaya by Countries of Origin*

	Japan	Hong Kong	China	America	Great Britain	Others
1927	34.5%	18.7%	12.5%	22.5%	7.5%	4.2%
1928	46.1%	18.7%	9.0%	15.5%	3.9%	6.7%
1929	53.4%	19.5%	1.1%	19.4%	3.2%	3.3%
1930	81.3%	13.5%	1.5%	1.3%	0.6%	1.7%
1931	82.2%	7.7%	5.0%	1.3%	0.5%	3.3%
1932	60.3%	24.6%	7.3%	—	0.3%	7.6%
1933	77.6%	—	—	—	—	—
1934	78.7%	—	—	—	—	—

*Source:*

- Compiled from: 1. 1928–1930: *NKZ* 18, 3 (March 1932): 11–12;  
 2. 1929–1931, Japan and total: *NKZ* 19, 3 (March 1933): 13;  
 3. 1930–1933, all nations: *NKZ* 20, 4 (April 1934): 38–39;  
 4. *NKZ* 22, 4 (April 1936): 24–25.

38 M. V. Del Tufo. 1947. *A Report of the 1947 Census of Population in Malaya: Comprising the Federation of Malaya and the Colony of Singapore* (Printed by the authority in London, 1949), 33.

39 *NKZ* 18, 3 (March 1932): 24; 20, 4 (April, 1934): 44–45; 20, 4 (April, 1934): 37–47.

TABLE 4.3 *Estimation of Retail Prices of Rubber-soled Canvas Shoes by Production Areas, 1931*

Unit: Straits Dollars

Singapore			Japan***	Hong Kong and South China****
Tan Kah Kee & Co.*	People's Rubber Shoes Manufactory	Nanyang Manufacturing Co.**		
\$ 0.75–1.15	\$ 0.40–0.90	\$ 0.80 and above	\$ 0.55–0.70	\$ 0.38–0.40

\* Based on the prices of the trademarks “Bell” and “Three Stars.”

\*\* Based on the prices of the trademark “Elephant.”

\*\*\* Based on the prices of the trademarks “Washington,” “Moon &amp; Star,” “3 Heroes,” and “B. B. B.”

\*\*\*\* Based on the prices of the trademarks “Knife” and “Kwong Tong.”

*Source:* NKZ 17, 5 (May 1931): 48–50.

These Japanese rubber-soled shoes not only were popular in Singapore; they also were re-exported to hinterland Malaya, Siam, Sumatra, and Java.<sup>40</sup> No statistics are available to compare Japanese imports with these domestically produced Chinese rubber shoes, but in the 1930s, Japan clearly dominated the market. The Singapore office of the Japanese intelligence organ Nanyō Kyōkai surveyed retail prices for rubber-soled canvas shoes of different makes, allowing us to gauge the competitive niche of the Japanese product (table 4.3).

Japanese products benefited from low prices due to the depreciation of the Japanese yen in the 1930s. The exchange rate between Straits dollars and Japanese yen at the end of May 1932 was 1:1.3175. From August to September 1932, the rate reached 1:1.70. In other words, during the five months between May and September 1932, the exchange value of the yen declined by 22.5 percent.<sup>41</sup> Singapore Chinese shoe manufacturers could not cut their prices sufficiently to compete with Japanese products. Although the report also indicates that rubber-soled shoes made in China and Hong Kong were cheaper, the conventional perspective was that products from mainland China and Hong Kong were less durable than the higher-priced Japanese shoes.<sup>42</sup> Failing to respond

40 NKZ 17, 5 (May 1931): 47–52; 18, 3 (March, 1932): 8–33; 19, 3 (March 1933): 12–13; and 20, 4 (April 1934): 37–47.

41 CO 273 (Original Correspondence between the British Colonial Office (CO) and the Foreign Office Relating to the Straits Settlements and the Federated Malay States, 1919–1940)/583/92110, Memorandum of Oct. 20, 1932, 4.

42 NKZ 20, 4 (April, 1934): 37–47.

to Japanese competition, Teo Eng Hock's People's Rubber Goods Manufactory was finished by late 1933.<sup>43</sup> Tan Kah Kee's company was liquidated in 1934.<sup>44</sup>

### British Piece Goods

The other important Chinese business that was challenged by the expansion of Japanese exports to Southeast Asia was the trade in British piece goods. The business depended heavily on the entrepôt trade of Singapore, which involved the handling of the cross-regional trade of Western enterprises and the management of the intra-Asian trade of Chinese business networks.

In most cases, a Western trade agent in Singapore belonged to an international enterprise based in London or New York. Leading Western textile importers included Boustead & Co. Ltd., Guthrie & Co. Ltd., and Diethelm & Co. Ltd. These cross-regional Western enterprises controlled the shipping of commodities across the continents, while the Chinese agents handled the first-tier wholesalers and retailers of these Western products.<sup>45</sup> The Chinese dealing and retailing system in Singapore then re-exported to hinterland Malaya Peninsula, Sarawak, British North Borneo, the Dutch East Indies, and the Philippines.<sup>46</sup>

The importance of Chinese merchants in the trade of piece goods in Southeast Asia was well noted. In an observation in 1923, the trade commissioner of the U.S. Department of Commerce, John A. Fowler, pointed out, "The Chinese buyers are keen judges of the market and their judgments are usually uniform throughout the colony, with the result that their decision that the time is ripe for a rise or fall in the market takes the form of a general movement. It is very seldom that this 'mass judgment' is wrong."<sup>47</sup> To make use of these

43 NKZ 20, 4 (April 1934): 40–41.

44 For the announcement of the temporary closure of Tan's company, see *NYSF*: June 7, 1934. The company was later voluntarily liquidated in 1936. Rajeswary A. Brown attributes the failure of the Tan Kah Kee & Co. to its overdraft from banks. See R. A. Brown, *Capital and Entrepreneurship in South-East Asia*, 105–111.

45 Wong Lin Ken, "Singapore: Its Growth as an Entrepôt Port, 1819–1941," 83. Singapore Piece Goods Traders Guild, *Xinjiapo buhang shangwuju qingzhu chengli 85 zhounian jinian tekan* 新嘉坡布行商務局慶祝成立 85 週年紀念特刊 [Souvenir of the 85 Annual of the Singapore Piece Goods Traders Guild] (Singapore: Singapore Piece Goods Traders Guild, 1994), 101.

46 Singapore Piece-goods Traders Guild, *Xinjiapo buhang shangwuju qingzhu chengli 85 zhounian jinian tekan*, 97; 108–109.

47 Fowler, *Netherlands East Indies and British Malaya*, 234–235.

experienced Chinese business networks, Western enterprises cooperated with Chinese agents to distribute their goods in Asian markets. In other words, the Chinese were important “middlemen” in the trade of Western commodities in Asia.<sup>48</sup>

In Singapore, the Chinese middleman trade in British piece goods was dominated by the merchants of the Singapore Piece Goods Traders Guild. The association was formally registered in 1923, but its history can be traced back to the organization of the Teochew Textile Commerce Bureau in 1908. As the organization’s name suggests, the textile trade was in the hands of Teochew people. These Teochew piece-goods dealers set up stores side by side on Circular Road. The significance of the association in Singapore could be gauged by the social status of its leader, Tan Teck Joon (1859–1918). Tan was one of the founding members of the SCCC, and he chaired the association between 1915 and 1918.<sup>49</sup>

Through the cooperation of the Chinese retailing and wholesaling system, British piece goods dominated the markets in Southeast Asia in the early twentieth century. Challenges from the expansion of Japanese piece goods emerged in the mid-1910s. Between 1913 and 1918, imports from Japan almost tripled.<sup>50</sup> The British, however, failed to recognize the problem initially. They viewed the competitive advantage of Japanese piece goods as temporary. From the perspective of the British, Japanese products could be sold at such low prices simply because they were manufactured in a country where both living standards and working conditions were poor. This argument was supported by the temporary retreat of Japan’s business expansion in the early 1920s. In April 1925, the Monthly Record of the Manchester Chamber of Commerce finally attributed Japan’s growth in the piece-goods trade to its technical improvements and stable financial and credit system.<sup>51</sup> But by that time, the British could do nothing to reverse the trend of Japanese piece-goods dominance (see table 4.4 for the trade of cotton piece goods). In the trade in artificial silk cloth in 1932,

48 Shanghai zixiu chuban she 上海自修出版社 ed., *Nanyang maoyi zhinan* 南洋貿易指南 [Directory of the Nanyang Trade] (Shanghai: Zixiu chuban she, 1940), 225–227; Singapore Piece-goods Traders Guild, *Xinjiapo buhang shangwuju qingzhu chengli 85 zhounian jinian tekan*, 101; 108–109; Huff, *The Economic Growth of Singapore*, 258–265.

49 Singapore Piece-goods Traders Guild, *Xinjiapo buhang shangwuju qingzhu chengli 85 zhounian jinian tekan*, 51.

50 *NKZ* 19, 7 (July 1933): 23.

51 Sugiyama Shinya, “Expansion of Japan’s Cotton Textile Exports,” in *International Commercial Rivalry in Southeast Asia in the Interwar Period*, ed. Sugiyama Shinya and Milagros C. Guerrero (New Heaven, Connecticut: Yale Southeast Asia Studies, 1994), 40–73.

among the 12,180,072 yards imported, 91.6 percent came from Japan and only 3.7 percent from Britain.<sup>52</sup>

TABLE 4.4 *Imports of Cotton Piece Goods from Britain and Japan to British Malaya, 1919–1931*

Unit: Straits Dollars

	Imports from Britain	Imports from Japan
1919	21,959,189 (50.2%)*	3,236,479 (7.4%)
1920	69,908,875 (65.8%)	6,305,988 (5.9%)
1921	20,777,003 (51.7%)	2,048,291 (5.1%)
1924	20,594,110 (46.4%)	3,535,645 (8.0%)
1925	30,785,234 (47.3%)	7,241,092 (11.1%)
1926	26,056,321 (42.1%)	7,260,735 (11.7%)
1927	22,258,147 (41.8%)	6,915,068 (13.0%)
1928	17,497,070 (40.6%)	4,216,423 (9.8%)
1929	25,159,458 (42.4%)	6,591,427 (11.1%)
1930	8,964,740 (27.0%)	8,145,732 (24.5%)
1931	4,927,109 (22.9%)	5,924,764 (27.5%)

\*Percentages in parentheses indicate the proportion of the total imports of the year of British/Japanese imports.

Source: *NKZ* 19, 7 (July 1933): 22–24.

<sup>52</sup> *NKZ* 22, 2 (February 1936): 22–24.

TABLE 4.5 *Average Export Prices of Cotton Piece Goods from Japan to Singapore*

Year	Yen	Indices of Export Price (1928 as the Basic Year)
1928	24.83	100
1929	23.05	93
1930	17.31	70
1931	14.06	57
1932	14.21	57
1933	18.33	74
1934	19.1	77
1935	18.2	73
1936	17.85	72
1937	21.67	87
1938	17.42	70

*Source:* Sugiyama Shinya, "Expansion of Japan's Cotton Textile Exports," *International Commercial Rivalry in Southeast Asia in the Interwar Period*, ed. Sugiyama Shinya and Milagros C. Guerrero (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale Southeast Asia Studies, 1994), 51.

Like the triumph of Japanese rubber-soled shoes in the Singapore market, selling products at lower prices was one element in the success of Japanese piece goods. Table 4.5 shows that export prices of Japanese textiles declined sharply in the decade between 1928 and 1938. Particularly in the years 1931 and 1932, prices reached their lowest point—as low as 57 percent of what they were in 1928.

It is now clear that expansion of Japanese piece goods in the South Seas market was at the expense of British cotton piece goods imported from Lancashire. The defeat of Lancashire cotton piece goods in the Singapore market was a loss not only to British importers but also to Chinese merchants involved in the trade. The latter therefore joined in the anti-Japanese boycotts.<sup>53</sup> Against this backdrop, the Teochew piece-goods merchant Yeo Chan Boon (1881–1967; vice-chair of the sccc 1931–1932) became an officer of both the 1932 and 1937 Chinese business-led nationalist campaigns (chapter 1).

53 Singapore Piece-goods Traders Guild, *Xinjiapo buhang shangwuju qingzhu chengli 85 zhounian jinian tekan*, 108–109.

## The Trade of Fujian Tea

Another Chinese product losing markets in the South Seas because of Japanese commercial expansion was Chinese tea—more specifically, the competition between Fujian's green tea from the Wuyi mountains and the Taiwanese Baozhong tea, as well as the rise of the latter at the expense of the former.

Baozhong tea was a semifermented oolong tea with a special flavor.<sup>54</sup> Japan's strategy of southward advance toward Southeast Asia in the 1910s contributed to the successful expansion of Taiwanese Baozhong tea in the new market. An advocate of this policy, Kwik Djoen Eng organized the Taiwan Tea Merchants' Association in Taipei for tea exportation and the Semarang Tea Agent Association in Java for tea importation. Cooperation between the two sides, in 1918 and 1919, challenged and annihilated the Dutch protective policy of banning the import of foreign tea to save local tea.<sup>55</sup> After WWI, the global demand for Chinese green tea also faced severe competition from Taiwanese Baozhong tea.<sup>56</sup>

The Singapore tea merchant Lim Keng Lian 林慶年 (Lin Qingnian; 1893–1968), a China-born Hokkien who received his B.A. from Beijing University, was an organizer of local militia in Zhangzhou, Fujian, before picking up his father's tea trade, the Lim Kim Thye Tea Chop 林金泰茶莊 (Lin Jintai cha zhuang), in 1925. It was an established tea agent in Amoy for the Fujian-Malaya trade. The trademark of his tea stocks emphasized that they were from the Wuyi mountains of Fujian, China (figure 4.4).

54 The production of Baozhong tea and oolong tea uses the same kinds of tea leaves. They become different products through different fermentation procedures. It requires more time to ferment oolong tea. In the process of fermenting Baozhong tea, special flavor is added. Most of the flavors come from flowers such as lilies and jasmine. See Taiwan chaye shuchu tongye gonghui 台灣茶葉輸出同業公會, *Tai chaye shuchu bainian jian shi* 台茶輸出百年簡史 [A brief history of the export of tea from Taiwan] (Taipei: Taiwan chaye shuchu tongye gonghui, 1965), 5–7.

55 About the export of Taiwan trade to the South Seas in the early twentieth century, see Kawarabayashi Naoto 河原林直人, *Kindai Ajia to Taiwan: Taiwan chagyō no rekishi teki tenkai* 近代アジアと台湾：台湾茶業の歴史的展開 [Modern Asia and Taiwan: a revelation of the history of Taiwan's tea industry] (Kyōto: Sekai Shisōsha, 2003).

56 *NYSB*: May 23, 1928; Wu Juenong and Fan Hejun 吳覺農、范和鈞, *Zhongguo chaye wenti* 中國茶葉問題 [The Problems of the Chinese Tea Industry] (Shanghai: The Commercial Press, 1937), 172–181; Yao Nan, Zhang Liqian and Xu Yunqiao eds., *Xingzhou shi nian*, 606–607.



FIGURE 4.4 Trademark of Lim Kim Thye Tea Chop

SOURCE: SSCC: FEB. 10, 1928.

Like other tea agents in the South Seas, the Chop Lim Kim Thye also engaged in the service of remittances.<sup>57</sup> In June 1928, Lim took part in the organization of the Singapore Tea Merchants' Association. Its inauguration statement read as follows: "Our goal is to expand the market of Chinese national products. Based on conscience, we vow not to trade any Japanese goods. We will hold to this position until the Jinan Incident is solved in a satisfactory way."<sup>58</sup> Likewise, Lim Pun Tao from the Lim Ho Thye Tea Chop posted a notice in a Chinese newspaper, declaring that it would no longer import any tea from Taiwan, as cited in the beginning of the chapter.

The organization of the Singapore Tea Merchants' Association was the tea merchants' response to the surging anti-Japanese boycotts in the aftermath of the Jinan Incident. Both Lim Keng Lian and Lim Pun Tao were active in setting guidelines for Chinese tea merchants in Singapore to import tea from China exclusively.<sup>59</sup> Both of their companies, Lim Kim Thye Tea Chop and Lim Ho

57 Chen Kezhan ed., *Anxi huaqiao zhi*, 180–181.

58 *NYSF*: June 26, 1928.

59 NA 531: Minutes of annual general meetings and executive committee meetings of the Singapore Tea Importer-Exporter Association (original name: the Singapore Tea Merchants' Association. The title changed after 1948; NA 531 thereafter), meetings of 1928 (National Archives of Singapore).

Thye Tea Chop, were part of the Anxi business networks, organized by Hokkien merchants coming from the Anxi district of southern Fujian.<sup>60</sup> The trademark of the Lim Ho Thye Tea Chop also highlighted its import of tea from Fujian, China.<sup>61</sup>

With the tea merchants' close connection with trade in China, the changing economic policies in that country directly affected their business. Lim Keng Lian was active in the Singapore Fujian Native-Place Association and was elected as the SCCC chairperson between 1935 and 1936, and its vice-chairperson between 1933 and 1934 as well as between 1937 and 1938 (table 1.5).<sup>62</sup> While chairing the SCCC, as chapter 7 elaborates, Lim was the principal organizer of the fairs of Chinese national products.

### The Reconfiguration of Chinese Bourgeois Communities in Hong Kong

Like Singapore, in Hong Kong, most bourgeois leaders of nationalist movements in the 1930s saw their businesses challenged by the Great Depression. Unlike Singapore, where the leaders belonged to a few tight-knit social and business networks, which almost invariably identified the expansion of Japan as a primary threat to the South Seas markets, the bourgeois leaders in Hong Kong had diverse business interests and different reactions to the Japanese expansion. New leaders rising after the 1930s were outside the Po On and the compradors' circles. Most of these new leaders engaged in local investments or had their branch companies in China. This can be seen from the backgrounds of the leaders in the CGCCHK: Wong Kwong Tin, the chairperson between 1931

60 Chen Kezhan ed., *Anxi huaqiao zhi*, 242; Jason Lim, *Linking an Asian Trans-Regional Commerce in Tea: Overseas Chinese Merchants in the Fujian-Singapore Trade, 1920–1960* (Leiden and Boston: Brill Academic Publisher, 2010), 23–38.

61 Notice of trademark registration from SSG: March 10, 1925.

62 For Lim Keng Lian's participation in the SCCC, see SCCC, *Xinjiapo zhonghua zongshanghui daxia luocheng jintian kan*, 174–176. For Lim's career and biodata, see Victor Sim ed., *Biographies of prominent Chinese in Singapore* (Singapore: Nan Kok Publication Company, 1950), 19–20; Xiamen huaqiao zhi bianzuan weiyuanhui 廈門華僑史編撰委員會 ed., *Xiamen huaqiao zhi* 廈門華僑史 [History of Overseas Chinese from Xiamen] (Xiamen: Lujiang chubanshe, 1991), 159; Jason Lim, "The Education Concerns and Political Outlook of Lim Keng Lian (1893–1968)," *Journal of Chinese Overseas* 3, 2 (November 2007): 194–219.

and 1936, was an estate developer from Nan Hoi. Li Sin Ku, who chaired the association between 1937 and 1939, worked for the China Hong Nin Life Insurance (one of the Sze Yap businesses founded by Li Yuk Tong). The Heung Sham department-store owner from Australia, Philip Gock Chin, led the association between 1939 and 1941 (table 1.7). Even Chan Lim Pak, when he was leading the Tung Wah Group of Hospitals to raise funds for Shanghai victims, minimized his comprador background but emphasized his position in the Nanyang Brothers' Tobacco Company (chapter 3). Overall, the reconfiguration of the business structure in Hong Kong was less about the expansion of Japanese interests and more about the collapse of the transregional trade between Europe and Asia as well as the decline of Hong Kong's export to China after 1930 (table 4.6).

### The Euro-Asian Trade and Chinese Compradors

During the Great Depression of the 1930s, the Chinese trade agents of European goods, *yanghang*, including Jardine, Matheson, & Co., Dent and Co., the Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank, and the P and O Steamship Company, declined. Total trade for this sector of the market in 1932 was only four-tenths that of 1931. Between 1932 and 1934, more than ten agents failed each year.<sup>63</sup> Concomitant to this loss, Chinese compradors employed in *yanghang* lost their economic and social status.

Hao Yen-p'ing argues that Chinese compradors were no longer important after the 1930s.<sup>64</sup> Zhang Zhongli 張仲禮, et al., however, contend that the reform of the Chinese comprador system in the 1930s created more opportunities for Chinese aspiring to engage in the business. The resulting new position, called Chinese manager (*hua jingli* 華經理), was like a comprador for the Chinese foreign trade, but a Chinese manager was not responsible for any transaction losses. A Chinese manager received payment based on a flexible salary scale. On the one hand, the commission fees declined from what a comprador would receive—from 5 percent to 2 percent—but on the other hand, more rewards were granted for larger transactions: a 1 percent commission fee on the first 100,000 dollars of profits that they earned, 2 percent on the second 100,000 dollars, and 3 percent on those profits exceeding 200,000

63 Chan and Chan ed., *Bainian shangye*, section of "changshan zhuan bian shi," no pagination.

64 Hao Yen-p'ing, *The Commercial Revolution in Nineteenth-century China: The Rise of Sino-Western Mercantile Capitalism* (University of California Press, 1986).

dollars.<sup>65</sup> For example, comprador Mok Kon Seng 莫幹生 (Mo Gansheng), also a Chinese manager at the Swire Company, received 2 percent.<sup>66</sup> However, the brother of Mok Kon Seng, Mok Ying Kui 莫應淮 (Mo Yinggui), attributed the reforms in the Swire Company to the British mistrust of the Chinese middlemen: Three generations of Mok Ying Kui's family served as compradors for the Swire Company, for example. Commissions for both his grandfather, Mok Shiyang 莫仕揚 (?–1879), and his father, Mok Zaoquan 莫藻泉 (?–1917), were packed at a 5 percent rate. Between the 1910s and 1920s, Mok Kon Seng made huge profits from the trade of Swire sugar. With this money, he purchased a British royal-style mansion in the hills of Hong Kong Island. This luxurious mansion, however, aroused suspicion among the British staff at Swire. They accused Mok Kon Seng of embezzling the company's money. The company demanded that Mok Kon Seng return 250,000 Hong Kong dollars. To the Mok brothers, the accusation was groundless. They believed that Mok Kon Seng was being treated as a scapegoat for what the company had lost during the General Canton–Hong Kong Strike and Boycott. As a result, Mok Kon Seng resigned from the Swire Company. This incident put the reform of the Chinese comprador system on the company's agenda. Finally, around 1933/1934, the Swire Company abolished the entire Chinese comprador system and replaced it with the Chinese manager system.<sup>67</sup> To handle the chaos, Mok Ying Kui participated in the official sugar revival plan on which the Guangdong regime was working in the early 1930s (chapter 6).

Reflected in the changing reward system of the Chinese middlemen for foreign trade were the changing dynamics in the Chinese comprador circle. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, many notable Chinese

65 Zhang Zhongli, Chen Zengnian and Yao Xinrong 張仲禮、陳曾年、姚欣榮, *Taigu jituan zai jiu Zhongguo* 太古集團在舊中國 [The Swire group in old China] (Shanghai: Renmin chubanshe, 1991), 168–169.

66 Zhang et al. *Taigu jituan zai jiu Zhongguo*, 154–157.

67 Mo Yinggui 莫應淮 [Mok Ying Kui], “*Wo zouguo de daolu—cong taigu yanghang maiban dao Xianggang jibanfa qicao weiyuan* 我走過的道路——從太古洋行買辦到香港基本法起草委員 [The paths I took: from being a comprador for the John Swire & Co., to a committee member drafting the Hong Kong Basic Law],” *Guangzhou wenshi ziliao* No. 39, *Guangzhou gongshang jingji shiliao* Vol. 2. 廣州文史資料 No. 39, 廣州工商經濟史料第二輯 [Cultural and historical data on Canton, No. 39; Historical archives of Canton's industry and commerce, Vol. 2], ed. Guangzhoushi gongshangye lianhehui and Guangzhoushi zhengxia wenshi ziliao weiyuanhui 廣州市工商業聯合會、廣州市政協文史資料委員會 (Canton: Zhongguo renmin zhengzhi xieshang huiyi Guangdong Sheng Guangzhou Shi weiyuanhui wenshi ziliao yanjiu weiyuanhui, 1989), 1–23.

TABLE 4.6 *Hong Kong's Import-Export Trade, 1921–1939*

Unit: Percentage of Total Per Year

<b>Imports</b>						
Areas	1921	1922	1923	1924	1931	1932
China	13.9	12.5	12.9	12.7	27.2	27.2
Japan	11.8	13.5	10.8	12.7	9.3	3.4
The Americas and Australia*	9.7	11.8	10.6	9.9	8.6	9.5
South Seas**	39.9	36.5	43.1	39.4	26.2	29.0
United Kingdom	11.9	11.3	11.2	13.1	10.6	12.3
Others	12.7	14.3	11.5	12.3	18.2	18.5
Total (in \$1000 HKD)	511,073	489,707	545,200	613,321	737,740	624,048
<b>Exports</b>						
Areas	1921	1922	1923	1924	1931	1932
China	61.8	64.5	63.6	62.4	54.4	59.3
Japan	5.4	4.3	5.9	5.5	5.1	2.9
The Americas and Australia*	3.3	4.4	4.1	3.9	3.7	3.9
South Seas**	18.6	18.4	17.2	18.2	19.4	17.1
United Kingdom	1.2	1.0	1.3	1.2	1.0	0.7
Others	9.8	7.5	8.0	8.7	16.4	16.1
Total (in \$1000 HKD)	507,689	487,828	540,077	541,235	542,050	471,860

\*Australia, U.S., Cuba, and Central America.

\*\*British Malaya, French Indochina, Netherlands East Indies, and Siam.

Source: Compiled from Hong Kong Blue Books, Section S, Imports and Exports, 1931–1940.

---

1933	1934	1935	1936	1937	1938	1939	1940
31.0	35.2	33.8	33.6	34.2	37.7	37.6	34.1
5.0	8.8	11.8	12.8	9.4	3.0	4.6	3.4
8.0	8.9	9.7	9.2	10.6	10.9	9.9	12.6
27.4	24.0	22.4	22.4	19.4	19.3	20.7	27.1
10.4	7.8	6.5	6.4	7.6	9.1	6.7	6.2
18.1	15.2	15.7	15.6	18.9	20.0	20.5	16.7
500,939	415,919	364,990	452,350	617,064	618,169	594,199	752,739

---

1933	1934	1935	1936	1937	1938	1939	1940
56.3	48.1	49.0	42.7	40.7	45.1	16.9	24.9
3.2	3.5	4.2	5.1	4.2	0.6	1.2	2.2
4.8	5.7	7.8	8.1	8.8	10.2	14.4	12.2
17.3	22.2	17.7	19.2	20.0	17.7	24.8	20.8
1.1	2.0	2.8	3.8	4.5	4.1	4.2	6.3
17.3	18.6	18.4	21.1	21.7	22.3	38.5	33.5
403,092	325,105	271,033	350,865	467,323	511,902	533,385	621,752

---

compradors in the Pearl River delta came from the Heung Sham district.<sup>68</sup> Theirs was the largest single native-place of origin among the CGCCHK members who registered their profession as compradors or Chinese managers in *yanghangs*.<sup>69</sup> The other major speech-group in the business was the group of the Po On Chinese. Robert Ho Tung and his brothers Ho Fook and Ho Kom Tong served as compradors for Jardine, Matheson, & Co. and E. D. Sassoon & Co. The second generation of the Ho family continued the tradition. Ho Sai Wing (Ho Fook's son adopted by Ho Tung) worked for the Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank, Ho Sai Iu for the Mercantile Bank of India, Ho Sai Kwong for E. D. Sassoon & Co., and Ho Sai Leung for Jardine, Matheson, & Co.<sup>70</sup> Lo Cheong Siu (?–1934) and his second son, Lo Man Hin, were both Jardine compradors.<sup>71</sup>

The decline of exports from Europe to Hong Kong during the Great Depression (table 4.6) directly challenged the economic status of Chinese compradors. Among the results of the weakening compradors' business power was their diminishing influence in the CGCCHK. Most Chinese compradors (including Chinese managers and people acting as independent comprador agents) became members of the association between 1913 and 1941, the majority of them registering in 1921 (table 4.7).

---

68 Lee Pui-tak, "Business Networks and Patterns of Cantonese Compradors and Merchants in Nineteenth-century Hong Kong," *Journal of Hong Kong Branch of the Royal Asiatic Societies*, Vol. 31 (1991): 1–39.

69 Among the ninety-six CGCCHK members whose businesses were listed as compradors or Yanghang Chinese managers, twenty-seven were of Heung Sham origin, followed by thirteen from the Sze Yap district, eighteen from Pun U, nine from Hong Kong, nine from Nam Hoi, six from Shun Tek, two from Tung Kwan, two from Hokkien, two from Hainan Island, and one from Sam Shui. Based on HKMS 164-1-29: Registration Book of Individual Members, the Chinese General Chamber of Commerce, Hong Kong, 1910–1940.

70 Public Bureau for South China, *Anglo-Chinese Directory, Hong Kong, 1922*, 8–9; He Wenxiang, *Xianggang jiazhu shi*, 70–75. It is worth noting that members of the Ho family mostly subscribed to the CGCCHK before 1921: Ho Kom Tong's registration number was 11, Ho Sai Wing 270, and Ho Sai Leung 475, while Ho Sai Iu registered in 1931; HKMS 164-1-29: number 1046.

71 Lo Cheong Siu registered his membership in the CGCCHK during the period between 1913 and 1921. His son Lo Man Kim (a solicitor) also joined the association during the same period. Another son, Lo Man Hin (a comprador for the Jardine Co.), registered with the association in 1921. See their registrations in HKMS 164-1-29: no. 113, no. 392, and no. 611. He Wenxiang, *Xianggang jiazhu shi*, 76–87, 112–114.

TABLE 4.7 *Chinese Compradors in CGCCHK, 1913–1941*

Years	Number of Members	%
1913–1921	60	63%
1922–1931	25	26%
1932–1941	11	11%
Total 1913–1941	96	100%

Source: HKMS 164-1-29.

Compradors of both Heung Sham and Po On origins suffered in the economic downturn. But in light of the formidable influence achieved by the Po On by the 1930s, their decline was more dramatic.

The Po On compradors had once dominated the CGCCHK, but they were no longer the sole leaders of the association after the 1930s. Important leaders included Lau Chu Pak, Chan Kai Mun, Lo Cheong Siu, Ho Sai Kwong, and Ho Sai Leung. Losing all his fortunes in the stock market, Ho Sai Leung committed suicide in 1933.<sup>72</sup> With this year as a watershed, the Po On compradors' influence declined. Non-Po On Chinese compradors rose to power thereafter. These new leaders were Tong Wing Iu (a native of Toi Shan and a comprador for Japanese and American shipping companies),<sup>73</sup> J. M. Wong (a Hakka of Tung Kwun origin and an E. D. Sassoon comprador), Ng Chak Wah (a Teochew working for Java-China-Japan Lijn, N. V.), and Yung Kon Man (of Heung Sham origin, working for Wo Kee Yanghang as a Chinese manager; chapter 1).

The Heung Sham comprador Mok Ying Kui responded to the economic crisis by developing close ties with the Guangdong government, including the left-wing force in the mid-1920s and Chen Jitang's semiautomatic Guangdong provincial government in the 1930s. After receiving his law-school degree from

72 He Wenxiang, *Xianggang jiazu shi*, 74.

73 Here the statement of Tong Wing Iu's businesses is based on the following sources: First, Tong registered his membership in the CGCCHK by the title "comprador for the American *huaqi lunchun* [Pacific Mail Steamship Company]." See HKMS 164-1-29: no. 820. Second, information in the CGCCHK's *Directory of Hong Kong 1927* listed him as a Chinese manager of a Japanese steamship company. See CGCCHK, *Directory of Hong Kong 1927*, 1628. Third, a Japanese intelligence report published in 1939 documents him as the owner of the Wing Kee Company, a shipping business. See *Nanshi Nanyō* (April 1939; Taihoku): 21.

Cambridge in 1925, Mok worked as a legal consultant for a left-wing newspaper of the GMD, *Xin Wen Bao* 新聞報. Through this connection, Mok became a legal consultant who provided crucial support to the CCP cadre Ye Jianying 葉劍英 and other leftists to escape from Chiang Kai-shek's antileftist purge in Canton.<sup>74</sup> When the comprador department of the Swire Company was downsized in 1933, Mok diversified his business and invested in Chen Jitang's three-year policy agenda (chapter 6).

### The Trans-Pacific Trade

The two long-distance trading networks and remittance houses for overseas Chinese to send money back to their hometowns were Nam Pak Hong 南北行 and Kam Shan Chong 金山莊. They could be understood roughly as the Nam Pak Hong's operation of intra-Asian trade and the Kam Shan Chong's management of trans-Pacific trade. Commercial directories registered the Nam Pak Hong as "general exporters and importers to Southern and Northern ports."<sup>75</sup> The northern ports referred to those in North China, Japan, and Korea, while the southern ports were those in South China and South Seas.<sup>76</sup> The English description of the business guild of Kam Shan Chong was "exporters and importers to Melbourne, Sydney, San Francisco, and Honolulu,"<sup>77</sup> or "exporters to California."<sup>78</sup>

The conventional perspective was that merchants of the Nam Pak Hong were mostly Teochew.<sup>79</sup> However, the following table on the leading firms that subscribed to the Nam Pak Hong in 1922 suggests that Cantonese merchants were as important as, if not more significant than, Teochew merchants in the guild (table 4.8). But at the same time, most merchants in the Kam Shan Chong were of Sze Yap origin. A survey of the merchants enrolled in the CGCCHK in

74 Chan Lau Kit-ching, *From Nothing to Nothing*, 183.

75 Jan George Chance 鄭紫燦 [Zheng Zican] ed., *Xianggang zhonghua shangye jiaotong renming zhinanlu* 香港中華商業交通人名指南錄 [Directory for Hong Kong's commerce, transportation, and who's who] (Hong Kong: Publisher unknown, 1915 [?]), 2–14.

76 Jingji daobao she 經濟導報社 [Economic information and agency, Hong Kong] ed., *Handbook of Hong Kong Commerce* (Hong Kong: Jingji daobao she, 1960), 36–39.

77 Jan George Chance ed., *Xianggang zhonghua shangye jiaotong renming zhinanlu*, 15–50.

78 CGCCHK, *Directory of Hong Kong 1927*, 392–431.

79 Nanbei hang gongsuo 南北行公所, *Nanbei hang gongsuo xinxiang luocheng ji chengli bashiliu zhou nian jinian tekan* 南北行公所新廈落成及成立八十六週年紀念特刊 [Souvenir publication for the establishment of the new building of the Nam Pak Hong and its 86th anniversary] (Hong Kong: Nanbei hang gongsuo, 1954), 23.

TABLE 4.8 *Nam Pak Hong Merchants in Hong Kong, 1922*

Member <sup>1</sup>	Firm's Address <sup>1</sup>	Proprietors and Managers <sup>2</sup>	Owners' Backgrounds <sup>3</sup>
Kwong Mau Tai 廣茂泰	No. 15 & 17, Bonham Strand West	Chan U Fan 陳雨蕃 Hau Chung Chiu 侯頌招 Shum Chak Chiu 岑澤樵	Cantonese (Nan Hoi)
Wa On Hong 華安行	No. 5, Bonham Strand West	Chan U Fan 陳雨蕃 Chan Yik Din 陳益典 Kwok Siu Hoy 郭少凱	Cantonese
Yuen Fat Hong 元發行	No. 10, Bonham Strand West	Ko Shing Kee 高盛記 Chan Din Sen 陳殿臣 Chan Pik Chi 陳碧池	Teochew
Yu Tak Shing 裕德盛	No. 18, Bonham Strand West	Chan Din Sen 陳殿臣 Ng Chuk Chuen 吳竹村 Chan Woon Fu 陳煥夫	Teochew
乾泰隆 Kin Tai Loong	No. 27, Bonham Strand West	Chan Lap Mui 陳立梅 Chan Tsz Tan 陳子丹 Chan Yeung Hon 陳仰韓	Teochew
榮發 Wing Fat	No. 34, Bonham Strand West	Chan Pik Chuen 陳碧泉 Chung Chi Nam 鍾熾南 Lai Shun Chia 黎慎齋	Cantonese (Pun U)
裕和隆 Yu Wo Loong	No. 45–47, Bonham Strand West	Wong Wood Chuen 黃活泉	Cantonese
吳源興 Ng Yuen Hing	No. 64, Bonham Strand West	Ng Chang Luk 吳增祿 Ng Kai Wing 吳啟榮 Wong Yeung Chai 王養齋 Ng Siu Nagm 吳少岩	Hokkien (Cheng Hai)
泰生行 Tai Sang Hong	66, Bonham Strand West	N/A	N/A
昆茂 Kwang Mau	120, Wing Lok Street West	Li Kit Cho 李杰初	Cantonese
朱永安 Chu Wing On	312, Des Voeux Road Central	Yuen Man Chuen 阮文邨 Yuen Chi Oi 阮次藹	Cantonese (Sun Wui)

*Sources:*

<sup>1</sup> *Anglo-Chinese Directory, Hong Kong, 1922* (Hong Kong: The Publicity Bureau for South China, Hong Kong, 1922), 114.

<sup>2</sup> CGCCHK, *Directory of Hong Kong 1927* (Hong Kong: Chinese General Chamber of Commerce, Hong Kong, 1927), 240–251; 1586–1638.

<sup>3</sup> For those firms not listed in source #2 above, their background is based on Jingji daobao she 經濟導報社 [Economic information and agency, Hong Kong] ed., *Handbook of Hong Kong Commerce* (Hong Kong: Jingji daobao she, 1960), 36.

1927 shows that eighteen of the forty members registering their businesses as associated with the Kam Shan Chong were Sze Yap merchants (table 4.9). But a significant number of merchants in Hong Kong might have covered both Asia and the Americas. For example, Chiu U Tin, a notable merchant from the Nam Pak Hong guild, extended his business to Chile.<sup>80</sup>

In addition to their long-distance intra-Asian trade, merchants of the Nam Pak Hong group were active in the insurance industry. They established insurance companies such as Man On Insurance Co. Ltd.,<sup>81</sup> Chun On Fire Insurance Co. Ltd.,<sup>82</sup> I On Marine & Fire Co. Ltd.,<sup>83</sup> Tung On Fire Insurance Co. Ltd.,<sup>84</sup> and South China Fire & Marine Insurance & Godown & Loan Co. Ltd.<sup>85</sup> The Nam Pak Hong also engaged in real-estate investment. An example was the Hong Kong and Kowloon Land and Loan Co. Ltd.<sup>86</sup> At the same time, the Kam Shan Chong merchants were active in businesses other than import-export trade. Representative enterprises of the Sze Yap merchants were Li Yuk Tong's series of marine, fire, and life insurance companies<sup>87</sup> and the On Lok Yuen refreshment manufacturing companies.<sup>88</sup> In addition, another Sze Yap merchant, Chan Fu Hsiang, was noted for his Luk Hoi Tong series of companies, involved in sectors such as insurance, dispensaries, hotels, and restaurants. Chan also founded two other land investment companies.<sup>89</sup> Among them, his first registered company, Luk Hoi Tong Co. Ltd. (registered in 1926), drew more than one-fifth of its total stockholders from Toi Shan, his native-place.<sup>90</sup>

80 Chen Ronggun 陳榮袞 (Ou Langruo, Xian Yuqing, and Chen Deyun 區朗若、冼玉清、陳德芸 eds.), *Chen Zibao xiansheng jiaoyu yiyi* 陳子襄先生教育遺議 [A posthumous volume of Mr. Chen Zibao's agendas on education] (Hong Kong: Wen guang guan dai Zibao xue xiao tong xue hui 文光館代子襄學校同學會, 1952), 87.

81 HKRS 122-5-1.

82 HKRS 122-5-2.

83 HKRS 122-5-4.

84 HKRS 122-5-3.

85 HKRS 122-5-21.

86 HKRS 122-5-5.

87 HKRS 122-5-6; HKRS 122-5-9; HKRS 122-5-12; HKRS 122-5-17.

88 HKRS 122-5-30; HKRS 122-5-33.

89 HKRS 122-5-50; HKRS 122-5-101.

90 In the company report submitted to the Japanese colonial government in Hong Kong in 1944, of the total 158,971 shares, 33,644 shares were owned by 379 shareholders in Toi Shan. Shareholders from other counties in the Sze Yap district were also important: 6,075 shares were held by 61 shareholders in Sun Wui, 3,310 by 41 in Hoi Ping. Compiled from HKRS 122-5-6.

TABLE 4.9 *Kam Shan Chong Merchants Who Were Members of the CGCCHK, 1927*

Firm Name	Address	Proprietor or Manager	Native-place
寬和祥 Fun Wo Cheong	No. 86, Des Voux Road West, 1st Floor	陳寬典 Chan Foon Tin	Sun Hui
三盛昌 Sam Shing Cheong	No. 132, Des Voux Road West	陳廉孚 Chan Lim Foo	N/A
源隆棧 Yuen Lung chan	No. 69, Des Voux Road West	陳雲繡 Chan Wen Sau	Sun Hui
商業 Shiong Ya	New Street, Happy Valley	陳文宗 Chan Man Zong	Toi Shan
廣興源 Kwong Hing Yuen	No. 81, Des Voux Road West	陳象惠 Chan Cheung Wai	Sun Hui
安榮棧 On Loong Chan	No. 105, Des Voux Road West	陳溥濂 Chan Pu Lim	Pun U
遠東 Yuen Tong	No. 156, Connaught Central	陳鴻陞 Chan Yuen Sing	Tung Kwun
廣永昌 Kwong Wing Cheong	No. 279, Des Voux Road Central	李耀堂 Li Yiu Tong	Toi Shan
廣永昌 Kwong Wing Cheong	No. 279, Des Voux Road Central	李炳芬 Li Pin Fen	Toi Shan
旋昌泰 Suen Cheung Tai	No. 136 Connaught Road Central	李聘侯 Li Pin Hau	Nam Hoi
匯英源 Wui Ying Yuen	No. 19, Old Bailey Street	李初藻 Li Ying Jo	Toi Shan
萬源隆 Man Yuen Lung	No. 302 Des Voux Road Central	張培煖 Cheung Pui Nuen	Hoi Ping
福和興 Foo Ho Hing	No. 134, Bonham Strand West	張舜臣 Cheung Shunsen	Hokkien
均祥盛 Quan Chong Sing	249 Des Voux Road Central	黃培初 Wong Yin Tong	Hoi Ping
泗聚興 Sze Jue Hing	No. 17, Queen's Street	黃勵初 Wong Li Chu	Nam Hoi
光亞公司 Kwong An & Co.	No. 6, Wing Lok Street	黃組安 Wong Zu On	Huiyang

TABLE 4.9 (cont.)

Firm Name	Address	Proprietor or Manager	Native-place
英美源 Ying Mee Yuen	No. 292, Des Voux Road Central	黃軫章 Wong Chan Chong	Toi Shan
永祥吉 Wing Cheung Gut	No. 135, Connaught Road Central	黃信仲 Wong Hin Cheong	Toi Shan
明發 Min Fat	Des Voux Rd. West	何星儔 Ho Hing Chou	Shun Tak
永義昌 Wing Yee Cheong	No. 94, Connaught Road West	馬沃川 Ma Wo Chuen	Toi Shan
裕生源 Yu Sang Yuen	No. 12, Connaught Road West	馬寶隆 Ma Pao Loong	N/A
聯盛昌 Luen Shing Cheong	No. 80, Des Voux Road West, 2nd Floor	麥瑞淇 Mak Rui Chi	Hok Shan
聯盛昌 Luen Shing Cheong	No. 80, Des Voux Road West, 2nd Floor	麥章 Mak Cheung	Hok Shan
祥合 Heung Wo	Ko Sing Street	楊敬菴 Yeung Ching'an	Hokkien
萬利 Man Li & Co.,	No. 81, Des Voux Road Central, 2nd Floor	林鐵生 Lam Te Sing	Heung Sham
裕棧 Yu Chang	No. 155, Connaught Road Central	伍耀雲 Ng Yao Yun	Toi Shan
明記 Ming Kee	No. 134, Connaught Road Central	謝蔭墀 Che Yum Chi	Nam Hoi
泰興和 Tai Hing Wo	No. 132, Connaught Road Central	謝秋譚 Tse Chiu Tan	Nam Hoi
厚德祥 How Tak Chong	No. 75, Des Voux Road West	劉星昶 Lau Ngok Fan	Zencheng
華棧 Wah Chan	No. 10, Connaught Road	朱瀚宸 Chu Han Huan	Nam Hoi
誠泰號 Shing Tai	No. 312, Des Voux Road Central	關翼之 Kwan Yick Che	Nam Hoi
福榮昌 Fook Wing Cheong	No. 69, Bonham Strand East	羅子霖 Lo Tsz Lam	Hoi Ping

Firm Name	Address	Proprietor or Manager	Native-place
保生昌 Po Sang Cheung	No. 124, Des Voux Road West	郭淡雲 Kwok Tan Yun	Heung Sham
永祥盛 Wing Cheung Shing	No. 140, Wing Lock Street	余澤生 Yu Chak Shang	Toi Shan
維安祥 Wai On Cheung	No. 243, Des Voux Road Central	江瑞英 Gong Seo Ying	Tung Kwun
可益豐 Ke Yi Foong	20 Wing Seng Street	江楚材 Cheung Chu Chai	Hoi Feng
杜四端 Toh Sze Tuan	Cleverly Street	杜四端 Toh Sze Tuan	Hokkien
達華洋 Ta Wah Yeong	Sai Yin Pun (West Point)	潘萬世 Pang Man Sei	Hoi Ping
利豐源 Lee Foong Yuen	No. 6, Wing Lok Street	潘摧學 Pang Wui Son	Hoi Ping
廣勝恒 Kwong Shing Hang	No. 89, Wing Lok Street	趙惠臣 Jiu Wui Cheng	San Wui
廣泰安 Kwong Tai On	No. 3, Wo Hing West Road	湛搏雲 Jam Po Yun	Zeng Cheng

Source: The list of the firms' CGCCHK membership as well as the owners' native-place of origins, see CGCCHK, *Directory of Hong Kong 1927*, 1586–1638; addresses and Romanization of the firm names, are based on CGCCHK, *Directory of Hong Kong 1927*, 392–431, if they are documented in the section of “Exporters for California.”

Like the compradors in the middlemen trade for foreign trade, especially European merchants, both the Nam Pak Hong and the Kam Shan Chong also suffered business losses from the decline of Euro-Asian trade and the burdens of China's import tariffs in the 1930s. Moreover, these long-distance trading houses were affected by China's monetary policies, which stubbornly held to a strong silver standard after the gold standard was abandoned in the global economy. Before 1935, the exchange rate between Hong Kong dollars and Chinese silver was unfavorable to Hong Kong.<sup>91</sup> Many of Kam Shan Chong's overseas buyers, such as those in the Americas, therefore, withdrew their savings from Hong Kong's Kam Shan Chong agents. In the single year of 1933, it

91 Chan and Chan ed. *Bainian shangye*.

was estimated that 60 to 70 percent of their business was lost.<sup>92</sup> Furthermore, in 1934, China adopted a monetary reform that prohibited the circulation of bank notes issued by private remittance houses or business associations. This new Chinese monetary policy challenged Chinese trade agents in Hong Kong that had set up remittance houses in their home counties in China. For example, the collapse of Yuen Fat Hong, one of the founding members of the Nam Pak Hong guild, was triggered by the bankruptcy of its remittance houses in Swatow.<sup>93</sup>

Nonetheless, throughout the 1930s, businesses of the Kam Shan Chong merchants were relatively better off than those of the Nam Pak Hong merchants. In general, the Kam Shan Chong trade benefited from the booming Pan-Pacific trade with the Americas and Australia in the interwar years. It was estimated that between 1915 and 1929, the global trade volume in the region rose 73 percent, compared with 30 percent in the European trade.<sup>94</sup> Hong Kong's engagement in trans-Pacific trade with the United States and, to a lesser extent, Australia increased rapidly after 1934 (table 4.6).

It is worth noting that the businesses of Kam Shan Chong and Nam Pak Hong also included trade with the Japanese empire. Commercial directories in Hong Kong registered the import-export agents of Japanese goods under "Exports for Japan," "Exports for Kobe," and "Exports for Taiwan." For example, the *Anglo-Chinese Directory* lists nine agents in Hong Kong trading with Japan (including Taiwan).<sup>95</sup> The *Directory for Hong Kong 1927* listed only two exporters for Kobe<sup>96</sup> and three exporters for Taiwan.<sup>97</sup> But other than those specifically engaged in trade with Japan, other Chinese merchants active in the trans-Pacific trade were also crucial. In Hsu Tsz-feng's research on the Nagasaki-based Chinese enterprise Tai Yi Hao, she reveals that between 1910 and 1933, the firm conducted business with more than sixty Chinese agents in

92 CGCHK, *CGCHKAR: Chinese General Chamber of Commerce, Hong Kong, Annual Report* (CGCHKAR). Hong Kong: Chinese General Chamber of Commerce (Hong Kong), 1933, 9–10.

93 Choi Chi-cheung 蔡志祥 (Cai Zhixiang), "Qiyè, lìshǐ jǐyǐ yú shèhuì xiǎngxiàng: Qiang tailong yú Huangli 企業、歷史與社會想像：乾泰隆與贊利 [Enterprise, history and social imagination, the Kin Tye Lung and Huang Li]," *Chaoxue yanjiu* Vol. 13 (2006): 158–174.

94 WKYP: January 28, 1932.

95 Public Bureau for South China, *Anglo-Chinese Directory, Hong Kong, 1922*, 94–95.

96 Chinese General Chamber of Commerce, Hong Kong (CGCHK), *Directory of Hong Kong 1927* (Hong Kong: Chinese General Chamber of Commerce, Hong Kong, 1927), 361.

97 CGCHK, *Directory of Hong Kong 1927*, 359.

Hong Kong.<sup>98</sup> Crosschecking Hsu's documentation and the Chinese commercial directories, one would find that many agents trading with Japan were listed in general categories of importer-exporter guilds, such as the Nam Pak Hong or the Kam Shan Chong. It can therefore be concluded that Chinese agents in the Japanese trade were not concentrated in a particular guild but were spread among various guilds in Hong Kong. In 1928, when the wave of Chinese anti-Japanese boycotts affected the Chinese trade of Japanese goods, merchants of the Nam Pak Hong complained that they suffered the greatest losses.<sup>99</sup> Nonetheless, that Japanese imports to Hong Kong continued to grow points to the survival of Japanese-associated Chinese merchants in the wake of the Chinese anti-Japanese boycotts. In the midst of these boycotts, in July 1928, a journalist witnessed Chinese wholesalers of Japanese goods as they continued loading these products and re-exporting them to mainland China. To avoid damage due to the boycotts, these Hong Kong merchants resorted to subterfuge; they removed the original packaging of the Japanese products and repacked them as Chinese or Western imports. For example, Japanese dried scallops could be sold as Shandong (North China) products, Japanese squid and cuttlefish as Zhangzhou (southern Fujian) goods, Japanese abalone as abalone from the United States or Australia, shark fins from Japan as Bengalese, Japanese dry mushrooms as from mainland China, Japanese piece goods and laces as German and British piece goods and laces, and so on.<sup>100</sup>

Those who dominated the export of Japanese goods to Hong Kong were merchants involved in the China–Japan–South Seas business networks. In the case of the export of Japanese textiles, for example, the trade started in 1886, when Chinese merchants in Yokohama realized the demand for a higher quality of textiles, as consumers in China and the South Seas complained about the quality of British textiles that dominated the markets. The British goods were considered too thin and easily broken. The Chinese merchants thus shipped more durable Japanese products from Yokohama, Osaka, and Kobe to Hong Kong. In Hong Kong, some of these products were further shipped to South China (Fujian and Guangdong), Vietnam, and Singapore. In July 1899, the Anglo-Japanese Treaty of Commerce and Navigation came into force. Among other things, it allowed Japanese goods to enjoy low import tariffs to China via Hong Kong. The Chinese business networks of Japanese goods prospered. By the 1930s, Japanese intelligence reports revealed that the Chinese agents specializing in the export of Japanese goods, most of them based in Osaka and

98 Hsu Tse-feng, *Nakasaka kashō ken'eū no shiteki kenkyū*.

99 *WTYP*: July 7, 1928.

100 *WKYP*: August 30, 1928.

Kobe, had established far-flung business networks throughout major cities in Asia. These included Kobe, Osaka, Shanghai, Hong Kong, and Singapore.<sup>101</sup>

### Department Stores and First-tier Wholesalers of Foreign Goods

The import sector and the first-tier wholesalers of foreign imports were led by a group of Heung Sham merchants with overseas experience. They were represented by the Gock brothers, Gock Lock and Philip Gock Chin of the Wing On Group of Companies; Ma Ying Piu of the Sincere Group of Companies; and the Sun Company of Choy Hing and his brother Choy Chong. Chapter 2 introduced their primary business: fixed-price department stores. But they managed other businesses as well. In 1931, M. Harr Chan (a native of Kao Yiu), a shareholder of the Sincere Group of Companies, opened China Emporium Co. Ltd. Its important investors included notable Po On merchants such as Chow Shou Son and Chan Lim Pak.<sup>102</sup> Business competition aside, Ma Ying Piu and the Gock brothers, as well as other core subscribers of the Sincere and Wing On companies, jointly invested in Heung On Insurance Co. Ltd. in 1914<sup>103</sup> and Li Man Hing Kwok Manufacturer Co. Ltd. in 1915.<sup>104</sup> Heung On Insurance Co. Ltd. (established in 1914) drew significant capital from Heung Sham county in Guangdong.<sup>105</sup> These Heung Sham merchants also had business connections with the Sze Yap merchant Li Yuk Tong. Both the Wing On Company and the Sincere Company held significant stock in Li Yu Tong's Shanghai Fire and Marine Insurance Co. Ltd. (established in 1915).<sup>106</sup>

101 Hamashita, *Jindai zhongguo de guoji qiji*, 214–261; Hsu Tse-feng 許紫芬 (Yamaoka Yuka 山岡由佳), *Nakasaki kashō keiei no shiteki kenkyū: kindai chūgoku shōnin no keiei to choōbo* 長崎華商經營の史的研究: 近代中国商人の経営と帳簿 [Research on the history of the management of Chinese merchants in Nakasaki] (Kyoto: Minereoa bookstore, 1995), 233–258.

102 HKRS 121-105; HKRS 122-5-93.

103 HKRS 122-5-15.

104 HKRS 121-120.

105 According to the company report of 1944, among the 17,270 claimed shares, 1,949 shares were held by people in Heung Sham county, compared to other non-Hong Kong stockholders in Guangzhou (398 shares), Macao (239), Beijing (220), and Shanghai (186) (compiled from HKRS 122-5-15). The other characteristic of the enterprises of the Heung Sham people was their Shanghai connection. Both the Wing On group of companies and the Sincere group of companies had large amounts of shares held by people in Shanghai. On the Wing On group of companies, see HKRS 122-5-20; HKRS 122-5-52; HKRS 122-5-94; on the Sincere group of companies, see HKRS 122-5-18; HKRS 122-5-25.

106 HKRS 122-5-17.

The Sincere Company, Wing On Company, and Sun Company were all member firms of the Po Yick Commercial Society 普益商會, a guild for buyers and wholesalers of goods sold by compradors.<sup>107</sup> In 1931, on behalf of the compradors, the United Association for Yanghangs and Compradors (*yanghang banfang lian he hui*) proposed that the Po Yick Commercial Society and other piece-goods importers raise their commission fees from 0.5 percent (“995 commission,” in their terms) to 1 percent (99 commission). The Po Yick Commercial Society united with other piece-goods importers to reject the proposal. After months of negotiation, the Chinese buyers won. Not only did the *yanghangs* fail to win an increase in commission fees, they also had to pay a bonus charge of 0.05 percent commission to the buyers.<sup>108</sup> Their strong bargaining power suggests that in the 1930s, the buyers got the upper hand over the Western importers and their associated compradors.

Seizing this opportunity, the Gocks' Wing On Company expanded its investment in the manufacturing sector. The company had purchased the Wei Sun Knitting Factory 維新織造廠 from the British S. Thomas Company in 1919.<sup>109</sup> In 1932, Wing On set up three more textile factories in Shanghai, with another under construction.<sup>110</sup> The upstream manufacture of yarn by Hong Kong's Wei Sun factory integrated with the downstream production of textile products by Wing On's textile factories in Shanghai. A large portion of the yarn contributed by Wing On's Shanghai factories had been manufactured by Hong Kong's Wei Sun factory (Figure 4.5). With twenty live-in male workers and two hundred commuting female workers, Wei Sun Manufacturing specialized in the production of shirts and underwear.<sup>111</sup>

The Wing On Company's expansion to the industrial sector was one among several business ventures in Hong Kong during the World War I years. By 1919, Chinese industrialists in Hong Kong had begun manufacturing matches, rattan furniture and goods, tobacco, canned and preserved fruit, wine, knitwear,

107 Public Bureau for South China, *Anglo-Chinese Directory, Hong Kong, 1922*, 116–117.

108 Xianggang Puyi Shanghai 香港普益商會 [Hong Kong Po Yik Commercial Society], *Xianggang Puyi shanghai si-shi-er zhounian jinian tekan* 香港普益商會四十二週年紀念特刊 [Souvenir publication of the 42nd annuals of the Po Yik Commercial Society] (Hong Kong: Po Yik Commercial Society, 1950), B4–B5.

109 Yong An Youxian Gongsi, *The Wing On Co., Ltd. Hong Kong in Commemoration of 25th Anniversary 1907–1932*, 10–11; Taiwan Sōtokufu shokusan-kyoku 台灣總督府殖産局, *Honkon ni okeru kōgyō* 香港に於ける工業 [Industries in Hong Kong] (Taiwan: Taiwan Sōtokufu shokusan-kyoku, 1919), 35.

110 Yong An Youxian Gongsi, *The Wing On Co., Ltd. Hong Kong in Commemoration of 25th Anniversary 1907–1932*, 9.

111 *Nanshi Nanyō* (April 1939; Taihoku-shi): 612–13.

香港  
維新織造廠  
THE WEI SUN KNITTING  
FACTORY  
HONG KONG

香港  
維新織造廠  
馬頭牌  
上等純毛衫



永安公司  
總發售  
各埠  
洋貨  
代理

香港  
維新織造廠  
玫瑰牌



香港  
維新織造廠  
玫瑰花



織造等衫毛洋內及動  
造等衫毛衣運

Manufacturers of High Grade  
Singlets and Woollen Un-  
derwears

Products on sale at The Wing  
On Co., Ltd. and all leading  
Stores

Factory:	九電	竹	香	廠 址
Saukiwan	六	話	港	
Road,	號	式	灣	
Hongkong.	壹	道	道	
Phone: 21896,	八		環	

FIGURE 4.5 Advertisement of the Wei Sun Knitting Factory  
 SOURCE: YONG AN YOUXIAN GONGSI (THE WING ON CO. LTD.), THE WING ON CO., LTD.  
 HONG KONG IN COMMEMORATION OF 25TH ANNIVERSARY 1907-1932 (HONG KONG: THE  
 WING ON COMPANY, 1932), NO PAGINATION.

swine lard, leather products such as shoes, soap, sugar, preserved ginger, saltpeter (for making cosmetics and perfumes), paper, soy sauce, vermilion (a brilliant red pigment made of mercury sulfide), lead powder (for cosmetics), vinegar, aerated water, and metalware. Fifteen knitting and weaving factories were set up in Hong Kong, with an annual production of more than 1.2 million shirts. Together with ten other factories in Canton and Macao, these factories contributed about 70 percent of all knitwear produced in South China.<sup>112</sup> By the late 1920s, six hundred to seven hundred Chinese factories existed in Hong Kong.<sup>113</sup> This is a conservative estimate. A Chinese survey published in 1941 shows that by 1930, eight hundred factories had been established by the Chinese in Hong Kong. Among them, “two to three hundred factories were producing woven and knitted goods, on a larger scale than those in Shanghai.”<sup>114</sup>

### Conclusion

This chapter points out the changing economic environment of the 1930s in which the businesses of leading Chinese bourgeoisie in Hong Kong and Singapore were embedded. Chinese bourgeoisies in the SCCC as well as Hokkien and Teochew associations concentrated in the business sectors that faced challenges from the expansion of Japanese goods. The Chinese bourgeois leaders in the nationalist campaigns in Singapore thus adopted a consistent anti-Japanese tone. In Hong Kong, the business interests of the leaders in the CGCCHK and the Tung Wah Board of Hospitals varied. For example, to diversify their investments when the Euro-Asian trade declined, the Nan Hoi and Po On Cantonese compradors in Hong Kong sought an alternative investment channel back in China. The Heung Sham owners of department stores, who had business investments in China before the Great Depression, also focused on sustaining their Chinese businesses rather than boycotting Japanese goods. As for the import-export traders of Kam Shan Chong and Nam Pak Hong, the supply of Japanese goods was essential to sustain their inter-Asian and trans-Pacific businesses. Therefore, the leadership and theme of each fund-raising campaign that the bourgeoisie in Hong Kong organized varied. With the emphasis on China markets and the concern of risking their Japanese trade, Chinese

112 Taiwan Sōtokufu Shokusan-kyoku ed. *Honkon ni okeru kōgyō*.

113 Ngo Tak-wing, “Industrial History and the Artifact of Laissez-faire Colonialism,” *Hong Kong’s History: State and Society under Colonial Rule*, ed. Ngo Tak-wing (London and New York: Routledge, 1999), 122–123.

114 Chan and Chan ed. *Bainian shangye*, xhg.

bourgeoisie in Hong Kong did not form a consistent and consolidated anti-Japanese position. But as shown in the previous chapter, in both Hong Kong and Singapore, the bourgeoisie did not fail in donating and raising funds to support China's defense against the Japanese territorial inroads. The bourgeoisie's concern in their business interests showed their continuing commitment to the notion of *shì yè jiù guó*. As such, their choice to keep their distance from the anti-imperialist struggles in the 1920s was made to preserve their business strength; in the 1930s, they expected to rescue their enterprises from the economic downturn of the Great Depression. After all, the Chinese overseas bourgeoisie in British Hong Kong and Singapore achieved their status in communal leadership through their economic success.

## Whose National Interests? Selling Chinese Goods along the Hong Kong–Singapore Corridor

Now if Chinese manufacturers in Hong Kong wanted to compete with products made in Canton, their only chance was to make use of British preferential tariffs: export to other British territories as much as possible.

—WONG KWONG TIN 黃廣田 (Huang Guangtian)<sup>1</sup>



On April 7, 1935, during the general meeting of the CGCCHK, the chairperson Wong Kwong Tin made the above comment. It emphasized the importance of redirecting the markets for Hong Kong's products from China to the rest of the British empire. The statement highlighted Wong's view about the importance of forging a Hong Kong–Singapore business corridor at the time when China's heavy tariffs from 1930 burdened the Hong Kong merchants, and when the British, beginning in 1932, implemented the British Imperial Preference system to promote trade within the British empire.

Beginning in 1930, when the global economic slump hit the Euro-Asian trade (chapter 4), Chinese overseas bourgeoisie in Hong Kong and Singapore expected the Nanjing government to certify their products as Chinese national goods. This would exempt them from paying the high Chinese import tariffs required on foreign imports. The Nanjing government declined this request. The protective policies set up in Nanjing were aimed at supporting the development of domestic Chinese industry, not those based overseas. Existing studies have pointed out the correlation between Nanjing's policies and the support of Shanghai capitalists to Chiang Kai-shek's leadership.<sup>2</sup> But given that Chinese overseas support was crucial to Chiang's government, one may well query what was implied by the official refusal to protect Chinese overseas capitalists vis-à-vis the latter's claims of economic rights. In the process of distinguishing products made by "Chinese" from those made by foreign capitalists, the notion of Chinese interests was constructed within the contour of the territorial boundary of China. Territorially defined Chinese national interests were

1 HKMS 163-1-34: Minutes of Meetings of the CGCCHK, April 17, 1935.

2 Bergère, *The Golden Age of Chinese Bourgeoisie, 1911–1937*.

opposed to the emphasis on transnational Chineseness, dictated in the *jus sanguinis* principle of the Chinese law of nationality.<sup>3</sup> As a result, although Chinese overseas could claim their Chinese citizenship through tracing their ethnic roots, the businesses they set up outside the border of China were not considered Chinese. The motivation for Chinese overseas to claim their products as Chinese in order to receive special treatment in Chinese markets, in the terms of Aihwa Ong, was an exercise of claiming one's "economic citizenship."<sup>4</sup> This concept is helpful to understanding the making of the Hong Kong–Singapore business corridor, when Chinese bourgeoisie in Hong Kong and Singapore had to promote their own "buy Chinese products" campaigns despite a lack of official protection.

### Territorially Bounded Economic Nationalism in the Nanjing Decade

The Nanjing government's policies to promote the development of domestic manufacturing were set up against the backdrop of China pursuing its tariff autonomy, which the Nanjing government was able to reclaim, step by step, between 1928 and 1933. The achievement was a result of a decade-long struggle that started with Sun Yat-sen's anti-Beijing *hu fa* 護法 (protect the provisional constitution) movement 1917. Sun managed to develop Guangdong as his political base, and he demanded that Beijing spare customs surplus to Guangdong. Beijing compromised, sparing 13.9 percent of the customs surplus to Guangdong in 1919. This practice, however, was in place for only one year, as after 1920, the Guangdong government was disbanded.

Nonetheless, Britain learned the potential cost had it attempted to continue its domination of Chinese maritime customs. In a nine-nation conference in Washington (Washington Conference 1921–1922), the secretary to the delegation from Beijing, Dr. Phillip Tyau 刁作謙 (Diao Zuoqian), pointed out that "the greatest single cause of the financial and other weakness of the Peking [Beijing] government is that China now stands divested of all power over that source of revenue which has been the chief factor in the public finance of every modern national Government, the customs tariff."<sup>5</sup> The special committee of

3 Cochran, *Big Business in China*; Karl Gerth, *China Made: Consumer Culture and the Creation of the Nation* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Asia Center, 2003).

4 Aihwa Ong, *Flexible Citizenship: the Cultural Logics of Transnationality* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1999).

5 Charles James Fox, *China's Fight for Tariff Autonomy at the Washington Conference* (Tianjin: the North China Star, 1923), 4.

Chinese tariffs, organized in the Washington Conference, thus recognized the need to reconsider China's tariff issues. Another conclusion reached in the conference was the end of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. All involved countries (Britain, the United States, Japan, France, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Portugal) agreed upon the principle of dealing in Asian affairs (including their respective interests in China) under the Open Door Policy.

But the Chinese party that these foreign powers negotiated with was the Beijing government, not the Canton regime. As the latter was staging anti-British movements in the mid-1920s, London attributed this antagonism to the customs issue. In a telegram dispatched on January 13, 1926, from the Foreign Office at London to Sir R. Macleay in Beijing: "We are not convinced that Canton is merely Bolshevik and therefore alien to the rest of China and not amenable to the same treatment. Though boycott is prompted by Bolsheviks, does its root not lie rather in past refusal to allot due shares of customs to Canton? Would not concession in matter of customs revenues tend to promote settlement by strengthening hand of Right or even Left GMD who are uneasy under Soviet domination?"<sup>6</sup> Macleay, however, emphasized the danger of the Canton government, for its being "a good illustration of the evils inherent in the present regime," because of the devastating boycott against Hong Kong and its influence in foreshadowing problems elsewhere.<sup>7</sup> Macleay rejected what the Foreign Office suggested about "leaving local customs collections in the hands of local Chinese officials." Macleay's concerns included the disintegration of China and the spread of Bolshevism from Canton to elsewhere.<sup>8</sup> The British viewed the Beijing government as the ideal negotiating party, although the regime later "disappeared altogether" from the conference—the worst scenario that Britain could imagine.<sup>9</sup> Nonetheless, the table of interim surtaxes proposed in tariff meetings between London and Beijing in the mid-1920s became the foundation of Nanjing's renegotiation over China's tariffs with foreign countries after the Northern Expedition in 1928. In this regard, the Nanjing government reaped the fruits of the Beijing government's earlier negotiations.

T. V. Soong, the Minister of Finance of the Nanjing government, stipulated new trade treaties with all foreign countries to get rid of the 5 percent *ad valorem* imposed on China after the 1858 Treaty of Tianjin. China's new, higher import tariffs protected Chinese domestic manufactured goods

---

6 co 129/495: Cypher telegram to Sir. R. Macleay in Beijing from Foreign Office, January 13, 1926, No. 18, 459.

7 co 129/495: Chinese Special Custom Tariff Conference, 1926/01/06, 458.

8 co 129/495: Cypher Telegram to Sir R. Macleay, from Foreign Office, Feb. 20, 1926, 546.

9 co 129/496, FO Running Memo, Part VIII, May 31, 1926, 205–210.

from the competition of foreign imports in Chinese markets. The process of renewing all of China's trade treaties with foreign countries was completed in 1933.<sup>10</sup>

The Nanjing government set up plans to promote Chinese industrialization. In June 1928, in the midst of the Chinese anti-Japanese boycotts, Xue Dubi 薛篤弼, the Minister of Home Affairs, considered the development of the Chinese manufacturing sector as the fundamental solution to terminate China's dependence on industrial goods from Japan. And to distinguish Chinese from non-Chinese products, the government would issue certificates to qualified Chinese "national goods" (*guohuo* 國貨). The criterion of qualification included the use of Chinese capital, Chinese management, Chinese labor, and Chinese materials.<sup>11</sup> However, exceptions could be made when the use of foreign capital, foreign know-how, foreign technicians, and foreign materials was proved to be indispensable and beneficial to the Chinese economy. Based on these principles, products circulated in China would therefore be ranked by six levels: the quintessential Chinese national products would be produced from a company with 100 percent Chinese capital, Chinese management, Chinese materials, and Chinese workers. The sixth group included those that fulfilled only the minimal criteria: Chinese capital with foreign loans, Chinese management, mostly foreign materials, and Chinese workers as well as foreign technicians.<sup>12</sup> The following figure (figure 5.1) is based on the proposal of H. H. Kong 孔祥熙, the Minister of Industry and Commerce of the Nanjing government, concerning the application form that each Chinese manufacturer should submit to the government in order to obtain the certificate of Chinese national goods.

As there were no specifications about the conditions in which foreign management, materials, technology, and capital would be allowed, beginning in 1932, the Chinese Ministry of Industries (merged from the Ministry of Industry and Commerce as well as the Ministry of Agriculture and Mining, in 1930) proposed different plans to modify the criterion to certify Chinese national goods.

10 Koo Shou-Eng, *Tariff and the Development of the Cotton Industry in China, 1842–1937* (New York and London: Garland Publication, 1982), 190.

11 Guominzhenfu files, 001-110010-036: *Xue Dubi ti chang guohuo banfa* 薛篤弼提倡國貨辦法 [Xue Dubi's proposals for promoting the sales of national goods], June 1928–August 1928.

12 Files of the Ministry of Pragmatic Industry: 17-22-113-01, *Guohuo zhengming shu: Faji guohuo zhengmingshu guize* 國貨證明書：發給國貨證明書規則 [Certificates of Chinese national products: Rules of issuing certificates of Chinese national product, June 1928–August 1929] (Taipei: Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica).



*Gongshang-bu Zhonghua guohuo zhanlanhui* 工商部中華國貨展覽會 (Exhibition of Chinese National Products) in Shanghai. Among the 13,271 products on display, the Nanyang Brothers' Tobacco Company, Sincere Company, Wing On Company, Sun Company, and other Chinese companies originating in Hong Kong and expanding to Shanghai all organized their own exhibition rooms. After the exhibition, the Ministry of Industry and Commerce also encouraged all major cities in China to open their own showcases of Chinese goods.<sup>14</sup>

But supporting Chinese national goods was just one, albeit important, public agenda that these Hong Kong companies endorsed. A month before the exhibition in Shanghai, in October 1928, Sincere Company, Wing On Company, and Sun Company were in charge of promoting ticket sales for the British Garrison's Grand Tattoo at Sookunpoo Valley, Hong Kong. The three-day event, between October 4 and October 6, 1928, showcased the British incorporation of local Hong Kong culture. The program included British military army tattoos, Chinese martial arts performances, automobile shows, and multicultural dances.<sup>15</sup>

In contrast to their active, spontaneous role in organizing the Shandong Relief Fund (chapter 3), the Chinese bourgeoisie in Singapore were hesitant at first to agree to Nanjing's request to sponsor the Ministry of Industry and Commerce's Exhibition of Chinese Products. In October 1928, the preparatory committee of the official trade fair asked the sccc for a ten thousand dollar donation to sponsor the event. The sccc directors declined, considering the request as "the [committee's] attempt to be generous at the expense of the other [the sccc]."<sup>16</sup> But the Nanjing government continued to seek overseas investors from Singapore to support the organization of official-merchant joint stock companies, such as the China National Product Bank 中國國貨銀行 and Shanghai Great China Co. Ltd. 上海大中華有限公司. The proposals were met with fervent discussion among the sccc board of executive officers. Among them, Lim Kim Tian and Li Yuk Kai 李玉階 (Li Yujie) organized their own Great Overseas Chinese National Product Company Ltd. 大華僑國貨有限公司. Like those Shanghai-based "Chinese national product" companies, the Great Overseas Chinese National Product

14 Pan Junxiang 潘君祥, "20 niandai Zhongguo guohuo yundong de pengbo fazhan 20 年代中國國貨運動的蓬勃發展 [Prosperous development of the Chinese National Product Movement in the 1920s], in *Zhongguo jindai guohuo yundong* 中國近代國貨運動 [Buy Chinese product movements in modern China] ed. Pan (Beijing: Zhongguo wenshi chubanshe, 1996), 22–36.

15 WKYP: Sept. 5, 1928.

16 NA 007: Oct. 1, 1928.

Company employed the rhetoric of “promoting and improving Chinese national products.”<sup>17</sup>

For the Chinese overseas bourgeoisie, the official buy Chinese products movement failed to allay their concerns of making profits from abroad. The official definition of Chinese national products adhered to a rigorous territorial criterion. Only those produced within the territorial boundaries of the Republic of China could qualify as Chinese national products. Although the soaring Chinese import tariffs would protect the development of domestic manufacturers, this protection hurt the export of ethnic Chinese products from overseas communities to China. The Chinese overseas bourgeoisie handling the import-export trade with mainland China also realized that the high Chinese duties harmed their business.<sup>18</sup>

The impact of the soaring Chinese tariffs on Chinese overseas factories that used to take China as an important market was devastating. For example, the duty on rubber-soled shoes was raised from 5 to 17 percent in 1931 and then to 30 percent in 1933.<sup>19</sup> In the case of Hong Kong–Canton trade, the situation was more complicated, given that the Nanjing government, between May 1931 and July 1936, granted Canton the autonomy to set up its own tariffs, which were heavier than the Nanjing system.<sup>20</sup> For example, from 1932 to 1933, the import tariffs of woolen and cotton textiles from Hong Kong to China soared from 50 to 100 percent. Tariffs on necessities such as salted fish rose 100 percent.<sup>21</sup> Effective from May 1933, taxation of foreign crops, most of them rice, contributed to 16,000,000 dollars (Guangdong bills), or 30 percent of all revenues for the province.<sup>22</sup> The loss of Hong Kong merchants was a gain for Guangdong:

17 NA 007: Feb. 13, 1929.

18 WKYP: January 5, 1934; March 1934; CGCCHK, *CHCCHK Annual Report*, 1933, 1–3.

19 Norman Miners, “Industrial Development in the Colonial Empire and the Imperial Economic Conference at Ottawa 1932,” *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 30, 2 (May 2002): 53–76. The citation is on page 57.

20 This is a compromise with the plan that Chen Jitang’s Guangdong tried to assume control of Guangdong Maritime Customs from Nanjing. After Nanjing agreed to grant Canton the right to set up its own tariffs, Canton had to submit 5 percent of customs surplus to Nanjing. Chen Shiqi 陳詩啟, *Zhongguo jindai haiguan shi: minguo bufen* 中國近代海關史: 民國部份 [History of the Maritime Customs in Modern China: the Republican Era] (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe), 262–265.

21 CGCCHK, *CGCCHKAR* 1933: 8.

22 Kang Jing A 姜珍亞, “1935 nian de Shentou shijian: 1930 niandai Guangdong difang guanshui(zhuanshui) han Riben 1935 年的汕頭事件: 1930 年代廣東地方關稅和日本 [The Swatow incident of 1935: Guangdong’s local taxes and Japan in the 1930s], in *1930 Niandai de Zhongguo* 一九三〇年代的中國, ed. Zhongguo shehui kexuyuan jindai

between 1933 and 1936, these commercial and industrial taxes were 65 to 85 percent of the local revenues in Guangdong.<sup>23</sup>

Against this backdrop, although the British colony remained the most important transshipment center in South China, export of foreign goods from Hong Kong to Guangdong declined. In 1933, 13.26 percent, or the fourth largest amount of imports to Canton, came from Hong Kong. In 1935, the percentage slumped to only 6.7 percent.<sup>24</sup>

Chinese overseas in Hong Kong and Singapore did not find this official exclusion justified. The overseas bourgeoisie, especially manufacturers and import-export traders, claimed their Chinese identity, contribution to China's affairs, and job creation for fellow Chinese migrants. Beginning in 1929, the Singapore-based rubber tycoon Tan Kah Kee filed a request for reduction of import tariffs for products imported by overseas Chinese enterprises to China.<sup>25</sup> In the following year, an advertisement about his understanding of "Chinese national products" was published in the *Nan Yang Siang Pau* (figure 5.2):

A student asked a teacher, "What does national economy mean?"

The teacher replied, "National economy means people only purchase products made by their own nation. Are you wearing shoes made by Chinese?"

All of the students said, "Sure! They are products of the Tan Kah Kee & Co."

The teacher cheerfully said, "That is exactly what national economy means. All products of Tan Kah Kee & Co. are national goods."<sup>26</sup>

---

shi yanjiu suo minguo yanjiu shi, Sichuan shefan daxue lishi xi wenhua xue yuan 中國社會科學院近代史研究所民國史研究室、四川師範大學歷史文化學院 (Beijing: Shehui kexue wenxian chubanshe, 2006), 323–337.

- 23 Kang Jing A, *1930 nendai Kanton-shō no zaisei seisaku: chōowu, jikata, shōnin no sansha kankei wo chūshin ni* 1930年代広東省の財政政策：中央、地方商人の三者關係を中心に [Financial policies of the Guangdong province in the 1930s: focusing on the relationship among the central and local governments as well as merchants], unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Concentration of East Asian History, Research Institute of Humanities and Societies, Tokyo University, 36–37.
- 24 Deng Kaisong and Lu Xiaomin 鄧開頌、陸曉敏 eds., *Yue GangAao jindai guanxishi* 粵港澳近代關係史 [Modern relationship between Canton, Macao, and Hong Kong] (Canton: Guangdong renmin chubanshe, 1996), 246.
- 25 *NYSF*: March 21, 1930.
- 26 *NYSF*: various days in 1930.



FIGURE 5.2 Advertisement of Tan Kah Kee & Co., 1930

SOURCE: NYSF: AUGUST–SEPTEMBER 1930, VARIOUS DAYS.

In Tan’s ad, a Chinese product meant a product made by ethnic Chinese, whether they resided in mainland China or abroad and held Chinese or foreign citizenship. Tan himself was a naturalized British subject, as were many business leaders in Singapore and Hong Kong. He insisted that his products fully qualified as Chinese national products. Nonetheless, the government did not support his business. In 1934, in part because of the loss of markets in China, in part because of the expansion of Japanese goods in the South Seas, he liquidated his company.<sup>27</sup> The Chinese bourgeois communities in Singapore looked at Tan’s case and criticized the Chinese Nationalist Government’s failure to protect its merchants.<sup>28</sup>

Tan Kah Kee might be the most high-profile Chinese overseas manufacturer who expected to be covered by the official buy Chinese products movement, but he was not the only one. In another case, in August 1932, the match manufacturer Lee Kim So 李金賜 (Li Jinsi) argued that his wooden matches, made by Chinese workers in his Chinese-run factories in British Malaya, could become a popular choice for customers in China since the dominant matches were all made in Japan and the United States. Responses from the Ministry of Industries, which were dispatched quickly, reiterated that all products produced outside the territorial boundary of the Chinese nation-state were

27 NYSF: June 7, 1934.

28 sccc, *Xinjiapo zhonghua zongshanghui guohuo kuoda zhanlan tuixiao dahui tekan* 新嘉坡中華總商會國貨擴大展覽推銷大會特刊 [Special Issue of the Grant Exhibition of Chinese Products Organized by the Singapore Chinese Chamber of Commerce] (Singapore: sccc. 1935), Section e, 1–3.

“foreign products” and should be taxed as foreign imports, without any exception.<sup>29</sup>

In Hong Kong, individual merchants and the CGCCHK likewise requested that their products be exempted from import taxes from both Nanjing and Guangdong, when the latter formed the semi-independent Southwest regime between 1931 and 1936. All requests were denied. The CGCCHK leaders pushed forward the organization of the Chinese Manufacturers' Union, Hong Kong (CMUHK), in spring 1934.<sup>30</sup> Chan Lim Pak was elected the first chair, though he did not assume the position.<sup>31</sup> A year later, Nanjing still did not modify its policies.<sup>32</sup>

Given that Chinese overseas had been important donors for various charities and fund-raising events, the government was careful to balance its protection of domestic capitalists and overseas bourgeoisie. The news of the liquidation of Tan Kah Kee's company in Singapore in 1934 shocked the Nanjing government. In July 1934, Wu Jing-heng 吳敬恆 cited Tan's case to request Chiang Kai-shek to allocate five million dollars from Chinese national bonds to support the Shenxin Textile Factory 申新紡織廠 in Shanghai: “I am not demanding our government to emulate the ways that Japan and the United States help their merchants. I am just suggesting that the government should try its best to support integral people like Tan Kah Kee.”<sup>33</sup>

Though the Chinese bourgeoisie in Hong Kong and Singapore were in the same boat regarding their exclusion from the official buy Chinese products movement, those in Hong Kong seemed to be more salient. To avoid the high import tariffs, many Chinese companies in Hong Kong began to set up branch factories in Guangdong. In 1932, it was reported that there were “few factories

29 Record group number 422 (4), file number 719: Xinjiapo Li Jinsi faming huocha muzhi qing mian jinko shui 新嘉坡李金賜發明火柴木枝請免進口稅 [Request to exempt import tariffs by Lee Kim So from Singapore who invented wooden matches] (Nanjing: the 2nd Historical Archives).

30 WKYP: March 11, 1934.

31 CMUHK [Chinese Manufacturers' Union (Hong Kong)], *Xianggang zhonghua changshang chupin zhinan* 香港中華廠商出品指南 [Directory of Hong Kong Chinese manufactures] (Hong Kong: Chinese Manufacturers' Union, 1936), 2.

32 HKMS 163-1-34: Minutes of meeting of the CGCCHK, April 17, 1935.

33 Chiang files: 002-080200-00436-151, Wu Jingheng de dian Jiang Zhongzheng qing zhun Shenxin fangzhi chang faxing gongzhai yi zi weizhi de wen dian ri bao bia 吳敬恆等電蔣中正請准申新紡織廠發行公債以資維持等文電日報表 [Cables about requests from Wu Jingheng et al. to Chiang Kai-shek about permitting the Shenxing Textile Factory to issue national bonds in order to sustain], July 5, 1934.

in Hong Kong which are not duplicated in China."<sup>34</sup> For example, Ping Sing Knitting Company, founded by the Lee brothers in Yaumatei, Hong Kong, in 1922, set up a branch factory in Canton in 1935. Standard Chemical Works Ltd., founded by Luk Chung Shan and Robert Der in 1931, opened a branch office in Canton in 1932. Nam Jam Factory, a manufacturer of flashlights, set up in Hong Kong in 1928 and subsequently opened a branch factory in Canton.<sup>35</sup> An industrial zone between Canton and Hong Kong was in the making. However, this was not the best solution for the Hong Kong bourgeoisie, as the products made in Canton would have to cover the import tariffs for the materials shipped from Hong Kong, as well as the export taxes when the final products had to be transported to overseas markets via Hong Kong.

Leaders of the CGCCHK thus envisioned to develop Hong Kong as the Chinese industrial center. In the words of the CGCCHK's 1933 Chairperson Wong Kwong Tin:

After the global economic depression, Hong Kong suffered from the soaring gold prices in international trade and from the rising tariffs of domestic [China] trade. In China, the internal political struggles, foreign invasion as well as the communist uprisings all weakened people's purchasing power. All the above conditions seriously hurt Hong Kong's economy . . . In the process of awaiting the recovery . . . we have to know the recent prosperous growth of the manufacturing sector in Hong Kong. Now there is a strong quest in China that Chinese should no longer count on manufacturing goods imported from foreign countries but should produce Chinese own goods. Hong Kong's geographical location is convenient to access to the China markets. Hong Kong also enjoys the stable political protection. It would be a natural trend for Hong Kong to become the center of Chinese manufacturing production.<sup>36</sup>

Chinese manufacturers in Hong Kong believed that they were in a better position in marketing and exporting Chinese industrialist goods. This confidence came from the use of British preferential tariffs.<sup>37</sup>

---

34 CGCCHK, *CGCCHKAR* 1932, 22.

35 CMUHK, *Xianggang zhonghua changshang chupin zhinan*, section b.

36 CGCCHK, *CGCCHKAR* 1933, 1–3.

37 HKMS 163-1-34: Minutes of meeting of the CGCCHK, April 17, 1935.

## Economic Citizenship in the Hong Kong–Singapore Business Corridor

The British preferential tariffs were part of the British Imperial Preference system, which was established in 1932. In order to design new strategies for global trade amid the rise of national tariffs worldwide, with China as a crucial case, nations of the British Commonwealth convened an Imperial Economic Conference in Ottawa in 1932 (the Ottawa Conference 1932). The conclusion was to set up preferential tariffs to facilitate trade within the British empire while imposing a heavy *ad valorem* on foreign imports entering British markets. Britain's primary concern was to sustain the domination of its manufactured goods in the empire's markets. In general, a 10 percent reduction on import tariffs would be granted to all products manufactured in the empire, if they could demonstrate that 50 percent of their production cost was related to British content (including raw materials, overhead expenses, and labor). In Hong Kong, because few raw materials were produced locally, the criterion was initially set at 25 percent. Implementation of the new tariffs system, which distinguished merchandise coming out of the British territories from those within, marked the abandonment of the British long-term practice of the free-trade system.<sup>38</sup>

The 25 percent of leeway allowed Chinese manufacturers in Hong Kong to import raw materials or even semifinished products from China (particularly Guangdong province) for final processing. While only minimal parts of the production process were conducted in Hong Kong, these products nonetheless qualified for certification as empire products and enjoyed the preferential duty.<sup>39</sup> The CMUHK was authorized to issue certificates for exports from Hong Kong under the British Imperial Preference system.<sup>40</sup> With the certificate, the products would enjoy low British tariffs to other British markets. For instance, an advertisement of the Hong Kong Match Factory, printed in 1940, emphasized the following two messages: "products from our factory could enjoy the British preferential tariffs" and "what a glory to use national products!" (figure 5.3). The idea of taking this opportunity to expand in the vast British markets motivated some factories from Canton to open new production sites in Hong Kong. In other examples, the Kwang Tung Hat Factory, established in 1924 in Canton, set up its factory in Hong Kong in 1933; Chuan Hsin Knitting

38 *Hong Kong General Chamber of Commerce Annual Report for the year 1932* (HKGCCAR 1932): 21–22; Endacott, *A History of Hong Kong*, 292–293.

39 HKGCCAR 1932: 22; HKGCCAR 1933: 22–23; HKGCCAR 1935: 26–27.

40 CGCCHK, *Xianggang zhonghua zongshang hui bainianshi*, 50.

**品出廠柴火港香**  
HONG KONG MATCH FACTORY

採用國貨，是何等光榮！



請用國貨 頂上火柴  
灣瓜土龍九港香設廠

本廠出品英屬可享特惠稅

BEST EUROPEAN & CHINESE MATERIALS  
SAFETY MATCHES  
LAM TONG COMPANY LIMITED  
PENANG  
商標 888 註冊  
進製廠柴火港香  
灣瓜土龍九港香  
FACTORY: TOKWAWAN, KOWLOON, H.K.

三個八味安全火柴



道前火燒着醫  
首投倫華  
進製廠柴火港香  
灣瓜土龍九港香  
HONGKONG MATCH FACTORY

HONGKONG MATCH FACTORY  
BEST EUROPEAN AND CHINESE MATERIALS  
SAFETY MATCHES  
紅葉牌火柴  
REDLEAF BRAND  
TRADE MARK  
FACTORY: TOKWAWAN ROAD, KOWLOON, H.K.



國貨



港 灣瓜土龍九港香

二三八二三：話電 樓六行銀亞東港香：處事辦  
 OFFICE: BANK OF EAST ASIA BLDG. 5TH FLOOR TEL. 32832  
 六七七七五：話電 街州貴道灣瓜土龍九：址廠  
 FACTORY: TOKWAWAN-KOWLOON TEL. 57776

FIGURE 5.3 Advertisement of Hong Kong Match Factory  
 SOURCE: XINGDAO RIBAO 星島日報, KANGZHAN SAN ZHOUNIAN JI XINGDAO RIBAO CHUANG KAN LIANG ZHOUNIAN JINIAN TEKAN 抗戰三週年暨星島日報創刊兩週年紀念特刊 [SOUVENIR PUBLICATION OF THE THIRD ANNIVERSARY OF THE ANTI-JAPANESE WAR AND THE SECOND ANNIVERSARY OF THE XING DAO RIBAO] (HONG KONG: XING DAO RIBAO SHE, 1940).

Factory, founded in Macao in 1930, opened a factory in Hong Kong in 1933; and the Chow Ngai Hing Knitting Factory, from Canton, expanded its Hong Kong factory (established in 1927) in 1934.<sup>41</sup>

The establishment of Canton-originated firms in Hong Kong, together with the growing number of Hong Kong-based manufacturers who set up factories in Canton, blurred the boundary between Chinese manufacturers in Hong Kong and those in Canton.<sup>42</sup> Japanese intelligence reports commented that most “made in Hong Kong” products were actually manufactured in Canton.<sup>43</sup>

These Canton-originated goods—either semifinished or fully completed—once shipped to Hong Kong and labeled as Hong Kong products, could be exempted from the discriminatory tariffs when entering the Malaya markets.<sup>44</sup> Singapore was exempted from the discriminatory tariffs against foreign goods because the British expected it to keep its supreme transshipment status in the maritime South Seas.<sup>45</sup> In the mid-1930s, the CMUHK coordinated with the SCCC to strengthen the economic ties between the two British colonies with predominant Chinese populations. In 1935 and 1936, the SCCC hosted two trade fairs of Chinese national goods, respectively: the First Grant Exhibition of Chinese National Products between October 5 and 13, 1935, and the Second Grant Exhibition of Chinese National Products between October 2 and 11, 1936. The Hokkien tea merchant Lim Keng Lian was the principal organizer of both trade fairs.<sup>46</sup> Behind the scenes, the interests presented there were not about the Chinese manufacturers in Singapore but those based in Hong Kong. Trade agents in Singapore found it a good opportunity to introduce their imports from Hong Kong. At the trade fair in 1935, three out of five

41 CMUHK, *Xianggang zhonghua changshang chupin zhinan*, section b.

42 Chung Wai-keung, “Made in China or Made in Hong Kong? National Goods and the Hong Kong Business Community,” in *Colonial Hong Kong and Modern China: Interaction and Reintegration*, ed. Lee Pui-tak (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2005), 185–198.

43 NKZ 17, 5 (May 1931): 47–52; NKZ 19, 10 (October 1933): 38.

44 In May 1932 and July 1933 respectively, the British set up in Federated Malay States and Un-federated Malay States. Shimizu Hiroshi and Hirakawa Hitoshi, *Japan and Singapore in the World Economy: Japan's Economic Advance into Singapore, 1870–1965* (London and New York: Routledge, 1999), 82.

45 Huff, *The Economic Growth of Singapore: Trade and Development in the Twentieth Century* (Cambridge University Press, 1994), 108, 266.

46 SCCC, *Xinjiapo zhonghua zongshanghui guohuo kuoda zhanlan tuixiao dahui tekan*; *Xinjiapo zhonghua zongshanghui di erjie guohuo zhanlan tuixiao dahui tekan* 新嘉坡中華總商會第二屆國貨展覽推銷大會特刊 [Souvenir Issue of the Second Exhibition of National Products hosted by the Singapore Chinese Chamber of Commerce] (Singapore: SCCC 1936).

weaving factories classified as participants from Singapore belonged to companies based in Hong Kong (table 5.1). In the second trade fair in Singapore, in 1936, among the thirty-five piece-goods, weaving, and knitting manufacturers who participated, twenty-nine came from Hong Kong and the remaining six were from Shanghai.<sup>47</sup>

The initial encounter between Hong Kong and Singapore merchants pointed to the expansion of the Guangdong–Hong Kong industrial zone to the South Seas, as well as the Hokkien dominance in the buy Chinese products movements in Singapore. According to the report of the manager of the general office of the CMUHK, Liang Qianwu 梁謙武, at the trade fair in 1935, the delegates from Hong Kong felt neglected because no one talked to them.<sup>48</sup> The problem centered on the fact that the Hong Kong representatives spoke only Cantonese, which was not understood by the organizers in Singapore. This reveals two things: first, most of the CMUHK and the Guangdong–Hong Kong industrial capitalists were Cantonese but did not belong to other speech-groups such as Hakka or Teochew from Guangdong. Second, in the SCCC, the leaders in charge of the exhibitions were non-Cantonese speakers. Given that the SCCC was a Hokkien-dominant association (chapter 1), and that Lim Keng Lian was a Hokkien who attended colleges in Beijing,<sup>49</sup> one may well assume that the languages used in the venue were either Hokkien or Mandarin Chinese. None of them was intelligible to Cantonese. The interests between Cantonese industrialists and the Hokkien import-export trade thus converged in Singapore in the middle of the 1930s, though at the interpersonal level, linguistic barrier between the Hokkien and Cantonese speech-groups continued to set them apart.

The trade fairs in Singapore also drew many Chinese merchants from major cities in mainland China such as Tianjin, Shanghai, and Canton. Together they adopted the slogan “Chinese buy Chinese products.” This slogan, however, was interpreted differently by merchants from China and those in Hong Kong and Singapore. Those from China were interested in expanding exports to the South Seas; those in Hong Kong and Singapore expected the Chinese government to protect their trade in China. But overall, these exhibitions lend weight to the notion of transnational Chinese economic citizenship, deviating from the Chinese official criteria of “Chinese products” as defined by territorially

47 SCCC, *Xinjiapo zhonghua zongshanghui di erjie guohuo zhanlan tuixiao dahui tekan*, section I, 1–2.

48 CMUHK, *Xianggang zhonghua changshang chupin zhinan*, section d: 10–16.

49 Jason Lim, “The Education Concerns and Political Outlook of Lim Keng Lian (1893–1968),” 194–219.

TABLE 5.1 *Commodities Displayed by Hong Kong and Singapore Firms in the sccc's First Grant Exhibition of Chinese National Products in 1935*

Product Classification	Total Number of Hong Kong Firms*	Total Number of Singapore Firms
Chinese patent medicine/dispenser	12	12 (1 Shanghai; 2 Canton)**
Chinese spirits	1	1
Coconut oil	0	1
Cosmetics	2	3 (2 Hong Kong)
Educational supplements	2	2 (1 Shanghai)
Electronic utilities (flashlights and batteries, etc.)	8	5 (2 Hong Kong)
Enamelware	0	1
Food (candy, cake, soy sauce, soda, etc.)	5	8
Household utilities	2	5 (1 Canton)
Incense, insect repellent	2	3 (1 Macao)
Ivory sculptures	1	0
Leather products	0	2 (1 Shanghai)
Paint	2	1
Paper	1	0
Print	0	2
Rubber	1	3
Shoes and hats	2	4
Silk	0	2
Silver utensils	0	1
Soap	1	1
Tailored goods	0	1
Tea	0	2
Tobacco	0	2
Woven and knitted goods	16	5 (3 Hong Kong)
Total	58	67

\* Includes the Hong Kong firms that dispatched representatives to the fair and the firms that were represented by trade agents in Singapore.

\*\* Parentheses indicate the number of Singapore firms that were branch offices of companies elsewhere.

Source: Compiled from sccc, *Xinjiapo zhonghua zongshanghui guohuo kuoda zhanlan tuixiao dahui tekan* 新嘉坡中華總商會國貨擴大展覽推銷大會特刊 [Special Issue of the Grant Exhibition of Chinese Products Organized by the Singapore Chinese Chamber of Commerce] (Singapore: sccc, 1935), section h and i.

bounded tariff systems. Chinese manufacturers set up in Western colonies and in China were treated equally at the exhibitions in Singapore, but the official discourses excluded those manufactured in foreign territories from the category of Chinese national goods.

What the Nanjing government learned from the two trade fairs of Chinese goods was the potential organizing power of the Chinese bourgeoisie overseas. The government wanted to use this power to promote the sale of products made in China abroad. In an article entitled “My Plan to Develop the South Seas Trade,” published in the souvenir volume issued for the first nationalist trade fair organized by the SCCC in 1935, the Minister of Pragmatic Industry, Chen Gongbo 陳公博, explained this position. He argued the importance of persuading all Chinese in South Seas to consume products made in China. Not a word was mentioned about how to facilitate the growth of ethnic Chinese manufacturers in overseas societies such as Hong Kong and Singapore.<sup>50</sup>

The refusal of both the Southwest regime and Nanjing to lower the import tariffs for Chinese overseas products seems to be an important factor in the organization of a biweekly subcommittee within the CGCCHK, the Prospering Commerce Working Committee 繁榮商務促進會, on February 12, 1936. Its primary facilitator was the comprador-turned-Guangdong sugar dealer Mok Ying Kui. In the subcommittee’s second meeting, on April 17, 1936, Mok proposed developing a tourist industry in Hong Kong to boost its economy.<sup>51</sup> In another meeting, on July 2, the Hong Kong Society of Silk and Craft Workshop (*Xianggang xilianxie gongyi she*) sent a similar request that the CGCCHK tried but failed, about the importance of filing a petition to the Chinese government for a reduced import tariff for Hong Kong products. Under the current situation, “business declined and many moved to Macao, Swatow and elsewhere, workers lost their jobs.”<sup>52</sup> Though the committee’s initial response was to ask the association to elaborate more on the proposal next time, at the very same meeting Mok appeared to see some chance of a breakthrough. He reported to the committee about possible improvements to the tariffs imposed on Hong Kong imports: “If Hong Kong manufacturers of Chinese national goods could submit the following information—first, a list of all national goods produced

50 SCCC, *Xinjiapo zhonghua zongshanghui guohuo kuoda zhanlan tuixiao dahui tekan* [Special Issue of the Grant Exhibition of Chinese Products Organized by the Singapore Chinese Chamber of Commerce] (Singapore: SCCC 1935), section j, 1–5.

51 HKMS 163-1-32: the Prospering Commerce Working Committee of the CGCCHK, Minutes of General Affairs Committee: Meeting on April 17, 1936.

52 HKMS 163-1-32: the Prospering Commerce Working Committee of the CGCCHK, Minutes of General Affairs Committee: Meeting on July 2, 1936.

in the factory; second, percentage of Chinese raw materials and proportion of foreign materials; third, a list of national goods that would be exported to Canton—the provincial government and [Guangdong] Chamber of Commerce would improve the situation respectively.”<sup>53</sup>

Mok's assessment was related to the changing politics in China. In July 1936, the separate Southwest regime ceased to exist, as Chiang Kai-shek suppressed the revolt of Chen Jitang that took place a month earlier (chapter 6). But this later proved to be another futile effort to demand equal treatment for overseas Chinese manufacturers. In November 1937, one year after the second fair of Chinese national goods in Singapore, the Minister of Finance reiterated the principle that “all products that were not manufactured in China, no matter the nationality of their producers, should pay the import tariffs.”<sup>54</sup> This decision dismayed the Hong Kong bourgeoisie. During the same meeting, a CGCCHK member pointed out that the Chinese Nationalist Government still owed the CGCCHK the majority of the loan of 10,000,000 Hong Kong dollars borrowed during the Northern Expedition. The merchant should thus be exempted from twenty years of import tariffs in lieu of paying back the loans. The CGCCHK did not agree with this proposal.<sup>55</sup> Nonetheless, this proposal manifested the frustration, and even resentment, of Chinese bourgeoisie in Hong Kong toward the government's refusal to protect their businesses.

### **Incorporating Hong Kong in the Contour of the Shanghai Trade**

The Nanjing government finally began to pay attention to Chinese manufacturers in Hong Kong after July 1937, but it prioritized those relocating from Shanghai and those based in China's southwest expecting to export from Hong Kong. Following Japan's occupation of Shanghai and Nanjing in December 1937, many Chinese domestic industrialists left Shanghai along with the retreat of Chiang Kai-shek's nationalist government to Chongqing. Losing most of their seaports on China's coast, Chiang's government and his capitalist followers found it difficult to export Chinese industrial goods. Only those manufacturers relocating to Hong Kong, most of them from Shanghai, could engage in foreign trade under

---

53 HKMS 163-1-32: the Prospering Commerce Working Committee of the CGCCHK, Minutes of General Affairs Committee, July 2, 196.

54 HKMS 163-1-32: the Prospering Commerce Working Committee of the CGCCHK, Minutes of General Affairs Committee, November 26, 1937.

55 HKMS 163-1-32: the Prospering Commerce Working Committee of the CGCCHK, Minutes of General Affairs Committee, November 26, 1937.

the British trading policies. From the perspective of Hong Kong's economic development, the war brought an influx of refugees to Hong Kong that provided not only abundant capital and technical and commercial expertise but also an ample labor force.<sup>56</sup> A report estimated that, between 1937 and 1940, seven hundred Shanghai factories reorganized in Hong Kong.<sup>57</sup> These Shanghai capitalists substituted for Singapore merchants as business partners of the CMUHK. Between 1938 and 1940, the CMUHK organized four exhibitions of Chinese products. Most participants were Hong Kong-based manufacturers.<sup>58</sup> But there was a special exhibition section for Shanghai manufacturers at the fourth fair (held between December 22, 1940, and January 2, 1941). Throughout the four fairs, no trading agents from Singapore attended.<sup>59</sup>

The exclusion of Singapore Chinese manufacturers was concordant with the official policy of the Chinese Nationalist Government. In July 1939, the Chinese Consulate in Singapore noticed that the Chinese government now granted exceptions for those Chinese manufactured goods made in Hong Kong. He thus requested the Chinese Nationalist Government to verify whether the criterion of being certified as Chinese “national” goods had changed. Examining this request in the context of the SCCC's long-term expectation for tariff reductions from the Chinese Nationalist Government, the implication was to explore whether governmental protection could likewise extend to the industrial goods manufactured by the Chinese in Singapore. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Chinese Nationalist Government, however, explained the exception by emphasizing the importance of the origin of those Hong Kong factories: “The original idea was to recognize Chinese national goods only for those made in China, but the current situation is special. Many Shanghai manufacturers had to relocate to Hong Kong because of the anti-Japanese war.” An example was the Tian Chu MSG Manufacturer 天廚味精廠. It was founded in 1923 as the first Chinese MSG factory in Shanghai. Before moving to Hong Kong in the aftermath of the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, in 1937, the company was a certified Chinese factory for the production of “national products.” The government later authorized the CGCCHK and CMUHK to issue licenses of Chinese

56 Chan and Chan ed., *Bainian shangye*, no pagination.

57 Chan and Chan ed., *Bainian shangye*, no pagination.

58 CMUHK, *Xianggang zhonghua changshang lianhehui xinxia kamu qingdian tekan* 香港中華廠商聯合會新廈開幕慶典特刊 [Souvenir Issue of the Establishment of the New Building of the Chinese Manufacturer's Union, Hong Kong] (Hong Kong: Chinese Manufacturers' Union, Hong Kong, 1964), 24.

59 Industrial and Chinese Products (ICP; Chinese title: Guohuo yu shi ye 國貨與實業) 1, 2 (February 1941; Hong Kong): 105–107.

national products to Chinese manufacturers in Hong Kong. But in any case, those based in Singapore were not included in the government's protection.<sup>60</sup>

According to the mandate of the Chinese Nationalist Government's Department of Economics in October 1940, all Chinese manufacturers overseas, if they wanted to sell their products as Chinese national goods either in China or overseas, were required to apply for licenses of "Chinese products" according to the following criteria: first, the factories had to be built entirely with overseas Chinese capital, or with less than half of the total capital contributed by foreigners; second, if any foreign capital was involved, the factories were required to be managed and operated by overseas Chinese. If the factories used foreign capital and foreign raw materials, these could not originate from enemy countries.<sup>61</sup> For the first time, Chinese manufacturers established in Hong Kong could have their products officially recognized as "Chinese."<sup>62</sup>

The inclusion of Hong Kong as an eligible production locus of Chinese national goods in 1940 reflected the challenges imposed by Japan's fast expansion, as it took over most coastal cities in China. In September 1941, the Lee Kung Min Knitting Factory 利工民織造廠 in Hong Kong, originally founded in Canton in 1923, asked the Overseas Chinese Committee to clarify that its current operation was no longer related to its factory in Canton, which was taken by Japan after October 1938. The concern behind the request was that the company's trademark kept the factory addresses in both Hong Kong and Canton, thus generating concern among Chinese consumers about whether Lee Kung Min products were Japanese goods (figure 5.4). The owners of the Lee Kung Min Knitting Factory claimed that all their products were made in their factories in British Hong Kong and should thus be certified as Chinese goods. To distinguish their Hong Kong-made products from the copycats in Canton who stole their trademarks, the official solution was to request the CMUHK to issue certificates for all Lee Kung Min's Hong Kong-made products to prove they were not from Japanese Canton. It is worth noting that the

60 The government's response in the original document mentioned only the CGCCHK, but the wording is "the two associations, the CGCCHK and the other." See Record group number 4 (Mingguo shiqi Caizhengbu dang an 民國時期財政部檔案 [Files of Ministry of Finance, ROC era]), file number 9993: *Xinjiapo lingshiguan qing Waijiaobu dianxun guohuo shi fo xu zai guonei zhizao fang wei guohuo san xiang wen ti* 新嘉坡領事館請外交部電詢國貨是否需在國內製造方為國貨三項問題 [Chinese Consulate in Singapore inquired about the Minister of Foreign Affairs about whether Chinese national products must be made inside China and other three questions], 1938–1939 (Nanjing: Second Historical Archives).

61 *ICP* 1, 1 (January 1941, Hong Kong), 84.

62 *ICP* 1, 5 (May 1941): 97; *ICP* 1, 6 (June 1941): 113.



trademark of the Lee Kung Min Knitting Factory highlights that it was registered through both the Chinese and British governments.<sup>63</sup>

Between 1938 and 1941, the Chinese Nationalist Government's main concern about the industrialist capitalists in Hong Kong was related to those relocating from Shanghai. To support these Shanghai industrialists, the Ministry of Finance of the Chinese Nationalist Government pushed forward the organization of the Industrial and Chinese Products Service Society 中國國貨實業服務社 (ICPSS) in Hong Kong in December 1940. It had the following purposes: to promote the sale of Chinese products in overseas markets, to accelerate the development of commerce and industry in China, to launch the Showcase of Chinese Products in Hong Kong 香港國貨陳列館, to issue certificates of Chinese products, to register all trademarks of Chinese products, to investigate markets in Southeast Asia, and, last but not least, to serve as a referral for technicians to work at specific industrial projects.<sup>64</sup> Against this backdrop, when the sccc was no longer active in hosting Chinese nationalist trade fairs, Chinese industrialists on the mainland became new business partners to the CMUHK.

The Minister of Finance of the Chinese Nationalist Government appreciated Hong Kong's model of exporting goods to other British territories. After building the connection between relocated Shanghai capitalists in Hong Kong and the CMUHK, the next issue would be convincing all overseas Chinese to support the sale of Chinese domestic manufactured goods. On top of the agenda was to distinguish the sales of Chinese products in overseas Chinese markets (*guo huo qiao xiao* 國貨僑銷) vis-à-vis those in other foreign markets (*guo huo wai xiao* 國貨外銷). The difference rested on the possible support of overseas Chinese in the promotion of China-made products.<sup>65</sup> According

63 HKMS 175 (Selected Microfilm Records from the Second Historical Archives of China relating to Hong Kong, 1896–1950): HKMS 175-1-194: *Qiaowei-hui wei Xianggang ligongmin shizao chang cheng yi liehuo fangmao kenyu yan cha* 僑委會為香港利工民織造廠呈以劣貨偽冒懇予嚴查 [The Overseas Chinese Committee's Request to investigate the use of Japanese materials in the products of Hong Kong Lee Kung Man Knitting Factory] (Hong Kong: Hong Kong Public Record Office).

64 Group record number 3 (Mingguo shiqi Caizhengbu dang an) (6), file number 385: *Zhongguo guohuo shiye fuwushe gongzuo baogao ji youguan wenshu* 中國國貨實業服務社工作報告及有關文書 [Reports of work progress and related documents of the Industry and Chinese Products Service Society], Feb. 1939–Jan. 1948 (Nanjing: the 2nd Historical Archives).

65 Record group number 3 (6), file number 528: *Caizheng-bu guanyu tuiguang guohuo waixiao de shi yu jingji-bu de laiwan wenshu* (*fu haiwai huaqiao shanghui tuiguang guohuo yao dian* 財政部關於推廣國貨外銷的事由經濟部的來往文書 (附海外華僑商會推廣國貨要點) [Correspondences between Minister of Finance and Minister

to the “Five Points for Overseas Chinese Chambers of Commerce to Engage in *guo huo qiao xiao*,” issued on August 24, 1941, the wartime regime of the GMD government expected Chinese consulates to order overseas Chinese chambers of commerce to execute the following preparations: first, to set up commercial showcases for the display of samples of Chinese goods; second, to give talks to overseas Chinese communities so as to generate their commitment to buy only Chinese; third, to launch surveys about the consumer behaviors of other ethnic groups; fourth, to cooperate with “legitimate industrial and commercial groups in Hong Kong and Shanghai;” and fifth, to remind Chinese business associations overseas to encourage their members to invest in China.<sup>66</sup>

### The Economic Effectiveness of Chinese Anti-Japanese Boycotts

In contrast to the inconsistent views on what constituted Chinese national products between the Chinese Nationalist Government and overseas bourgeois associations between 1928 and 1940, both the domestic politicians and bourgeoisie realized that the buy Chinese products movement was a tactic to help China survive its commercial wars against Japan.

An apparent target of Chinese anti-Japanese boycotts was the trade of Taiwanese interests. Chapter 4 points out that, to prevent the import of any Taiwanese tea to the South Seas, Chinese tea merchants in Singapore organized their own business association, the Singapore Chinese Tea Merchants Association, in September 1928. The impact of the networking power against their fellow Hokkien interest from Taiwan between 1928 and 1935 can be gauged in the following facts. First, Chinese overseas merchants in the South Seas in general avoided carrying Taiwanese tea: in 1929, Chinese overseas were responsible for selling 17 percent of Taiwanese *baozhong* tea, the Taiwanese contributed 72.6 percent of the trade, and non-Chinese merchants, including the Japanese and other ethnic groups, accounted for the remainder at 3.7 percent and 6.7 percent of the trade, respectively. But in 1934, the amount from Chinese overseas merchants decreased to 14.2 percent, the trade handled by the Taiwanese slumped to only 58.5 percent, and the Japanese trade of Taiwanese *baozhong* tea rose to 11.6 percent. Other ethnic groups also jumped to

---

of Economics (including main points to promote Chinese national goods abroad], Dec. 1941–April 1942 (Nanjing: Second Historical Archives).

66 Record group number 3 (6), file number 528: *Cai zhengbu guanyu tuiguang guohuo waixiao de shi yu jingjibu de laiwang wenshu*.

TABLE 5.2 *Indexes of Taiwan's Baozhong Tea Exported to the South Seas and to the British Malaya, 1927–1934*

Trade Value in 1927=100%

Year	Value (Yen)	%	Value (Yen)	%
1927	4,718,687	100%	610,620	100%
1928	4,420,322	94%	106,076	17%
1929	4,562,073	97%	22,990	4%
1930	4,275,747	91%	58,106	10%
1931	3,509,306	74%	25,824	4%
1932	1,648,844	35%	24,615	4%
1933	1,272,795	27%	123,598	20%
1934	1,859,756	39%	267,496	44%

Source: Compiled from Taiwan Sōtokufu shokusan-kyoku tokusan-ka 台湾總督府殖産局特産課, *Nettai sangyō chōsa-sho: Taiwan cha ni kansuru chōsa* 熱帯産業調査書: 台湾茶に関する調査 [Report of tropical industry survey: survey on Taiwan tea] (Taihoku: Taiwan Sōtokufu shokusan-kyoku tokusan-ka, 1935), 61–62, 254–255.

15.7 percent.<sup>67</sup> Against this backdrop, the closure of the Singapore Taiwan Association marked the failure of Japan's attempt to use Taiwan connections to plug into Hokkien business networks in the South Seas.<sup>68</sup> Second, statistics on the import of Taiwanese baozhong tea show that from 1928 to 1934, trade declined more sharply in British Malaya than in the South Seas in general (table 5.2).

But the export of Taiwanese tea to the South Seas did not stop. The Taiwan Sōtokufu responded to the surging Chinese anti-Japanese boycott by detouring the trade route. The Japanese government subsidized the shipping of Taiwanese tea stocks to Swatow, where the stocks were repacked as Chinese tea before entering South Seas markets. It was reported that many Chinese tea agents in Swatow were involved in the trade.<sup>69</sup> In the late 1930s, tea supplies from Fujian and Guangdong declined dramatically. At the same time, some member firms of the Singapore Chinese Tea Merchants Association were accused of

67 Taiwan Sōtokufu shokusan-kyoku tokusan-ka 台湾總督府殖産局特産課, *Nettai sangyō chōsa-sho: Taiwan cha ni kansuru chōsa* 熱帯産業調査書: 台湾茶に関する調査 [Report of tropical industry survey: survey on Taiwan tea] (Taihoku: Taiwan Sōtokufu shokusan-kyoku tokusan-ka, 1935), 303.

68 *SSG* 1934, 1127.

69 *NYSF*: May 23, 1932.

handling Japanese or Taiwanese tea. For example, in August 1939, the association passed the “Bylaws of Inferior Goods Inspection” (*jiancha liehuo xize* 檢查劣貨細則) and paired two leaders to lead one inspection team. Any firm, if it was found trading “inferior goods” (i.e., Japanese or Taiwanese merchandise), would lose its membership.<sup>70</sup> But in November 1939, when the Children Salvation Pioneer Team 兒童救亡先鋒隊 accused Yu Shiang Tea Company 裕香茶莊 of selling Japanese/“inferior” tea, the Singapore Chinese Tea Merchants Association chose not to cancel Yu Shiang’s membership right away. Instead, the association accepted Yu Shiang’s grievance-filing and authorized Lim Keng Lian to scrutinize the case.<sup>71</sup> Before the investigation was completed, the association suspended Yu Shiang’s membership.<sup>72</sup> But ten days later, without any evidence to verify the accusation, the association recovered Yu Shiang’s membership.<sup>73</sup> It is worth noting that the Yu Shiang Tea Company’s owner, Li Zaiquan 李再全, was the vice-chairperson of the association in 1934, when Lim Keng Lian was the chairperson.<sup>74</sup> In December 1940, on the eve of Singapore’s surrender to Japan, a Hokkien native-place association from Taiping in Malaya asked the Singapore Chinese Tea Merchants Association to determine whether a shipment of tea was produced in a Chinese area or in a Japanese-occupied area in China. The association responded, “Under the current wartime economy... it was impossible to judge where the tea was produced.”<sup>75</sup>

Regardless of the endorsement from the Singapore Chinese Tea Merchants Association, the Singapore Chinese vernacular newspaper *Sin Chew Jit Poh*’s report supports the accusation that Taiwanese tea entered Singapore markets through Chinese merchants. The latter pointed out that in the late 1930s, Chinese tea merchants in Singapore would sell Taiwanese tea to compensate for their losses from the declining supply of Chinese tea.<sup>76</sup> In most other cases, Chinese overseas bourgeoisie took an indirect role in monitoring the circulation of Japanese goods in local markets. Chinese youth participated in a patrol team to pace the streets in search of Japanese goods. Their actions against any Chinese store handling Japanese goods included sending harassing letters,

70 NA 531: minutes of meeting on August 20, 1939.

71 NA 531: minutes of meeting Nov. 29, 1939.

72 NA 531: minutes of meeting on Dec. 3, 1939.

73 NA 531: minutes of meeting on Dec. 13, 1939.

74 NA 531: list of members and staffs, 1934.

75 NA 531: minutes of meeting on Dec. 19, 1940.

76 Yao Nan et al., *Xingzhou shi nian*, 606–607.

looting the stores, or cutting the ears of store owners.<sup>77</sup> The identified “treasonous” store would seek endorsement from a Chinese business association to clear its name. The latter would file a grievance to a prominent Chinese business association such as the SCCC in Singapore or the CGCCHK in Hong Kong. These associations would dispatch members to investigate the case. If no link with Japanese trade was found, the business association would help clarify the issue. Sometimes a Chinese company from afar would request the Chinese chamber of commerce in its business partner’s city to ensure that no Japanese goods were involved in the trade. For example, in 1932, a Chinese merchant from Sarawak asked the CGCCHK about the products of the Sam Kwong Weaving Factory Ltd. 三光布廠. The CGCCHK responded by asking the factory to submit sample products for examination. Based on these samples, the CGCCHK then replied to the Sarawak merchant that “no doubt the products were national products.”<sup>78</sup> In the CMUHK’s directory in 1936, the factory was established in 1928 in Kowloon, Hong Kong, and soon expanded. Sam Kwong’s products were made of cotton yarns and cotton-and-nylon blended yarns from Shanghai and England, as well as German dyes. These products were all sold in British Malaya and Dutch East Indies.<sup>79</sup> Apparently, these Western materials did not affect the CGCCHK’s view that the Sam Kwong Weaving Factory was a Chinese capital. The factory also marketed itself as producing exemplary Chinese national goods in its advertisement in Singapore (figure 5.5).

Overall, did the anti-Japanese boycotts effectively suppress Japanese imports to the two British colonies? By taking the shares of Japan’s exports to Hong Kong, the Straits Settlements, and China out of the total exports in 1927 (3.34 percent, 1.84 percent, and 16.77 percent of the total export value of 1,992,317,000 Japanese yen, respectively) as the base, the following figure (figure 5.6) charts trade fluctuations in the decade following the Jinan Incident, in May 1928. The comparison of the changing rates reveals the economic effectiveness of anti-Japanese boycotts in Hong Kong and Singapore as well as compares them with development in China.

77 See the various reports about the violence: NKZ 23, 10 (October 1937): 113; 23, 11 (Nov. 1937): 105–107; (Jan. 1938): 108–116. Stephen Leong’s interview with one Guomintang participant in Malaya, Oh Siow Yam, on April 3, 1971, verified these incidents. These practices were regarded as the practice of “elimination of traitors.” See S. Leong, “The Kuomintang-Communist United Front in Malaya during the National Salvation Period, 1937–1941.” *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* 8, no. 1: 31–47, especially page 35.

78 CGCCHK, *CGCCHKAR* 1932, 15–16.

79 CMUHK, *Xianggang zhonghua changshang chupin zhinan*, section b, 39.



FIGURE 5.5 *Advertisement of the Sam Kwong Weaving Factory, Ltd., in Singapore, 1937*  
 SOURCE: *NYSP*: 20 JULY 1937.




FIGURE 5.6 *Changes of Yearly Percentages of Japan's Export to Hong Kong and the Straits Settlements between 1927 and 1939 (with the Percentage of 1927 as the Base Year)*  
 SOURCE: COMPILED FROM THE DATA OF *NIHON TEIKŌ TŌKEI NENKAN* [ANNUAL STATISTICS REPORTS OF THE JAPANESE IMPERIAL EMPIRE] (日本帝國統計年鑑), VOL. 40-58.

The findings show that, first, although Singapore responded to the rise of systemic organization in the anti-Japanese movement in 1928, by 1937, it was among the three economies where demand for Japanese goods resiliently bounced back after 1931 and surpassed the 1927 level. Second, between Hong Kong and China, although China's tariff autonomy defeated Hong Kong's entrepôt trade while helping China, both economies did not recover their

import of Japanese goods to the 1927 level. Third, after 1937, when both Hong Kong and Singapore witnessed slumps in Japanese exports, Japan's exports to China increased. The last point can be explained by the systemic mobilization of Chinese anti-Japanese movements in the British colonies after 1937, compared with the Japanese occupation of most parts of the Chinese shores at the same time.

This finding of the low economic impact of the Chinese anti-Japanese boycotts in Singapore between 1932 and 1935 is concordant with the views of the British Trade Commissioner in Singapore. Its memo submitted to the comptroller-general, Department of Overseas Trade at London, dated May 30, 1932, offers the following observation:

In normal times Japanese piece goods are imported by Japanese, Indians, Arabs and Chinese. The applications for import permits between January to March 1932 show clearly that particularly no Chinese merchants were importing certain piece goods from Japan . . . The piece goods imported cannot all go into consumption in Malaya unless the Chinese distribute a part of them. The arrangements for distribution by other merchants are quite inadequate to handle the quantities shown as coming into the country.<sup>80</sup>

The discontinuation of Chinese trade of Japanese goods lasted only a few months. Another British memorandum, dated October 20, 1932, shows that the import of Japanese piece goods in British Malaya gradually recovered after July.<sup>81</sup> But regarding Chinese trade during the same period, a Japanese survey points out that the center of Chinese textile trading, on Circular Road and South Bridge Road, stopped carrying any Japanese goods.<sup>82</sup> If these merchants did not handle Japanese piece goods, how was recovery possible? The Trade Commissioner explained: "There is no doubt that outside Circular Road the Chinese are buying from Indian, Japan and Arab importers. Outside Singapore the smaller Chinese dealers are stocking Japanese piece goods and Chinese consumers are buying them. The increase in quantities retained in Malaya may to some extent represent the replacement of depleted stocks but it is more likely that the goods are going into consumption. *The boycott has not yet been openly raised but it has lost its activeness.*"<sup>83</sup>

80 CO 273/583/92110, Memorandum dated 30 May 1932, 8.

81 CO 273/583/92110, Memorandum dated 20 Oct. 1932, 6.

82 NKZ 19, 9 (September 1933): 47.

83 CO 273/583/92110, Memorandum dated 20 Oct. 1932, 4. My emphasis.

Table 5.3 shows that in the trade of Japanese plain cotton piece goods in Singapore between April and August 1932, for example, imports from Japan increased from 25 percent in April to 34.2 percent in May, 26.5 percent in June, 49.3 percent in July, and 54.7 percent in August. The trade in Japanese dyed cotton piece goods and printed cotton piece goods shows a similar pattern of recovery by July and August.

### Trading with the “Enemy”

Who were the merchants that continued to carry Japanese goods? All sources point out that the target of Chinese anti-Japanese boycotts was other Chinese merchants, most of them Cantonese. According to a survey conducted by the Japanese intelligence organ in Singapore, the Singapore Branch of the Nanyō Kyōkai, most Chinese dealers of Japanese goods in Singapore set up their stores on High Street.<sup>84</sup> From the early 1930s, when High Street became the primary target of Chinese anti-Japanese boycotts, some of these merchants relocated to Arab Street, where Indian and Arabian dealers of Japanese goods gathered. These Indian and Arabian merchants sought from the 1930s onward to break the dominance of the Chinese trade in Japanese goods.<sup>85</sup> Among Chinese shops on High Street, only one store was opened by a Hakka; the rest were run by Cantonese.<sup>86</sup> These Cantonese merchants were part of the Kōbe-Singapore business networks, which developed in the late nineteenth century as the main channel of exporting Japanese goods to the South Seas.<sup>87</sup> Although some agents of the Kōbe-Singapore trade, the majority of them Cantonese, would use Japanese banks, these merchants were not exclusive clients of Japanese state-sponsored banking, shipping, insurance, and trade enterprises.<sup>88</sup> As Japan’s initial goal of advancing business southward in the 1910s was to establish a direct connection between manufacturers in Japan and overseas exporters in the South Seas, control over the exportation of Japanese goods

84 NKZ 13, 6 (June 1927): 52.

85 NKZ 19, 8 (August 1933): 47; 19, 11 (November 1933): 99–102.

86 NKZ 19, 11 (Nov. 1933): 28–42.

87 Hsu Tsz-feng 許紫芬 (Yamaōka Yūka 山岡由佳), *Nagasaki kashō keiei no shūteki kenkyū: kindai Chūgoku shōnin no keiei to chōbo* 長崎華商經營の史的研究-近代中國商人の經營と帳簿 [Research on the history of the management of Chinese merchants in Nakasaki: management and account books of modern Chinese merchants] (Kyoto: Minereoa bookstore, 1995), 20–22; Shimizu Hiroshi and Hirakawa Hitoshi, *Japan and Singapore in the World Economy*, 56–66.

88 NKZ 22, 2 (February 1936): 22–37.

TABLE 5.3 *The Economic Effectiveness of Chinese Boycotts of Japanese Piece Goods in Singapore, 1932*

a. Cotton Piece Goods, Plain

1932	Total Imports into Malaya (Quantities, 1,000 Yards)	Imports from Japan	%	Reexports (Quantities, 1,000 Yards)
April	3655	1416	25.0	860
May	3847	1314	34.2	782
June	3926	1040	26.5	1053
July	3917	1931	49.3	1515
August	3425	1872	54.7	878

b. Cotton Piece Goods, Dyed

1932	Total Imports into Malaya (Quantities, 1,000 Yards)	Imports from Japan	%	Reexports (Quantities, 1,000 Yards)
April	4455	1867	41.9	933
May	3584	1546	43.1	1165
June	3391	1134	33.4	1150
July	3596	1748	48.6	1031
August	4342	2964	68.2	1434

c. Cotton Piece Goods, Printed

1932	Total Imports into Malaya (Quantities, 1,000 Yards)	Imports from Japan	%	Reexports (Quantities, 1,000 Yards)
April	3525	1959	55.6	1173
May	4573	3131	68.4	1638
June	5474	3420	62.5	1413
July	3667	2395	65.3	1525
August	4080	3083	75.6	1882

Source: CO 273/583/92110 (1932): "Memorandum: Boycott of Japanese Goods by Chinese in Malaya", Oct. 20, 1932, 6.

by the Chinese/Cantonese merchants in Kōbe was viewed as an obstacle to Japan's agenda.<sup>89</sup> Unlike the Taiwanese elites being recruited into this southward advance, such as the Nanyō Kyōkai, China and Southern Bank, and the Southern Godown Company (chapter 2), Cantonese merchants of Japanese goods were not included in any Japanese business association in Singapore. In the rayon-cloth trade, the Japanese had the Japanese Textiles Importers Association of Malaya, the Chinese/Cantonese established the Chinese Importers and Exporters Association (Lianyi Gongsuo 聯益公所), the Indians had the Siudi Merchants Association, and the Europeans had the Singapore Importers Association.<sup>90</sup> These groups operated as separate entities competing with one another. In the early 1930s, Japanese direct export handled only near 30 percent of the textile trade.<sup>91</sup> From the perspective of the Japanese empire, the Cantonese monopoly of Japanese trade in the South Seas was as disappointing as the Hokkien's support of anti-Japanese Chinese nationalism. For one thing, the Cantonese merchants were independent from the control of the *zaibatsu*. For another, with the Cantonese base in Hong Kong, the business networks abided by the British status quo. In 1932, an internal report of the China and Southern Bank concluded that Japanese southward economic expansion had failed: Twenty years after Japan's official sponsorship of southward business expansion, "commerce, industry, and maritime navigation in the South Seas were still under the control of overseas Chinese."<sup>92</sup> Among the Chinese merchants importing rubber-soled shoes from Japan to Singapore, the eleven Cantonese merchants on High Street who controlled 30 percent of the trade handled the businesses without forming direct connections with either the Japanese exporters or the Japanese manufacturers.<sup>93</sup>

Furthermore, in the late 1930s, when boycotts developed into violent action against Chinese merchants selling Japanese goods, Chinese wholesalers of Japanese goods tried to use Indian merchants to retail the products in Singapore.<sup>94</sup> The Singapore branch of the Nanyō Kyōkai viewed Cantonese-Indian cooperation as an attempt by the Cantonese to monopolize the supply

89 Shimizu Hiroshi and Hirakawa Hitoshi, *Japan and Singapore in the World Economy*, 68–73.

90 Kanan Ginkō 華南銀行, *Nan'yō ni okeru konponteki hōjin hatten-saku toshite no ichi-kōsatsu* 南洋に於ける根本的邦人発展策として一考察 [Survey of the fundamental development] (Taihoku: Kanan Ginkō, 1932), 6.

91 *NKZ* 20, 8 (August 1934): 96–97.

92 Kanan Ginkō, *Nan'yō ni okeru konponteki hōjin hatten-saku toshite no ichi-kōsatsu*, 6.

93 Ten other Chinese agents, who imported the shoes from export agents or manufacturers in Japan, contributed to another 20.5% of the imports. Altogether the Chinese merchants controlled more than 50% of the trade. *NKZ* 18, 3 (March 1932): 26–28.

94 *NKZ* 25, 8 (August 1939): 1–25.

TABLE 5.4 *Textile Wholesalers and Retailers for Japanese Cotton Cloth, Sarong, Rayon in Singapore, 1933*

Company*	Address
Kyen Ho Loong & Co.	68 High Street
Him Woo & Co.	66 High Street
Wing Hing Loong & Co.**	70 High Street
Yue Tai & Co.	72 High Street
Woo Song Loong & Co.	76 High Street
Chong Futt (chop)	86 High Street
Loe Sang Yuen Sing Kee	81 High Street
Chop Yick	79 High Street
Kwong Wha Loong**	75 High Street
Ng Hong Hing & Co.**	73 High Street
Kwong On (chop)***	26–28 South Bridge Road
Sam Yik & Co.	20 South Bridge Road
Kwong Fook Tai	231 South Bridge Road
Lee Sang & Co.** ***	241 South Bridge Road
Chop Kwong Yick	234 South Bridge Road
Nam Sang (chop)***	232 South Bridge Road
Choon Fat	230 South Bridge Road
Wing On***	32 South Bridge Road
Chop Nam Seng	16 South Bridge Road
Wing Wah Cheong	34 South Bridge Road
San Lee Guan	24 South Bridge Road
Ming Kee & Co.	219 Beach Road
Teck Sang Hing (chop)	116 Rocher Road
Thakordas Chhotalal & Co.	26 Kandahar Street
Masiamull Nagindas	578 North Bridge Road
Mehamad Kasin & Co.	12–13 Boat Quay
Hasannasan & Co.	20–22 Chulia Street
G. A. M. Gabriel & Co.	24–26 Chulia Street
Kimatolai & Co.	n/a High Street
Chop Yick Tai	467 North Bridge Road

\* The original Japanese source did not provide *kanji* for these companies, though their names and locations suggested that most of them were Chinese. All of these stores were reported to substitute the sales of Japanese products to Chinese ones in 1932 when Chinese anti-Japanese boycotts surged;

\*\* Companies also carried British rayon in a survey in 1933;

\*\*\* Companies also carried Chinese cotton towels in 1933.

Sources: *NKZ* 19, 9 (September 1933): 45–63; *NKZ* 19, 11 (November 1933): 101–104; 103–108.



FIGURE 5.7 *Silk Stores on High Street, Singapore (circa 1924–1930)*

SOURCE: JOHN RANDALL COLLECTION, COURTESY OF NATIONAL ARCHIVES, SINGAPORE.

of Japanese goods in Singapore. The office therefore committed to introducing exporters from Japan to the Indian retailers in Singapore, trying to marginalize the Cantonese wholesalers.<sup>95</sup> In addition, the Cantonese merchants in the Kōbe-Singapore network were not exclusive channels for the sale of Japanese goods (table 5.4). Throughout the 1930s, whenever Chinese anti-Japanese boycotts surged, the Chinese merchants ordering Japanese goods would temporarily give up the trade—either by shifting to selling Chinese products or by refusing to claim the merchandise that they had ordered from Japan when it arrived.<sup>96</sup> Among the Chinese/Cantonese companies that shifted to carrying merchandise from China/Hong Kong and England were the Cantonese High Street agents Ng Hong Hing Company 吳漢興公司 and Kwong Wah Long 廣華隆 (table 5.4). The latter had dominated the importation of Japanese cotton blankets to Singapore by 1930.<sup>97</sup>

95 *NKZ* 25, 8 (August 1939): 16; Peter Post, “Chinese business networks and Japanese capital in South East Asia, 1880–1940,” in *Chinese business enterprise in Asia*, ed. Rajeswary Ampalavanar Brown (London and New York: Routledge, 1995), 154–176; Shimizu Hiroshi and Hirakawa Hitoshi, *Japan and Singapore in the World Economy*, 68–73.

96 *Nan'yō* 27, 4 (April 1941): 61.

97 *NKZ* 17, 5 (May 1931): 51.

### Light Industrialization on the Periphery of the British Empire

In view of the expansion of Japanese products in Singapore markets, beginning in 1932, the Manchester Chamber of Commerce began to urge the British government to negotiate with Japan over the crisis of the Lancashire cotton industry. In Singapore, futile negotiations resulted in British renunciation of the 1911 Anglo-Japanese Trade Treaty. In May 1934, the British enacted the Importation of Textiles (Quota) Ordinance, with Japanese imports as the primary target. Importation of Japanese cotton piece goods and artificial silk, among other fabrics, to Singapore would be limited to the average annual amount during the entire period between 1927 and 1931.<sup>98</sup> In the first year of the British textile (quota) ordinance, imports of Japanese textiles to British Malaya were less than one-third of the imports in 1933. But Japanese textiles once again out-competed British products in 1935 and 1936. As shown in table 5.5, in those two years, Japanese textiles retained control of half the import market.

In most parts of the British dominions, the quota system was set up to curtail the import of foreign textiles. Local British textile merchants in Singapore believed that such a regulation suited the interest of merchants in the imperial metropolis but not those in the peripheral colonies such as Singapore. These Singapore-based merchants argued that such a discriminatory trade policy would eventually destroy Singapore's transshipment trade. To control the volume of trade according to a certain quota, all consignments of piece goods, be they for local consumption or for re-export to foreign markets, would have to be arranged in advance. This made it impossible for merchants to consign goods based on comparable market values. The British piece-goods merchants thus mobilized the Singapore Chamber of Commerce (an association for British merchants in Singapore) to criticize London's favoritism toward metropolitan capital in England at the expense of Singapore's market speculators. As expected, the re-export trade in Singapore declined in the following years. But London defended this situation by arguing that the British quota system was only one among various reasons for the trade's slump. Another factor was the

---

98 *SSG* 1934: 1851–1858. It is worth noting that the quota system was to protect the interests of British homeland capitalists but not those based in the Straits. From the perspective of Clementi, the supply of cheap Japanese products benefited the poor in the colony during the economic downturn. In his words, “The fortunes of the Lancashire cotton industry, great though they are, should not be allowed to jeopardize the future of this Colony.” Michael Havinden and David Meredith, *Colonialism and Development: Britain and Its Tropical Colonies, 1850–1960* (New York: Routledge, 1993), 189.

TABLE 5.5 *Impact of the 1934 Importation of Textiles (Quota) Ordinance (Including Cotton and Silk Textiles) in British Malaya*

Unit: Thousand Yards

	Great Britain	British Colonies	Japan	Total Imports in British Malaya
1927	82,688 46.90%	18,411 10.44%	35,609 20.20%	176,305
1928	68,230 45.7 %	17,513 11.73%	24,224 16.23%	149,295
1929	88,865 44.53%	18,956 9.50%	42,407 21.25%	199,564
1930	33,192 23.02%	11,852 8.22%	67,145 46.57%	144,166
1931	22,034 18.33%	9,752 8.11%	59,145 49.19%	120,232
1933	26,391 14.42%	5,413 2.96%	126,939 69.38%	182,969
1934	29,468 17.00%	5,600 3.23%	29,662 17.11%	173,337
1935	33,932 27.12%	9,417 7.53%	65,195 52.10%	125,123
1936	38,635 26.96%	16,658 11.63%	67,524 47.13%	143,282

Source: Compiled from *Nanshi Nanyō* 南支南洋 (March 1940): 133.

restriction of Japanese textile imports in the neighboring Dutch East Indies after 1935.<sup>99</sup>

99 Ian Brown offers a detailed analysis of the response of Singapore British merchant communities to the imposition of the 1934 Importation of Textiles (Quota) Ordinance. He suggests that only a small portion of British merchants specializing in the importation of Lancashire piece goods benefited from the ordinance, while the majority of members did

What the British quota system managed to curtail but failed to accomplish was completed by the rise of Chinese anti-Japanese nationalism after the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, in July 1937. Two months after the incident, importation of Japanese cotton underwear plummeted sharply to half the trade amount during the same period in 1936. In November 1937, it reached its lowest point, at one-third of the amount for the same month the previous year (table 5.6).

The wave of boycotts continued through the late 1930s. During those years, imports of Japanese cotton piece goods to British Malaya fell to about 50 percent of their assigned quotas. Import of Japanese clothing, for example, in mid-1938 was 35 percent of its assigned quotas. In mid-1939, the rate was 53 percent (table 5.7).

While economic protectionism became the norm in lieu of the declining free-trade system, the British nonetheless avoided imposing the quota system in Hong Kong.<sup>100</sup> The differences in British trade policies for these two Crown colonies can be understood in terms of the different economic roles played by Singapore and Hong Kong within the empire. Singapore's coordinating ties with other ports of the British Straits Settlements made it not only the

---

not suffer from the expansion of Japanese textile markets in the South Seas in the early 1930s. These British merchants in the trade of Japanese piece goods enjoyed Singapore's free trade system, as it allowed them to speculate on the market. The ordinance, however, changed the rules of the game, and they could no longer do that. See Ian Brown, "The British Merchant Community in Singapore," in *International Commercial Rivalry in Southeast Asia in the Interwar Period*, ed. Sugiyam Shinya and Milagros C. Guerrero (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Southeast Asia Studies, 1994), 111–132.

Brown's observations about the significant number of British merchants active in the trade of Japanese piece goods are based on British records. These sources, however, are different from the information provided by the Japanese intelligence organ, the Nanyō Kyōkai. The latter shows that between June 1 and June 30, 1934 (the first month after the 1934 Textile Ordinance came into force), eight European wholesale agents transported 383,779 yards of Japanese cotton piece goods, or 3.71 percent of all Japanese imports. At the same time, twenty-five Indian agents carried 3,120,764 yards, which was 30.195 percent of total Japanese imports; ten Japanese agents carried 3,083,223 yards (29.83 percent); and fifteen Chinese agents carried 3,748,475 yards (36.27 percent). Compared with the amounts of Japanese piece goods carried by Japanese, Indian, and Chinese agents, the trade amounts of British merchants were only a small portion. See NKZ 20, 8 (August 1934): 95.

100 Christopher Howe, *The Origins of Japanese Trade Supremacy: Development and Technology in Asia from 1540 to the Pacific War* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1996), 201–231; Norman Miners, "Industrial Development in the Colonial Empire and the Imperial Economic Conference at Ottawa 1932," *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 30, 2 (May 2002): 53–76.

TABLE 5.6 *Monthly Exports of Japanese Cotton Underwear to Singapore, 1936–1937*

Unit: Straits Dollars

1936	Value	1937	Value	1937 Value Compared to the Same Period in 1936
July	81,970	July	140,281	171.1%
August	135,217	August	124,785	92.3%
September	95,897	September	48,313	50.4%
October	82,741	October	41,809	50.5%
November	63,062	November	22,789	36.1%
December	87,819	December	48,234	54.9%
1936 Total	1,044,861	1937 Total	866,293	82.9%

Source: NKZ 24, 4 (Tokyo, 1938): 120–122.

transshipment center but also the emporium for hinterland Malaya, Sumatra, Siam, Java, and Borneo.<sup>101</sup> By reducing the supply of Japanese textiles shipped to Singapore, London's goal was to protect Lancashire interests. The situation in Hong Kong, however, was different. Hong Kong was losing its significance in the transshipment trade after 1929 because of China's soaring tariffs. Had the British implemented discriminatory tariffs against Japanese goods, the latter could still find its way to China via Canton.<sup>102</sup>

In the absence of the quota system, there was no limit on the import of Japanese textiles to Hong Kong. Import from Japan to Hong Kong continued (figure 5.8). Japanese yarn was an important source of raw material for the Chinese weaving and knitting industry. As shown in table 5.8, the import of cotton yarn from Japan to Hong Kong increased between 1932 and 1936. Considering the infiltration of Japanese interests into North China during these years, one can even argue that more than half the piece goods and textiles in Hong

101 Wong Lin Ken, "Singapore: Its Growth as an Entrepôt Port, 1819–1941." *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* Vol. IX, No. 1 (1978): 69–84; Ian Brown, "The British Merchant Community in Singapore," 114–115.

102 Norman Miners, "From Nationalistic Confrontation to Regional Collaboration: China-Hong Kong-Britain, 1926–41," in Ming K. Chan ed. *Precarious Balance: Hong Kong between China and Britain, 1842–1992*. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1994, 59–70. The citation is based on pages 61–63.

TABLE 5.7 *Imports of Japanese and Chinese Textiles in British Malaya in 1938 and 1939*

Unit: Dozen

From	Year	Clothes (Made of Cotton or Artificial Silk)		Cotton Underwear		Artificial-silk Underwear		Total	
		Quota	Actual Imports	Quota	Actual Imports	Quota	Actual Imports	Quota	Actual Imports
Japan	Mid-1938	10,593	3,704 (35%)*	381,845	209,869 (55%)	28,102	15,377 (55%)	420,540	228,950 (54%)
	Mid-1939	10,593	5,617 (53%)	381,845	200,809 (53%)	28,102	19,276 (69%)	420,540	225,702 (54%)
China	Mid-1938	3,529	3,218 (91%)	106,370	91,927 (86%)	1,556	1,378 (89%)	111,455	96,523 (87%)
	Mid-1939	3,529	3,140 (89%)	106,370	101,068 (95%)	1,556	1,348 (87%)	111,455	105,556 (95%)

\* Percentage in bracket indicates the percentage of actual imports of the yearly quota.

Source: Compiled from *NKZ* 27, 4 (Tokyo, 1941): 60–63.

Kong markets were related to Japanese interests. Although trade declined after 1937, except for the year 1938, the importation of cotton textiles from Japan exceeded that from Britain.

The use of Japanese materials by Chinese manufacturers in Hong Kong certainly troubled Lancashire interests. The industrial capitalists in Britain were particularly annoyed that the British Imperial Preference system did not protect their interests, but rather benefited the Chinese manufacturers in Hong Kong. Most Hong Kong manufacturers used Japanese materials and semifinished products from China to save on the cost of raw materials and labor. The Manchester Chamber of Commerce suggested to the Superintendent of Imports and Exports in Hong Kong that “frequent checks should be made in view of the fact that singlets and other goods made in Japan can be imported and sold here at a price below the cost of local manufacture, and if

FIGURE 5.8 *Japanese business streets in Hong Kong, late 1930s*

SOURCE: *TAIWAN GINKŌ, TAIWAN GINKŌ SHIJŪNENSHI* 台湾銀行四十年誌 [FORTY-YEARS OF THE BANK OF TAIWAN] (TAIHOKU: TAIWAN GINKŌ), 204. COURTESY OF THE ARCHIVAL OFFICE OF THE INSTITUTE OF TAIWAN HISTORY, ACADEMIA SINICA, TAIPEI.

TABLE 5.8 *Imports of Piece Goods and Textiles to Hong Kong by Country, 1932–1940*

	1932	1933	1934	1935	1936	1937	1938	1939	1940
United Kingdom	38.6	23.9	15.5	13.6	12.6	12.7	15.3	8.1	7.6
Japan	7.0	9.3	17.3	30.3	42.6	36.3	11.8	9.5	14.4
North China	36.3	47.3	50.6	46.0	35.2	32.9	46.5	57.6	71.1
Others	18.1	19.5	16.6	10.1	9.6	18.1	26.4	24.7	6.9
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Source: Compiled from *Hong Kong Trade Returns*, various years between 1932 and 1938, "Imports and Exports by Main Groups," and *Hong Kong Blue Book 1940/1941*, "Imports and Exports by Countries," S4–S12.

such goods can be re-exported as British, it entirely defeats the objective of imperial preference."<sup>103</sup>

In 1933, the Manchester Chamber of Commerce pressed the Hong Kong colonial administration and the Hong Kong General Chamber of Commerce to take a stricter stance on the eligibility for favorable tariffs. They wanted the

103 *HGCCAR* 1935, 26.

proportion of production cost related to the British empire (including materials, labor, and factory overhead expenses) to be raised from 25 to 50 percent.<sup>104</sup> The change was repeatedly proposed in the following years, but the 25 percent criteria for British empire interests remained until 1937.<sup>105</sup>

In 1937, the British government decided to respond to the grievances of their homeland capitalists. This meant the sacrifice of the development of Chinese manufacturers in Hong Kong, a peripheral colony in the eyes of policy makers in London. In December 1937, the British imposed quotas to constrain the import of all manufactured goods made of cotton and rayon to British territories.<sup>106</sup> Although Hong Kong was part of the British lands, another new regulation specifically required all industrial goods exported from Hong Kong to be double-checked by both the Superintendent of Imports and Exports and accountants. The goal was to ensure that these Hong Kong—made products fulfilled the following two criteria: first, they had to be made of British raw materials; second, they had to be “spun, woven, and finished in the British Empire.”<sup>107</sup> Only piece goods made of 100 percent British yarns could apply for the export license and enjoy the preferential tariff.<sup>108</sup> This was an impossible standard that most Chinese manufacturers in Hong Kong could not possibly meet; most could barely fulfill the 25 percent requirement.<sup>109</sup> Had the policy been enforced, it would be certain to devastate the manufacture of Chinese piece goods in Hong Kong. Hong Kong Chinese manufacturers banded together and collectively requested that the British reconsider the policy, but the homeland interests in England dominated the revisions of the trade regulations.<sup>110</sup>

To be sure, although the British authority was willing to include Chinese business interests in Singapore and Hong Kong in the framework of the British Imperial Preference system, the protection was limited to those Chinese interests in British lands. In the eyes of the British, those companies originated in either Hong Kong or Singapore; their owners were Chinese by race, belonging to Chinese, not British, interests. In 1936, the British began to systemically withdraw protection from non-British Singapore companies with branches in China. Those labeled as “Chinese” interests included the Overseas Chinese

104 *HKGCCAR* 1933, 22–23.

105 *HKGCCAR* 1935, 27.

106 *Nanshi Nanyō* (March 1940), 107–137; Ian Brown, “The British Merchant Community in Singapore,” 122.

107 *HKGCCAR* 1937, 35–37.

108 *WKYP*: June 26, 1937.

109 *NYSP*: July 20, 1937; *WKYP*: June 24, 1937; July 6, 1937.

110 *WKYP*: July 7, 1937; July 8, 1937; July 16, 1937.

Banking Corporation, Ho Hong Bank Ltd., and the Overseas Assurance Company Ltd. The British pointed out that these “are in fact not British at all” and “compete directly with the genuine British enterprises.” Underneath this claim was a racial distinction among the subjects of the British empire, given the fact that many of the directors of these “Chinese” companies were British subjects (six out of eighteen in the OCBC, seven out of eleven in the Ho Hong Bank, and eleven out of twelve in the Overseas Assurance Company).<sup>111</sup>

The same discrimination was also applied to branches of Hong Kong–based Chinese companies in China. For example, when Japan bombed Shanghai in August 1937, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs refused to protect the Shanghai branches of the Wing On Company and Sincere Company. “As neither of these companies contain any genuine British interest or enjoy British protection in China, claims on their behalf should not be entertained.”<sup>112</sup> The British Consul-General at Shanghai agreed with this direction. On the eve of the Japanese occupation of Canton in October 1938, the British adopted the same principle to decline the requests of two British banks—the Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank as well as the Chartered Bank—to hang a British flag on the properties of the Canton branches of the Sincere Company and Sun Company, respectively. In the case of Sincere Company, the British realized that it was based in Hong Kong and its manager was a returned British student, but they claimed that the company should not be entitled to British protection because it did not register under Article 221 of the China Order-in-Council of 1925. “They [the owners of the company] were regarded, and regarded themselves, as a Chinese concern in China.”<sup>113</sup> Since the buildings of the Sun Company were destroyed in the fires following the Japanese occupation and no recovery was possible, the British concern was the Sincere Company’s mortgage held by the Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank. “While I cannot tell the Japanese that the property of the Sincere Company at Canton is British and under the protection of His Majesty’s Government, since such is not the case, I informed them as soon as they were installed at Canton of the Bank’s interest in the property, and

---

111 In addition to the “Chinese” companies, the list also included the Beta Shoe Company (Czech) and the Singapore Rubber Works Company (Dutch). CO 129/557/9, 1936-03-26 to 1937-02-27.

112 CO 129/571/14: Sino-Japanese Conflict: Protection of Interests in Sincere Company, Code telegram to Mr. Gage (Nanjing) from Foreign Office, Sept. 3, 1937.

113 CO 129/571/14: Sino-Japanese Conflict: Protection of Interests in Sincere Company, 1938, 6.

forwarded to the Japanese Consular-General at Canton copies of the mortgage deeds as soon as I received them from the Bank's Canton agent.<sup>114</sup>

Compounding the loss of the Chinese manufacturers in Hong Kong was the monetary policy of the British empire. Effective November 18, 1939, two months after the British declared war against Nazi Germany, the British restricted imports of many classes of goods from Hong Kong to Singapore and British Malaya, because Hong Kong was not part of the British sterling bloc.<sup>115</sup> The scope of commodities being restricted, according to an ordinance published in the *Straits Settlements Government Gazettes* of May 4, 1940, included piece goods, sarongs, and apparel made of artificial silk. These had been important imports from Hong Kong to British Malaya.<sup>116</sup> Beginning March 1, 1940, certain kinds of textile goods (principally hosiery and shirts) that previously had been permitted entry into the United Kingdom free of restriction would require an import license if manufactured in Hong Kong.<sup>117</sup> Many Chinese manufacturers stopped exporting to British Malaya to avoid any possible loss.<sup>118</sup>

Exports from Hong Kong to British Malaya slumped accordingly. A Chinese industrial newsletter in Hong Kong attributed the downturn to poor quality: Chinese textile goods were "too rough and coarse, fell apart during cleaning, and their colors easily faded away."<sup>119</sup> This critique pointed to the hope that trade would be recovered if Chinese manufacturers improved their product quality. What was ignored was the international reality that Britain chose to protect its homeland capitalists at the expense of its Chinese subjects in Hong Kong.

The British regime in Hong Kong expressed discontent with these discriminatory policies, but the Secretary of State in London argued implausibly but decisively that Hong Kong's exports to the United Kingdom were not affected. It indicated that the effect on Hong Kong trade of the revocation of licenses was regrettable, but it should be borne in mind that despite the war conditions, the total value of imports from Hong Kong to the United Kingdom in the first nine months of 1940 was nearly three times the value of that for the first nine months of 1939.<sup>120</sup> The optimistic view about Hong Kong total exports to the United Kingdom proved to be accurate. Exports of textiles from Hong Kong to

114 CO 129/571/14, 7.

115 HKGCCAR 1939, 27.

116 ICP 1, 1 (January 1941): 79–81.

117 HKGCCAR 1940, 16.

118 *Nanshi Nanyō*: Feb. 1939, 121; ICP 1, 1 (January 1941): 79–81.

119 ICP 1, 7 (July 1941): 64.

120 HKGCCAR 1940: 19.

TABLE 5.9 *Hong Kong Textile Exports to the U.K. and British Malaya*

Unit: HKD	Piece Goods and Textiles		Clothing Apparel	
	United Kingdom	British Malaya	United Kingdom	British Malaya
1939	48,915 (0.07%)*	4,192,592 (5.8 %)	6,545,401 (22.95%)	3,914,615 (13.7%)
1940	505,391 (0.51%)	4,829,562 (4.9%)	12,768,004 (30.81%)	4,079,582 (9.8%)

\* Parentheses indicate percentage of total export.

Source: Compiled from the Hong Kong Blue Book 1940, S4, S5, and S8.

British Malaya dropped, but Hong Kong's exports to the United Kingdom rose (table 5.9).

Nonetheless, between 1939 and 1940, Hong Kong became an important supplier of industrial goods to British markets, whose original suppliers in Europe were hampered by the war.<sup>121</sup> The loss of Hong Kong's total exports to British Malaya was compensated by its rising exports to the United Kingdom. The total value of imports from Hong Kong to the United Kingdom in the first nine months of 1940 was nearly three times the value of that for the first nine months of 1939.<sup>122</sup> Compared to the trend of exports of Hong Kong apparel to the United Kingdom surging sharply between 1932 and 1938 as well as between 1939 and 1940, one can see that the new trade regulations did not hamper this line of trade (table 5.10).

By 1941, the number of factories exceeded two thousand, employing one hundred thousand workers. In addition, the range of items produced also expanded. New industries developed in the 1920s and 1930s manufactured rubber goods, flashlights, electrical products, musical instruments, toys, medicines, insect repellants, paint, glass, and so on.<sup>123</sup> These products were also popular in Shanghai, Vietnam, the Philippines, and Singapore. The nascent Chinese manufacturing industry in Hong Kong in the interwar years found a niche in producing commodities that fit special Chinese tastes. For example, they could produce red pigments to compete with the once-popular German-made red dye, which did not meet Chinese customers' preference for bright

<sup>121</sup> *ICP* 1, 5 (May 1941): 71–73.

<sup>122</sup> *CGCHK, CGCHKAR* 1940, 19.

<sup>123</sup> Chan and Chan ed., *Bainian shangye*, xhg.

TABLE 5.10 *Exports of Hong Kong Clothing Apparel by Destination, 1932–1940*  
HK \$ Thousands

%	1932	1933	1934	1935	1936	1937	1938	1939	1940
British Malaya	20.0%	21.1%	21.2%	17.5%	14.4%	14.4%	15.6%	13.7%	9.8%
United Kingdom	0.2%	5.9%	21.5%	18.8%	18.8%	17.1%	20.3%	23.0%	30.8%
China	28.4%	23.4%	11.2%	6.7%	2.5%	2.0%	4.9%	1.2%	1.1%
Others	51.4%	49.7%	46.1%	57.1%	64.3%	66.5%	59.3%	62.1%	58.3%
Total Export	12,784	8,488	8,487	6,223	12,591	19,685	20,561	28,520	41,438

HK \$ Thousands

Sources: 1932–38: *Hong Kong Trade and Shipping Returns*, annual reports between 1932 and 1938: “Values of Imports and Exports by Main Groups,” and “Imports and Exports by Main Groups and by Countries”; 1939–40: *Hong Kong Blue Book 1940/1941*, S4–S12.

red. In addition, the rise of Chinese knitted and woven manufactured goods in Hong Kong—in particular, the production of socks—challenged the Japanese-goods markets of this particular item.<sup>124</sup>

In 1941, in a speech given at Hong Kong’s one-hundred-year celebration, Robert H. Kotewall stated, “Today the Colony possesses over a thousand manufacturing concerns, large and small; and it is the Chinese who have been principally responsible for the striking development that has led to the export of huge quantities of rubber shoes, electric torches, and many other commodities to all parts of the world.”<sup>125</sup>

### Conclusion

This chapter elaborates on the development of the Hong Kong–Singapore corridor as an outlet for nascent Guangdong–Hong Kong manufactured goods in the 1930s. Against the backdrop of the exclusion of Chinese overseas prod-

124 Taiwan Sōtōkufu Shōkusan-kyū 台湾總督府殖産局 ed. *Honkon ni okeru kōgyō* 香港に於ける工業 [Industries in Hong Kong] (Taiwan: Taiwan Sōtōkufu shokusan-kyoku, 1919).

125 Kotewall, Robert H., “Anglo-Chinese Co-operation: Past, Present, and Future.” *Hong Kong Century Commemorate Talks* (Hong Kong: World News Service), 46.

ucts from the protection of Chinese national and provincial governments during this decade, the bourgeoisie in Hong Kong and Singapore coordinated with each other to expand the definition of Chinese national goods so as to accommodate overseas interests. Though the cooperative ties between Singapore and Hong Kong changed after the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War, the Hong Kong-Singapore corridor facilitated the export of Chinese industrial goods from Hong Kong to enter markets of the British territories, including the British metropolis. One hundred years after the Opium War, the Chinese bourgeoisie in the easternmost part of the British empire reversed the hierarchical division of labor between the metropolis and colonial peripheries. By 1940, as Chinese official policy did not include the Hong Kong and Singapore interests in its framework of economic protection, and as the British homeland capitalists tried to disqualify Hong Kong exports from enjoying British preferential tariffs, it is fair to say that Chinese overseas trading networks along the Hong Kong-Singapore corridor were key factors supporting the development of a Chinese manufacturing sector in Hong Kong and Guangdong. The South Seas connections were vital to the development of South China, and the connections were formulated by Chinese overseas, through their flexible responses to the British colonial framework and the expanding Japanese empire.

## United Chinese Identity among Divided Homeland Ties

Because 80 percent to 90 percent of the Chinese in Hong Kong were Cantonese sojourners, they did not organize any fundraising movement and did not dispatch any representative to attend. More than a year after the outbreak of the [Sino-Japanese] war, only a small portion of Fujian sojourners sent two representatives.

—TAN KAH KEE<sup>1</sup>



The Chinese bourgeoisie in Singapore were crucial to the circulation of Hong Kong industrial goods in the South Seas (chapter 5). But in the transnational mobilization of Chinese fund-raising campaigns to support China in the anti-Japanese war, the Singapore leader Tan Kah Kee found that his success in Singapore could not be reproduced in Hong Kong. On October 10, 1938, on behalf of the chairperson at the founding meeting of the *Nanyang Huaqiao Chouzhan Zuguo Nanmin Shangbing Daibiao Dahui* 南洋華僑籌賑祖國難民傷兵代表大會 [Campaign of South Seas Chinese for the Motherland's Refugees and Soldiers; alias *Nan Qiao Zong Hui* in Chinese [NQZH)], Tan realized that among the 160 delegates from the South Seas, only two came from Hong Kong. Tan attributed the low enrollment of Hong Kong Chinese to their different speech-group background: the majority of the Chinese in Hong Kong were Cantonese, while Tan and most other leaders in the NQZH were Hokkien.

In the 1930s, the Chinese overseas reactions to Japan reinforced the cleavages along speech-group lines. These speech-group networks facilitated the

1 Translated from Chen Jiagen [Tan Kah Kee], *Nanqiao huiyilu* 南僑回憶錄 [Memoir of an overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia] (Changsha: Hunan Yuelu shushe, 1998), 70. It is worth mentioning that “Fujian sojourners” as translated here was based on the Chinese term “*Min qiao* 閩僑” [sojourners from Min]. “Min 閩” can be understood either as an all-inclusive term for all dialect groups from the Fujian province in general—including the Hokkien, Hokchia, Hokchiu, and Hakka—or as an exclusive term for the Hokkien only. What follows shows that the Hakka people were also active in the native-place associations for *Min qiao*, therefore, I used “Fujian” rather than “Hokkien” here.

mobilization of Chinese nationalism on a transnational scale, but at the same time, the social divides related to the diverse interests among each network continued in transnational nationalism. Unlike the existing studies that consider the continuing dominance of Chinese speech-group ties in nationalist movements as the “the transcendence of ‘localisms’” into “the imagining of national community,”<sup>2</sup> this chapter analyzes the macro-political-economic contexts that structured the tension among the southern Chinese speech-groups in migrant communities. Against the backdrop of the constant competition among national and regional actors over the definition of Chinese economic nationalism, different native-place and speech-group ties would develop different strategies in nationalism. These strategies, albeit contradictory with each other at times, adopted the same rhetoric of Chinese nationalism.

### The Homeland Politics of Chinese Overseas in the Nanjing Decade

Divided Chinese politics in Fujian and Guangdong in the early 1930s shaped the divergent political dispositions among speech-group interests. After spring 1931, when Chiang Kai-shek arrested Hu Hanmin, Wang Jingwei allied with generals in Guangdong and Guangxi—Chen Jitang in Guangdong and Li Zongren as well as Bai Chongxi 白崇禧 in Guangxi. In May 1931, the Guangdong-Guangxi leaders formed a separate Chinese nationalist government in Canton to undermine the legitimacy of Chiang’s Nanjing government. In Guangdong, with the departure of Chen Mingshu (chapter 3), Chen Jitang became the “King of the Southern Heaven.”<sup>3</sup> Chen Jitang further justified his anti-Chiang campaign using Dr. Sun Yat-sen’s doctrines:

The revolutionary movement is through mobilizing democratic politics to overthrow dictatorship. This is entirely consistent with what we have done in the anti-Manchu and anti-Yuan [Shikai] movements . . . Furthermore, China has not yet been unified. Assuming that if we are now unified, would the unified China become all under the heaven of the Chiangs? Wasn’t the Manchu’s Qing unified? Wasn’t Yuan Shikai’s China unified? If the only reason for not challenging Chiang’s dictatorship is to preserve China’s unification, then all the previous revolutions were meaningless . . . The strategy of revolution, according to what Dr. Sun’s Three

<sup>2</sup> Goodman, *Native Place, City, and Nation*, 313–314.

<sup>3</sup> Li and Tang, *Li Zongren huiyi lu xia*, 487–491; Guangdong dang an guan, *Chen Jitang yanjiu shiliao*, 30–37.

Doctrines of the People, started from local self-governance and moved to establish democratic politics, and from democratic politics to totally commit to the Three Principles of the People.<sup>4</sup>

Chen Jitang employed the legacies of Sun Yat-sen to justify the separatist move in the southwest. But whereas Sun attempted to unite north and south China, Chen considered the divide an inevitable political reality. After the Manchurian Incident, in September 1931, public opinion was that leaders of the southwest regime and Nanjing had to seek common ground and cooperate with each other to defend Japan's encroachments.<sup>5</sup> Chiang set both Li Jishen and Hu Hanmin free. Interpreting this move as a compromise, Wang Jingwei joined the Nanjing government. The Guangdong-Guangxi regime thus transformed itself into branch offices of the Nanjing government and the central committee of the GMD: the Southwest Executive Bureau of the GMD Central Executive Committee as well as the Southwest Political Affairs Committee of the Chinese Nationalist Government. Hu Hanmin was appointed the leader for both offices, although the real power was in the hands of local military leaders Chen Jitang, Li Zongren, and Bai Chongxi (together called the "local power clique"). Chen was seated on the board of directors of both these offices.

Chen, however, did not support another anti-Chiang movement developed by Chen Mingshu and the Nineteenth Route Army in Fujian. After the latter's triumph in the Shanghai Incident, in January 1932 (chapter 3), Chiang Kai-shek sent the Nineteenth Route Army to anticommunist battles in the "Red District" in Fujian's mountainous border between Jiangxi and Guangdong. In December 1932, Chiang appointed Jiang Guangnai as the Fujian provincial governor. The generals of the Nineteenth Route Army, however, alleged a conspiracy set up by Chiang: Chiang expected the Nineteenth Route Army and the CCP's Red Army to extinguish each other. They believed that this was the only explanation for why Chiang, after ordering the Nineteenth Route Army to conquer Fujian's Red Districts, neglected the army's requests for weapons and provisions. On May 31, 1933, Chiang signed the Tang-gu Truce as a cease-fire agreement with Japan in Manchuria. This further diluted the precarious trust that the Nineteenth Route Army had in him. On November 15, 1933, the Nineteenth Route Army declared the establishment of the Production and People's Party 生產人民黨 as well as the People's Revolutionary Government of the Republic of China 中華共和國人民革命政府 (also known as the Fujian People's Government 福建人民

---

4 Guangdong dang an guan, *Chen Jitang yanjiu shiliao*, 103.

5 *WKYP*: January 16, 1932.

政府) in Fuzhou. The principal leader of the Fujian People's Government was Li Jishen.<sup>6</sup> Song Qingling, Eugene Chen, Ye Ting 葉挺, and other partisans classified as GMD leftists or third-party leaders all came to Fuzhou to endorse Li. The Fujian government, however, did not win support from Chen Jintang in Guangdong. The consequence of failing to unify those veterans of the First Division of the Guangdong Army—Li Jishen, Chen Jitang, Cai Tingkai, and Jiang Guangnai, among others—was the rapid collapse of the Fujian government.

In October 25, 1933, Chen Jitang informed Chiang of the surreptitious negotiations between the CCP and the Fujian government.<sup>7</sup> Chiang later confirmed this through his intelligence networks in Fujian. The deal was that in exchange for the CCP's support, the Nineteenth Route Army would provide provisions to the Red District. This deal would help the CCP break the GMD's encirclement attacks and extend its influence to Guangdong.<sup>8</sup> When the Nanjing government started to attack Fujian in December, the Guangdong government ordered troops to stop the southward escape of the renegade forces. From the north, Chiang sent squadrons of airplanes that showered Fujian with bombs. To make things worse, the CCP in Jiangxi broke its promise with the Nineteenth Route Army and allowed Chiang's troops to enter Fujian en route to the Red District. On January 21, 1934, less than three months after its establishment, the People's Government surrendered.<sup>9</sup>

After the fall of the Fujian government, Li Jishen's residence in Hong Kong, a three-story western mansion at no. 92 Robinson Road at the Mid-Levels, became a meeting point for the southern leaders. The mansion, located on the slopes of the Peak, was adjacent to the campus of Hong Kong University.

6 Xue Moucheng and Zheng Quanbei 薛謀成、鄭全備 eds. 1983. *Fujian shibian ziliao xuanbian* 福建事變資料選編 [Compilation of data about the Fujian Incident] (Jiangxi: Jiangxi renmin chubanshe), 147–149.

7 Chiang files: *Geming wenxian: Min bian* 革命文獻：閩變 [Documents of revolution: the Fujian incident], 002-020200-00018-001, October 3, 1933.

8 Chiang files: *Geming wenxian: Min bian*, 002-020200-00018-008, Nov. 15, 1933; 002-020200-00018-037, Nov. 12, 1933; 002-020200-00018-052, Nov. 28, 1933; 002-020200-00018-062; Dec. 9, 1933.

9 Chiang files: *Gou jie Min ni pan bian, san* 勾結閩逆叛變，三 [Collusion with the rebels in Fujian, 3], 002-090300-011-525, Jan. 3, 1934; Chen Bisheng 陳碧笙, "Minbian huiyi 閩變回憶 [Memories of the Fujian incident]," in *Fujian shibian qijian wo dang yu shijiulu jun guanxi wenti taolun hui* 福建事變期間我黨與十九路軍關係問題討論會 [Seminar on the relationship and problems between CCP and the Nineteenth Route Army], ed. Zhonggong Fuzhou shiwei dangshi ziliao zhengji weiyuan hui 中共福州市委黨史資料徵集委員會 (Fuzhou: *Fujian sheng Zhonggong dang shi yanjiuhui Fuzhou shi fanhui*, 1982), 10–18.

Defeated generals of the Nineteenth Route Army, the agents of Chen Jitang from Guangdong, and leaders of the Guangxi clique all came to meet Li Jishen (figure 6.1).<sup>10</sup> In July 1935, they established the *Zhonghua minzu geming tongmeng* 中華民族革命同盟 [Revolutionary alliance of the Zhonghua people], with Li Jishen as chairperson.<sup>11</sup> In spring 1936, in view of the completion of the Canton-Hankou Railway, these southern leaders realized the spread of Nanjing influence: Nanjing could use the railway to send troops down to Guangdong. On June 1, 1936, Chen Jitang renounced Chiang Kai-shek's policies. The statement criticized Chiang's incapability of defending China from Japan's aggression, and it became a pretext to declare the political independence of the southwest in Guangdong and Guangxi.<sup>12</sup> Known as the "double-Guang incident," Li Jishen and other veterans of the Fujian incident as well as the military leaders in Guangxi endorsed Chen Jitang's anti-Chiang movement.

10 This house sheltered Chen Jiongming in 1925 after he retreated from Guangdong. Li Zongren rented the house in 1929. Li Jitang bought the property for HK 20,000 after he was set free in late 1931. The mansion became his base and could house up to twenty people. See Li Zongren and Tang Degang, *Li Zongren huiyi lu xia*, 554. Chiang Kai-shek's intelligence agents in Hong Kong identified this place as the base of a rebellious plot. See HKMS 175-1-60: *Xingzheng yuan ling fa Xianggang didie huo dong baogao* 行政院令發香港敵諜活動報告 [Warnings of spy agents in Hong Kong, the Executive Bureau], Dec. 1938; HKMS 175-1-61: *Xingzheng yuan fanchao Ri kou zai Xianggang tewu jiguan qingkuang baogao* 行政院抄發日寇在香港特務機關情況報告 [Japanese spy agents in Hong Kong, report of the Executive Bureau], Dec. 1938. Diana Lary viewed the Li Zongren mansion as one example of Hong Kong's being a sanctuary for struggling Chinese politicians. Another example is Wang Jingwei. After losing his power to Chiang Kai-shek, in 1929, Wang found an alternative base in his house in Happy Valley, Hong Kong. Lary, "The Guangxi Clique and Hong Kong," in *Colonial Hong Kong and Modern China: Interaction and Reintegration*, ed. Lee Pui-tak (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2005), Ch. 9.

11 Jiang and Wang, *Li Jishen yu Zhongguo Guomindang geming weiyuanhui*, 41.

12 A month before the formal declaration of the anti-Chiang position by the Guangdong-Guangxi anti-Chiang alliance, Chiang's intelligence agents analyzed the potential challenge from the southwest. The report points out the divergent goals between the Guangxi clique and Chen Jitang's Guangdong regime: the former attempted to compete with Chiang at a national level, while the latter was satisfied with the automatic status in the south. The report also reveals that "the power clique in Guangdong, led by Chen [i.e., Chen Jitang], could not control Yu Hanmou." It is worth noting that Li Jishen was considered a liaison for the Guangxi clique, so Li's leaving for Guangxi after the defeat of the Fujian Incident aroused the suspicion of the Nanjing regime. Nanjing also prepared to use the tension between Chen Jitang and Yu Hanmou to suppress the revolt before it formally broke out. Chiang files: *Geming wenxian—liang Guang shibian* 革命文獻——兩廣事變 [Documents of revolutions: the Guangdong-Guangxi incident], 002-080101-00033-001, May 7, 1934.



FIGURE 6.1 *House of Mid-Levels, Hong Kong, 1937*

*\*The center of the photo is the Union Church on Kennedy Road, while the Robinson Road is a level higher from the sea. No. 92 Robinson Road should be close to the right end of the photo.*

SOURCE: HONG KONG PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, IMAGE 08-16-004.

COURTESY OF THE GOVERNMENT RECORDS SERVICE PUBLIC RECORDS OFFICE, HONG KONG.

However, Chen's enemy came from within. The leader of the First Army Group of the Guangdong nationalist government, Yu Hanmou 余漢謀, together with other core generals in Guangdong, deserted the Guangdong-Guangxi alliance for Chiang. On July 19, 1936, Chen Jitang surrendered. He resigned from all political offices and retreated to Hong Kong.<sup>13</sup> Nanjing's complete rule over Fujian and Guangdong thus started after the liquidation of the Nineteenth Route Army, in January 1934, and the collapse of Chen Jitang's Guangdong government, in July 1936. But the Japanese occupation soon challenged the Nanjing government and its control in the south. Chiang Kai-shek gave up Nanjing in December 1937, and as the Japanese troops pushed southward, Amoy fell in May 1938, Canton in October 1938, and Swatow in June 1939. Finally, in

13 Guangdong da an guan, *Chen Jitang yanjiu shiliao*, 361–372; Li Zongren and Tang Degang, *Li Zongren huiyi lu xia*, 599–610.

December 1941, Japan took over the British colony Hong Kong and in February 1942, Singapore.

### Chinese Overseas Investments in Fujian and Guangdong, 1927–1936

The tension between the Guangdong leaders and the Nanjing government did not discourage Chinese overseas in Hong Kong and Singapore from investing in south China. The research of contemporary historian Lee Ying-hui has pointed out that, between 1929 and 1933, the Nanjing government as well as the provincial regimes in Fujian and Guangdong all helped unemployed Chinese overseas to repatriate back home.<sup>14</sup> Political tension between South China and Nanjing did not seem to affect the Chinese overseas investors in the south. In Fujian and Guangdong from the 1870s to the 1940s, real investment amounts were highest between 1929 and 1933, when the anti-Chiang movements were operating (table 6.1).<sup>15</sup>


Although the two provinces witnessed the same patterns of receiving Chinese overseas investment, the distribution of this capital between Fujian and Guangdong was different. In the real-estate industry, for instance, 90 percent of the investment in Fujian was concentrated in the city of Amoy. If considering Jinjiang and Quanzhou, one would find that 98 percent of overseas Chinese investment in real estate focused on the Hokkien homeland (table 6.2), while in Guangdong, Canton attracted half the overseas Chinese investments.<sup>16</sup> The other half were spread among the homelands of the Sze Yap and Teochew districts, the Hakka's Moi Hien, and the Hainane's Hainan Island (table 6.2).

The presence of communist power along the Guangdong, Fujian, and Jiangxi border was the primary concern of Chinese overseas investment. The lack of Chinese overseas investment in the Hakka homeland in western Fujian between 1927 and 1934 could be explained by the establishment of the CCP's Soviets in nearby Ruijin, Jiangxi. As land reforms were occurring in the Red District, Chinese overseas bourgeoisie would not consider it a desirable venue of investment. But communism affected not only the Hakka people and their

14 Lee Ying-hui, *Huaqiao zhengce yu haiwai minzu zhuyi*, 229–232.

15 On Fujian, see Lin and Zhuang eds. *Jindai huaqiao touzi guonei qiyesi ziliao xuanji*, *Fujian juan*, 42–43; on Guangdong, see Lin and Zhuang eds. *Jindai huaqiao touzi guonei qiyesi ziliao xuanji*, *Guangdong juan*, 54–59.

16 For example, 58 percent of investors in Guangzhou's real estate between 1927 and 1937 were Sze Yap Cantonese. Lin and Zhuang eds. *Jindai huaqiao touzi guonei qiyesi ziliao xuanji*, *Guangdong juan*, 75.

TABLE 6.1 *Overseas Chinese Investments in Fujian and Guangdong, 1860s–1940s*

Unit: RMB

Sources:

1) Data on Fujian, see Lin and Zhuang eds., *Jindai huaqiao touzi guonei qiyeshi ziliao xuanji, Fujian juan*, 51;

2) On Guangdong, see Lin and Zhuangi eds., *Jindai huaqiao touzi guonei qiyeshi ziliao xuanji, Guangdong juan*, 45–62.

home counties, given that Chiang Kai-shek's antibanditry suppression and encirclement attacks had pushed the communist power in Jiangxi from the east and north. In the late 1920s, the CCP's Red Army began planning to take over the Zhangzhou-Longyan area to gain an overseas outlet.<sup>17</sup>

The Nanjing government's decision to authorize the 49th Division of the Chinese Nationalist Army to combat the communists disappointed the Hokkiens. The army lost the trust of local people by imposing heavy surtaxes and compulsory opium plantations. Beginning in 1927, NMJH leaders from the Philippines and Malaya sponsored local militias to protect themselves from both the army and the bandits.<sup>18</sup> Concerned Chinese overseas in the

17 Chiang files: *Wuzhuang pan guo (san)* 武装叛國 (三) [Military revolts, 3], 002-090300-00026-263, Oct. 19, 1928; *Goujie Min ni panbian (san)* 勾結閩逆叛變 (三) [Colluding with the rebels in Min, 3], 002-090300-00011-525, Jan. 13, 1934.

18 In 1927, the Department of Military Affairs of the Fujian provincial government appointed the GMD veteran Qin Wangshan 秦望山 the director for the organization of militias. Chinese overseas, led by Dee Cheng Chuan, were recruited in the fund-raising

TABLE 6.2 *Overseas Investment in the Real Estate Industry in Major Cities in Fujian and Guangdong, by Native Places of Speech Groups*

Province	City	% of the Whole Province	Native Places of a Speech Group*	
Fujian	Amoy 廈門	90.02%	Hokkien	98%
	Quanzhou 泉州	3.45%	Hokkien	
	Jinjiang 晉江	4.21%	Hokkien	
	Fuzhou 福州	2.32%	Hokchiu	2%
Guangdong	Canton 廣州	53.16%	Guangfu Cantonese	56%
	Fat Saan 佛山	1.90%	Guangfu Cantonese	
	Tung Kwun 東莞	0.58%	Guangfu Cantonese	
	Jiang Men 江門	9.74%	Sze Yap Cantonese	18%
	Toi Sham 台山	4.74%	Sze Yap Cantonese	
	Hoi Ping 開平	3.15%	Sze Yap Cantonese	
	Swatow 汕頭	10.38%	Teochew	12%
	Chiu An 潮安	1.57%	Teochew	
	Chiong Hai 瓊海	0.40%	Hainanese	9%
	Hai kou 海口	7.38%	Hainanese	
	Wen Chong 文昌	1.18%	Hainanese	
	Moi Hien 梅縣	3.09%	Hakka (Guangdong)	3%
	Others	2.71%	Others	2.71%

\*References to the geographical classification, see chapter 2.

Sources: On Fujian, compiled from Lin and Zhuang, eds., *Jindai huaqiao touzi guonei qiyeshi ziliao xuanji*, Fujian juan, 469–470; on Guangdong, Lin Jinzhi and Zhuang Weiji eds., *Jindai huaqiao touzi guonei qiyeshi ziliao xuanji*, Guangdong juan, 86.

South Seas convened many meetings under the name of “*jiu Min* 救閩 [Saving Fujian].” Their primary agenda was to raise funds from prominent bourgeois associations such as Ee Ho Hean and the Singapore Fujian Native-Place

campaigns to sponsor the militias. After 1930, more militias were organized in southern Fujian, which likewise received funds from overseas Chinese. The latter were particularly concerned about the government’s strategy of incorporating local bandits into the regular standing army. The boundary between official troops and banditry blurred. *NYSF*: December 30, 1927; January 13, 1930; August 4, 1930; August 21, 1930.

Association, among others. Speaking as the Hokkien leader from Singapore, Tan Kah Kee's initial response to the request to convene a general meeting for the Hokkiens in Malaya was passive, if not negative. He believed that "the central government should take the full responsibility to save Fujian. We Chinese overseas should consolidate our strength to follow the government's plan . . . If we are going to organize a meeting, we should lay out a concrete plan before convening overseas Chinese for a meeting under a unspecified agenda."<sup>19</sup> But in August 1930, Tan joined the Hakka Aw Boon Haw as honorary chairpersons of the *Minxi Juxiang Hui* 閩西救鄉會 [Home Saving Association for Western Fujian], an *ad hoc* association for an antibanditry militia.<sup>20</sup> In the following year, Aw's Chinese vernacular newspaper *Sin Chew Jit Poh's* second annual report pointed out that the bandits were those communists.<sup>21</sup> These efforts, however, were in vain. In April 1932, the Red Army created a southern escape route: it occupied the entire west of Fujian, all the way from Changding in the northern mountains via Longyan to Zhangzhou by the Hokkien's shore.<sup>22</sup> This was the area where the NMJH had long planned to build a railway (chapter 2).

The communist insurgence alarmed the NMJH and other Chinese overseas investing in China. Both Lim Boon Keng and Dee Cheng Chuan cabled Chiang Kai-shek to condemn the "brutal behaviors of the red bandits" and asked Chiang to "dispatch great military forces to annihilate them."<sup>23</sup> The "great military forces" that Chiang dispatched to Fujian were the Nineteenth Route Army. In June 1932, when the army marched to Fujian, the communists in Zhangzhou retreated to the hinterland.<sup>24</sup>

Coming from Guangdong, the long-term goal of the Nineteenth Route Army was to return Guangdong. Leaders of the army thus approached the NMJH and other potential Chinese overseas supporters for funds. Chinese newspapers in Hong Kong, beginning in February 1932, reported the secret meetings among leaders of the Nineteenth Route Army, Chen Jitang's protégés from

19 *NYSF*: January 28, 1929, 6.

20 *NYSF*: August 21, 1930.

21 *Sin Chew Jit Poh*, *Xingzhou ribao liang zhounian jinian tekan*, f 96–f 98.

22 Chiang files: *Wuzhuang panguo (er shi san)* 武裝叛國 (二十三) [Military revolts, 23], 002-090300-00046-248, April 20, 1932–June 16, 1932.

23 Chiang files: *Wuzhuang pan guo (er shi si)* 武裝叛國 (二十四) [Military revolts, 24], 002-090300-00047-086, July 19, 1932–May 17, 1932. Also, reports in the newspaper founded by Aw Boon Haw emphasized that there was little, if any, distinction between bandits and official troops. *Sin Chew Jit Poh*, *Xingzhou ribao si zhounian jinian tekan* 星洲日報四週年紀念特刊 [Souvenir publication of the 4th annual of the *Sin Chew Jit Poh*] (Singapore: *Sin Chew Jit Poh*, 1933): e23–e31.

24 Chiang files: *Wuzhuang pan guo (er shi si)*, 002-090300-00047-086.

Guangdong, as well as possible Chinese overseas supporters in Hong Kong.<sup>25</sup> In April, the general of the Guangxi clique, Li Zongren, was also spotted in Hong Kong, although Li explained that he was there for medical treatment.<sup>26</sup> On June 28, 1932, Cai Tingkai made a public appearance at the board meeting of the CGCCHK, when the Nineteenth Route Army was fighting the communists in western Fujian. The CGCCHK hosted a welcome meeting for Cai to acknowledge his honorable battle in the Shanghai Incident.<sup>27</sup>

Learning of the frequent meetings between the Guangdong and Guangxi leaders, Chinese overseas sensed change brewing in the politics of South China. The Nineteenth Route Army's triumph in the Shanghai Incident did not win them a ticket back to Guangdong. In December 1932, Chiang ordered the Nineteenth Route Army to take over the Fujian provincial government. In response to this new situation, the NMJH held a meeting in Singapore. In the beginning, the army's Guangdong/Hakka background aroused the concern of the NMJH. The latter called the army as a "*ke jun* 客軍 [guest army]" to emphasize its being outsiders to Fujian and its Hakka background.<sup>28</sup> Nonetheless, the NMJH soon concluded that "the principal of Fujian for the Fujianese, in the past, became the source of chaos in the province."<sup>29</sup> They also agreed that "although the Nineteenth Route Army was a guest army, they helped people in Fujian expel local banditry troops."<sup>30</sup> The NMJH participants proposed that the Nineteenth Route Army annihilate banditry and communists in the whole province, help develop local militias, prepare for local self-government,

25 WKYP: Feb. 10, 1932; March 24, 1932; April 21, 1932; WTYP: April 5, 1932; June 13, 1932.

26 WKYP: March 29, 1932. A month earlier, Li Zongren had met with generals of the Guangdong Army in Canton as well as Zhang Zhen 張貞 from Fujian to discuss strategies to eliminate the communist power in Jiangxi. See WKYP: February 29, 1932.

27 CGCCHK, *CGCCHKAR 1932*, 2–3.

28 Most veterans of the Guangdong Army in the Fujian People's Government, as well as Chen Jitang in Guangdong, were from marginal places in Guangdong province. Chen Mingshu was from Hepu 合浦, Cai Tingkai from Luoding 羅定, and Chen Jitang from Fangcheng 防城. Hepu and Fangcheng began to be administered under the Zhuang People Automatic Zone of the Guangxi province in the 1950s. Li Jishen actually came from Cangwu 蒼梧, Guangxi. Only Jiang Guangnai came from the core of the Cantonese speaking area, Tung Kwun. Analyzing the army's heroic defense against Japan's bombing of Shanghai in January 1932, Lo Hsiang-lin considers the Nineteenth Route Army as a Hakka army, because Chen Mingshu was a Hakka, while many of the generals "manifested the Hakka's nationalist consciousness." See Lo, *Kejia yanjiu daolun*, 172.

29 NYSF: December 27, December 28, 1932.

30 NYSF: December 27, 1932.

set up a steering committee for overseas Chinese, and increase the number of representatives of Chinese overseas in the auditing committee of the provincial government, among other suggestions.<sup>31</sup>

In response to the demands from Chinese overseas, in December 1932, Jiang Guangnai recruited Dee Cheng Chuan to its executive committee.<sup>32</sup> Dee Cheng Chuan, however, left Fuzhou for Shanghai in the summer of 1933.<sup>33</sup> But Jiang Guangnai's invitation to another NMJH member, He Gong'gan 何公敢, to join the provincial government was well received.<sup>34</sup> Regardless of this incident, Jiang Guangnai moved to proceed with constructing the Zhangzhou-Longyan railway, which had been planned by the NMJH since the 1920s (chapter 2). The blueprint provided for building a 120-kilometer railway, starting at the Jiangdong Bridge of Zhangzhou and ending at Longyan. Two-thirds of the capital would be collected from overseas Chinese bourgeoisie, and the rest would come from the British Boxer Indemnity Fund.<sup>35</sup> In addition to the NMJH members, the Hakka tycoon Aw Boon Haw joined the project.<sup>36</sup>

31 *NYSF*: December 26, 1932.

32 Guomin zhengfu files: *Fujian sheng zhengfu guanyuan renmian* (5) 福建省政府官員任免 (五) [Appointments and dismissals of officials of the Fujian provincial government, 5], 001-032220-0111, July 18, 1932–Jan. 19, 1934.

33 After the fall of the Fujian People's Government, Dee explained to Chiang Kai-shek that, when he left Fuzhou for Shanghai in autumn 1933, he should have resigned from the Committee of the Fujian provincial government. What prevented him from doing so, in his own words, was "the sudden sickness of my wife." And, "when I could finally write a letter of resignation, the revolt in Fujian already broke out." Chiang accepted his explanation. See Guomin zhengfu files: *Fujian sheng guanyuan renmian an* 福建省官員任免案 [Appointments and dismissals of officers of the Fujian provincial government], 001-032222-0112, Jan. 15, 1934–July 3, 1936.

34 Before the declaration of Fujian's independence, Nanjing had the right to approve the organization of a provincial government in Fujian. In the case of He Gong'gan, Nanjing pointed out that He was not qualified. The reason given was that He, in his capacity as the Minister of Finance of Fujian in the early 1930s, imposed passage taxes that violated Nanjing's policy. He Gong'gan should therefore be prohibited from taking any official position for four years. Guomin zhengfu files: *Fujian sheng zhengfu guanyuan renmian* (5), 001-032220-0111, July 18, 1932–Jan. 19, 1934; Guomin zhengfu files: *Fujian sheng zhengfu guanyuan tanhe an* 福建省政府官員彈核案, 001-018320-0008, Feb. 9, 1933–June 11, 1947.

35 Mi Rucheng ed., *Zhonghua minguo tielu shiliao, 1919–1949*, 762–763.

36 Sin Chew Jit Poh, *Xingzhou ribao si zhounian jinian tekan*, b79–b80.

Aw's interest in the railway project can be understood in terms of the ongoing land reforms in the Hakka homeland in western Fujian. After May 1933, the implementation of land-reform policies in western Fujian isolated the new Fujian government from well-to-do overseas Chinese bourgeoisie such as Aw Boon Haw. An article published in the souvenir issue of the fourth annual *Sin Chew Jit Poh* states that "after the raids of the communist bandits in Fujian, its economy collapsed. To improve the industry, only Chinese overseas can help. Those Chinese overseas who have some basic capital all invest in real estate so that the sojourners could plan to settle in their home province after retirement. Now the land redistribution policies in western Fujian would nullify the private property rights of overseas Chinese. Even people who do not come from western Fujian feel scared."<sup>37</sup>

When news of the inauguration of the Fujian People's Government in November 1933 reached Singapore, Chinese overseas from Fujian province were divided by the political change. On the one hand, Tan Kah Kee's Singapore Fujian Native-Place Association cabled the Fujian People's Government with words of disapproval.<sup>38</sup> On the other hand, He Gong'gan of the NMJH, joined the ten-person committee under Li Jishen.<sup>39</sup> Before the overseas communities reached any consensus on how to react to the situation, in two months, the regime collapsed. Along its retreat, the Nineteenth Route Army destroyed all rails and ties laid in western Fujian, thus ending the NMJH's railway dream.<sup>40</sup>

### Hong Kong in the Southern Sky

The Guangdong-Hong Kong industrial zone emerging in the 1930s was a product of the smooth relationship between Guangdong and the British, as well as Guangdong's pursuit of economic modernization. Between 1927 and 1936, the British in Hong Kong considered the provincial leaders Li Jishen, Chen Mingshu, and Chen Jitang as supporters of the British colonial status quo in South

37 Sin Chew Jit Poh, *Xin Zhou ribao si zhounian jinian tekan*, 18.

38 *NYSF*: November 17, 1933; November 18, 1933.

39 Yang Hongchao 楊洪潮 ed., *Minguo Fujian sheng defang zhengquan jigou yange ziliao (1911–1949)* 民國福建省地方政權機構沿革資料 (1911–1940) [Data on the history and development of local administrative systems of the Fujian province in the republican era, 1911–1940] (Fuzhou: Fujian renmin chubanshe, 1994), 40. He Gong'gan was also appointed as the mayor of Fuzhou city in the Fujian People's Government. Chiang files: *Geming wenxian—Min bian*, 002-020200-00018-093, Dec. 30, 1933.

40 Taiwan sōtokufu gaiji-bu 台灣總督府外事部, *Kakyō keizai jiyō*. 華僑經濟事情 [Economic situations of overseas Chinese] (Taihoku: Kōmyōsha shōkai), 126.

China. Above all, the British appreciated Li Jishen's anticommunist stand and his attempt to keep Nanjing away from the politics in the southwest. The official exchange of visits between Li Jishen and Clementi in spring 1928 was the first time after the establishment of the Republic of China (chapter 3). Chen Mingshu's brief leadership in Guangdong between 1929 and 1931, as well as Chen Jitang's "years of southern heaven" between May 1931 and July 1936, continued these friendly terms with the British. This calm political environment also soothed tensions between the Chinese in Canton and the British interests in Hong Kong.

In early 1935, when Sir William Peel was about to retire from the post of British Governor in Hong Kong, Lim Yun Koy organized a goodwill mission to bid him farewell. As part of the trip, Lim also invited businesspeople in Hong Kong to visit Canton. After a two-day trip to Canton in May 1935, the chairperson of the CGCCHK, W. H. Bell, concluded his visit with the following observations:

We are amazed to see the splendid progress in Canton . . . We have all been most impressed by the great progress which has been made in the realm of industrial reconstruction and modernization during the last few years. In addition we notice with special interest that the same care has been devoted to the education, health, and general well-being of the inhabitants of Kwangtung [Guangdong].<sup>41</sup>

The economic development in Canton that Bell applauded reflected the achievements of a stable transition of powers in Guangdong after 1928. Starting with Li Jishen's governance, the province witnessed the development of several special economic bureaus to improve the agricultural production of sugarcane, forests, and silkworms.<sup>42</sup> Li also emphasized the development of a modern cement factory and other industrial endeavors.<sup>43</sup> By the time

41 CGCCHK, *CGCCHKAR 1935*, 18.

42 Guangdong sheng dang an guan 廣東省檔案館 ed., "Minutes of the 116th Meeting of the Fourth Committee of the Guangdong Provincial Government, December 11, 1928," *Minguo shiqi Guangdong sheng zhengfu dang an shiliao xuan bian 2* 民國時期廣東省政府檔案史料選編二 [Collection of historical archives of the Guangdong provincial government in the republican era, 2] (Guangzhou: Guangdong sheng dang an guan, 1987), 79.

43 Guangdong sheng dang an guan ed., "Minutes of the 121th Minutes of the Fourth Committee of the Guangdong Provincial Government, December 28, 1928," "Minutes of the 134th Meeting of the Fourth Committee of the Guangdong Provincial Government, Feb. 22, 1929," *Minguo shiqi Guangdong sheng zhengfu dang an shiliao xuan bian 2*, 105–106; 170–172.

Chiang arrested Li, a plan of collecting bird guano in the Paracel Islands (east of Hainan Island) for manufacturing chemical fertilizer was under way.<sup>44</sup> Li's successors, Chen Mingshu and Chen Jitang, likewise committed to the goal of building Guangdong as a model province. Xicun, near Canton City, became an important industrial zone for cement manufacturing. Under Chen Jitang's rule, in September 1932, the Southwest Political Affairs Committee approved the Three-Year Policy Agenda of Guangdong. Effective January 1, 1933, the agenda laid out a series of political reforms and economic plans for a "revolutionary construction" of Guangdong.<sup>45</sup>

In Chen Jitang's time, most economic plans followed the blueprint that Chen Mingshu and Li Jishen had laid out. Chen Jitang, however, went a step further to allow direct governmental involvement in the economic agendas. This included the organization of production, control over the banking system and loan process, as well as regulation of the circulation of some industrial and agricultural products. According to Feng Rui 馮銳 (1897–1936), the Minister of Agriculture and Forestry in the Guangdong provincial government, the goal of Guangdong's governmental intervention was to make the province self-sustaining so that it could produce all staples, especially rice and sugar, without relying on foreign supply.<sup>46</sup> It is therefore not a surprise that in September 1933, the Guangdong government set up an ad hoc office to collect import tariffs on foreign agrarian products, especially rice and sugar.<sup>47</sup> To seek endorsement from the Southwest Political Affairs Committee, in September 1932, when Chen Jitang first proposed the Three-Year Policy Agenda, he emphasized the centrality of Guangdong in modern Chinese revolutions: "Our GMD's revolutionary ventures once emerged in the land of *Baiyue* 百粵 (hundred Yues). In the past twenty years, people in *Baiyue* contributed their lives and money to subscribe to one revolutionary movement after the other. They

44 Guangdong sheng dang an guan ed., "The 139th Minutes of Meeting of the Fourth Committee of the Guangdong Provincial Government, March 15, 1929," *Minguo shiqi Guangdong sheng zhengfu dang an shiliao xuan bian* 2, 188.

45 Guangdong da an guan, *Chen Jitang yanjiu shiliao*, 137.

46 Chen Shaoyu 陳紹宇, Guangdong tangye yu Feng Rui 廣東糖業與馮銳 [Guangdong sugar industry and Feng Rui], in *Min guo shiliao congkan* 民國史料叢書 [Documents of the Republic of China] (Beijing: Daxiang chuban she, 2009), 21–23.

47 Guangdong sheng dang an guan ed., "The 224th Minutes of Meeting of the Fourth Committee of the Guangdong Provincial Government, Sept. 22, 1933," and "The 226th Minutes of Meeting of the Fourth Committee of the Guangdong Provincial Government, Sept. 29, 1933," *Minguo shiqi Guangdong sheng zhengfu dang an shiliao xuan bian* 3, 445; 449–450.

were backbones of the party and the state.”<sup>48</sup> On January 1, 1933, during the convention to celebrate the twenty-second anniversary of the founding of the Republic of China, Chen further advocated that “the Three-Year Policy Agenda was to get ready to develop a new Guangdong.”<sup>49</sup>

To introduce Chinese overseas to Guangdong’s economic programs, in February 1933, Chen Jitang invited Choy Chong and Mok Ying Kui to chair a Chinese nationalist trade fair in Canton. The event was followed by a home-visit tour for Chinese bourgeoisie from Hong Kong and Macao. More than one hundred merchants attended the event.<sup>50</sup> The enthusiastic response from Chinese overseas inspired the southwest regime. In May 1933, the Southwest Executive Bureau implemented a policy to encourage Chinese overseas investment in Guangdong. It proclaimed to “guarantee the protection of private enterprise. Except for those businesses that should be managed by the government, the others would allow private capitalists to manage with governmental support.”<sup>51</sup> Mok and Choy thus connected with other sugar merchants, including the Java tea tycoon Kwik Djoen Eng and Hong Kong’s Hokkien sugar dealer Tsong Sing Tsung 莊成宗 (Zhuang Chenzon). With their support, Mok raised 3,000,000 Hong Kong dollars and expected to launch a private sugar enterprise in Guangdong. To their surprise, the Southwest Executive Bureau rebuked the proposal. The reason was that sugar industry belonged to a governmental monopolistic sector. In retrospect, Mok attributed the problem to his comprador background and blamed Feng Rui for rejecting merchants from setting up their own private sugar factories.<sup>52</sup>

Feng Rui, a Cantonese from Pun U and a Cornell-trained Ph.D. in agricultural economics, introduced engineers, refinery machines, and technologies from the American Philippines as well as sugar crops from the Dutch East Indies to the sugar project in Guangdong. In his agenda to modernize sugar production in Guangdong, Feng set up a system that allowed the Guangdong provincial government to regulate different stages of production: to offer loans to the

48 Guangdong da an guan, *Chen Jitang yanjiu shiliao*, 137.

49 Guangdong da an guan, *Chen Jitang yanjiu shiliao*, 155.

50 Mo, “*Wo zouguo de daolu—cong taigu yanghang maiban dao Xianggang jibanfa qicao weiyuan*,” 7–10.

51 Guangdong da an guan, *Chen Jitang yanjiu shiliao*, 180–181.

52 Mo, “Yinjin qiaozi suoji 引進僑資瑣記 [Some details about introducing overseas capital],” in *Nan tian suiyue: Chen Jitang zhu yue shiqi jianwen shilu* 南天歲月：陳濟棠主粵時期見聞實錄 [Record of the Guangdong Province under Chen Jitang’s rule], ed. *Guangzhoushi zhengxie wenshi ziliao yanjiu weiyuanhui* 廣州市政協文史資料委員會 [Cultural and historical data research committee of the political negotiation unit of the Canton city] (Canton: Guangdong renmin chubanshe, 1987), 306–609.

producers, to collect all sugarcane, to mill it at a modern manufacturer, and to allocate the final products to assigned wholesalers. The goals were to substitute the circulation of foreign sugar in China markets with local Guangdong sugar, to allow the government to coordinate all stages of sugar production so as to disseminate the most advanced machinery to the producers, and to develop unclaimed “wastelands” as state sugar farms and factories.<sup>53</sup> As most of the wastelands were part of the corporations of certain big lineage groups, Feng’s sugar agenda thus hurt the interests of not only the importers of foreign sugar to Guangdong but also local elites.<sup>54</sup> Chen Jitang, however, rendered full support to Feng Rui. In 1933, Chen allocated customs duties collected from the import of foreign rice, equivalent to 4 percent of total taxes in Guangdong that year, to set up modern sugar mills. By the fall of Chen Jitang, in July 1936, Feng had founded six modern sugar mills: four located in the Pearl River delta and two in the Teochew homelands in eastern Guangdong. Feng expected that the new mills could contribute twenty million national dollars of revenue to Guangdong.<sup>55</sup>

Feng Rui’s original blueprint for the sugar revival did not include a role for these middlemen merchants from Hong Kong. But the first batch of refined sugar produced under Feng Rui’s policy did not come up until December 1934. The Guangdong government turned to Mok and Tsong, among other selected merchants, to commission the supply of raw sugarcane and to manage the wholesaling of processed Guangdong sugar.<sup>56</sup>

Critiques of Feng Rui’s sugar policies can be seen as a clue to estimate the profits that Chinese overseas bourgeoisie might have gained from Feng Rui’s sugar reforms. Some pointed out that what Mok shipped to Guangdong included not only raw sugarcane from the Dutch East Indies and Japanese Taiwan but also the final refined sugar from the Swire Company in Hong Kong. They also commented that Chen even dispatched a navy to patrol the secret import of foreign refined sugar. These sugar stocks were repackaged as products manufactured in Guangdong. As they were produced neither with

---

53 Emily W. Hill, *Smokeless Sugar: The Death of a Provincial Bureaucrat and the Construction of China’s National Economy* (Vancouver and Toronto: University of British Columbia Press, 2010), 33–46.

54 Chen Shaoyu, *Guangdong tangye yu Feng Rui*, 51–72.

55 Chen Shaoyu, *Guangdong tangye yu Feng Rui*, 22–23.

56 Including Mok and Tsong, the number of merchants commissioned to ship sugar to Guangdong was five, but then extended to ten. Mo Yinggui, “*Yinjin qiaozi suoji*, 306–312; Mo, “*Wo zouguo de daolu—cong taigu yanghang maiban dao xianggang jibanfa qicao weiyuan*,” 7–10.

new steaming machines nor through traditional boiling, this Guangdong sugar thus came to be known as “smokeless sugar.”<sup>57</sup> An estimate was that between June 1934 and December 1936, at least thirty thousand tons of smokeless sugar were shipped to Guangdong.<sup>58</sup> The Nanjing government received reports about the operation of the illicit trade in Guangdong. In December 1934, the Nanjing government inquired whether the Chinese sugar dealers were repackaging foreign sugar stocks as Guangdong sugar. Represented by the Hong Kong Sugar Association, which Mok and Tsong chaired, the Chinese sugar dealers responded that they did not need to do so because Guangdong had established three sugar factories by that time and the local production of sugarcane was sufficient. “This is a great opportunity to revive the sugar industry and to recover the nation’s rights of making profits.”<sup>59</sup> Judging by what the historian Emily M. Hill has argued—that those involved in sugar smuggling to Guangdong included local sugar merchants, foreign sugar interests, as well as Guangdong officials and military people including Chen Jitang’s brother Chen Weichou—one doubts the validity of the merchants’ denial.<sup>60</sup> Seen in this light, the profits of Chinese overseas bourgeoisie, especially those involved in Guangdong’s sugar trade, were associated with the controlled-economy experiment in Chen Jitang’s Guangdong.

After the collapse of the Guangdong regime, in July 1937, Chen Jitang and many of his followers fled to Hong Kong. Feng Rui, however, chose to stay in Guangdong, planning to continue his sugar revival plan under the new government. This proved to be an unwise choice. Within two months, he was executed without trial. It was said that when some of Feng Rui’s family members reported the tragedy to Chen’s wife, Mo Xiuying 莫秀英, she made the

57 Xian Zi'en 洗子恩, “*Ban tangchang jinguo ji zhenxiang* 辦糖廠經過及真相 [The process and reality of operating a sugar factory],” *Nantian suiyue—Chen Jitang zhu Yue shiqi jianwen shilu*, ed. Guangzhoushi zhenxie wenshi ziliao yanjiu weiyuanhui (Guangzhou: Zhongguo renmin zhengzhi xieshang huiyi Guangzhoushi weiyuanhui, 1987), 245–261; Mo Yinggui, “*Yinjin qiaozi suoji*,” 306–312; Mo, “*Wo zouguo de daolu—cong taigu yanghang maiban dao xianggang jibanfa qicao weiyuan*,” 7–10.

58 Xian Zi'en, “*Ban tangchang jinguo ji zhenxiang*,” 245–261.

59 HKMS 175-1-43: *Xianggang tangshang zonghui chaxun tutang gaizhuang yang tang yun xiao quanguo de dianwen ji xingzheng yuan guanyu chuanwen shishi de han* 香港糖商總會查詢土糖改裝糖運銷全國的電文及行政院關於傳聞失實的函 [Cables about the inquiry of the Hong Kong Sugar Merchants Association on whether foreign sugar was repacked as local sugar as well as Executive Yuan’s letter that rebukes such a rumor].

60 Hill, *Smokeless Sugar*, 148–172.

following remark: “Why didn’t he [Feng Rui] just come to Hong Kong?”<sup>61</sup> This rumor was certainly meant to ridicule Chen Jitang and his supporters, but it also reflected the importance of Hong Kong in sheltering the failed politicians in the southern movements.

### Isolation of Hokkien Business Networks in the GMD’s Controlled Economy, 1936–1941

In Fujian, beginning in 1935, when Chen Yi 陳儀 became the new governor of the Fujian provincial government following the collapse of the Nineteenth Route Army, he implemented a series of policies that authorized the government to regulate and intervene in almost all spheres of economic activity in the province. For instance, in the development of Fujian’s tea trade, the government took steps to get rid of the middlemen tea agents. The first step was to set up a storehouse in Fuzhou in 1935. Under the framework of joint management between merchants and officials, the Fuzhou Tea Storehouse provided low-interest loans to farmers with the guarantee of collecting their stocks with a reasonable price. In the second step, beginning in 1936, the Fujian provincial government set up the Department of Construction to consolidate the implementation of different levels of economic control. The leader was the Zhejiang man Xu Xueyu. Under his command, the Fuzhou Tea Storehouse was reorganized and renamed the Managerial Institute of Tea Storage, which prohibited the participation of any private merchant.<sup>62</sup> The rationale behind such a policy was twofold: First, the government wanted to set up standardized factory production in the Chinese tea industry, so it could become competitive with the tea production in British India and Ceylon as well as in Japanese Taiwan. The government believed that the latter’s success rested on its transformation from a household to a factory production system. Second, the government wanted to eradicate the influence of Chinese middlemen agents

61 Anonymous, “Ba mian feng 八面風 [winds blowing from eight sides],” *Shidai sheng-huo* 時代生活 (Tianjin), nos. 4–5 (1937), 23. Digital reproduction of Modern Chinese Journals in the Republican Era, the Library of the Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica, Taipei; accessed on August 12, 2013.

62 Yu Mi 毓泌, “Wu nian lai de Fujian chaye guanli, san xu 五年來的福建茶業管理，三緒 [Management of Fujian tea industry in the past five years—3–3],” in *Cha Xun* 茶訊 2, no. 12 (Fuzhou: April 21, 1940): 874–877. The newsletter *Cha Xun* cited in this article is based on the reprint of *Minguo cha wenxian shiliao huibian* 民國茶文獻史料匯編 (Beijing: Quanguo tushuguan wenxian suo weifu zhizhongxin, 2009).

in tea production, believing that they exploited the producers by offering loans with heavy interest rates and purchasing tea stocks at unreasonable low prices.<sup>63</sup> It is worth noting that the official diagnosis of the problem was contrary to the conclusion drawn by the tea exporters. The latter, mostly Hokkien merchants active in the trade between Amoy and Singapore, did not view the household production as a problematic system. They attributed the decline of the Chinese tea industry to the cheating of “tea ghosts,” or the individual tea farmers who were not honest about the quality of the tea.<sup>64</sup>

The divergent views of the Fujian provincial government and Chinese overseas tea merchants widened after Nanjing established the China Tea Company, in May 1937. The company was set up to coordinate Chinese tea sales nationwide. After the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, in July 1937, the purpose of regulating the Chinese tea trade changed from improving its competitiveness in the global market to securing its supply to wartime China and participating in China’s barter trade with the Soviet Union and United States. In October 1937, the Military Committee of the Chinese Nationalist Government set up the Trade Committee to regulate the circulation of key commodities. Tea was listed along with silk, cotton, bristle, frozen eggs, vegetable oil, and ores (especially antimony, wolfram, tin, and nickel) as being subject to the regulation.<sup>65</sup> The Trade Committee further established two companies in Hong Kong for the export of these products under the state-to-state Sino-Soviet and Sino-U.S. tung oil for loan: the Fu Hua Trading Company in April 1938 and the Foo Shing Trading Corporation in December 1938.<sup>66</sup> According to the “Guidelines for Chinese Tea Export,” issued by the Minister of Finance in June 1938, half the tea harvested in Zhejiang, Anhui, Jiangxi, Hubei, Hunan, and Fujian should

63 Yu Mi, “*Wu nianlai de Fujian chaye guanli, san shu.*”

64 Lim, *Linking an Asian Transregional Commerce in Tea*, 33–41.

65 After February 1938, the Trade Committee was put under the direct supervision of the Minister of Finance. Tea became an important item in the Sino-Soviet barter trade beginning in March 1938; tung oil was exchanged for American loans after February 1939. See Zheng Huixin 鄭會欣, *Guomin zhengfu zhan shi tongzhi jingji yu maoyi yanjiu, 1937–1945* 國民政府戰時統制經濟與貿易研究, 一九三七—一九四五 [Research on controlled economy and wartime trade of the Chinese Nationalist Government, 1937–1945] (Shanghai: Shanghai shehui kexue yuan chubanshe, 2009), 56–60; 82–91; 187–195; 229; 243; 283–290.

66 The Fu Hua Trading Company was reorganized as a formal state-run enterprise in June 1940 when controlled exports became the norm of China’s wartime economy. In January 1942, with the Japanese occupation of Hong Kong, the Foo Shing Trading Corporation incorporated the Fu Hua Trading Company. Zheng Huixin, *Guomin zhengfu zhan shi tongzhi jingji yu maoyi yanjiu, 1937–1945*, 205–211; 219–223; 225–232.

submit to the China Tea Company.<sup>67</sup> To continue exporting Fujian tea to Singapore, a Singapore tea merchant had to pay the Fujian Provincial Trade Company to order tea and have it shipped to the Fu Hua Trading Company in Hong Kong, from where it was exported to Singapore.<sup>68</sup>

The Fujian provincial government viewed the exportation of Fujian's tea as the last hope to recover the province's economy at a time when the Sino-Japanese war had devastated its domestic trade and general foreign exports. Coordinating with the Fu Hua Trading Company in Hong Kong could create an alternative outlet to avoid shipping goods through a seaport under Japan's control. The tea merchants, however, looked at these regulations differently. In 1939, tea merchants from Singapore refused to abide by the regulation and continued their old methods of trade by bringing their own capital to Fujian and collecting and processing their own tea stocks. In response, the Fujian provincial government locked these tea stocks in a storage house, leaving almost no Fujian tea to circulate in Singapore. After months of negotiations, in 1940, the Fujian Provincial Trade Company allowed some overseas Chinese tea firms that had been set up before May 1939 to export their goods as exceptional cases.<sup>69</sup>

Tea was not the only merchandise for which the government prohibited the long-term practice of Chinese business networks in the South China-South Seas area. After the fall of Amoy in May 1938, the *Xinjiapo bang xie jin hui* 新嘉坡幫協進會 (Hong Kong Singapore Hip Chun Association), an import-export agent for Singapore merchants based in Hong Kong, requested that the Chinese Nationalist Government verify whether all products from Japanese-occupied areas in China were to be considered Japanese. The long list of merchandise in question included soy beans and jinseng from Manchuria; various agricultural products including green beans, soy beans, black beans, red beans, haw berries, melons, cabbages, and pears from the Hebei province; peanuts, ginkgo biloba, and vermicelli from Shandong; winter pickles from

67 Zheng Huixin, *Guomin zhengfu zhan shi tongzhi jingji yu maoyi yanjiu, 1937-1945*, 284-288.

68 HKMS 175-1-1300: *Xianggang Fuhua maoyi gongsi nanyang xiao cha jihua ji youguan wenshu* 香港富華貿易公司洋銷茶計劃及有關文書 [Related documents about the plan of the Hong Kong Fuhua Company to sell tea to the South Seas].

69 HKMS 175-1-1301: *Mao wei hui Xianggang banshi chu guanyu Gang gongsi ni song bo fu cha shang tongzhi de yijian* 貿委會香港辦事處關於港公司擬送駁覆茶商對茶葉統制的意見 [The Hong Kong office of the Trade Committee: opinions on Hong Kong company's plan to improve the tea merchants about the opinions on tea control]; Huang Chaoren, "Ruhe kuozhan Min cha nanyang de xiaolu [how to expand the markets of Fujian tea in the South Seas]," *Cha Xun* 2, no. 13 (Fuzhou, May 1, 1940).

Tianjin; and sundry squids, lark, preserved duck eggs, bamboo leaves, garlic, lotus seeds, chestnuts, broad bean, melon seeds, and condiments from Shanghai. Although the Minister of Economics explicitly prohibited only the sale of ginseng, the government would not grant any certificate of Chinese products to those shipped from Japanese-occupied zones. This generated the ambiguity that, although the Chinese Consulate in Singapore would choose to limit the range of economic boycotts, allowing goods not officially classified as Japanese to be circulated in the markets, anti-Japanese patriotic groups in Singapore still treated those products as Japanese products subject to boycotting.<sup>70</sup> The lack of an official proof also generated problems for the trade between China and the Straits Settlements, as after June 1941, the government of the Straits Settlements prohibited the inflow of Chinese goods from Japanese-occupied areas, unless a certificate was issued. To facilitate Chinese trade, the Chinese Consulate in Singapore went ahead and provided provisional certificates for those goods ordered before June 1941, while seeking the approval of the Chinese Nationalist Government afterward.<sup>71</sup>

In Guangdong, after the fall of Canton in October 1938, Japanese control of the province's prosperous Pearl River delta challenged Hong Kong's role as the sole outlet for exporting Chinese goods from the hinterland to the South Seas. Beginning on August 17, 1937, the Chinese Nationalist Government allowed the Kowloon-Canton Railway to connect with the Canton-Hankou Railway. The daily volume of goods carried along this route was between 140 and 400 tons, and the total volume between February and October 1938

70 Record group number 4, file number 28594: *Xinjiapo bang xie jin hui dian chen ge youji zhanqu chanpin yunxiao beizu* 新嘉坡幫協進會電陳各游擊戰區產品運銷被阻 [Cables from the Hong Kong Singapore Hip Chu Association about the obstructions of trade by the guerillas in China's Japanese occupied areas]; Record group number 4, file number 28756: *Xinjiapo bang xie jin hui guanyu zai yishi gedi gouhuo waixiao shifou shi zuo di huo an, 1939* 新加坡幫協進會關於在已失各地購貨外銷是否視作敵貨案, 一九三九 [Inquiry from the Hong Kong Singapore Hip Chun Association over whether the products purchased in Japan-occupied area in China should be considered as enemy's goods].

71 Record group number 4, file number 28803: *Xinjiapo zong lingshiguan dian chen dang di qiaoshang yunxiao lunxian qu tu chan mou zi yiwei dang di zhengfu xianzhi shuru qing yu zhengming de qingxing qing zhishi* 新嘉坡總領事館電陳當地僑商運銷淪陷區土產謀資以為當地政府限制輸入請予證明等情形請核示 [From Chinese Consulate in Singapore: overseas Chinese merchants requested certificates for Chinese products shipped from Japanese occupied areas in China, otherwise local government would not allow these products to enter the markets], Sept. 1941.

reached 130,000 tons.<sup>72</sup> After Japan connected the Hankou-Canton Railway with the Whampoa Port, in 1939, Japan mandated that steamers navigating between Canton and Hong Kong as well as Macao could carry only passengers and necessities; no cargo was allowed.<sup>73</sup> The alternative outlet for exporting goods was en route from Huizhou and Sha Yu Yong (in Shenzhen) to Kowloon, Hong Kong.<sup>74</sup> That strategy worked. In the first eleven months of 1939, goods valued at 274,000,000 Chinese dollars were transported from hinterland China to Hong Kong.<sup>75</sup> But at the same time, after Guangdong provincial capital moved to Shao'guan, on the northern tier bordering southern Hunan, the Guangdong provincial government's economic focus turned to hinterland industrialization and agriculture, such as paper, alcohol, flour, textiles, hemp, agrarian machines, sugar refineries, and oil refineries.<sup>76</sup> To respond to the policy of the Chinese Nationalist Government in Chongqing (Chongqing government) that encouraged overseas Chinese to set up small- and medium-size enterprises (with capital between 10,000 and 200,000 national dollars) in China, the Guangdong provincial government sponsored the establishment of fire match and textile factories whose annual net profits were below 6 percent of paid-in capital.<sup>77</sup> Guangdong also authorized its Hong Kong Correspondence Office to recruit overseas Chinese to resettle and farm in Guangdong.<sup>78</sup> They set up an office in Singapore to facilitate overseas Chinese remittances back to their home province.<sup>79</sup> In addition, Guangdong also cooperated with the Kian Gwan 建源公司 from Java to establish a sugar manufacturer in Guangxi.<sup>80</sup> On August 15, 1941, at the grand opening of the Showcase of Chinese National Products in Hong Kong, Chinese bourgeois elites in attendance included Robert Kotewall and

72 Deng and Lu, *Yue gang ao jindai guanxishi*, 265.

73 Xu Dezhi, Huang Dazhang, Liang Yurong and Cheng Youjiang 徐德志、黃達璋、梁郁榮、成有江 eds. *Guangdong dui wai jingji maoyi shi* 廣東對外經濟貿易史 [History of Guangdong's foreign trade] (Guangzhou: Guangdong renmin chubanshe), 163.

74 Xu et al., *Guangdong dui wai maoyi shi*, 172.

75 Deng and Lu, *Yue gang ao jindai guanxishi*, 283.

76 Xu et al. eds., *Guangdong dui wai jingji maoyi shi*, 170.

77 Guangdong sheng dang an guan ed., "Minutes of the 183th Meeting of the Ninth Committee of the Guangdong Provincial Government, November 29, 1940," *Minguo shiqi Guangdong sheng zhengfu dang an shiliao xuan bian* 6, 283–284.

78 Guangdong sheng dang an guan ed., "Minutes of the 172th Meeting of the Ninth Committee of the Guangdong Provincial Government, October 18, 1940," *Minguo shiqi Guangdong sheng zhengfu dang an shiliao xuan bian* 6, 205.

79 Xu et al. eds., *Guangdong dui wai jingji maoyi shi*, 171.

80 Record group number 3 (6), file number 385: *Zhongguo guohuo shiye fawushe gongzuo baogao ji youguan wenshu*.

Chow Shou Son, the owner of the Wing On Company, Philip Kwik Chin (then the chairperson of the CGCCHK and Tung Wah Hospital); and Yip Lan Chuan 葉蘭泉 from the CMUHK. In addition, the Singapore-based Hakka leader Aw Boon Haw was present.<sup>81</sup> Many of them were manufacturers or Chinese overseas investors in China.

### Chinese Overseas Nationalism in the GMD-CCP Divides

As the vast coastal line of China was now under the control of Japan, the united front between the GMD and CCP did not bring all Chinese overseas to form a consolidated anti-Japanese campaign. On the one hand, the split of the GMD's leadership structure took some overseas Chinese nationalists away from their rally to Chiang Kai-shek and the Chongqing regime. On the other hand, the GMD's implementation of the controlled economy isolated it from the support of overseas Chinese engaging in the China–South Seas trade.

In November 1938, Japan's prime minister, Konoe Fumimaro, announced the six principles for a New Asian Order, which included forming an anti-communist front and advocating for a peaceful solution to the Sino-Japanese conflict. On December 29, 1938, Wang Jingwei, then the vice-president of the GMD, cabled to Chongqing about his determination to stop the war and the merits of the peaceful solution that Konoe proposed. Chiang Kai-shek responded to this cable by dismissing Wang's GMD membership, calling Wang and his followers "traitors" to China. At the same time, Chiang wanted all Chinese to rally to his anti-Japanese war.<sup>82</sup> To the satisfaction of Chiang, his long-term competitor, the Guangxi clique, immediately condemned Wang and vowed allegiance to the Chongqing regime.<sup>83</sup> In the South Seas, the leader of the primary fund-raising campaign NQZH, Tan Kah Kee, also endorsed Chiang, on January 1, 1939.<sup>84</sup> Other Chinese associations in Singapore, including the Singapore Guangdong Association, the Joint Meeting of Hokkien Associations

81 Group record number 3 (6), file number 385: *Zhongguo guohuo shiye fuwushe gongzuo baogao ji youguan wenshu*.

82 Guomin zhengfu files: *Wang Zhaoming panguo* 汪兆銘叛國 [Wang Zhaoming rebelled against the nation], 001-103100-001, Dec. 20, 1938–Jan. 11, 1939.

83 Chiang files: *Wang wei zuzhi* (1) 汪偽組織 (1) [Wang's puppet regime, 1], 002-090200-00022-003, Dec. 28, 1938.

84 Chiang files: *Wang wei zuzhi* (1), 002-090200-00022-048.

in Singapore, and the sccc, all expressed their disapproval of Wang's appeasement policy toward Japan.<sup>85</sup>

These cables with words of support from Chinese overseas, however, did not entirely clear up Chiang Kai-shek's worry about the expansion of Wang's influence. Reports were rampant about Wang's attempts to undermine overseas Chinese support of Chiang. The tactics being used, as Chiang's secret agents revealed, were to aggravate the conflict between Tan Kah Kee and his Hakka competitor Aw Boon Haw (chapter 3). Hong Kong and Singapore were the primary targets of Wang's work. For example, in January 1939, one report shows that Wang's supporter Liang Xianfan 梁顯凡, a Cantonese who was the general editor of the Singapore Chinese vernacular newspaper *Lat Pau* between 1931 and 1932, successfully united the Chinese rallying for Wang's pro-Japan campaign in Hong Kong. Liang was heading to Singapore to undermine Chinese overseas support for Chiang by making use of the long-term tension between Tan and Aw.<sup>86</sup> The other report suggests that Wang was dispatching his long-term supporter Teo Eng Hock to persuade either Tan or Aw to develop Guangdong as an anti-Chiang base. And between Tan and Aw, as the speculation goes, Tan might have been more likely to accept Teo's proposal.<sup>87</sup>

When Wang established a pro-Japan regime in Nanjing, in March 1940, Teo became a core promoter of Wang's peace movement in the South Seas. Teo advocated the notion that forging an amicable Sino-Japanese relationship would be a long-term solution to end Western colonialism in Asia and ensure the region's survival.<sup>88</sup> Teo also played a critical role in the stipulation of diplomatic ties between Wang's Nanjing regime and Thailand in 1942.<sup>89</sup> By the time Japan occupied Hong Kong and Singapore, in 1942, Chinese overseas

85 Chiang files: *Wang wei zuzhi* (1), 002-090200-00022-024, 002-090200-00022-039, 002-090200-00022-039, Jan. 4, 1939–Jan. 9, 1939.

86 Chiang files: *Yiban ziliao: cheng biao huiji* (86) 一般資料：呈表彙集（八十六） [General data, with tables, 86], 002-080200-00522-015, Sept. 17, 1939. This is based on a cable dispatched from Hong Kong on January 15, 1939.

87 Chiang files: *Yiban ziliao: cheng biao huiji* (95) 一般資料：呈表彙集（九十五） [General data, with tables, 95], 002-080200-00522-008, March 10, 1939.

88 Koh Kow Chiang ed., *Who's Who in South East Asia*, A 64; Lee Ying-hui, *Kanri yu furi: huaqiao, guominzhengfu, Wang zhengquan*, 111–112, 120–121, 132, 139, 228.

89 Chiang Kai-shek's Nanjing regime had long expected to establish formal diplomatic ties with Thailand, which by 1939 was known as Siam. In the mid-1930s, while serving in the Overseas Chinese Committee of the Chinese Nationalist Government, Teo asked the government to set up a consulate. The plan did not work, given Siam's refusal to enter any formal diplomatic relationship with the Republic of China. In 1937, however, Siam recognized the Manchukuo. See Wai jiaobu files: *Tai wei guangxi* 泰偽關係 [Relationship

communities in the region were divided. But in the two British colonies, the divide was less about the influence of Wang Jingwei's pro-Japan campaign and more about the disappointment in Chiang Kai-shek's leadership during the anti-Japanese war.

Between March and December 1940, in his capacity as the NQZH chairperson, Tan Kah Kee organized a comfort mission to investigate wartime development in China. Participants in the tour included Tjhung Sie-gan 莊西言 (Zhuang Xiyan; 1885–1965), from the Dutch East Indies, and Hau Say Huan 侯西反 (Hou Xifan; 1883–1944), who was deported by the British to China for his association with two communist organizations in Malaya: the Anti-Enemy Backing-Up Society and the Chinese National Vanguard Corp.<sup>90</sup> During the trip, he noticed the contrast between the GMD officials' luxurious lifestyles and the CCP's hardships, as well as the poverty and chaos in his home province Fujian.<sup>91</sup> The GMD kept a close eye on Tan while he was touring China. A classified report submitted to Chiang Kai-shek in June 1940 shows that when Tan was visiting Yan'an, the CCP leaders told him about the crucial support of the overseas Chinese in settling the GMD-CCP friction. Chiang Kai-shek was aware of Tan's attempt to distance himself from an exclusive GMD supporter, but he found no way to change it.<sup>92</sup>

In December 1940, on his return trip to Singapore by way of Rangoon, Tan publicly expressed his appreciation of the CCP's progress and reported the problems of Fujian under Governor Chen Yi's rule. Though this marked the sudden change of Tan's attitude toward the GMD, the change reflected the growing popularity of the CCP in the war. Citing the reports of firsthand observers in Yan'an, such as Edgar Snow, Mark Selden points out that CCP officials in the early 1940s demonstrated to the public "striking contrast to the Kuomintang [GMD] officials," because "no communist cadre lived in a style even remotely approaching comfort, much less affluence; the hardships of war and poverty

---

between Thailand and the Wang's puppet regime], 020-010411-0001, Dec. 31. 1935–March 1, 1939; *Zhong Xian dingyue*, 002-010402-0015, Sept. 1932–May 1935.

90 S. Leong. "The Kuomintang-Communist United Front in Malaya during the National Salvation Period, 1937–1941;" Yong, *Tan Kah Kee*, 222. See the conclusion of the book for a detailed discussion of the repercussions of Hau's deportation.

91 Chen Jiageng, *Nanqiao huiyilu*, 187–188.

92 Chiang files: *Yiban ziliao—cheng biao huiji* (123) 一般資料——呈表彙集 (一二三) [General data, with table 123], 002-080200-00550-110, June 20, 1940; Chiang files, *Shilue gaoban—Minguo sanshinian yi yue* 事略稿本——民國三十年一月 [Drafts of issues, January of the 30th year of the Republic of China], 002-060100-00148-005, Jan. 5, 1941.

fell on cadre and soldier as well as on the peasant.”<sup>93</sup> Tan was among those visitors who had such an impression.

After his return to Singapore, in January 1941, Tan continued to lecture about the problems in Fujian. He also began to organize people to impeach Chen Yi. He criticized Chen’s entrusted officer Xu Xueyu in the Fujian provincial government for displaying favoritism in his operation of the controlled economy.<sup>94</sup>

Beginning in January 1941, Tan’s anti-Chen Yi forces developed into a transnational mobilization of the Hokkien networks. Under Tan’s influence, almost all Fujian native-place associations in the South Seas dispatched representatives for the convention of the *Nanyang Geshu Fujian Tongxianghui Daibiao Dahui* 南洋各屬福建同鄉代表大會 [All Fujian Native-Place Association in the South Seas; NGFDD thereafter] in Singapore. Between April 1 and 3, 1941, 313 delegates representing 115 prominent Fujian associations throughout the South Seas attended the convention.<sup>95</sup> Although the vice-president of the NQZH and the long-term supporter of Fujian’s development, Dee Chen Chuan, passed away in November 1940,<sup>96</sup> the Philippines branch of the NMJH in which Dee had actively participated sent a representative to endorse the campaign. The Singapore-based tea merchant Lim Keng Lian also attended the meeting as one of four representatives from the Singapore Fujian Native-Place Association. Lim’s presence suggested that the concern over Fujian affairs transcended their prior conflict regarding the local SCCC election in 1939, when

93 Mark Selden, *China in Revolution: The Yan’an Way Revisited* (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, [1971] 1995), 157.

94 Xu Xueyu, the Chair of the Department of the Construction of the Fujian Provincial Government, was also on the board of directors of the China Tea Company between July 1939 and May 1940. About Xu, see Zheng Huixin, *Guomin zhengfu zhan shi tongzhi jingji yu maoyi yanjiu, 1937–1945*, 180–187. Tan’s attacks of Chen and Xu are documented in his memoir, *Nanqiao huiyilu*, 286–293. The original records include Record group number 1 (2), file number 1763: *Xinjiapo qiaomin tuanti Chen Jiagen de jielou Minsheng kezheng yanshuo ji youguan hudian* 新嘉坡僑民團體陳嘉庚等揭露閩省苛政演說及有關互電 [Overseas Chinese societies and Tan Kah Kee in Singapore reveals the brutal policies in Fujian and related cables].

95 For a list of participants of the NGFDD, see *Nanyang Geshu Fujian Tongxiang Daibiao Dahui* 南洋各屬福建同鄉會代表大會, *Nanyang geshu Fujian tongxianghui daibiao dahui jiyao* 南洋各屬福建同鄉會代表大會輯要 [Chronicle of all the representative meeting of all Fujian native-place associations in the South Seas] (Singapore: Nanyang geshu fujian tongxiang daibiao dahui, 1941), 46, 61, 69.

96 *Guomin zhengfu files: Xiezhu kangzhan yougong ren yuan biao xu an, yi* 協助抗戰有功人員褒卹案, 一 [Cases on rewards and compensations for those who assisted the Chinese anti-Japanese war, 1], 001-030600-0067, June 7, 1939–Dec. 13, 1940.

Lim tried to get elected chairperson, Tan supported his son-in-law Lee Kong Chian instead, doubting Lim's credibility in leading the Chinese business community.<sup>97</sup> Tsong Sing Tsung and Ye Taihen 葉苔痕 were the only two delegates from Hong Kong. Tsong attended the venue as a representative from the following four organizations: the Hong Kong Fukien Chamber of Commerce, the Hong Kong Fukien Native-Place Association, the Home-Saving Committee of the Hong Kong Fukienese Association, and the Relief Association of the Hong Kong Fujian Chamber of Commerce. Ye Taiheng attended on behalf of the *Xianggang Fujian tongxiang huzhu hui* 香港福建同鄉互助會 [Hong Kong Fujian People's Mutual-Help Association].<sup>98</sup>

At the founding meeting of the NGFDD, Tan argued that the GMD leaders in Fujian such as Chen and Xu were part of the "Zhejiang clique," whose policies did not match the expectations of the Fujian people. He also made an analogy between the Zhejiang clique in Fujian and the Japanese in Taiwan: "Those who annihilated Taiwan were the Japanese; those who annihilated Fujian would be the Zhejiang people. If *Min* [Hokkien/Fujian] people do not quickly rise up, Fujian will soon become a colony of the Zhejiang clique."<sup>99</sup> The NGFDD thus issued a notice to remind Chinese overseas "not to deposit money in the Fujian provincial government before Chen Yi and Xu Xueyi were removed from their positions."<sup>100</sup>

The Chinese consulate in Singapore, Kao Ling Pai 高凌白 (Gao Lingbai), noticed that the published transcript of the speech substituted the wording "Zhejiang clique" with "Chen Yi." This modification might have been made to avoid distracting participants from the focus of discussion: the leader who should be responsible for the wrong policies, without concern for his parochial native-place ties. The native-place solidarity nonetheless was key to the organization of Tan's anti-Chen Yi campaign. And as Kao was collecting Tan's

97 Jason Lim, "The Education Concerns and Political Outlook of Lim Keng Lian (1893–1968)," 194–219.

98 Nanyang geshu fujian tongxianghui ed. *Nanyang geshu Fujian tongxianghui daibiao dahui jiyao*, 68–69.

99 Waijiao bu files: 020-010607-0017, *Nanyang Huaqiao chouzhan zonghui zhaokai di er ci dai biao da hui* 南洋華僑籌賑總會召開第二次代表大會 [The Second Meeting for Representatives of the NQZH].

100 The notice was published in local Chinese newspapers on April 25, 1941, collected in Waijiao bu files: 020-010607-0017, *Nanyang Huaqiao chouzhan zonghui zhaokai di er ci dai biao da hui*.

speeches as evidence of his betrayal of Chinese nationalism, Tan accused Kao of being one of Wang's followers.<sup>101</sup>

The withdrawal of support from Tan was a critical challenge to the GMD's wartime regime, given the handsome contributions between 1938 and 1940 to the GMD's military budget.<sup>102</sup> After 1941, when Tan's conflict with the GMD became irreversible, local newspapers brought up the old issue of Tan's allocation of residual funds of the Shandong Relief Fund that he organized in May 1928 (chapter 3). Given that this issue had been clarified in 1932, Tan and his supporters were sure that the GMD intentionally stirred up such a discussion to tarnish his credentials and discredit his leadership of Chinese overseas nationalism.<sup>103</sup>

The GMD also kept a close eye to prevent the spread of Tan's influence from Singapore to Hong Kong. Prominent Hokkien merchants throughout the South Seas, if they also had business in Hong Kong, would join the Hong Kong Fukien (Fujian) Chamber of Commerce 香港福建商會 (est. 1916). Its notable non-Hong Kong members included Kwik Djoen Eng, Lim Peng Siang and his brother Lim Peng Mao 林秉茂 (Lin Bingmao) of the Singapore-based Ho Hong Group of Companies, as well as Kang Jingpo 康靜波, who left Singapore as manager of the Hong Kong branch of the OCBC.<sup>104</sup> The leader of the Hong Kong Fukien Chamber of Commerce for twenty-five years between 1916 and 1940 was Toh Sze Tuan 杜四端 (Du Siduan; 1859–1940). Toh's import-export trade reached throughout the South Seas, South China and Taiwan, so as his social connections.<sup>105</sup> Before Tan Kah Kee's influence became a threat to the GMD in 1940, in 1938,

101 Waijiao bu files: 020-010607-0017, *Nanyang Huaqiao chouzhan zonghui zhaokai di er ci dai biao da hui*, Jan. 19, 1941–Nov. 16, 1941.

102 Lee Ying-hui, *Kang Ri yu fu Ri*, 138, fn. 109.

103 Waijiao bu files: 020-010607-0017, *Nanyang Huaqiao chouzhan zonghui zhaokai di er ci dai biao da hui*. As Tan Kah Kee argued, the disputes were settled in 1932. See *NYSF*: March 14, 1932; Jul 12, 1932; August 6, 1932; August 23, 1932.

104 Wu Zaiqiao 吳在橋 ed. "Fujian lugang shanghai 福建旅港商會 [Hong Kong Fukien Chamber of Commerce]," in *Xianggang Minqiao shanghai renminglu 香港閩僑商號人名錄* [Directory of the Fujian merchants and companies] (Hong Kong: Lugang Fujian Shanghai and Fujian lugang tongxianghui, 1947), 5.

105 As a Hokkien merchant in the Cantonese-dominant port-city, Toh exceptionally rose to the top elite circles including the CGCHK, the Tung Wah Hospital, the Twenty-four Merchants Guild, the Hong Kong Confucian Society, among others. Du Qizhang (Toh Kee Chueng) ed., *Sidian xiansheng ba zhi kai yi shuangshou jinian kan 四端先生八十開一雙壽紀念刊* [Souvenir Issue of the Celebration for the 81 Birthday of Mr. Sze Tuan] (Hong Kong: publisher unknown, 1929).

Toh's son, Toh Kee Cheung, organized art fairs with the Shanghai painter Wang Juyuan to collect national salvation funds. Toh and Wang decided not to wire the donations to Chiang's government in Chongqing, but to send the money to the Fifth Route Army, organized by the Guangxi clique that Chiang did not fully trust. When Toh and Wang toured in Singapore, Gao Lingbai reported to Chongqing that Toh was embezzling the patriotic funds.<sup>106</sup> This was a way that GMD used to strengthen its control over Chinese overseas communities.

Another way that the GMD did was through constructing its own association to compete with Toh's influence based on the Hong Kong Fukien Chamber of Commerce. In February 1939, Fujian migrants in Hong Kong witnessed the establishment of another Fujian association. This time the key organizers were either Hakka merchants or GMD partisans, or both. Registered in English as the Hong Kong Fukienese Association (*Fujian lugang tongxianghui* 福建旅港同鄉會),<sup>107</sup> the association's founding member was the high-profile Hakka tycoon Aw Boon Haw. Aw also served as its first-term chairperson between the mid-1939 and mid-1940. The other two founding members—Zheng Yushu 鄭玉書 and Lin Aimin 林藹民—were both related to the GMD. Zheng, a native of Yongchun, Fujian, began his career as the chief military doctor of Fujian's Northern Expedition Army in 1911. Between 1912 and 1927, he served in several executive positions related to hygiene, road construction, and finance in Fujian, Jiangsu, and Anhui. In 1939, he chaired the Relief Committee in the Hong Kong Fukien Chamber of Commerce after the fall of Amoy to the Japanese in May 1938.<sup>108</sup> Zheng later became the association's first-term vice-chairperson in 1939 and the second-term chairperson in 1940.<sup>109</sup> Lin, a

106 Record group number 2 (1), file number 10372: *Wang Jiyuan Du Qizhang zai Xingjiapo yi jiucai mingyi kai meishu zhanlanhui mukuan baoru sinang an*, 1938.

107 The Chinese name is sometimes presented as *Xianggang Fujian tongxiang hui* 香港福建同鄉會 (Hong Kong Fujian Native-Place Association). For example, the title of the first publication of the association is *Xianggang Fujian tongxianhui jinian kangzhan shengli dahui tekan* 香港福建同鄉會紀念抗戰勝利大會特刊 [Souvenir issue of the Hong Kong Fujian native-place association in honor of the Chinese triumph in the Sino-Japanese war] (Hong Kong: Xianggang Fujian lugang tongxianghui chengli weiyuanhui, 1945). The souvenir publication of the association's twenty-fifth anniversary however used Fujian *lugang tongxiang hui: Fujian lugang tonxianghui chengli ershiwu zhounian jinian tekan* 福建旅港同鄉會成立二十五週年紀念特刊 (Hong Kong).

108 Zheng Yushu ed., *Yongchun jiaji Zheng shi zu pu* 永春夾滌鄭氏族譜 [Lineage book of the Zhengs' in Jiaji, Yongchun] (Taipei: Longwen chubanshe, 1993), 224, 319.

109 Wu ed. "*Fujian lugang tongxianghui* 福建旅港同鄉會 [Hong Kong Fukienese Association]," in *Xianggang Mingqiao shanghai renminglu*, 3.

Hakka from Yongding, took the position as the director of the Granary and Transportation Bureau of the GMD's Fujian provincial government.<sup>110</sup> The vice-chair of the Fukienese Association in 1940, Chen Bochen 陳伯誠, was a merchant in Burma and an active GMD member over there. The vice-chair in 1941, Lai Wenqing 賴文清, born in Burma, worked for the executive committee of GMD's Hong Kong office.<sup>111</sup>

Tan Kah Kee's attempt to expand his influence challenged the GMD's hold on the Hong Kong Fukienese Association. On July 14, 1941, Tsong Sing Tsung, a veteran of the Hong Kong Fukien Chamber of Commerce, won the majority vote (469 votes).<sup>112</sup> He became the third-term chairperson of the Hong Kong Fukienese Association. But the incumbent chairperson, Zheng Yushu, who lost the election, refused to recognize Tsong's victory. Zheng and his supporters argued that the election was invalid: Tsong's supporters intentionally boycotted the meeting on July 1 when the election took place. Tsong's people also formed the committee and reviewed the votes two weeks later.<sup>113</sup> Zheng's supporters, including staffs of the Amoy-Datong Canning Company, also argued that the election result was ineffective because 128 votes from the company were not counted. In rebuttal, the new officers stated that these votes were not counted because only four of them were identified, the rest 124 voters did not register their full names.<sup>114</sup>

110 Yongding Xian difangzhi bianji weiyuanhui 永定縣地方誌編輯委員會 ed., *Yongding Xianzhi* 永定縣誌 [Gazettes of the Yongding county] (Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue jishu chubanshe, 1994), 1012.

111 Wu, ed., "Fujian tongxianghui," in *Xianggang Minqiao shanghao renminglu*, 3.

112 Tsong was the vice-manager of the Hong Kong Fukien Chamber of Commerce in 1929, a manager between 1930 and 1935; at the same time, he served as a liaison between the Hong Kong Fukien Chamber of Commerce and the CGCCHK. See CGCCHK, *CGCCHKAR* various years between 1932 and 1940. In addition to the investment in Guangdong's sugar industry with Mok Yingkui in the early 1930s, as mentioned in the earlier part of the chapter, he name was also listed as a stockholder of the Oriental Soy and Canning Company (HKRS 121-28; HKRS 122-5-165). This company's other stockholders included the Nam Pak Hong merchant Chan Yang Ji 陳庸齋, the Toi Shan merchant Chan Fu Chueng 陳符祥, and the founder of the Singapore Chinese Rubber Dealers' Association, Tan Ean Kham 陳延謙.

113 For details of the dispute, see Fujian lugang tongxianghui, *Fujian lugang tongxianghui baogao shu* 福建旅港同鄉會報告書 [Report of the Hong Kong Fukien Native-place Association] (Hong Kong: Fujian lugang tongxianghui, unpublished pamphlet), 1-7.

114 For disputes about the ballots from the Amoy-Datong Canning Company, see *Da Gong Bao* 大公報: September 21-29, 1941.

The dispute within the Fukienese Association was related to Tan Kah Kee's changing relationship with the GMD. To be sure, the chairperson of the election committee that verified Tsong's victory was Tjhung Sie-gan, who accompanied Tan Kah Kee in the comfort mission to China in 1940. In the midst of this conflict, on August 21, 1941, the election committee hired a lawyer to assist the new officers to assume their positions.<sup>115</sup> Soon, in September, Tsong sent a cable to condemn Chen Yi on behalf of the Hong Kong Fukienese Association.<sup>116</sup> This was consistent with Tan's political move against Chen Yi's leadership in Fujian.

Around the time when Tan began to question the GMD's policies, the nationalist government began to cultivate stronger ties with Aw Boon Haw.<sup>117</sup> Aw did not subscribe to the campaign against Chen Yi and his controlled economy in Fujian. When the government put the province's import-export trade under strict regulation, Aw expanded his business in hinterland China. In 1940, the chairman of the Chinese Nationalist Government, Lin Sen 林森, encouraged Aw to trade in Kunming, Guizhou, and to supply wartime provisions in China's southwestern district.<sup>118</sup> Around the same time, Aw joined the Overseas Chinese Construction Company, with Zheng Yushu as his primary business partner.<sup>119</sup> Within a year, they collected more than 20,000,000 national dollars

115 Fujian lugang tongxianghui, *Fujian lugang tongxianghui baogao shu*, 1–7.

116 For the meetings between July and September 1941, see Xianggang Fujian tongxianghui bianji weiyuanhui 香港福建同鄉會編輯委員會, *Xianggang Fujian tongxianghui jinxi jinian tekan* 香港福建同鄉會金禧紀念特刊 [Souvenir publication of the golden jubilee of the Hong Kong Fukien Native-place Association] (Hong Kong: Hong Kong Fujian Tongxianghui, 1989), 69.

117 According to Tan See Cheng, the GMD's initial response to Tan's critiques and his growing sympathy to the CCP was to dispel Tan's misunderstanding. The GMD dispatched Wu Tiecheng, who was in charge of the Overseas Chinese affairs of the government, to negotiate with key Chinese overseas leaders in the South Seas. Wu toured around the region between September 1940 and February 1941. In Malaya, his primary goal was to soothe the tension between Tan Kah Kee and Gao Lingbai but no avail. See Tan Chee Seng 陳是呈, "Wu Tiecheng de Nanyang zhi xing (1940–1941): yi zai Malaya de huodong wei taolun zhongxin 吳鐵城的南洋之行 (1940–1941): 以在馬來亞的活動為討論中心 [Wu Tiecheng's missions to Nanyang: A study based on his activities in Malaya ], in *Wu Tiecheng yu jindai Zhongguo* 吳鐵城與近代中國 [Wu Tiecheng and modern China], ed. Chen Hongyun (Taipei: Xiuwei zixun, 2013), 74–102.

118 Yao, Zhang, and Xu, eds., "*Hu Wenhu xiansheng xiaozhuan*," *Xingzhou shi nian*, 168.

119 Ren Guixiang 任貴祥, "*Huaqiao dui zuguo kangzhan jingji de gongxian* 華僑對祖國抗戰經濟的貢獻 [Chinese sojourners' contribution to their motherland's economy during the Sino-Japanese war]," *Jindaishi yanjiu* 近代史研究, no. 5 (1987): 142–163.

to invest in hardwood plantations in western Fujian.<sup>120</sup> Zheng was also working with the Hokkien merchant Chen Rongfang 陳榮芳 from the Philippines to establish the Fujian Development Company 福建建設公司 for the development of mining and farming businesses in Fujian. This became a highlight in the official propaganda to solicit Chinese overseas to invest in Fujian in 1940.<sup>121</sup>

In March 1941, Aw flew to Chongqing to attend the national political council (established in 1938 as the representative organ in wartime China) in the wartime capital of the GMD. All levels of the government—including the Bureau of Overseas Affairs of the Chinese Nationalist Government, the Committee of Overseas Chinese Affairs, the Minister of Society, the Youth Corp of the Three People's Principle, the Fundraising Committee, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Minister of Chief Commander, the Diplomatic Association for the Chinese People, the GMD's Chongqing city council, the mayor of the Chongqing government, and the chairperson of the Chongqing Chamber of Commerce—dispatched representatives to attend the welcome reception for Aw's visit.<sup>122</sup> A classified report of the Minister of Foreign Affairs even encouraged the Minister of Overseas Affairs to entice the support of Aw's close ally Lin Aimin. The draft of the cable read as follows: "Lin Aimin's official rank is pretty high," although in the loop of cable exchanges, an anonymous reviewer replaced the word *guan* 官 (official rank) with *ming wang* 名望 (reputation).<sup>123</sup> This modification nonetheless reveals the GMD's understanding of the dynamics of Chinese overseas communities: communal influence in overseas settlements was equivalent to official titles in China.

On the very same trip, a Japanese intelligence report shows that Aw publicly condemned Tan's management of the NQZH. The Japanese observation was that by spring 1941, Aw had replaced Tan as the top Chinese nationalist leader in the South Seas.<sup>124</sup> An underlying development might be that Tan began to

120 Dai Yifeng 戴一峰, *Quyū xīng jīngjī fāzhǎn yǔ shèhuì biànciàn: yǐ jīndài Fújiàn dìqū wéi zhōngxīn* 區域型經濟發展與社會變遷：以近代福建地區為中心 [Development of regional economy and social changes: a study focusing on modern Fujian] (Changsha: Yuelu chubanshe, 2000), 240.

121 Xinmin yuanken she 新閩月刊社, *Fújiàn shěng huānyíng nánqiáo wéiláo tuán wénxuān* 福建省歡迎南僑慰勞團文宣 [Propaganda to welcome returned Chinese overseas from the South Seas in the Fujian province] (July 1940), 20.

122 Files of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ROC: 065.1/0001, *Hu Wenhu fu Yu chuxi canzhenghui* 胡文虎赴渝出席參政會 [Aw Boon Haw attended the national political council in Chongqing] (Taipei: Archival office of the Institute of Modern History).

123 Files of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, ROC: 065.1/0001, *Hu Wenhu fu Yu chuxi canzhenghui*.

124 *Nanyō* 27 (Tokyo, 1941), no. 4: 111; no. 6: 35, 27; no. 7: 72.

transfer NQZH's funds to the CCP. The disputed chairman of the Hong Kong Fukienese Association, Tsoung Tsing Tsung, was the key person that Tan authorized to wire the funds sent from Singapore to the CCP.<sup>125</sup> This marked the end of the long-term support of leading Hokkien bourgeoisie and the GMD.

### Conclusion

This chapter demonstrates that in the decade when anti-Japanese feeling reached its highest manifestation during the long 1930s, cleavages and competition continued between state-builders from Guangdong and in Nanjing/Chongqing, as well as among overseas Chinese bourgeoisie of different speech-groups.

With the engagement of overseas Chinese bourgeoisie in Chinese nationalist movements and the China–South Seas trade, the southern periphery of China became a center of the political changes. The uneven articulation between provincial politics and Chiang's central government divided the overseas Chinese communities. As Tan Kah Kee observed, Chinese speech-group boundaries were the fault lines in Chinese overseas nationalist campaigns.

Through analyzing the attempts of each major Chinese speech-group in Hong Kong and Singapore to influence development in their home provinces, I argue that overseas Chinese nationalism was more than an advocacy of pan-Chinese consciousness or patriotism. Because political changes and economic policies affected different business networks overseas differently, the latter thus developed different approaches to advocate nationalism.

Between 1932 and 1933, when the Nineteenth Route Army ruled Fujian, the NMJH tendered support to the guest army because of the latter's commitment to carry on the NMJH's railway project. However, after 1936, when Chen Yi began installing policies to regulate Fujian's import-export trade, the Hokkiens found that these policies would strangle their long-term business practices. The Hokkien bourgeoisie in the China–South Seas trade thus turned their business and speech-group networks into campaigns against the provincial government in Fujian. In contrast, in response to the changing politics in Guangdong, from the semiautomatic status under Chen Jitang's rule in the first half of the 1930s to the province coming under direct GMD control in the second half of the 1930s, there were always some other bourgeoisie who could

---

125 OHC Synopsis Report, No. 85: Interview of Lim Soo Gan 林樹彥 (Singapore: National Archives, Singapore), 120–123. Lim's younger brother was a friend of Tsong Sing Tsung. Through Tsong's introduction, Lim Soo Gan was appointed to assist Tan Kah Kee to remit funds from Singapore to Hong Kong.

benefit from the Guangdong policies. The active promotion of Chinese nationalism, coupled with the stern confrontation with the state among the different speech-group networks, thus constituted a plethora of nationalist campaigns in the Hong Kong–Singapore corridor. This chapter shows that the Hong Kong–Singapore corridor in the interwar years was not what the state constructed, but was developed alongside the inter-speech group disputes, transnational mobilization of speech-group ties, as well as the consolidation and liquidation of various political alignments among Chinese overseas networks.

## Conclusion

In the 38 years that I stayed in Singapore, I have always been grateful to the government's favorable treatments . . . My nationality belongs to the Republic of China. And being protected under the British Empire, it is righteous for me to love the [Chinese] nation and the [British] empire. At the juncture when I am about to leave Malaya, I recall the pleasure of being able to settle in the British lands in the past decades, and what the British has offered to help us [Chinese] fight against Japan. I am awed by the British sympathy and the righteous spirit . . . I hope that overseas Chinese would retain the reciprocal attitude to cooperate with the British government. I also expect that all ranks of Chinese overseas could unite to facilitate the fund-raising work in order to help China win the war.

—HAU SAY HUAN<sup>1</sup>

On December 28, 1939, the British convened a meeting with members of the NQZH and announced the banishment of Hau Say Huan from British Malaya. Hau, a China-born Hokkien who came to Singapore at the age of twenty, was Tan Kah Kee's "most important officer at the NQZH."<sup>2</sup> The British, however, identified Hau as a communist collaborator because of his support of the Anti-Enemy Backing-Up Society and Chinese National Vanguard Corp. The British ordered Hau to leave the colony before January 1, 1940, and never return. Tan tried to negotiate with the British for a few days' extension so that Hau could wrap up his business and other personal things in Singapore. The British firmly declined. On the following day, December 29, the local English newspaper used the headline "The Enemy Within" to comment on Hau's connection with the "two illicit societies" that held "misguided patriotism" and "can be a great danger."<sup>3</sup> On the evening of December 31, 1939, at the airport, when Hau was about to fly to Kunming, China, he delivered the farewell address cited above. Regardless of his banishment, he emphasized the importance for Chinese overseas to retain dual allegiance to China, his motherland, and England, the host of the settlement. The inconsistent views of Hau and the British, on the

---

1 Waijiaobu files: *Ho Xifan Zhuang Mingli beipo chujing* 侯西反莊明理被迫出境 [Banishment of Hau Say Huan and Zhaung Mingli], Dec. 29, 1939–Feb. 14, 1940 (Taipei: Guoshi guan).

2 Chen Jiagen 陳嘉庚, *Nanqiao huiyilu* 南僑回憶錄 [Memoir of an overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia] (Changsha: Hunan Yuelu shushe, 1998), 103.

3 *Singapore Free Press and Mercantile Report*: December 29, 1939. The source spells Hau Say Huan's name as Hau Say Hoan.

eve of the British decline in Asia, show that Chinese overseas bourgeoisie were not passive colonial subjects in the British empire.

Hau's patriotism, which cost him the right to stay in Singapore, did not win him the trust of the GMD, however. Two weeks after his forced departure, in a report dated January 15, 1940, the Chinese Consulate in Singapore, Kao Ling Pai, suggested that Hau made a wrong decision in supporting the Chinese Anti-Enemy Backing-Up Society: the society was promoting communism. Kao's comment implies that the GMD agreed with the British banishment order.<sup>4</sup>

Hau's friend, Tan Kah Kee, believed that the British decision to expel Hau was made under the influence of his Chinese opponents. "What a pity for Chinese overseas to harm each other . . ."<sup>5</sup> Tan did not specify the names or backgrounds of the opponents in his memoir, but he must have sensed the hostility from Kao. A year later, Kao collected evidence that proved Tan's critiques of the GMD (chapter 6).

The above episode points out the tensions between mainland and overseas Chinese nationalism. Kao's reactions show his limited influence in controlling Chinese bourgeois nationalism in Singapore. For people like Tan and Hau, their commitment to Chinese nationalism was not equivalent to their acceptance of the GMD leadership. The GMD was trying hard to present an image of a unified Chinese community in the party's overseas mobilization of nationalism. In December 1944, Hau died in a plane crash in Kunming. The official eulogy of the Chinese Nationalist Government in Chongqing read as follows:

Comrade Hau migrated to the south in his early age for business. He soon joined our party [GMD] to devote to revolutions. He was one with strong and honest personality and was full of righteousness. He was particularly enthusiastic to social public affairs. After the age of 40, he gave up his business and committed to social affairs in Chinese overseas society . . . After the outbreak of the anti-Japanese war, comrade Hau called for Chinese overseas in Singapore and other places in the South Seas to donate money to China's patriotic movements. With his high credentials in the South Seas, his solicitation received wide response from overseas Chinese. Patriotic donations reached many billions dollars. In the first four years after the anti-Japanese war, the credits of raising so many funds

4 Waijiaobu files: Ho Xifan Zhuang Mingli beipo chu jing.

5 Chen Jiagen, *Nanqiao huiyilu*, 106. Yong Ch'ing-fatt also adopts Tan's explanations of the British banishment of Hau. See Yong Ching'-fatt, *Tan Kah Kee: the Making of an Overseas Chinese Legend* (Singapore, Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), 222.

from Chinese overseas in the South Seas should go to comrade Hau's advocate and tireless work...<sup>6</sup>

What is presented in the eulogy is the cooperative relationship between Hau and the GMD in the national salvation movement. This became the official discourse on prewar Chinese overseas nationalism, according to the GMD. But scholars of prewar history could still learn about the tensions between the GMD and Tan's transnational Hokkien networks through reading Tan's memoir as well as the scholarship of Yōji Akashi, Stephen Leong, and Yong Ch'ing-fatt.<sup>7</sup> These writings explain the tensions of the GMD-CCP divide, as well as the competition and feuds between Aw Boon Haw and Tan Kah Kee. This book, however, contextualizes the tensions between official vis-à-vis overseas nationalism from the perspective of the agency of Chinese overseas bourgeoisie.

The agency of Chinese overseas is manifested by their engaging in, but also transcending, the command of official Chinese nationalism. From the early modern era, Chinese private junk trade had transgressed official policies by trading with the Japanese and various European mercantile groups. The experiences gained from this international trade and resulting cosmopolitan encounters became crucial for the late Qing's economic reforms and, soon after, an inspiration for political transformation (chapter 1). In the interwar years, Chinese overseas agency was manifested in the bourgeoisie taking advantage of the British colonial status quo, while at the same time becoming potential collaborators with the surging Japanese power (chapter 2). The Chinese overseas bourgeoisie also formed multifarious connections with various levels of Chinese state-builders in their transnational operation of trade and nationalist campaigns. It can therefore be concluded that the history of Chinese overseas nationalism in interwar Hong Kong and Singapore should not be viewed as an appendage to modern Chinese history. Neither should we treat Chinese nationalist movements in Hong Kong and Singapore as two parallel campaigns that took place in two separate British colonies. The convergence of trade, migration, flow of ideas, and mutual influence made the space between

6 Guomin zhengfu files: *Xiezhu kangzhan yogong renyuan baoxu an, san* 協助抗戰有功人員褒卹案, 三 [Cases on rewards and compensations for those who assisted the Chinese anti-Japanese war, 3] [Honors and condolence to those who are merited in assisting China in the anti-Japanese war], 001-030600-0069, Nov. 13, 1942–Sept. 29, 1945 (Taipei: Guoshi guan).

7 Chen, *Nanqiao huiyi lu*; Yōji Akashi, *The Nanyang Chinese National Salvation Movement, 1937–1941* (Kansas: Center for East Asian Studies, the University of Kansas, 1970); Stephen Leong, "The Kuomintang-Communist United Front in Malaya during the National Salvation Period, 1937–1941." *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* 8, no. 1 (March 1977): 31–47; Yong, *Tan Kah Kee*.

the two British Crown colonies in Asia a corridor of Chinese overseas bourgeoisie. The Hong Kong–Singapore corridor also connected with the political and economic changes in South China, with Hong Kong being incorporated in the Guangdong political-economic changes while Singapore was incorporated in Fujian's. The corridor is thus a loci where transnational Chinese business networks in the South China–South Seas space converged. To conclude my research, I tackle the following questions: Did the prewar dynamics of Chinese overseas bourgeois nationalism continue in the postwar era? What does the emphasis on transnational networks and inter-speech-group cleavages recast within the parameters of the study of Chinese overseas nationalism?

### Chinese Overseas Nationalism beyond Official Nationalist Discourses

In the postwar years, the new Chinese government in Beijing, established by the CCP, honored Tan Kah Kee as the legendary Chinese nationalist leader from the South Seas. According to Yong Ch'ing-fatt, whose research presents the life and career of Tan as an example of the progressive growth of Chinese identity, Tan came to be known in Singapore in the 1910s and 1920s as an obedient British subject and successful Chinese merchant. He matured as a patriotic Chinese and an overseas donor to Chiang Kai-shek's government in the 1930s, and he attained his final enlightenment through taking part in the rise of the CCP in the 1940s. In 1949, when Mao Zedong announced the establishment of the new People's Republic of China, the CCP elected Tan a member of the Standing Committee of the PRC Government and a member of the new Overseas Chinese Affairs Commission.<sup>8</sup> Three months after he returned to Singapore from China, on May 21, 1950, Tan departed for China again and stayed there until he passed away in Beijing, in 1961. Yong emphasizes that Tan's decision to leave for China was his own choice, not due to British pressure. "It was Tan Kah Kee alone who made the decision to go back to China."<sup>9</sup> In Yong's terms, "politics took command" in the last two decades of Tan's life. The CCP thus highlighted Tan Kah Kee's nationalist endeavors to present another type of unification

8 Yong, *Tan Kah Kee: the Making of an Overseas Chinese Legend*, 331.

9 Yong, *Tan Kah Kee: the Making of an Overseas Chinese Legend*, 334. Yong retains the same view in the 2014 version of the book on page 343.

discourse of Chinese overseas nationalism. In this version, the unification was demonstrated through the rally of Chinese overseas to communist China.<sup>10</sup>

The break, or breakthrough, of Tan's political choice after the 1940s could be understood in reference to the politics of identity in the surging postcolonial movements, which mandated that one's national identity should be unalienable to and exclusively associated with the fixed territorial boundaries of a state. In Malaya, the Malay aristocratic groups organized the United Malays National Organization in 1946 to claim themselves the *bumiputera* (sons of the soil). This entitled them to be the justified leaders in local politics. At the same time, the British believed that the CCP was infiltrating its influence in Malaya through supporting the MCP, in which most members were Chinese. The British issued the Malaya Emergency (1948–1960) to purge the MCP guerillas, but other Chinese were also put under scrutiny. In 1949, the Chinese willing to struggle for their local political rights organized the Malay Chinese Association (MCA), which was in part an attempt to differentiate themselves from the MCP and show their commitment to the *merdeka* movement.<sup>11</sup> Under these circumstances, Tan's acceptance of official PRC positions belied his credentials of playing the local political game in postwar Malaya. Forming an exclusive loyalty to the new China became an inevitable choice.

But the transnational connections developed prior to the 1940s also played a crucial role in shaping Tan's political judgment in the postwar years. Yong has rightly delineated the connections between Tan Kah Kee and the CCP member Hu Yu-zhih 胡愈之 (1896–1986). The latter was an editor of Tan's *Nanyang Siang Pau* in Singapore between 1941 and 1942. Through Hu, Tan took part in the operation of the China Democratic League (CDL), an anti-Chiang

---

10 Hong Yonghong and Chen Gongcun's biography of Tan Kah Kee modifies Yong's assessment of Tan's affirmation of the PRC's policies between 1950 and 1961. In general, they emphasize how Tan was disappointed by the socialist agenda and furious about the antirightist campaigns. They also indicate that Tan remained concerned with developments in Singapore and expected to return there, but to no avail. Nonetheless, this new account also assumes that if Tan had lived to witness the changes in the PRC after the 1980s, he would still be proud of the new China. This modified view of Tan's experiences in the 1950s thus confirms but does not revisit the nationalist discourse for the Chinese overseas support of the CCP. See Chen Gongcun and Hong Yonghong 陳共存、洪永宏, *Chen Jiageng xin zhuan* 陳嘉庚新傳 [New biography of Tan Kah Kee]. Singapore: Tan Kah Kee International Society and Global Publishing Co. Inc., 2003), 395–409.

11 Heng, *Chinese Politics in Malaysia: A History of the Malaysian Chinese Association*.

third-party campaign, in Singapore in the immediate postwar years.<sup>12</sup> It is worth further exploration that the CDL connection bridged Tan's activities in Singapore, and the third-party activities in Hong Kong converged. Hong Kong had been an important base for the emergence of the third-party force from the time Chiang Kai-shek stripped Li Jishen's power in Guangdong in 1929 (chapter 3). After taking part in the two aborted attempts for southern autonomy in Fujian and Guangdong (chapter 6), Li became the leader among the veterans of the Guangdong Army. In 1940, Li Jishen sponsored Liang Shuming to found the newspaper *Guangming bao* in Hong Kong. Though the newspaper lasted less than a year, Liang's connections with other anti-Chiang intellectuals made Hong Kong an important political base. Liang was one of the founding members of the China Democratic Political Groups League 中國民主政團同盟 in Chongqing in 1941. The league reorganized and was renamed the CDL in Hong Kong in 1944.<sup>13</sup> After the war ended, in 1947, in Hong Kong, Li Jishen, Cai Tingkai, He Gonggan, Chen Mingshu, Jiang Guangnai, and other veterans of the southern automatic movements of the 1930s, together with the leftists Song Qingling and He Xiangning, organized another anti-Chiang campaign, the GMD Revolutionary Committee. In its first convention, on November 12, 1947, these leaders claimed to follow Dr. Sun Yat-sen's authentic political agenda of the Three Doctrines of the People from Chiang Kai-shek's distortions.<sup>14</sup>

Endorsement from these third-party campaigns became important for the CCP to claim its political legitimacy. In spring 1949, Li Jishen, Tan Kah Kee, and other third-party activists secretly left Hong Kong for Beijing, where they received a warm welcome from top CCP leaders Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, and Zhu De.<sup>15</sup> Tan attended the first meeting of the People's Political Consultative Conference (PPCC), in June 1949. The meeting was chaired by Mao Zedong and two leaders of the CDL, Li Jishen and Shen Junru. To the public eye, the third-party leaders from the south now supported the CCP in north China. At the first plenary meeting of the PPCC, in September 1949, Tan became its member of the national committee. With this status, on October 1, 1949, Tan attended the ceremony of the inauguration of the new China. On that day, while Mao was making his notable speech at the façade of Tiananmen Square, declaring that Chinese people were now standing up and would never be conquered by any foreign power, Li Jishen stood side by side with Mao. The veteran of

12 Yong, *Tan Kah Kee: the Making of an Overseas Chinese Legend*, 325.

13 Jiang and Wang, *Li Jishen yu Zhongguo Guomindang gemming weiyuanhui*, 58–61.

14 Jiang and Wang, *Li Jishen yu Zhongguo Guomindang gemming weiyuanhui*, 100–110.

15 Jiang and Wang, *Li Jishen yu Zhongguo Guomindang gemming weiyuanhui*, 142–151.

Guangdong Army from Guangxi and the brain behind the establishment of the Fujian People's Government in November 1933 was now known to the Chinese people as a vice-chairperson of the Committee of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China.<sup>16</sup> Two decades after Chiang stripped Li's power, Li witnessed the final fall of Chiang in mainland China.

How should we understand Tan Kah Kee's support of the CCP? According to the observation of a GMD agent, when Tan returned from his trip to Singapore in spring 1950, "Tan highly appraised the CCP's achievements. He took the industrialization in northeast China to support his argument about the positive connection between liberation [being taken over by the CCP] and industrialization: for provinces such as Fujian and Guangdong, where the progress of liberation was slower, not much development was achieved . . ." <sup>17</sup> This suggested that the CCP impressed Tan mainly for its promise to industrialize and improve China's economic development. In the postwar years, when transnationalism became incompatible with real politics, Tan turned to look for a capable state-builder in China that could carry out efficient economic agendas. Given that he had lost the trust of the GMD, the CCP appeared to be an ideal candidate to carry out the goal of economic nationalism. This argument is consistent with the research on Tan's stay in China in the 1950s and 1960s: Tan was concerned about the PRC's response to his ideas about building the Chi Mei-Amoy Causeway in 1955, as well as his schools in Fujian.<sup>18</sup> In short, Tan chose to support the new government because it appeared to be an ideal vehicle to achieve the goal of China's economic nationalism.

### Chinese Overseas Nationalism beyond Colonial Historiography

By looking at the long-term operation of Chinese seaborne trade and migration from South China to the South Seas from the time of the maritime bans

16 Jiang and Wang, 172–187.

17 Chiang Kai-shek file, 002-080200-340-024, *Chen Guofu cheng Chiang baogao zizhu Xiao Jishan tongzhi fu Nanyang yi siren zige wei Zhongyang xuanwei qiaobao qingxing* [Report to Chiang Kai-shek from Chen Guofu about sponsoring comrade Xiao Jishan to conduct a comfort trip] (April 6, 1950), 41.

18 According to Yong, the construction of the railway manifests Tan's influence in PRC: Tan submitted the railway proposal in 1953, and the government completed it in 1955. Hong and Chen, however, interpret that the railway project was used by PRC leader Zhou Enlai to lure Tan to work closely with the party, when Tan began to question his decision to stay in China. Yong, *Tan Kah Kee: the Making of an Overseas Chinese Legend*, 332–338; Hong Yonghong and Chen Gongcun, *Chen Jiageng xin zhuan*, 118–395.

in late imperial China to the early twentieth century when most parts of the South Seas were under Western and Japanese colonial dominance, this book shows that the boundary between patriotism and collaboration is a problematic framework by which to gauge the position of Chinese overseas bourgeoisie in nationalism. The “enemy” in the discourses of Chinese nationalism varied with time and was never agreed upon by all Chinese. As far as the Chinese bourgeoisie in the two colonies were concerned, in addition to their Chinese connections, they also looked at the development of an Anglo-Japanese relationship to formulate their Chinese nationalist agendas. In the 1910s, South Seas Hokkiens were Japan’s potential cooperators, and Japanese-related Chinese overseas such as Kwik Djoen Eng sympathized with the British during the high Chinese anti-British movements of the 1920s (chapter 2). Just as the label of “slaves of foreign imperialism” that the Chinese Marxist labor organizer Deng Zhongxia gave nonconformist Hong Kong Chinese bourgeoisie in the anti-British struggles presents only a partial view, it would likewise be a mistake to see the Chinese bourgeoisie trading or working with the Japanese as complicit traitors. Japan’s attempt to build up its direct trading system by plugging it into the Chinese bourgeois circles in Taiwan, Java, and Singapore replicated the contour of the Hokkien business networks developed in the *longue durée* (chapter 1). The transnational Cantonese business networks of Japanese goods, which became the primary target of Chinese anti-Japanese boycotts in the interwar years, manifested the strength of Chinese entrepreneurship that Japan’s direct trading system aimed for but failed to replace (chapters 3 and 4). Moreover, the continuing use of Japanese materials in the manufacturing sector in Hong Kong in the 1930s facilitated the development of the Canton–Hong Kong industrial zone and the transnational “buy Chinese products” movement along the Hong Kong–Singapore business corridor (chapter 5).

After the Japanese takeover of Hong Kong and Singapore, some responded to the trauma of the sudden collapse of the British empire by making a swift decision to collaborate with Japan. The strongest Chinese cooperator with Japan from Singapore was Teo Eng Hock. He joined Wang Jingwei’s pro-Japanese regime in Nanjing to advocate the peace movement for a new East Asian order under Japanese leadership. Postwar writings about Teo seem to pardon his choice based on the understanding of his comradeship with Wang, which had developed from years of supporting Dr. Sun’s Republican revolution.<sup>19</sup> Some chose to work with Japan in order to reduce Chinese

---

19 For example, Pan Xingnong put that “He [Teo] once participated in the revolution [Dr. Sun’s revolutionary campaign] thus became friends with Hu Hanmin and Wang

casualties under the Japanese occupation. For example, Lim Boon Keng and Lee Choon Seng joined the Overseas Chinese Association under the command of the Japanese Malay Military Association in March 1942. This helped stop the Japanese *sook chin* purge, which targeted participants in Chinese national salvation movements.<sup>20</sup>

In Hong Kong, many Chinese bourgeoisie—including Anglicized Chinese and Justices of the Peace—decided to work with the Japanese. According to Philip Snow, two weeks after the British surrender, on January 10, 1942, Robert Kotewall and Chow Shou Son, among other Chinese elites, saluted to the Japanese Lieutenant-General Sakai for rescuing Hong Kong from British rule.<sup>21</sup> In three months, Kotewall, Chou, as well as Lo Man Kam and Chan Lim Pak all accepted positions in the Japanese-founded Chinese Representative Council and Chinese Cooperative Council, among others. Even leaders in the Chinese patriotic fund-raising movements of the late 1930s, such as Tung Chung Wai and Philip Gock Chin, took part in serving the new Japanese regime.<sup>22</sup> Snow explains that the Chinese bourgeoisie sought “to seize the new chances for business that presented themselves with the change of regime.”<sup>23</sup> It is a fact that the Hong Kong bourgeoisie did not follow the official Chinese nationalist position. But did their choice to work with the enemy of the GMD government in Chongqing mean they had abandoned their nationalist tenets? A biography of Chow Shou Son, coauthored by Victor Zheng and Chow’s grandson Charles Chow, emphasizes the indispensable role of these Chinese elites in “helping solve socio-economic problems such as food supply, currency, social order,

---

Jingwei, especially Wang... Therefore, in 1942, Teo participated the Wang regime and was dispatched to Vietnam as ad hoc commercial officer and others.” See Pan Xingnong’s *The Teochews in Malaya* (Singapore: Nandao chubanshe, 1950), 158. The same line is also used in Koh Kow Chiang ed., *Who’s Who in Southeast Asia* (Singapore: published by the author, 1965), A64.

- 20 Cheah Boon Kheng, *Red Star Over Malaya: Resistance and Social Conflict during and after the Japanese Occupation of Malaya, 1941–1946* (Singapore: Singapore University Press [1983] 2003), 20–25; Heng Pek Koon, *Chinese Politics in Malaysia: A History of the Malaysian Chinese Association*, and Oxford New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), 37.
- 21 Philip Snow, *The Fall of Hong Kong: Britain, China, and the Japanese Occupation* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2003), 107–108.
- 22 Snow, *The Fall of Hong Kong*, 108–118.
- 23 Snow, *The Fall of Hong Kong*, 112.

traffics, social welfare and health care” in Hong Kong under Japanese control.<sup>24</sup> As pointed out by Carroll, in Hong Kong, Japan expanded the spheres of public administration that allowed a broader range of Chinese to participate. Collaboration with Japan would be neither better nor worse than their earlier support of British colonialism.<sup>25</sup>

After the end of the Pacific War, when Britain returned to its lost colonies, China’s wartime relationship with Japan became an inconvenient past to deal with. In Hong Kong, the British did not punish those Chinese elites who had worked with the Japanese, and the cooperative relationship continued.<sup>26</sup> The British, however, formed new connections with the newly retreated Shanghai capitalists, who soon out-competed local Cantonese manufacturers.<sup>27</sup> In Singapore, the surging anticolonial *merdeka* movements complicated the relationship between the British and the Chinese. While the British pardoned those Chinese bourgeoisie collaborating with the Japanese, the stout anti-Japanese force in the Malaya jungles throughout the years of the Pacific War, the MCP, became a thorn in Britain’s side. When the British issued the Malayan Emergency targeting the MCP in 1948, its leader Chin Peng (1924–2013), to whom the British had just awarded an OBE to honor his anti-Japanese battles in the Pacific War, became “public enemy no. 1.”<sup>28</sup>

---

24 Victor Zheng and Charles W. Chow, *Grand Old Man of Hong Kong: Sir Shouson Chow* (Hong Kong: the University of Hong Kong, 2010), 215.

25 Carroll, *Edge of Empires*, 182–192.

26 Snow, *The Fall of Hong Kong*, 305–327.

27 Wong Siu-lun, *Emigrant Entrepreneurs: Shanghai Industrialists in Hong Kong* (Hong Kong, Oxford, and New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), 120–131.

28 The British retreat from the political scene in Malaya did not help the MCP and Chin Peng to be accepted in local society. In the surging anticommunist atmosphere of the postcolonial state-building in Malaya and Singapore, Chin Peng led the MCP to withdraw to the jungles in southern Thailand. In the beginning of the Chinese Cultural Revolution in 1969, the PRC provided a radio station for the MCP members to coordinate their activities and broadcast their ideas. But the MCP connection became a thorn in the side of other Asian countries. In 1981, when the PRC was working to normalize its international relationships under Deng Xiaoping’s market reforms, Chin Ping closed the Hunan station at Deng’s request. A decade later, when the peace talks with Malaysia allowed the MCP members to repatriate back home, Chin Peng remained banned from the territory he once defended. Carl Trocki, *Singapore: Wealth, Power, and the Culture of Control* (Taylor and Francis, 2005), Ch. 4; Chen Ping, *Alias Chin Peng: My Side of History* (Singapore: Media Masters Pte. Ltd., 2003).

### Chinese Overseas Business Networks in Maritime Asia

The changing political-economic structures in which Chinese overseas trade and migration were embedded constituted the background against which Chinese overseas formulated their nationalist agendas. Instead of understanding the acceleration of Chinese anti-Japanese movements in the Hong Kong–Singapore corridor after the 1930s as a radical break from the bourgeoisie’s conservative reactions in the 1920s, I emphasize the bourgeoisie’s consistent commitment to economic nationalism. And against the backdrop of the transition from the global *laissez-faire* economy to a milieu of rising national tariffs, the Chinese bourgeoisie in British Hong Kong and Singapore made effective use of Chinese nationalism to buffer themselves against economic downturn.

In Benedict Anderson’s notable thesis about imagined communities, he argues that a shared cultural identity was constructed to unify people claiming the same ethnic background. The study of Chinese nationalist movements in Hong Kong and Singapore, however, shows that when attempts were made to forge a pan-Chinese identity, speech-group ties actually came to the fore. The transnational campaigns to strengthen nationalist responses created an opportunity for Chinese elites from different speech-group networks to consolidate their status as local communal leaders as well as to exercise influence in mainland China. These overseas elites were involved in political, social, and economic development in mainland China, particularly in the home countries from which they originated. In response to the transition of the region’s political-economic order from the replacement of the British-led *laissez-faire* economy by the surging economic protectionism in the interwar years, transnational Chinese business networks, especially those operated by the Hokkien and Teochew bourgeoisie, mobilized Chinese nationalism to negotiate for their best interests. Because the bourgeoisie was organized along speech-group lines and differentially positioned with respect to China, Britain, and Japan, each group had its own distinctive, and at times clashing, business interests. Chinese overseas nationalist movements were consequently divided.

The tenacious growth of speech-group cleavages once puzzled scholars studying the development of South Seas Chinese nationalism. This puzzle is best framed by Wang Gungwu’s citation of Tan Kah Kee’s comments in the late 1930s: “As for the word ‘unity,’ all the organizations of the overseas Chinese are mainly united in form only. Where substance is concerned, there is really very little worth talking about . . . [They] talk emptily of unity when still like scattered sand.”<sup>29</sup> The metaphor of scattered sands, which may be traced

---

29 Wang Gungwu, “the Limits of Nanyang Chinese Nationalism, 1912–1937,” 44.

back to Sun Yat-sen's critique on the lack of Chinese national solidarity, was an accurate portrayal. Competition and conflicts among various Chinese speech-groups in the South Seas formed undercurrents that shaped the strength, persistence, and outcomes of Chinese anti-Japanese boycotts. At the same time, changing political alignments and business interests reshaped Chinese speech-group boundaries in diverse localities. These scattered speech-groups were the backbone of the transnational networking of Chinese business operations and nationalist mobilizations.

In the early twentieth century, through their quest for transnational economic citizenship, Chinese overseas business networks in the Hong Kong–Singapore corridor manifested that the region was not simply a peripheral colonial zone to which British power extended easternmost. Nor was it a dependent backyard awaiting Japan's mission of civilization to the south. At times, the Chinese bourgeoisie abroad might transcend speech-group ties so as to forge a pan-Chinese ethnic identity, notably when their business connections with Chinese markets seemed promising. The global trend toward market protectionism in the 1930s motivated the Chinese bourgeoisie in Canton, Hong Kong, and Singapore to construct an industrial zone along the concept of "Chinese for Chinese goods," outside the auspice of official policy incentives. Examining the mutual investments and trade between South China and the South Seas in the decades after China's market reforms in 1978, Aihwa Ong coins the concept "flexible citizenship" to emphasize the back-and-forth movement, contingent political allegiances, as well as transnational capital investment among ethnic Chinese bourgeoisie in the region.<sup>30</sup> Ethnic Chinese capital from Taiwan, Singapore, and other parts of the Pacific region were the primary source of foreign direct investment in China.<sup>31</sup> And after the 1990s, more and more Chinese firms set up branch companies overseas, especially in Hong Kong and Singapore.<sup>32</sup> Along this line, Gary G. Hamilton argues that from the mid-nineteenth century onward, Hong Kong served as the cosmopolitan capital of Greater China, a Chinese world defined by the flow of migrants and capital

---

30 Ong, *Flexible Citizenship: the Cultural Logics of Transnationality* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1999).

31 Empirical research of the issue is plenty. One example: Alan Smart and Jinn-Yuh Hsu, "The Chinese Diaspora, Foreign Investment and Economic Development in China," *Review of International Affairs* Vol. 3 No. 4 (Summer 2004): 544–566.

32 Liu Hong, "Social Capital and Business Networking: A Case Study on Modern Chinese Transnationalism." *Southeast Asian Studies*. Vol. 39, No. 3. Dec. 2001, 358–383; Yeung, Henry Wai-chung, *Chinese Capitalism in a Global Era: Towards Hybrid Capitalism* (London and New York: Routledge, 2004).

and an economic and cultural zone transcending the control of any specific political sovereignty.<sup>33</sup>

Contextualizing the geographic scope and the networking behind the trade, one can easily see the revival of the long-term operation of the South China–South Seas economy. Prior to the presence of the British power in maritime Asia, the South China–South Seas economy had created a space from which southern Chinese had confronted the imperial ban on maritime trade to seek fortunes abroad. Back-and-forth movement between China and the South Seas has long demarcated the region as an economic zone exposed to various political and cultural influences. These “southern alternatives” created the momentum that led to establishment of the Republic of China. The impetus of change came from Chinese overseas. Their influence in China was most profound in urban and coastal area. After the demise of the British free-trade system in the 1930s, Chinese overseas bourgeoisie in Hong Kong and Singapore demonstrated their autonomy by allying with different state-builders in China. The negotiations between the Chinese overseas bourgeoisie and the southern political leaders in Fujian and Guangdong manifested the overseas Chinese autonomy in the hegemonic transition of the region. Their initial challenges to, and eventual support of, the northern political logics in the 1940s, completed the course of China’s transition. With the ongoing integration of trade and investment between China and the South Seas region, will Chinese overseas business networks aspiring to influence the reconfiguration of the regional order once again converge and contest in coastal China, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore? What will be the southern alternatives manifested this time? How will the Chinese overseas negotiate, compromise, or conflict with the official Chinese nationalist agendas?

---

33 Hsin You-tien, *Making Capitalism in China: the Taiwan Connection* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988); Hamilton, Gary G., “Hong Kong and the Rise of Capitalism in Asia,” in Hamilton ed. *Cosmopolitan Capitalists: Hong Kong and the Chinese Diaspora at the End of the Twentieth Century* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1999), 14–34.



# Bibliography

## Primary Sources

### *Unpublished Archives*

- CO 129: Original correspondence between British colonial office in Hong Kong and the Secretary of State for the Colonies in London during 1841 and 1943. Microfiche, the Hong Kong Collection of the Hong Kong University.
- CO 273: Original Correspondence between the British Colonial Office (CO) and the Foreign Office Relating to the Straits Settlements and the Federated Malay States, 1919–1940. Microfilm version, Library of National University of Singapore, Singapore.
- Files of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ROC. Taipei: Archival office of the Institute of Modern History.
- Files the Ministry of Pragmatic Industry, ROC. Taipei: Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica, Taipei.
- Guomin zhengfu files 國民政府檔 [Archives of the Chinese nationalist government]. Taipei: Guoshiguan [Academic Historica, Taipei].
- HKRS 58-1-91-25: Marine lot 526. Hong Kong Public Record Office.
- HKRS 58-1-114-16: I.L. 2546. Hong Kong Public Record Office.
- HKRS 121: Registers of Hong Kong Companies Applying for Registration during the Japanese Occupation, 1944–1948. Hong Kong: Hong Kong Public Record Office.
- HKRS 122: Files and Papers of Companies Incorporated during the Japanese Occupation, 1943–1944. Hong Kong: Hong Kong Public Record Office.
- HKMS 163: The Chinese General Chamber of Commerce, 1905–1941 (Series).
- HKMS 164-1-29: Registration Book of Individual Members, the Chinese General—Chamber of Commerce, Hong Kong, 1910–1940. Hong Kong: Hong Kong Public Record Office.
- HKMS 175: Selected Microfilm Records from the Second Historical Archives of China relating to Hong Kong, 1896–1950. Hong Kong: Hong Kong Public Record Office.
- NA 007: the Singapore Chinese Chamber of Commerce. Singapore: National Archives of Singapore.
- NA 531: the Singapore Tea Importer-Exporter Association (original name: the Singapore Tea Merchants' Association. The title changed after 1948). Singapore: National Archives of Singapore.
- OHC Synopsis Report, No. 40: Interview of Lee Seng Gee 李成義. Singapore: National Archives of Singapore.
- OHC Synopsis Report, No. 52: Interview of Tan Keong Choon 陳共存. Singapore: National Archives of Singapore.

- OHC Synopsis Report, No. 85: Interview of Lim Soo Gan 林樹彥. Singapore: National Archives of Singapore.
- OHC Synopsis Report, No. 735: Interview of Tan Keong Hee 陳恭喜. Singapore: National Archive of Singapore.
- President Chiang Chung-cheng files 蔣中正總統檔 (Chiang files). Taipei: Guoshiguan.
- Reference File 57: Singapore Improvement Trust. Singapore: National Archives of Singapore.
- sccc (Singapore Chinese Chamber of Commerce), Archives of the Minutes of Committee Meetings, 1905–1941. National Archives of Singapore.
- Waijiao bui files 外交部檔 [Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs]. Taipei: Guoshiguan.

### *Government Publications*

- Guangdong dang an guang 廣東檔案館. 1985. *Chen Jitang yanjiu shiliao* 陳濟棠研究史料 [Historical materials about the research of Chen Jitang]. Guangzhou: Guangzhou da an guan.
- Guangdong sheng dang an guan 廣東省檔案館 ed. *Minguo shiqi Guangdong sheng zhengfu dang an shiliao xuan bian* 民國時期廣東省政府檔案史料選編, Volume 1–6. Guangzhou: Guangdong sheng dang an guan, 1987–1988.
- Hong Kong Blue Books*. 1919–1940. Hong Kong: the government of Hong Kong.
- Hong Kong Sessional Papers*. 1919–1940. Hong Kong: the government of Hong Kong.
- Hong Kong Trade and Shipping Returns*. 1919–1940. Hong Kong: the government of Hong Kong.
- Hong Kong Census Department. 1986. *Hong Kong Census Report 1841–1941* (Xerox copy of reports from government publications and other sources, the Libraries of the Hong Kong University).
- Kikaku-in chōsa-bu 企画院調査部 ed. 1939. *Kakyō kenkyū shiryō* 華僑研究資料 [Research materials on Chinese Sojourners]. Tokyo: Kaikuin chōsa-bō.
- Marriott, Hayes. 1911. *Report of the Census of the Colony of the Straits Settlements, 1911*. Singapore: Government Printing Press.
- Merewether, E. M. 1892. *Report of the Census of the Straits Settlements, 1891*. Singapore: Superintendent of the Census.
- Miller, J. I. 1931. *Malaya Administration Report: Department of Statistics, Straits Settlements and Federated Malay States, for the year 1930*. Singapore: Authority in Singapore.
- Nathan, J. E. 1922. *The Census of British Malaya 1921*. Printed by London, Dunstable and Watford: Waterlow & Sons Limited.
- Record group numbers 1(2), 2(1), 2(2), 3, 4, 19, 422: Minguo shiqi Caizhengbu dang an 民國時期財政部檔案 [Files of the Ministry of Finance, ROC era]; Minguo shiqi Xinjiapo diqu dang an 民國時期新嘉坡地區檔案 [Singapore files, ROC era]; and

- Minguo shiqi Guangzhou diqu dang an 民國時期廣州地區檔案 [Canton files, ROC era]. Nanjing: Second Historical Archives.
- SSGG: *Straits Settlements Government Gazettes*. Singapore: the Straits Settlements. 1919–1940.
- Taiwan Sōtokufu shokusan-kyoku tokusan-ka 台灣總督府殖產局特産課. 1935. *Nettai sangyō chōsa-sho: Taiwan cha ni kansuru chōsa* 熱帶産業調査書: 台湾茶に関する調査 [Report of tropical industry survey: survey on Taiwan tea]. Taihoku: Taiwan Sōtokufu shokusan-kyoku tokusan-ka.
- Taiwan Sōtokufu gaiji-bu 台灣總督府外事部. 1943. *Kakyō keizai jiyō* 華僑經濟事情 [Economic situations of overseas Chinese]. Taihoku: Kōmyōsha shōkai.
- Taiwan Sōtokufu shokuin-roku 台灣總督府職員録. “Kimura Masutarō,” digital archival collection of the Institute of Taiwan History, Academia Sinica, Taipei, <http://who.ith.sinica.edu.tw/mpView.action> (access on July 28, 2012).
- Taiwan Sōtokufu shokusan-kyoku 台灣總督府殖産局. 1919. *Honkon ni okeru kōgyō* 香港に於ける工業 [Industries in Hong Kong]. Taiwan: Taiwan Sōtokufu shokusan-kyoku.
- Taiwan Sōtokufu shokusan-kyoku tokusan-ka 台灣總督府殖産局特産課. 1935. *Nettai sangyō chōsa-sho: Taiwan cha ni kansuru chōsa* 熱帶産業調査書: 台湾茶に関する調査 [Report of tropical industry survey: survey on Taiwan tea]. Taihoku: Taiwan Sōtokufu shokusan-kyoku tokusan-ka.
- Tufo, M. V. Del. 1947. *A Report of the 1947 Census of Population* (Malaya: Comprising the Federation of Malaya and the Colony of Singapore). Published by the authority in London.
- Vaughan, Jonas Danile. 1879. *The Manners and Customs of the Chinese of the Straits Settlements*. Singapore: the Mission Press.
- Vlieland, C. A. 1932. *Report on the 1931 Census and on Certain Problems of Vital Statistics*. London, The Crown Agents for the Colonies.
- Zhongguo di er li shi dang'an guan 中國第二歷史檔案館 [Chinese 2nd Historical Archives], ed. 1985. *Wu sa yun dong yu sheng gang ba gong* 五卅運動省港罷工 [The May 30th Movement and General Guangdong-Hong Kong Strike and Boycott]. Nanjing: Jiangsu guji chuban she.

### *Newspapers and Series*

- CGCCHKAR: *Chinese General Chamber of Commerce (Hong Kong) Annual Report*. Hong Kong: Chinese General Chamber of Commerce (Hong Kong). 1932–1941.
- Da gong bao 大公報 [the Da gong press]. Hong Kong: Da gong bao she. Aug. 1938–Dec. 1941. Microfilm collections of the libraries of the Chinese University of Hong Kong.
- HKGCCAR: *Hong Kong General Chamber of Commerce Annual Report*. Hong Kong: Hong Kong General Chamber of Commerce. 1932–1940.

- ICP: Industrial and Chinese Products*, Vols. 1–6 (January–June 1941). Hong Kong: Zhongguo guohuo shiye fuwushe.
- Lat Pao* 叻報 (Singapore): Le Bao Gongsi. Jan. 1, 1919–March 31, 1932.
- Nanshi Nanyō* 南支南洋 [South China and the South Seas]. Taihoku-shi: Taiwan Sōtokufu nai Taiwan Jihō Hakkōjo 臺灣總督府内台湾時報發行所. No. 148–No. 174 (1939–1940).
- NKZ: Nanyō Kyōkai Zasshi* 南洋協會雜誌 [Newsletters of the South Sea Association, Tokyo]. Issued monthly by the Nanyō Kyōkai [the South Sea Association], 1915–1942. Title changed to Nanyō after July 1939. Total 27 Volumes, each volume has twelve issues. Taipei: Archival Office of the Institute of Taiwan History, Academia Sinica. Nan'yō Sōko 南洋倉庫. 1936. *Nan'yō sōko kabushiki kaisha 15-nenshi* 南洋倉庫株式會社 15年史 [History of the 15 years of the Southern Godown Company]. Kōbe: Nan'yo soko kabushiki kaisha.
- NYSP: Nanyang Siang Pau* 南洋商報 [English title: Chinese Daily Journal of Commerce]. Singapore: Nanyang shang bao she. Sep. 1923–Dec. 1941 (Microfilm). Ithaca: Watson Library of the Cornell University.
- Nihon teikoku tōkei nenkan* 日本帝國統計年鑑. Tokyo: Naikaku Tōkeikyoku and Tōkei Kyōkai, Tokyo. 1910–1940. Taipei: Archival Office of the Institute of Taiwan History.
- Straits Times*, 1911–1941 (Singapore).
- Singapore Free Press and Mercantile Advertiser*, 1911–1941 (NL 1647, Lee Kong Chiang Reference Library, Singapore).
- WKYP: Wah Kiu Yat Po* 華僑日報 [English title: Overseas Chinese Daily News]. Hong Kong: Huaqiao ri bao Co. Ltd. June 1925–Dec. 1941. Hong Kong: Hong Kong Collection, Libraries of the University of Hong Kong.
- WTYP: Wat Tsz Yat Po* 華字日報 [English title: the Chinese Mail]. Hong Kong: Huazi ri bao Co. Ltd. May 1919–Dec. 1941. Hong Kong: Hong Kong Collection, Libraries of the University of Hong Kong.

### *Other Primary Sources*

- Anonymous, “Ba mian feng 八面風 [Winds blowing from eight sides],” *Shidai shenghuo* 時代生活 (Tianjin), nos. 4–5 (1937), p. 23. (Digital archives of Modern Chinese Journals in the Republican Era, Library of the Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica, Taipei; accessed on August 12, 2013).
- Anonymous. 1920. “Kaku Shun'ou-shi no keikaku seru Ni-Shi shinzen no daikyō 郭春秧氏の計画せる日支親善の大経 [Outlines for Mr. Guo Chunyang's plan for Japan-China friendship and goodwill],” *Taiwan Nichi-nichi Shin-pō* 台湾日日新報, April 28, 1920 (Digital files, Shinbun kiji bunko gaikoku, Kibe Daigaku Fuzoku Toshokan, accessed online at [http://www.lib.kobe-u.ac.jp/das/jsp/ja/ContentViewM.jsp?METAID=10126012&TYPE=IMAGE\\_FILE&POS=1](http://www.lib.kobe-u.ac.jp/das/jsp/ja/ContentViewM.jsp?METAID=10126012&TYPE=IMAGE_FILE&POS=1) on November 3, 2013).

- CGCCHK [Chinese General Chamber of Commerce (Hong Kong)]. 1927. *Directory of Hong Kong 1927*. Hong Kong: Chinese General Chamber of Commerce, Hong Kong.
- CGCCHK. 1938. *Xianggang huashang zonghui chouzhanhui yu muji jiuguo gongzhai zhengxinlu* 香港華商總會籌賑會與募集救國公債徵信錄 [Fundraising campaign of the Hong Kong Chinese General Chamber of Commerce and the public record for collecting national salvation bonds]. Hong Kong: Xianggang huashang zonghui.
- CGCCHK. 2002. *Xianggang zhonghua zongshang hui bainianshi* 香港中華總商會百年史 [The one hundred year history of the Hong Kong Chinese General Chamber of Commerce]. Hong Kong: Xianggang zhonghua zongshanghui.
- Cha Jiayu 查建瑜 ed. 1986. *Guomindang Gaizu pai ziliao xuanbian* 國民黨改組派資料選編 [Editorial volume of data on the reformed clique of the GMD]. Chansha: Hunan renmin chubanshe.
- Chan Tai Tung and Chan Man Yuen 陳大同、陳文元 ed. 1941. *Bainian shangye* 百年商業 [A Century of Commerce] Hong Kong: Guangming wenhua shiye chubanshe.
- Chen Bisheng 陳碧笙. 1982. "Minbian huiyi 閩變回憶 [Memories of the Fujian incident]." In *Fujian shibian qijian wo dang yu shijiulu jun guanxi wenti taolun hui* 福建事變期間我黨與十九路軍關係問題討論會 [Seminar on the relationship and problems between CCP and the Nineteenth Route Army], ed. Zhonggong Fuzhou shiwei dangshi ziliao zhengji weiyuan hui 中共福州市委黨史資料徵集委員會. Fuzhou: *Fujian sheng Zhonggong dang shi yanjiuhui Fuzhou shi fanhui*. Pp. 10–18.
- Chen Jiagen 陳嘉庚 [Tan Kah Kee]. 1998. *Nanqiao huiyilu* 南僑回憶錄 [Memoir of an overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia]. Changsha: Hunan Yuelu shushe.
- Chen Kezhan 陳克振 ed. 1994. *Anxi huaqiao zhi* 安溪華僑志 [Gazetteer of overseas Chinese from Anxi, Fujian]. Xiamen: Amoy University Press.
- Chen Ronggun. 1952. *Chen Zibao xiansheng jiaoyu yiyi* 陳子褒先生教育遺議 [A posthumous volume of Mr. Chen Zibao's agendas on education]. Ed. Xian Yuqing, Ou Langruo, and Chen Deyun 陳榮袞、冼玉清、區朗若、陳德芸. Hong Kong: Wen guang guan dai Zibao xue xiao tong xue hui 文光館代子褒學校同學會.
- Chen Shaoyu 陳紹宇. 2009. Guangdong tangye yu Feng Rui 廣東糖業與馮銳 [Guangdong sugar industry and Feng Rui]. In *Min guo shiliao congkan* 民國史料叢書 [Documents of the Republic of China]. Beijing: Daxiang chubanshe, pp. 21–23.
- Chen Tian-lai 陳天來. 1938. *Dōgyō kumiai taiwan chashō kōkai enkaku-shi* 同業組合台灣茶商公會沿革史 [History of the Guild of Taiwan Tea Agencies]. Taibeishi: Dōgyō kumiai taiwan chashō gōkai.
- CMUHK [Chinese Manufacturers' Union (Hong Kong)]. 1936. *Xianggang zhonghua changshang chupin zhinan* 香港中華廠商出品指南 [Directory of Hong Kong Chinese manufactures]. Hong Kong: Chinese Manufacturers' Union.

- CMUHK. 1964. *Xianggang zhonghua changshang lianhehui xinxia kaimu qingdian tekan* 香港中華廠商聯合會新廈開幕慶典特刊 [Souvenir Issue of the Establishment of the New Building of the Chinese Manufacturer's Union, Hong Kong]. Hong Kong: Chinese Manufacturers' Union (Hong Kong).
- Du Qizhang 杜其章 [Toh Kee Cheung] ed. 1929. *Siduan xiansheng ba zhi kai yi shuangshou jinian kan* 四端先生八十開一雙壽紀念刊 [Souvenir Issue of the Celebration for the 81 Birthday of Mr. Sze Tun]. Hong Kong: publisher unknown.
- Fujian lugang tongxiang hui [Hong Kong Fujian Native-Place Association]. 1941. *Fujiang lugang tongxianghui baogao shu* 福建旅港同鄉會報告書 [Report of the Hong Kong Fujian native-place associatio]. Unpublished pamphlet.
- Fujian lugang tongxianghui chengli weiyuanhui 福建旅港同鄉會成立委員會 ed. 1945. *Xianggang Fujian tongxianhui jinian kangzhan shengli dahui tekan* 香港福建同鄉會紀念抗戰勝利大會特刊 [Souvenir issue of the Hong Kong Fujian native-place association in honor of the Chinese triumph in the Sino-Japanese war]. Hong Kong: Xianggang Fujian lugang tongxianghui zhengli weiyuanhui.
- Guo Tingyi 郭廷以 ed. 1993. *Fu Bingchang xiansheng fangwen jilu* 傅秉常先生訪問紀錄 [Transcripts of the interviews with Mr. Fu Bingchang]. Taipei: Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica.
- Hoki Rikichi 保木利吉. 1916. *Ranryō Higashi'indo no Bōeki oyobi Kaiun* 蘭領東印度ノ貿易及海運 [Trade and maritime shipping in Dutch East Indies]. Taihoku: Taiwan Sōtokufu Minseibu Tsūshinkyoku.
- Huang Chaoren 黃朝仁. 1940. "Ruhe kuozhan Min cha nanyang de xiaolu 如何擴展閩茶南洋的銷路 [how to expand the markets of Fujian tea in the South Seas]," *Cha Xun* 茶訊 2, no. 13 (Fuzhou, May 1, 1940). The newsletter *Cha Xun* cited in this article is based on the reprint of *Minguo cha wenxian shiliao huibian* 民國茶文獻史料匯編. Beijing: Quanguo tu shu guan wen xian suo wei fu zhi zhong xin.
- Jan George Chance 鄭紫燦 [Zheng Zican] ed. 1915(?) *Xianggang zhonghua shangye jiaotong renming zhinanlu* 香港中華商業交通人名指南錄 [Directory for Hong Kong's commerce, transportation, and who's who]. Publisher unknown.
- Jingji daobao she 經濟導報社 [Economic information and agency, Hong Kong] ed., 1960. *Handbook of Hong Kong Commerce*. Hong Kong: Jingji daobao she.
- Koh Kow Chiang 許教正 [Xu Jiaozheng] ed. 1965. *Who's Who in South East Asia*. Singapore: published by the author.
- Lin Xiantang 林獻堂. 2000. *Guanyuan xiansheng riji, diyijuan* 灌園先生日記第一卷 [Diary of Mr. Guanyuan, Vol. 1]. Taipei: Academia Sinica, 2000), Vol. 1.
- Luo Yixing 羅一星. "Jian Zhaonan yu Nanyang xiongdi yancao gongsi 簡照南與南洋兄弟煙草公司 [Chien Chaonan and the Nanyang Brothers' Tobacco Company]." *Guangzhou wenshi ziliao di san-shi-liu* 廣州文史資料 no. 36, ed. Zhongguo minzhu jiaoguo hui Guangzhou shi weiyuan hui, Guangzhou-shi gongshang ye lianhehui

- and Guangzhou-shi zhengxie wenshi ziliao yanjiu weiyuanhui. Canton: Guangdong renmin chubanshe, 1986. Pp. 24–42. Xian Zi'en 冼子恩. 1987. "*Ban tangchang jinguo ji zhenxiang* 辦糖廠經過及真相 [The process and reality of operating a sugar factory]." In *Nantian suiyue—Chen Jitang zhu Yue shiqi jianwen shilu*. Ed. Guangzhoushi zhenxie wenshi ziliao yanjiu weiyuanhui. Guangzhou: Zhongguo renmin zhengzhi xieshang huiyi Guangzhoushi weiyuanhui. Pp. 245–261.
- Malaya Taishan huiguan lianhehui bianji weiyuanhui 馬來亞台山會館聯合會編輯委員會 [Editorial Board of the Federation of Toi Sun Association, Malaya] ed. 1948. *Malaya Taishan huiguan lianhehui jinian tekan, chuankan hao* 馬來亞台山會館聯合會紀念特刊, 創刊號 [Commemorative Bulletin of the Federation of Toi Sun Associations, Malaya, Inaugural Issue].
- Mi Rucheng 宓汝成 ed. 2002. *Zhonghua minguo tielu shiliao, 1919–1949* 中華民國鐵路史料, 一九一九 0 —一九四九 [Historical data on railways in Republic of China, 1919–1949]. Beijing: Beijing shehui kexue wenxian chubanshe.
- Minguo cha wenxian shiliao huibian* 民國茶文獻史料匯編. Beijing: Quanguo tu shu guan wen xian suo wei fu zhi zhong xin, 2009.
- Mo Yinggui 莫應淮 [Mok Ying Kui]. "Yinjin qiaozi suoji 引進僑資瑣記 [Some details about introducing overseas capital]." In *Nantian suiyue—Chen Jitang zhu Yue shiqi jianwen shilu* 南天歲月——陳濟棠主粵時期見聞實錄 [Years in the southern heave: records and experiences of Chen Jitang's Guangdong], ed. Guangzhoushi zhenxie wenshi ziliao yanjiu weiyuanhui 廣州市政協文史資料研究委員會. Guangzhou: Zhongguo renmin zhengzhi xieshang huiyi Guangzhoushi weiyuanhui. Pp. 306–312.
- Mo Yingui. 1989. "Wo zouguo de daolu—cong taigu yanghang maiban dao xianggang jibanfa qicao weiyuan 我走過的道路—從太古洋行買辦到香港基本法起草委員會 [The paths I took: from being a comprador for the John Swire & Co., to a committee member drafting the Hong Kong Basic Law]. *Guangzhou wenshi ziliao* No. 39, *Guangzhou gongshang jingji shiliao* Vol. 2 廣州文史資料 No. 39, 廣州工商經濟史料第二輯 [Cultural and historical data on Canton, No. 39; Historical archives of Canton's industry and commerce, Vol. 2]. Ed. Guangzhoushi gongshangye lianhehui and Guangzhoushi zhengxia wenshi ziliao weiyuanhui 廣州市工商業聯合會、廣州市政協文史資料委員會 [Federation of the industry and commerce in Canton and the committee of Canton political-negotiation and cultural and historical archives]. Canton: Zhongguo renmin zhengzhi xieshang huiyi Guangdong Sheng Guangzhou Shi weiyuanhui wenshi ziliao yanjiu weiyuanhui. Pp. 1–23.
- Nanbei hang gongsuo 南北行公所. 1954. *Nanbei hang gongsuo xinxiang luocheng ji chengli bashiliu zhou nian jinian tekan* 南北行公所新廈落成及成立八十六週年紀念特刊 [Souvenir publication for the establishment of the new building of the Nam Pak Hong and its 86th anniversary] Hong Kong: Nanbei hang gongsuo.

- Nanyang geshu fujian tongxiang daibiao dahui 南洋各屬福建同鄉會代表大會。1941. *Nanyang geshu fujian tongxianghui daibiao dahui jiyao* 南洋各屬福建同鄉會代表大會輯要 [Memorandum of the representative meeting of all Fujian native-place associations in Nanyang].
- Nanyang Khek Community Guild 南洋客屬總會 ed. 1967. *Nanyang keshu zonghui 35-36 zhounian jinian tekan* 南洋客屬總會三十五至三十六週年紀念特刊 [Souvenir publication of the 35 and 36 years of the Nanyang Khek Community Guild]. Singapore: the Nanyang Khek Community Guild.
- NMJH 南洋閩僑救鄉會 [Nanyang Minqiao Jiuxiang Hui]. 1926. *Nanyang minqiao jiuxianghui linshi dahui baogaoshu* 南洋閩僑救鄉會臨時大會報告書 [Report of the temporary meeting of the Nanyang Hokkien Sojourners Home Saving Movement]. Amoy, China: Nanyang Minqiao jiuxianghui linshi daibiao dahui.
- Pan Xingnong 潘醒農 ed. 1950. *The Teochews in Malaya*. Singapore: Nandao chubanshe.
- Publicity Bureau for South China. 1922. *Anglo-Chinese Directory, Hong Kong, 1922*. Hong Kong: the Publicity Bureau for South China, Hong Kong.
- sccc. 1935. *Xinjiapo zhonghua zongshanghui guohuo kuoda zhanlan tuixiao dahui tekan* 新嘉坡中華總商會國貨擴大展覽推銷大會特刊 [Special Issue of the Grant Exhibition of Chinese Products Organized by the Singapore Chinese Chamber of Commerce].
- . 1936. *Xinjiapo zhonghua zongshanghui di erjie guohuo zhanlan tuixiao dahui tekan* 新嘉坡中華總商會第二屆國貨展覽推銷大會特刊 [Souvenir Issue of the Second Exhibition of National Products hosted by the Singapore Chinese Chamber of Commerce].
- . 1964. *Xinjiapo zhonghua zongshanghui daxia luocheng jinian kan* 新嘉坡中華總商會大廈落成紀念特刊 [Souvenir of the Opening Ceremony of the Newly Completed Chinese Chamber of Commerce Building].
- Shanghai shi dang'an guang. 2010. *Jindai Zhongguo baihuoye xianqu: Shanghai sida gongsi dang'an hui bian* 近代中國百貨業先驅：上海四大公司檔案匯編 [Compilation of archives of the top four department stores in Shanghai]. Ed. Zhongshan shi zhe xue she hui ke xue lian he hui 上海市檔案館，中山市哲學社會科學聯合會. Shanghai: Shanghai shudian chubanshe.
- Shanghai zixiu chuban she 上海自修出版社. 1940. *Nanyang maoyi zhinan* 南洋貿易指南 [Directory of the Nanyang Trade]. Shanghai: Zixiu chuban she.
- Singapore Piece-goods Traders Guild. 1994. *Xinjiapo buhang shangwuju qingzhu chengli 85 zhounian jinian tekan* 新嘉坡布行商務局慶祝成立 85 週年紀念特刊 [Souvenir of the 85 Annual of the Singapore Piece Goods Traders Guild].
- Singapore Rubber Dealers' Association. 1957. *Xinjiapo shujiao gonghui nianjian* 新嘉坡樹膠公會年鑑 [Annual report of the Singapore Rubber Dealers Association].

- Taiwan chaye shuchu tongye gonghui 台灣茶葉輸出同業公會. 1965. *Tai cha shuchu bainian jian shi* 台茶輸出百年簡史 [A brief history of the export of tea from Taiwan]. Taipei: Taiwan chaye shuchu tongye gonghui.
- Taiwan Ginkō 台灣銀行. 1939. *Taiwan Ginkō shijūnenshi* 台灣銀行四十年誌 [Forty-years of the Taiwan Bank]. Taihoku: Taiwan Ginkō.
- The Tung Wah Group of Hospitals Editorial Board 香港東華三院編輯部. 1961. *Donghua san yuang fanzhan shi* 東華三院發展史 [Development of the Tung Wah Hospitals (1870–1960)]. Hong Kong: the Tung Wah Group of Hospitals.
- The Tung Wah Group of Hospitals 香港東華三院. 2000. *Donghua san yuan yibaisan-shi nian* 東華三院一百三十年 [One Hundred and Thirty Years of the Tung Wah Group of Hospitals]. Hong Kong: the Tung Wah Group of Hospitals.
- Unekawa Shizuo 畝川鎮夫. 1927. *Kaiun kōkokushi* 海運興國史 [The history of maritime transportation and national prosperity]. Ōsaka: Kaiji Ihōsha.
- Wu Zaiqiao 吳在橋 ed. 1947. *Xianggang Minqiao shanghao renminglu* 香港閩僑商號人名錄 [Directory of the Fujian merchants and companies]. Hong Kong: Lugang Fujian Shanghui and Fujian lugang tongxianghui.
- Xiamen huaqiao zhi bianzuan weiyuanhui 廈門華僑史編撰委員會 ed. 1991. *Xiamen huaqiao zhi* 廈門華僑史 [History of Overseas Chinese from Xiamen]. Xiamen: Lujiang chubanshe.
- Xianggang chongzheng zonghui 香港崇正總會 [Hong Kong Tsung Tsin association] ed. 1950. *Chongzheng zonghui sanshi zhounian jinian tekan* 崇正總會三十週年紀念特刊 [Thirty years of Tsung Tsin Association]. Hong Kong: Xianggang Chongzheng Zonghui.
- Xianggang Fujian tongxianghui bianji weiyuanhui 香港福建同鄉會編輯委員會 [Editorial committee of the Hong Kong Fujian Native-place Association] ed. 1989. *Xianggang fujian tongxianghui jinxi jinian tekan* 香港福建同鄉會金禧紀念特刊 [Souvenir issue of the golden jubilee of fiftieth anniversary of the Hong Kong Fujian Native-place Association].
- Xianggang Puyi Shanghui 香港普益商會 [Hong Kong Po Yik Commercial Society]. 1950. *Xianggang Puyi shanghui si-shi-er zhounian jinian tekan* 香港普益商會四十二週年紀念特刊 [Souvenir publication of the 42nd annuals of the Po Yik Commercial Society]. Hong Kong: Po Yik Commercial Society.
- Xianshi gongsi 先施公司. 1924. *Xianshi gongsi ershiwu zhounian jinian ce* 先施公司二十五週年紀念冊 [Souvenir Publication for the Twenty Fifth Anniversary of the Sincere Company] Hong Kong: Xianggang Xianshi gongsi.
- Xingdao ribao 星島日報. 1940. *Kangzhan san zhounian ji Xingdao Ribao chuang kan liang zhounian jinian tekan* 抗戰三週年暨星島日報創刊兩週年紀念特刊 [Souvenir publication of the third anniversary of the anti-Japanese war and the second anniversary of the Xing Dao Ribao] Hong Kong: Xing Dao Ribao she.

- Xingzhou ribao 星洲日報 [Sin Chew Jit Poh] 1931. *Xingzhou ribao liang-zhounian jinian tekan* 星洲日報兩週年紀念特刊 [Souvenir issue of the second annual of the Xingzhou ribao]. Singapore: Xingzhou ribao she.
- Xingzhou ribao. 1933. *Xingzhou ribao si-zhounian jinian tekan* 星洲日報四週年紀念特刊 [Souvenir issue of the fourth annual of the Xingzhou ribao]. Singapore: Xingzhou ribao she.
- Xue Fucheng 薛福成. 1885. "Diary of January 22, 1890." In *Xue Fucheng: Chu shi Ying Fa i Yi si guo ri ji* 薛福成: 出使英法比義四國日記 [Xue Fucheng's diary of embassy missions to the four countries: England, France, Italy and Belgium]. Ed. Zhong Shuhe 鍾叔河. Changsha, Hunan: Yuelu chubanshe.
- Xue Moucheng and Zheng Quanbei 薛謀成、鄭全備 eds. 1983. *Fujian shibian ziliao xuanbian* 福建事變資料選編 [Compilation of data about the Fujian Incident]. Jiangxi: Jiangxi renmin chubanshe.
- Yang Hongchao 楊洪潮 ed. 1994. *Minguo Fujian sheng defang zhengquan jigou yange ziliao (1911-1949)* 民國福建省地方政權機構沿革資料 (1911-1940) [Data on the history and development of local administrative systems of the Fujian province in the republican era, 1911-1940]. Fuzhou: Fujian renmin chubanshe.
- Yao Nan, Zhang Liqian and Xu Yunqiao 姚楠、張禮謙、許雲樵 eds. 1940. *Xingzhou shi nian* 星洲十年 [The Tenth Annual of the Sin Chew Jit Poh]. Singapore: Xingzhou ribao she.
- Yong An Youxian Gongsì 永安有限公司 [The Wing On Co., Ltd.]. 1932. *The Wing On Co., Ltd. Hong Kong in Commemoration of 25th Anniversary 1907-1932*. Hong Kong: The Wing On Company.
- Yongding xian difangzhi bianji weiyuanhui 永定縣地方誌編輯委員會 ed. 1994. *Yongding xianzhi* 永定縣誌 [Gazetter of the Yongding county]. Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue jishu chubanshe.
- Yu Mi 毓泌. 1940. "Wu nian lai de Fujian chaye guanli, san xu 五年來的福建茶業管理, 三書 [Management of Fujian tea industry in the past five years—3-3]." In *Cha Xun* 茶訊 2, no. 12 (Fuzhou: April 21, 1940): 874-877.
- Yung Wing. 1909. *My Life in China and America*. New York: Henry Holt and Company.
- Zheng Yushu 鄭玉書 ed. 1993. *Yongchun jiaji Zheng shi zu pu* 永春夾漈鄭氏族譜 [Lineage book of the Zhengs' in Jiaji, Yongchun]. Taipei: Longwen chubanshe.

### Secondary Studies

- Abu-Lughod, Janet L. 1989. *Before European Hegemony: The World System A.D. 1250-1350*. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Akashi, Yōji. 1968. "The Nanyang Chinese Anti-Japanese and Boycott Movement, 1908-28: A Study of Nanyang Chinese Nationalism," *Journal of South Seas Society* Vol. XXIII. Pp. 69-97.

- . 1970. *The Nanyang Chinese National Salvation Movement, 1937–1941*. Kansas: Center for East Asian Studies, the University of Kansas.
- Anderson, Benedict. [1983] 1991. *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*. London: Verso.
- . 1998. *Spectre of Comparisons: Nationalism, Southeast Asia and the World*. London and New York: Verso.
- Andrade, Tonio. 2008. *How Taiwan became Chinese: Dutch, Spanish and Han Colonization in the Seventeenth Century*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Arrighi, Giovanni. 1994. *The Long Twentieth Century*. London: Verso.
- Arrighi, Giovanni, Po-keung Hui, Ho-fung Hung, Mark Selden. 2003. “Historical Capitalism, East and West.” In *The Resurgence of East Asia*. Ed. Arrighi, Hamashita and Selden. London and New York: Routledge. Pp. 259–333.
- Au Chi Kin 區志堅. 2006. “Chan yang sheng dao, xi xie ju bo: Xianggang zun Kong huodong chu tan, 1900–jin 闡揚聖道，息邪距誠：香港尊孔活動初探，1909—今 [Promote the sacred way, suppress the divergent views: an introduction of Confucian revival activities in Hong Kong, 1900–present],” *Ju jiao ju xue ju shang dui renlei de gongxian 儒教儒學儒商對人類的貢獻. Proceedings of the 2nd Annual of International Confucius Global, 2006*.
- Bergère, Marie-Claire. [1986] 1989. *The Golden Age of Chinese Bourgeoisie, 1911–1937* (Translated by Janet Lloyd). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- . 1998. *Sun Yat-sen* (Translated by Janet Lloyd). Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Blussé, Leonard. 1986. *Strange Company: Chinese Settlers, Mestizo Women and the Dutch in voc Batavia* (Dordrecht, Holland; Riverton, NJ.: Foris Publications, 1986).
- Braudel, Fernand. 1992a. *The Structure of Everyday Life: Civilization and Capitalism, 15–18th*, vol. I. CA: University of California Press.
- . 1992b. *The Wheels of Commerce: Civilization and Capitalism, 15–18th*, vol. II. CA: University of California Press.
- . 1992c. *The Perspective of the World: Civilization and Capitalism, 15–18th*, vol. III. CA: University of California Press.
- Brown, Ian. 1994. “The British Merchant Community in Singapore.” In *International Commercial Rivalry in Southeast Asia in the Interwar Period*, ed. Sugiyam Shinya and Milagros C. Guerrero. New Heaven, Connecticut: Yale University Southeast Asia Studies. Pp. 111–132.
- . [1997] 1999. *Economic Change in South-East Asia, c. 1830–1980*. Kuala Lumpur and New York: Oxford University Press.
- Brown, Rajeswary Ampalavanar. 1994. *Capital and Entrepreneurship in South-East Asia*. New York and London: St. Martin Press.
- Carroll, John M. 2005. *Edge of Empires: Chinese Elites and British Colonials in Hong Kong*. Harvard University Press.

- Chaffee, John W. "At the Intersection of Empire and World Trade: The Chinese Port City of Quanzhou (Zaitun), Eleventh-Fifteenth Centuries." In Kenneth R. Hall, ed. *Secondary Cities and Urban Networking in the Indian Ocean Realm, c. 1400–1800* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2008), pp. 99–122.
- Chan Ming Kuo. 1975. *Labor and Empire: the Chinese Labor Movement in the Canton Delta, 1895–1927*. Ann Arbor, Michigan: University Microfilms International.
- . ed. 1994. *Precarious Balance: Hong Kong between China and Britain, 1842–1992*. Armonk, NY, and London: M. E. Sharpe.
- . 2002. "The Realpolitik and Legacy of Labor Activism and Popular Mobilization in 1920s Greater Canton," in Mechthid Leutner, Roland Felber, Mikhail L. Titarenko and Alexander M. Grigoriev eds., *The Chinese Revolution in the 1920s: Between Triumph and Disaster* (Routledge Curzon, 2002), pp. 187–212.
- Chan, Wellington K. K. 1977. *Merchants, Mandarins and Modern Enterprise in Late Ch'ing China*. Cambridge, Massachusetts and London, England: East Asian Research Center, Harvard University.
- . 1996. "Personal Styles, Cultural Values and Management: The Sincere and Wong On Companies in Shanghai and Hong Kong, 1900–1941". *Business History Review*, 70 (Summer 1996): 141–166.
- Chan Lau Kit-ching. 1999. *From Nothing to Nothing: the Chinese Communist Movement and Hong Kong, 1921–1936*. New York: St. Martin Press.
- Chang Kuan-yu 張光宇. [1996] 2003. *Minke fangyen shigao* 閩客方言史稿 [Historical accounts of the Hokkien and Hakka dialects]. Taipei: Nantian shuju.
- Chang Pin-tsun 張彬村. 1998. "The Formation of a Maritime Convention in Minnan (Southern Fujian), c. 900–1200." In *From the Mediterranean to the China Sea*. Ed. Galude Guillot, Denys Lombard and Roderich Ptak. Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag. Pp. 143–155.
- Cheah Boon Kheng. 2003. *Red Star Over Malaya: Resistance and Social Conflict during and after the Japanese Occupation, 1941–1946*. Singapore: Singapore University Press.
- Chen Da 陳達 [1938] 1939. *Nanyang huaqiao yu minyue shehui* 南洋華僑與閩粵社會 [Chinese sojourners in Nanyang and the Fujian and Guangdong societies]. Changsha: Shangwu chubanshe.
- Chen Donglin and Li Danhui 陳東林、李丹慧. 1987. "Qinalong xianling Guangzhou yikoutongshang zhengce ji yingshang Renhonghui shijian lunshu 乾隆限令廣州一口通商政策及英商任洪輝事件述論 [On the Qianlong Restriction of Trade to Guangzhou and the James Flint Incident]." *Lishi dang'an* [Historical Archives], Vol. XXV: 94–101.
- Chen Gongcun and Hong Yonghong 陳共存、洪永宏. 2003. *Chen Jiageng xin zhuan* [New biography of Tan Kah Kee]. Singapore: Tan Kah Kee International Society and Global Publishing Co. Inc.

- Chen Jiageng 陳嘉庚 (Tan Kah Kee). 1998. *Nanqiao huiyilu* 南僑回憶錄 [Memoir of an overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia]. Changsha: Hunan Yuelu shushe.
- Chen Jiarong 陳佳榮. 1987. *Zhong Wai Jiaotong shi* 中外交通史 [A History of Communication between China and Foreign Countries]. Hong Kong: Xuejin shudian.
- Chen, Leslie H. Dingyan. 2000. *Chen Jiongming and the Federalist Movement: Regional Leadership and Nation Building in Early Republican China*. Ann Arbor, MI: Center for Chinese Studies, the University of Michigan.
- Chen Ping. 2003. *Alias Chin Peng: My Side of History*. Singapore: Media Masters Pte. Ltd.
- Chen Shiqi 陳詩啟. 1999. *Zhongguo jindai haiguan shi: minguo bufen* 中國近代海關史：民國部份 [History of the Maritime Customs in Modern China: the Republican Era]. Beijing: Renmin chubanshe.
- Chen Qian 陳謙. 1989. *Xianggang jiushi jianwen lu* 香港舊事見聞錄 [Records of historical Hong Kong]. Canton: Guangdong renmin chubanshe.
- Chen Xiyu 陳希育. 1991. *Zhongguo fanchuan yu haiwai maoyi* 中國帆船與海外貿易 [Chinese Junks and Overseas Trade]. Xiamen, Fujian: Amoy University Press.
- Chen Zhiping 陳支平. 1997. *Kejia yuanliu xinlun* 客家源流新論 [New thesis on Hakka origins]. Nan'ning: Guangxi jiaoyu chubanshe.
- Chere, Lewis M. 1980. "The Hong Kong Riots of October 1884: Evidence for Chinese Nationalism?" *Journal of Hong Kong Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society*, Vol. 20 (1980): 54–65.
- Chesneaux, Jean. 1968. *Chinese Labor Movement, 1919–1927* (translated from the French by H. M. Wright). Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Chin, James Kong. 2004. "The Junk Trade between South China and Nguyen Vietnam in the Late Eighteenth and Early Nineteenth Centuries." In *Water Frontier: Commerce and the Chinese in the Lower Mekong Region, 1750–1880*. Ed. Nola Cooke and Li Tana. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield. Pp. 53–70.
- Chiu Peng-sheng 邱澎生. 2008. *Dang falu yu shang jingji: Ming Qing Zhongguo de shangye fa lu* 當法律遇上經濟：明清中國的商業法律 [When law and economy encounters: commercial laws in Ming and Qing China]. Taipei: Wunan tushu chuban youxian gongsi.
- Choa, G. H. [1981] 2000. *The Life and Times of Sir Hai Ho Kai*. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press.
- Choi Chi-cheung 蔡志祥. 2006. "Qiye, lishi jiyi yu shehui xiangxiang: Qiang tailong yu Huangli 企業、歷史與社會想像：乾泰隆與贊利 [Enterprise, history and social imagination, the Kin Tye Lung and Huang Li]." *Chaoxue yanjiu* 潮學研究 Vol. 13 (2006): 158–174.
- Chung, Po-yin Stephanie 鍾寶賢. 1996. "Zhengfu dang an chu huazi zhuce gongsi jilu jian jie 政府檔案處華資註冊公司記錄簡介 [an introduction of the files about registered Chinese companies at the Public Record Office]." *South China Research Resource Station Newsletter* No. 2 (January 15, 1996): 9–10.

- . 1998. *Chinese Business Groups in Hong Kong and Political Change in South China, 1900–25*. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Chung Shu-min 鍾淑敏. 1998. "Rizhi shiqi nanjin yanjiu zhi huigu yu zhanwang 日治時期南進研究之回顧與展望 [Prospects and review of research on Japanese southward advance]." *Zhonghua minguo shi zhuanli lunwenji di si jie taolunhui, juan er* 中華民國史專題論文集第四屆討論會卷二 [Conference proceeding of the fourth seminar on the history of Republic of China, Volume 2]. Taipei: Guoshiguan. Pp. 2063–2090.
- . 1999. "Taiwan zongdufu 'nanzhi nanyang' zhengce zhi yanjiu: yi qingbao tixi wei zhongxin 台灣總督府「南支南洋」政策之研究：以情報體系為中心 [Research of 'South China and Nanyang' of the Office of the Government-General, Taiwan: A study on the intelligence systems]." *Zhongguo haiyang fazhan shi lunwenji di qi juan* 中國海洋發展史論文集第七卷 [Essays on the history of Chinese maritime development, Vol. 7]. Taipei: Institute of Sun Yat-sen Humanities and Social Sciences Center, Academia Sinica. Pp. 695–733.
- Chung Wai-keung. 2005. "Made in China or Made in Hong Kong? National Goods and the Hong Kong Business Community." In *Colonial Hong Kong and Modern China: Interaction and Reintegration*. Ed. Lee Pui-tak. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press. Pp. 185–198.
- Clark, Huff R. 1991. *Community, Trade, and Networks: Southern Fujian Province from the Third to the Thirteenth Century*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Cochran, Sherman. 1980. *Big Business in China: Sino-Foreign Rivalry in the Cigarette Industry, 1890–1930*. Cambridge, Massachusetts and London, England: Harvard University Press.
- Cohen, Paul A. [1984] 2000. *Discovering History in China: American Historical Writing on the Recent Chinese Past*. NY: Columbia University Press.
- Crane, George T. 1996. "'Special Things in Special Ways': National Economic Identity and China's Special Economic Zones." *Chinese Nationalism*. Ed. Jonathan Unger. Armonk, New York and London: M. E. Sharpe. Chapter 7.
- Cushman, Jennifer. 1993. *Fields from the Sea: Chinese junk trade with Siam during the Late Eighteenth and Early Nineteenth Centuries*. Ithaca, NY: Southeast Asia Program, Cornell University.
- Dai Yifeng 戴一峰. 2000. *Quyue xing jingji fazhan yu shehui bianqian: yi jindai Fujian diqu wei zhongxin* 區域型經濟發展與社會變遷：以近代福建地區為中心 [Development of regional economy and social changes: a study focusing on modern Fujian]. Changsha: Yuelu chubanshe.
- Deng Kaisong and Lu Xiaomin 鄧開頌、陸曉敏 eds. 1996. *Yue Gang Ao jindai guanxi shi* 粵港澳近代關係史 [Modern relationship between Canton, Macao, and Hong Kong]. Canton: Guangdong renmin chubanshe.

- Deng Zhongxia 鄧中夏. [1949] 1957. *Zhongguo zhigong yundong jianshi, 1919–1926* 中國職工運動簡史, 一九一九—一九二六 [A Brief History of Labor Movements in China, 1919–1926]. Beijing: Renmin chubanshe.
- Dirlik, Arif. 1989. *The Origins of Chinese Communism*. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press.
- Douw, Leo, Cen Huang and Michael R. Godley eds. 1999. *Qiaoxiang Ties: Interdisciplinary Approaches to Cultural Capitalism in South China*. London and New York: Routledge.
- Duara, Prasenjit. 1995. *Rescuing History from the Nation: Questioning Narratives of Modern China*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- 1997a. “Nationalists Among Transnationals: Overseas Chinese and the Idea of China, 1900–1911”. In Aihwa Ong and Donald M. Nonini (eds.) *Ungrounded Empires: The Cultural Politics of Modern Chinese Transnationalism*. New York and London: Routledge. Pp. 39–60.
- 1997b. “Transnationalism and the Predicament of Sovereignty: China, 1900–1945.” *American Historical Review* (October 1997), pp. 1030–1051.
- 1998. “Transnationalism in the Era of Nation-states: China, 1900–1945.” *Development and Change*. October 1998, Vol. 29 (4): 647–670.
- Dunn, Rose E. 1989. *The Adventures of Ibn Battuta: A Muslim Traveler of the 14th Century*. Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: University of California Press.
- Eastman, Lloyd E. 1974. *The Abortive Revolution: China under Nationalist Rule, 1927–1937*. Harvard University Press.
- Elleman, Bruce. 1997. *Diplomacy and Deception: The Secret History of Sino-Soviet Diplomatic Relations, 1917–1927*. Armonk NY: M. E. Sharpe.
- Elvin, Mark. 1973. *The Pattern of the Chinese Past: A Social and Economic Interpretation*. Stanford University Press.
- Endacott, G. B. 1964. *A History of Hong Kong* (second edition). Hong Kong: Oxford University Press.
- Erbaugh, Mary. 1992. “The Secret History of the Hakkas: the Chinese Revolution as a Hakka Enterprise.” *China Quarterly* Vol. 132 (December, 1992): 937–968.
- Fairbank, John King. 1953. *Trade and Diplomacy on the China Coast: the Opening of the Treaty Ports, 1842–1854*. Vol. 1. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
- Faure, David. 1990. “The Rice Trade in Hong Kong before the Second World War.” In *Between East and West: aspects of social and political development in Hong Kong*. Ed. Elizabeth Sinn. Hong Kong: Center of Asian Studies, University of Hong Kong), 216–225.
- Feng Bangyen 馮邦彥. 1997. *Xianggang Huazi caituan, 1848–1997* 香港華資財團 (1841–1997). Hong Kong: Sanlian shudian.
- Feng Xiaocai 馮筱才. 2004. *Beifa qianhou de shangmin yundong, 1924–1930* 北伐前後的商民運動, 一九二四—一九三零 [Merchants and Civic Movements before and after the Northern Expedition, 1924–1930]. Taipei: Commercial Press.

- Fitzgerald, John. 1995. "The Nationless State: the Search for a Nation in Modern Chinese Nationalism." *The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs* No. 33 (January 1995): 75–104.
- Flowerdew, John. 1998. *The Final Years of British Hong Kong: the Discourse of Colonial Withdrawal*. New York: St. Martin Press, Inc.
- Flynn, Dennis O. and Arturo Giráldez, "Born with a Silver Spoon: The Origin of World Trade in 1571," *Journal of World History* 6 (1995), no. 2.
- Fox, Charles James. 1923. *China's Fight for Tariff Autonomy at the Washington Conference*. Tianjin: the North China Star.
- Frank, Andre Gunder. 1998. *Reorient: Global Economy in the Asian Age*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Freedman, Maurice. 1978. *The Study of Chinese Society: Essays by Maurice Freedman (Selected and Introduced by G. William Skinner)*. Leland, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Fu Yiling 傅衣凌. 1956. *Ming Qing shidai shangren ji shangye ziben* 明清時代商人及商業資本 [Merchants and merchant capital in Ming and Qing periods]. Beijing: Renmin chubanshe.
- Gates, Hill. 1996. *China's Motor: A Thousand Years of Petty Capitalism*. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press.
- Gerth, Karl. 2003. *China Made: Consumer Culture and the Creation of the Nation*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Asia Center.
- Goda Miho 合田美穗. 2003. "Xinjiapo ji Xianggang de Fujian shetuan ji qi jiaoyu shiye de bijiao yanjiu 新嘉坡及香港的福建社團及其教育事業的比較研究 [Comparative study on the Fujian associations and schools in Singapore and Hong Kong]." Paper presented in the International Conference of Institutes and Libraries for Overseas Chinese Studies, the Second Conference. Hong Kong: University Library System, the Chinese University of Hong Kong.
- Godley, Michael R. 1981. *The Mandarin-capitalists from Nanyang: overseas Chinese enterprise in the modernization of China, 1893–1911*. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Goodman, Bryna. 1995. *Native Place, City, and Nation: Regional Networks and Identities in Shanghai, 1853–1937*. Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: University of California Press.
- Gong Bohong 龔伯洪 ed. 2003. *Guangfu huaqiao huaren shi* 廣府華僑華人史 [History of Chinese Sojourners from the Cantonese-speaking region]. Guangzhou: Guangdong gaode jiaoyu chubanshe.
- Granovetter, Mark. 1985. "Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problems of Embeddedness." *American Journal of Sociology* 91 (Nov. 1985): 481–510.
- Grove, Linda and Sugiyama Shinya eds. 2001. *Commercial Networks in Modern Asia*. London and New York: Routledge.

- Hamashita Takeshi. 1999. *Jindai zhongguo de guoji qiji: chaogong maoyi tixi yu jindai Yazhou jingji quan* 近代中國的國際契機：朝貢貿易與近代亞洲經濟圈 [The International Relationship of Modern China: Tributary Trade System and Modern Asian Economic Circle], translated by Zhu Yingui and Ouyang Fei 朱蔭貴、歐陽菲. Beijing: Chinese Social Science Press.
- Hamashita, Takashi (edited by Linda Grove, and Mark Selden). 2008. *China, East Asia and the Global Economy: Regional and Historical Perspectives*. London and New York: Routledge.
- Hamilton, Gary ed. 1999. *Cosmopolitan Capitalists: Hong Kong and the Chinese Diaspora at the End of the Twentieth Century*. Seattle: University of Washington Press.
- Hao Yen-p'ing. 1970. *The Comprador in Nineteenth-century China: Bridge between East and West*. Harvard University Press.
- . 1986. *The Commercial Revolution in Nineteenth-century China: The Rise of Sino-Western Mercantile Capitalism*. University of California Press.
- Harlem, Christine Margerum. 1999. "A Reappraisal of Classical Economic Nationalism and Economic Liberalism." *International Studies Quarterly* (1999) 43: 733–744.
- Havinden, Michael and David Meredith. 1993. *Colonialism and Development: Britain and Its Tropical Colonies, 1850–1960*. New York: Routledge.
- He Wenxiang 何文翔. 1992. *Xianggang jiazu shi* 香港家族史 [History of prominent families in Hong Kong]. Hong Kong: Mingbao chubanshe.
- Heng, Derek. 2009. *Sino-Malay Trade and Diplomacy from the Tenth through the Fourteenth Century*. Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 2009.
- Heng Pek Koon. 1988. *Chinese Politics in Malaysia: A History of the Malaysian Chinese Association*. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press.
- Hevia, James L. 2005. *Cherishing Men from Afar: Qing Guest Ritual and the Macartney Embassy of 1793*. Duke University Press.
- Hill, Emily W. 2010. *Smokeless Sugar: The Death of a Provincial Bureaucrat and the Construction of China's National Economy*. Vancouver and Toronto: University of British Columbia Press.
- Honig, Emily. 1986. *Sisters and Stranger: Women in the Shanghai Cotton Mills, 1919–1949*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- . 1992. *Creating Chinese Ethnicity: Subei People in Shanghai, 1850–1980*. New Heaven, Connecticut.
- Horimoto Naohiko 堀本尚彦. 1997. "Shingaporru no kanin kōni undō to nihōn sō keizai dantai シンガポールの華人抗日運動と日本側経済団体 [Chinese anti-Japanese activities and Japanese-associated Economic Groups]." *Kindai Ajia no nihonjin keizai dantai* 近代アジアの日本人経済団体 [Japanese Economic Organizations in Modern Asia], ed. Namikata Shōichi 波形昭一. Tokyo: Dōbun-kan, Ch. 10, pp. 237–256.

- Howe, Christopher. 1996. *The Origins of Japanese Trade Supremacy: Development and Technology in Asia from 1540 to the Pacific War*. Chicago: Chicago University Press.
- Hsin You-tien. 1998. *Making Capitalism in China: the Taiwan Connection*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Hsu, Madeline. 2000. *Dreaming of Gold, Dreaming of Home: Transnationalism and Migration between the United States and China, 1882–1943*. Stanford University Press.
- Hsu Tsz-feng 許紫芬 (Yamaoka Yūka 山岡由佳) 1995. *Nagasaki kashō ke'ei no shiteki kenkyū: kindai Chūgoku shōnin no keiei to chōbo* 長崎華商經營の史的研究: 近代中国商人の経営と帳簿 [Research on the history of the management of Chinese merchants in Nakasaki: management and account books of modern Chinese merchants]. Kyoto: Minereoa bookstore.
- Hui Po-Keung. 1995. *Overseas Chinese Business Network: East Asian Economic Development in Historical Perspective*. Ph. D. Dissertation of Sociology Department, State University of New York at Binghamton.
- Huff, W. G. 1994. *The Economic Growth of Singapore: Trade and Development in the Twentieth Century*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Hung, Ho-fung. 2001. "Imperial China and Capitalist Europe in the Eighteen-Century Global Economy." *Review: Fernand Braudel Center* Vol. XXIV, No. 4: 473–513.
- Ide Kiwata 井出季和太. 1941. *Nan'yō to Kakyō* 南洋と華僑. Tōkyō: Sanseidō.
- Igawa Kenji 伊川健二. 2010. "At the Crossroads: Limahon and Wakō in Sixteenth Century Philippines." *Elusive Pirates, Pervasive Smugglers. Violence and Clandestine Trade in the Greater China Seas*. Ed. Robert J. Anthony. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press. Ch. 6.
- Jiang Jian and Wang Qinghua 姜建、王慶華. 2004. *Li Jishen yu Zhongguo Guomindang gemming weiyuanhui* 李濟琛與中國國民黨革命委員會 [Li Jishen and GMD Revolutionary Committee] Guangdong: Guangdong renmin chubanshe.
- Kang Jing A. 姜珍亞. 2001. *1930 nendai Kanton-shō no zaisei seisaku: chūowu, jikata, shōnin no sansha kankei wo chūshin ni* 1930年代廣東省の財政政策: 中央、地方商人の三者関係を中心に [Financial policies of the Guangdong province in the 1930s: focusing on the relationship among the central and local governments as well as merchants]. Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Concentration of East Asian History, Research Institute of Humanities and Societies, Tokyo University.
- . 2006. "1935 nian de Shentou shijian: 1930 niandai Guangdong difang guanshui(zhuanshui) han Riben 1935 年的汕頭事件: 1930 年代廣東地方關稅和日本 [The Swatow incident of 1935: Guangdong's local taxes and Japan in the 1930s], in *1930 Niandai de Zhongguo* 一九三〇年代的中國, ed. Zhongguo shehui kexuyuan jindai shi yanjiu suo minguo yanjiu shi, Sichuan shefan daxue lishi xi wenhua xue yuan 中國社會科學院近代史研究所民國史研究室、四川師範大學歷史文化學院 (Beijing: Shehui kexue wenxian chubanshe).

- Kawarabayashi, Naoto 河原林直人. 2003. *Kindai Ajia to Taiwan: Taiwan chagyō no rekishi teki tenkai* 近代アジアと台湾：台湾茶業の歴史的展開 [Modern Asia and Taiwan: a revelation of the history of Taiwan's tea industry]. Kyōto: Sekai Shisōsha.
- Kenley, David L. 2003. *New Culture in a New World: The May Fourth Movement and the Chinese Diaspora in Singapore, 1919–1932*. New York and London: Routledge.
- Kenneth, Olenik, J. 1992. "Deng Yanda and the Third Party," in Roger B. Jeans ed. *Roads not Taken: The Struggle of Opposition Parties in Twentieth-Century China*. Boulder, San Francisco and Oxford: Westview Press. Pp. 111–134.
- Ko Mu Lin and Lim How Seng 柯木林、林孝勝 eds. 1986. *Xing hua lishi yu renwu yanjiu* 星華歷史與人物研究 [Research on the history and people of Singapore and Malaya Chinese]. Singapore: Nanyang xuehui.
- Koo Shou-Eng. 1982. *Tariff and the Development of the Cotton Industry in China, 1842–1937*. New York and London: Garland Publication.
- Kratoska, Paul H. 1990. "The British Empire and the Southeast Asian Rice Crisis of 1919–1921." *Modern Asian Studies* Vol. 24, no. 1 (Feb. 1990), pp. 115–146.
- Ku Hung-ting. 1976. "Kuomintang's Mass movement and the Kreta Ayer Incident (1927) in Malaya." Institute of Humanities and Social Sciences, College of Graduate Studies, Nanyang University, Occasional Paper Series No. 13.
- Kuhn, Philip K. 2009. *Chinese among Others: Emigration in Modern Times*. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
- Kwan, Daniel. 1997. *Marxist Intellectual and the Chinese Labor Movement: A Study of Deng Zhongxia 1894–1933*. Seattle & London: University of Washington Press.
- Landes, David S. 1998. *The Wealth and Poverty of Nations: Why Some Are So Rich and Some So Poor*. New York and London: W. W. Norton & Company.
- Lary, Diana. 1974. *Region and Nation: The Kwangsi Clique in Chinese Politics, 1925–1937*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- . 2005. "The Guangxi Clique and Hong Kong." In *Colonial Hong Kong and Modern China: Interaction and Reintegration*. Ed. Lee Pui-tak. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press. Ch. 9.
- Lee Poh Ping. 1978. *Chinese Society in Nineteenth Century Singapore*. Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press.
- Lee Pui-tak 李培德. 1991. "Business Networks and Patterns of Cantonese Compradors and Merchants in Nineteenth-century Hong Kong," *Journal of Hong Kong Branch of the Royal Asiatic Societies*, Vol. 31 (1991): 1–39.
- . "Xianggang de Fujian shanghui yu Fujian shangren wangluo [Fujian business associations and networks of Fujian merchants in Hong Kong] 香港的福建商會與福建商人網絡," in *Jindai Zhongguo de shanghui wangluo ji shehui gongneng* [Networks and Social Functions of Chamber of Commerce in Modern China] 近代

- 中國的商會網絡及社會功能, ed. Lee Pui-tak. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, Ch. 7.
- . 2012. "Hua shang kuaiguo wangluo de xingcheng, yanshen han chongtu: yi Hu Wenhu yu Chen Jiageng jingzheng wei ge'an 華商跨國網絡的形成、延伸和衝突: 以胡文虎與陳嘉庚競爭為個案 [The Expansion and Conflict of Overseas Chinese Merchant Network: The Case of Rivalry between Aw Boon Haw and Tan Kah Kee]." *The International Journal of Diasporic Chinese Studies*, v. 4 n. 1 (2012), pp. 53–74.
- Lee Ying-hui 李盈慧. 1997. *Huaqiao zhengce yu haiwai minzuzhuyi, 1912–1949 華僑政策與海外民族主義, 1912–1949* [Overseas Chinese Policies and Overseas Chinese Nationalism, 1912–1949]. Taipei: Academia Historica.
- . 2003. *Kang Ri yu fu Ri: huaqiao, guominzhengfu, Wang zhengquan 抗日與附日: 華僑、國民政府、汪政權* [Anti-Japanese and pro-Japanese: overseas Chinese, the Chinese Nationalist Government, and the Wang regime]. Taipei: Shuiniu chubanshe.
- Leong Sow-theng (Edited by Tim Wright). 1997. *Migration and Ethnicity in Chinese History: Hakkas, Pengmin, and their Neighbors*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Leung Yuen Sang 梁元生. 1994. "Chao xing, chao luo: zao qi Xinjiapo Huaren shehui zhong liang ge chao ren jiazu zhi lishi kaocha 潮興、潮落: 早期新嘉坡華人社會中兩個潮人家族之歷史考察 [the rise and fall of the Teochews: historical surveys on two Chinese families in Singapore's early days]." *Chaozhou xue guoji yantao hui lunwen ji 潮州學國際研討會論文集* [Proceedings for the International Conference of the Teochew Study]. Ed. Zheng Liangshu 鄭良樹. Guangzhou: Jinan daxue chubanshe. Pp. 822–840.
- . 1989. "The Singapore Hainanese and Their Political Orientation during the Inter-War Period." In *Overseas Chinese in Asia between the Two World Wars*, ed. Ng Lun Ngai-ha and Chang Chak Yan. Hong Kong: The Chinese University of Hong Kong.
- Leong, Stephen 1977. "The Kuomintang-Communist United Front in Malaya during the National Salvation Period, 1937–1941." *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* 8, no. 1: 31–47.
- . 1979. "The Malayan Overseas Chinese and the Sino-Japanese War, 1937–1941." *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* X, 2 (Sept. 1979): 293–320.
- Li Enhen 李恩涵. 2003. *Dongnanya huaqiao shi 東南亞華僑史* [History of the Chinese sojourners in Southeast Asia]. Taipei: Wunan chubanshe.
- Li Guangbi 李光璧. 1956. *Ming dai yu wo zhan zheng 明代禦倭戰爭* [the war against the Wokou in Ming Dynasty]. Shanghai: Shanghai ren min chu ban she; Xin hua shu dian Shanghai fa xing suo fa xing.
- Li Jinming 李金明. 1990. *Mingdai haiwai maoyi shi 明代海外貿易史* [History of Overseas Trade in the Ming Period]. Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexueyuan chubanshe.

- Li Tana. 1998. *Nguyen Cochinchina: Southern Vietnam in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries*. Southeast Asian Program, Cornell University.
- . 2004. "Rice from Saigon: Singapore Chinese and Saigon Trade of the Nineteenth Century." In *Maritime China and Overseas Chinese Communities in Transition, 1750–1850*. Ed. Ng Chin Keong. Germany: Harrassowitz Verlag. Pp. 261–270.
- Li Zongren and Tang Degang 李宗仁、唐德剛. 2010. *Li Zongren huiyi lu xia* 李宗仁回憶錄下 [Memoir of Li Zongren, volume 2]. Taipei: Yuanliu chubanshe.
- Liang Qichao 梁啟超. 1997. "Zhong guo bad a zhimin weiren zhuan 中國八大殖民偉人傳 [Biographies of the eight Chinese colonial grandeurs]." In *Liang Qichao quan ji, di san ce* 梁啟超全集, 第三冊. Beijing: Beijing chubanshe. P. 1368.
- Lim, Jason. 2010. *Linking an Asian Transregional Commerce in Tea: Overseas Chinese Merchants in the Fujian-Singapore Trade, 1920–1960*. Leiden and Boston: Brill Academic Publisher.
- . "The Education Concerns and Political Outlook of Lim Keng Lian (1893–1968)," *Journal of Chinese Overseas* 3, 2 (November 2007): 194–219.
- Lim, Christine Suchen. 2005. *Hua Song: Stories of the Chinese Diaspora*. San Francisco: Long River Press.
- Lin Jinzhi and Zhuang Weiji 林金枝、莊為璣 eds. 1985. *Jindai huaqiao touzi guonei qiyesi ziliao xuanji: Fujian juan* 近代華僑投國內企業史資料選輯：福建卷 [Data collection of the history of modern Chinese overseas investments in homeland enterprises: Fujian section]. Fuzhou: Fujian Renmin chubanshe.
- . 1989. *Jindai huaqiao touzi guonei qiyesi ziliao xuanji, Guangdong juan* 近代華僑投資國內企業史資料選輯：廣東卷 [Data collection of the history of modern Chinese overseas investments in homeland enterprises: Fujian section]. Fuzhou: Fujian Renmin chubanshe.
- Lin Man-houng 林滿紅. 2001a. "Overseas Chinese Merchants and Multiple Nationality: A Means for Reducing Commercial Risk," *Modern Asian Studies* (2001, Vol. 35, No. 4): 985–1009.
- . 2001b. "Taiwanese Merchants, Overseas Chinese Merchants, and the Japanese Government in the Economic Relations between Taiwan and Japan, 1895–1945." In *Ajia Taiheiyō Kenkyū* 太平洋研究. No. 4 (2001): 3–20.
- . 2005. "Taiwanese Merchants in the Economic Relations between Taiwan and China, 1895–1937." In *Japan, China, and the Growth of the Asian International Economy, 1850–1949*. Ed. Kaoru Sugihara. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Pp. 217–243.
- Liu Hong. 2000. "The Singapore Chinese Chamber of Commerce and Industry and the Institutionalization of Chinese Business Networks in Asia." *Lishi yanjiu* 歷史研究, No. 263 (2000): 106–118.
- Lo Hsiang-lin 羅香林 (Luo Xianglin). [1933] 1992. *Kejia yanjiu daolun* 客家研究導論 [An Introduction to the study of the Hakkas in its Ethnic, historical, and capital

- Aspects]. Shi-Shan Library, Hsingning, Kwangtung, in 1933. Reprinted in 1992 in Taipei by the Nantian shuju Co., Ltd.
- Lu Qian and Ta Qianhong 盧權、禰倩紅. 1997. *Shenggang da bagong shi* 省港大罷工史 [History of the General Canton-Hong Kong Strike and Boycott]. Guangzhoushi: Guangdong renmin chubanshe.
- Lu Yan. 2013. "Together with the Homeland: Civic Activism for National Salvation in British Hong Kong." *Modern China* Vol. XX (X, 2013): 1–36.
- Mak Lau Fong. 1995. *The Dynamics of Chinese Dialect Groups in Early Malaya*. Singapore: Singapore Society of Asian Studies.
- McKeown, Adam. 2001. *Chinese Migrant Networks and Cultural Exchange: Peru, Chicago, Hawaii, 1900–1936*. Chicago and London: the University of Chicago Press.
- Miners, Norman. 1994. "From Nationalistic Confrontation to Regional Collaboration: China-Hong Kong-Britain, 1926–41," *Precarious Balance: Hong Kong between China and Britain, 1842–1992* ed. Ming K. Chan. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press.
- . 2002. "Industrial Development in the Colonial Empire and the Imperial Economic Conference at Ottawa 1932," *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 30, 2 (May 2002), 53–76.
- Munn, Christopher. 2000. "The Hong Kong Opium Revenue 1845–1885." In *Opium Regimes: China, Britain and Japan, 1839–1952*. Ed. Timothy Brook and Bob Tadashi Wakabayashi. California: University of California Press. Pp. 105–126.
- Ng Chin-keong. 1983. *Trade and Society: The Amoy Network: 1683–1735*. Singapore: Singapore University Press.
- . 1997. "Maritime Frontiers, Territorial Expansion and Hai-fang during the Late Ming and High Ch'ing." In *China and Her Neighbors: Borders, Visions of the Other, Foreign Policy 10th–19th Centuries*. Ed. Sabine Dabringhaus and Roderick Ptak. Hamoisowitz Verlag. Pp. 211–258.
- Ngo Tak-wing. 1999. "Industrial History and the Artifact of Laissez-faire Colonialism" In *Hong Kong History*. Ngo Tak-wing ed. London and New York: Routledge, 1999. Pp. 119–140.
- Ong, Aihwa. 1999. *Flexible Citizenship: the Cultural Logics of Transnationality*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
- Pan Junxiang 潘君祥 ed. 1996. *Zhongguo jindai guohuo yundong* 中國近代國貨運動 [Buy Chinese product movements in modern China] ed. Pan. Beijing: Zhongguo wenshi chubanshe.
- Pang Wing Seng. 1973. "The 'Double-Seventh' Incident, 1937: Singapore Chinese Response to the Outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War." *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* 4, 2 (1973). Pp. 269–299.

- Parmer, N. 1962. "Attempts at Labor Organization by Chinese Workers in Certain Industries in Singapore in the 1930s." In Trengonning ed. *Papers on Malayan History*. Singapore: Journal South-East Asian History. Pp. 239–255.
- Png Peng-seng. 1962. "The Kuomintang in Malaya." In Trengonning ed. *Papers on Malaya History*. Singapore: Journal South-East Asian History, 1962. Pp. 214–225.
- Portes, Alejandro and Julia Sensenbrenner. 1993. "Embeddedness and Immigration: Notes on the Social Determinants of Economic Action." *American Journal of Sociology* 98: 1320–50.
- Post, Peter. 1995. "Chinese Business Networks and Japanese Capital in South East Asia, 1880–1940". In *Chinese Business Enterprise in Asia*. Ed. Rajeswary Ampalavanar Brown. London and New York: Routledge. Pp. 154–176.
- . 1997. "The Formation of the Pribumi Business Elite in Indonesia, 1930s–1940s." In *Japan, Indonesia and the War-Myths and Realities*. Ed. Post and Elly Touwen-Bousma. Leiden: KITLV Press. Pp. 87–110.
- Purcell, Victor. 1965. *The Chinese in Southeast Asia: the 2nd Edition*. London, New York: Oxford University Press.
- . 1967. *The Chinese in Malaysia*. Kuala Lumpur, London, etc.: Oxford University Press.
- PuruShotam, Nirmala. 1998. "Disciplining Difference: Race in Singapore." In *Southeast Asian Identities: Culture and the Politics of Representation in Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand*. Ed. Joel S. Kahn. NY: St. Martin Press. Pp. 51–94.
- Rankin, Mary Backus. 1971. *Early Chinese Revolutions: Radical Intellectuals in Shanghai and Chekiang, 1902–1911*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
- Remer, C. F. 1933. *A Study of Chinese Boycotts: With Special Reference to Their Economic Effectiveness*. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Ren Guixiang 任貴祥. 1987. "Huaqiao dui zuguo kangzhan jingji de gongxian 華僑對祖國抗戰經濟的貢獻 [Chinese sojourners' contribution to their motherland's economy during the Sino-Japanese war]." *Jindaishi yanjiu* 近代史研究, no. 5 (1987): 142–163.
- Rowe, William T. 1984. *Hankow: Conflict and Community in a Chinese City, 1796–1895*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- . 1989. *Hankow: Conflict and Community in a Chinese City, 1796–1895*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Sakuma Shigeo 佐久間重男. 1992. *Nichi-min kankeishi no kenkyū* 日明關係史の研究 [Research on the History of Sino-Japanese Relation]. Tōkyō: Yoshikawa Kōbunkan.
- Schiller, Nina Glick, Linda Basch, and Cristina Blanc-Szanton eds. 1992. *Towards Transnational Perspective on Migration: Race, Class, Ethnicity, and Nationalism Reconsidered*. New York: New York Academy of Sciences.

- Schwarcz, Vera. 1996. *The Chinese Enlightenment: Intellectuals and the Legacy of the May Fourth Movement of 1919*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Schottenhammer, Angela. 1999. "Quanzhou's Early Overseas Trade: Local Politico-Economic Particulars During its Period of Independence." *Journal of Song Yuan Studies* 29 (1999): 1–41.
- . 2006. "Japan—the tiny Dwarf? Sino-Japanese Relations from the Kangxi to the Early Qianlong Reigns." In *The East Asian Mediterranean—Maritime Crossroads of Culture, Commerce, and Human Migration*, ed. Angela Schottenhammer. Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 2006. Pp. 331–388.
- Selden, Mark. 1995. *China in Revolution: the Yen'an Way Revisited*. Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe.
- Shimizu Hiroshi and Hirakawa Hitoshi. 1999. *Japan and Singapore in the World Economy: Japan's Economic Advance into Singapore, 1870–1965*. London and New York: Routledge.
- Sikko Visscher. 2007. *The Business of Politics and Ethnicity: A History of the Singapore Chinese Chamber of Commerce and Industry*. Singapore: National University of Singapore Press.
- Sim, Victor ed. 1950. *Biographies of prominent Chinese in Singapore*. Singapore: Nan Kok Publication Company.
- Sinn, Elizabeth. 1982. "The Strike and Riot of 1884: A Hong Kong Perspective." *Journal of Hong Kong Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society*. Vol. 22, 65–98.
- . [1989] 2003. *Power and Charity: The Early History of the Tung Wah Hospital*. Hong Kong: Oxford University Press.
- . 1990. "A History of Regional Associations in Pre-war Hong Kong." In Sinn, Elizabeth (ed.) *Between East and West: Aspects of Social and Political Development in Hong Kong*. Hong Kong: Centre of Asian Studies, the University of Hong Kong. Pp. 159–168.
- . 2013. *Pacific Crossing: Californian Gold, Chinese Migration and the Making of Hong Kong*. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press.
- Skinner, G. William. 1957. *Chinese Society in Thailand: An Analytical History*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- . 1977. "Introduction: Urban Social Structure in Ch'ing [Qing] China." In W. G. Skinner ed., *The City in Late Imperial China*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Pp. 521–53.
- . 1985. "The Structure of Chinese History," *Journal of Asian Studies* 44 (1985), no. 5: 271–292.
- Smith, Carl T. [1985] 2005. *Chinese Christians: Elites, Middlemen, and the Church in Hong Kong*. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press.

- Smart, Alan and Jinn-Yuh Hsu. 2004. "The Chinese Diaspora, Foreign Investment and Economic Development in China." *Review of International Affairs* Vol. 3 No. 4 (Summer 2004): 544–566.
- Snow, Philip. 2003. *The Fall of Hong Kong: Britain, China, and the Japanese Occupation*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- So, Alvin Y. 1986. *The South China Silk District: Local Historical Transformation and World-System Theory*. Albany: SUNY Press.
- So, Billy K. L. 2000. *Prosperity, Region, and Institutions in Maritime China The South Fukien Pattern, 946–1368*. Cambridge: Harvard University Asia Center.
- Song Ong Siang. [1923] 1967. *One Hundred Years' History of the Chinese in Singapore*. Kuala Lumpur: University of Malaysia Press.
- Su Jiqing 蘇繼楨 ed., *Dao yi zhi lue jiao shi* 島夷誌略校釋 [Editions and annotations of the brief history of the islands and the barbarians]. Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 2000.
- Su Xiaoxian 蘇孝先 ed. 1948. *Zhangzhou shishu lu Xing tongxianglu* 漳州十屬旅星同鄉錄. Singapore: Qiaoguang chuban she.
- Sugiyama Shinya. 1994. "Expansion of Japan's Cotton Textile Exports." In *International Commercial Rivalry in Southeast Asia in the Interwar Period*. Ed. Sugiyama Shinya and Milagros C. Guerrero. New Heaven, Connecticut: Yale Southeast Asia Studies. Pp. 40–73.
- Tagliacozzo, Eric and Chang Wen-chin, eds. 2011. *Chinese Circulations: Capital, Commodities, and Networks in Southeast Asia*. Durham: Duke University Press.
- Tan Chee Seng 陳是呈. 2013. "Wu Tiecheng de Nanyang zhi xing (1940–1941): yi zai Malaya de huodong wei taolun zhongxin 吳鐵城的南洋之行 (1940–1941): 以在馬來亞的活動為討論中心 [Wu Tiecheng's missions to Nanyang: A study based on his activities in Malaya ]. In *Wu Tiecheng yu jindai Zhongguo* 吳鐵城與近代中國 [Wu Tiecheng and modern China]. Ed. Chen Hongyun. Taipei: Xiuwei zixun. Pp. 74–102.
- Tian Rukang 田汝康. 1987. *Zhongguo fanchuan maoyi yu duiwai guanxishi luanwen ji* 中國帆船貿易與對外關係史論文集 [Essays of Chinese Junk Trade and International Relationship]. Zhejiang: Renming chubanshe.
- Tremml, Birgit M. "The Global and the Local: Problematic Dynamics of the Triangular Trade in Early Modern Manila." *Journal of World History*, Vol. 23, no. 3 (September 2012): 555–586.
- Trocki, Carl. 1990. *Opium and Empire: Chinese Society in Colonial Singapore, 1800–1910*. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1990.
- . 1999. *Opium, Empire and the Global Political Economy: A Study of the Asian Opium Trade, 1750–1950*. New York: Routledge.

- . 2002. "Opium and the Beginning of Chinese Capitalism in Southeast Asia," *Journal of Southeast East Asia* 32, 2 (2002): 297–314.
- Tsai Jung-fang 蔡榮芳. 1993. *Hong Kong in Chinese History: Community and Social Unrest in the British Colony, 1842–1913*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- . 2001. *Xianggang ren zhi Xianggang shi, 1841–1945* 香港人之香港史, 1841–1945 [The Hong Kong People's History of Hong Kong, 1841–1945]. Hong Kong: Oxford University Press.
- Tsang, Steven ed. 1995. *A Documentary History of Hong Kong: Government and Politics*. Hong Kong University Press, 1995.
- Tsin, Michael. 1999. *Nation, Governance, and Modernity in China: Canton, 1900–1927*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Turnbull, Constance Mary. 1984. "Sir Cecil Clementi and Malaya: The Hong Kong Connection." *Journal of Oriental Studies* Vol. XXII (1984, No. 1): 33–60.
- . 2009. *A History of Modern Singapore, 1819–2005*. Singapore: National University of Singapore Press.
- Viraphol, Sarasin. 1977. *Tribute and Profit: Sino-Siamese Trade 1652–1853*. Harvard University Press.
- Wakeman, Frederic, Jr. 1966. *Strangers at the Gate: Social Disorder in South China, 1839–1861*. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press.
- Wang Gungwu 王庚武. 1989. "Lu Xun, Lim Boon Keng and Confucianism." *Papers on Far Eastern History* 39 (March 1989): 75–91.
- . 1992 a. "The Limits of Nanyang Chinese Nationalism, 1912–1937". In *Community and Nation: China, Southeast Asia and Australia*. St. Leonards: Allen and Unwin Pty Ltd. Pp. 40–57.
- . 2003. *The Nanhai Trade: Early Chinese Trade in the South China Sea*. Singapore: Eastern Universities Press.
- Wang Lixin 王立新. 2000. *Meiguo duihua zhengce yu zhongguo minzuzhiyi yundong, 1904–1928* 美國對華政策與中國民族主義運動 (1904–1928) [American China Policy and Chinese Nationalism]. Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe.
- Wang Tai Peng. 1994. *The Origins of Chinese Kongsis*. Selangor Darul Ehsan, Malaysia: Pelanduk Publications.
- Warren, James F. 1986. *Rickshaw Coolie: A People's History of Singapore, 1880–1940*. Singapore: Oxford University Press.
- Williams, Lea E. 1960. *Overseas Chinese Nationalism: the Genesis of the Pan-Chinese Movement in Indonesia, 1900–1916*. Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, [1960].
- Wong Lin Ken. 1978. "Singapore: Its Growth as an Entrepôt Port, 1819–1941." *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* IX (1978), no. 1: 50–84.
- Wong Sin-kiong. 2001. "Die for the Boycott and Nation: Martyrdom and the 1905 Anti-American Movement in China", *Modern Asian Studies*, 35: 3(2001): 565–588.

- Wong Siu-lun. 1988. *Emigrant Entrepreneurs: Shanghai Industrialists in Hong Kong*. Hong Kong, Oxford, and New York: Oxford University Press.
- Wu Juenong and Fan Hejun 吳覺農、范和鈞. 1937. *Zhongguo chaye wenti* 中國茶葉問題 [The Problems of the Chinese Tea Industry]. Shanghai: The Commercial Press.
- Xiang Da 向達 ed. 2000. *Xi Yang Fanguo zhi, Zheng He hanghai tu, liang zhong haidao zhenjing* 西洋番國志、鄭和航海圖、兩種海道針經. Beijing: Zhonghua shuju.
- Xie Chongguang 謝重光. 2002. *Shezu yu kejia fulao guanxi shilue* 畬族與客家福佬關係史略 [A brief history of the relationship between the She people, the Hakka, and the Hoklow]. Fuzhou: Fujian remin chubanshe.
- Xu Dezhi, Huang Dazhang, Liang Yurong and Cheng Youjiang 徐德志、黃達璋、梁郁榮、成有江 eds. *Guangdong dui wai jingji maoyi shi* 廣東對外經濟貿易史 [History of Guangdong's foreign trade] (Guangzhou: Guangdong renmin chubanshe).
- Yang Tianshi 楊天石. 2007. "Bei fa shiqi zuopai liliang yu Jiang Jieshi de maodun yu douzheng" 北伐時期左派力量與蔣介石的矛盾與鬥爭 [Contradictions and conflicts between the leftwing force and Chiang Kai-shek in the Northern Expedition]. In Yang, *Guomindang ren yu qianqi Zhonghua minguo* 國民黨人與前期中華民國. Beijing: Zhongguo renmin daxue chubanshe. Pp. 492–520.
- Yano Tōru 矢野暢. 1975. *Nanshin no keifu* 南進の系譜 [Genealogy of Japan's Southward Advance]. Tokyo: Chuoōu kōron-sha,
- Yen Ch'ing-hwang 顏清煌. 1976. *The Overseas Chinese and the 1911 Revolution: with Special Reference to Singapore and Malaya*. Kuala Lumpur; New York: Oxford University Press.
- . 1982. "Overseas Chinese Nationalism in Singapore and Malaya, 1877–1912." *Modern Asian Studies* (1982) 16, 3.
- . 1986. *A Social History of the Chinese in Singapore and Malaya, 1800–1911*. Singapore: Oxford University Press.
- . 1989. "The Response of the Overseas Chinese in Singapore and Malaya to the Tsinan [Jinan] Incident, 1928," in Ng Lun Ngai-ha and Chang Chak Yan (eds.) *Overseas Chinese in Asia between the Two World Wars*. Hong Kong: Overseas Chinese Archives and Centre for Contemporary Asian Studies, The Chinese University of Hong Kong. Pp. 263–282.
- . 1993. "Early Fujianese Migration and Social Organization in Singapore and Malaya before 1900." In *Zhongguo haiyang fazhan shi lunwenji di wu ji* 中國海洋發展史論文集第五輯 [Essays on Development of Chinese Maritime Transportation, No. 5], ed. Chang Pin-tsun and Liu Shiji 張彬村、劉石吉. Taipei: Sanminzhuyi yanjiusuo [Institute of the Three Principles of the People], Academia Sinica, Taipei. Pp. 679–740.

- . 1994. "Power Structure and Power Relations in the Teochew Community in Singapore, 1819–1930," in *Chaozhou xue guoji yantaohui lun wen ji, xia ce* 潮州學國際研討會論文集, 下冊 [International Symposium of the Teochew Study, vol. 2–2]. Ed. Zheng Liangshu 鄭良樹. Guangzhou: Jinan daxue chubanshe. Pp. 685–732.
- . 1995. *Community and Politics: the Chinese in Colonial Singapore and Malaysia*. Singapore: Times Academic Press.
- Yeung, Henry Wai-chung. 2004. *Chinese Capitalism in a Global Era: Towards Hybrid Capitalism*. London and New York: Routledge.
- Yi Ruofen 衣若芬. "Xiyan yu aiguo: 'Wu si yundong' qianhou Nanyang Xiongdi Yancao Gonsi zai Xinjiapo Le Bao de guanggao 吸煙與愛國: 「五四運動」前後南洋兄弟煙草公司在新加坡《叻報》的廣告 [Smoking and patriotism: Advertisements of the Nanyang Brothers' Tobacco Company in Singapore Lat Pau, before and after the 'May Fourth Movement']." *Journal of National Taiwan Normal University*, Vol. 54, no. 2 (Sept. 2009): 65–106.
- Yong Ch'ing-fatt. 1977. "Leadership and Power in the Chinese Community of Singapore during the 1930s." *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies*. 7, 2 (Sept. 1977). Pp. 195–209.
- . 1988. *Collected Papers on the Studies of Chen Jia Geng*. Beijing: Youyi chubanshe.
- . [1987] 1989. *Tan Kah Kee: The Making of an Overseas Chinese Legend*. London; Singapore: Oxford University Press.
- . 1992. *Chinese Leadership and Power in Colonial Singapore*. Singapore: Times Academic Press.
- . 2014. *Tan Kah Kee: The Making of an Overseas Chinese Legend (Revised Edition)*. Singapore: World Scientific Publishing Company.
- Yong Ch'ing-fatt and R. B. McKenna. 1990. *The Kuomintang Movement in British Malaya, 1912–1949*. Singapore: Singapore University Press.
- Yuan Bingling. 2000. *Chinese Democracies: A Study of the Kongsis of West Borneo, 1776–1884*. Leiden: Research School of Asian, African and Amerindian Studies, Universiteit Leiden.
- Zhang Xie 張燮. 2000. "Dong Xi Yang Kao." In Xie Fong ed. *Xi Yang Chaogao dian lu jiaozhu, Dong Xi Yang kao* 東西洋考西洋朝貢典錄校注, 東西洋考 [Annotations of Western tributary missions, Surveys of the Eastern and Western Seas]. Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju.
- Zhang Zhongli, Chen Zennian, and Yao Xinrong 張仲禮、陳曾年、姚欣榮 et al. 1991. *Taiku jituan zai jiu Zhongguo* 太古集團在舊中國 [The Swire Group of Company in old China]. Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe.
- Zheng Guangying 鄭觀應. 1998. *Sheng shi wei yan* 盛世危言 [Warning to an Apparently Prosperous Age]. Zhengzhou: Zhongzhou Guji Chubanshe.

- Zheng Huixin 鄭會欣. 2009. *Guomin zhengfu zhan shi tongzhi jingji yu maoyi yanjiu, 1937-1945* 國民政府戰時統制經濟與貿易研究，一九三七—一九四五 [Research on controlled economy and wartime trade of the Chinese Nationalist Government, 1937-1945]. Shanghai: Shanghai shehui kexue yuan chubanshe.
- Zheng, Victor and Charles W. Chow. 2010. *Grand Old Man of Hong Kong: Sir Shouson Chow*. Hong Kong: the University of Hong Kong.
- Zhou Min, and Lin Mingang. 2005. "Community Transformation and the Formation of Ethnic Capital: Immigrant Chinese Communities in the United States." *Journal of Chinese Overseas* 1, 2 (Nov. 2005): 260-284.
- Zhou Zhaojing 周昭京. 1995. *Chaozhou huiguan shi hua* 潮州會館史話 [History and Anecdotes of the Teochew Associations]. Shanghai: Shanghai guji chubanshe.

# Index

- Abu-Lughod, Janet 29
- Aceh 33
- Africa 29, 39
- Akashi, Yoji 10n30, 12n36, 11, 131n4, 131n6, 287, 287n7
- Amoy
- Japanese occupation 270, 309, 331
  - Gulangyu 98
  - Hokkien trade with Batavia 36
  - in Qing's multiport system 32, 35
  - in Singapore tea trade 166, 183, 269
  - overseas capital in real-estate industry 256, 310
  - relief work for refugees from Amoy to Hong Kong 279
  - spread of ideas from Singapore to 126, 144
- Amoy University 57, 98, 126, 139
- Amoy-Datong Canning Company 280, 281n14
- Anatolia 11
- Anderson, Benedict 3, 3n7, 3n8, 4, 295
- Anglo-Japanese Alliance 1, 82, 207
- Anti-Enemy Backing-Up Society 275, 285–86
- Anti-Japanese Boycotts
- Economic boycotts, thesis 12
  - Economic Effectiveness 166, 182, 198–99, 227–34
  - Marco Polo Bridge Incident 130–31
  - May Fourth protest, Singapore 1, 85
  - National Humiliation Day 1923, Singapore 97
  - Tatsu Maru Incident, Hong Kong 66–67
- Arabs
- Maritime trade in history 27, 27n7, 29, 35
  - Trade of Japanese goods 1930s 232, 233
- Arrighi, Giovanni 17, 17n40
- Aw Boon Haw 胡文虎
- and Chinese nationalist government 7n19, 157, 164, 273, 281, 282n122
  - and development in western Fujian 7n18, 259, 259n23, 261–62
  - and Fujian organizations 144–45, 279
  - and Tan Kah Kee 9n26, 140–44, 140n39
- See also* Hakka, Chinese speech-group interactions
- Baba Chinese
- “King’s Chinese” 7–8, 11
  - “Straits-born” Chinese in British census 42–43
  - Advocate Mandarin education 8, 56, 56n98, 86
  - Challenge from China-born Chinese 60
  - In revenue farming system 43, 48–49, 123, 167
  - Straits Chinese British Association (SCBA) 49
  - and late Qing reforms 25, 48, 51
  - and London Missionary Society 54
- Bai Chongxi 白崇禧 251, 252
- Bank of East Asia 71, 78, 98, 151, 163
- Bank of Taiwan 94, 94n47, 96n55
- Batavia 30–32, 32n26, 33n29, 36, 94
- Beijing government
- and Chen Jiongming’s federalist movement 148
  - and British “One China Policy” 107, 111, 120, 207, 207n6
  - connections with Chinese overseas 70, 84, 123–26
  - relief of rice shortage, Hong Kong 91–92
  - tension with Sun Yat-sen in Guangdong 63, 67, 69, 102, 123, 154n108, 207
  - in the May Fourth Movement 1–2, 15, 82
- Bell, W. H. 263
- Bergère, Marie-Claire 14, 14n43, 14n44, 54n95, 66n127, 205n2
- Braudel, Fernand 17, 17n50, 18n51, 18n52, 34n33
- British colonialism in Hong Kong
- census data 49–50
  - Clementi and Li Jishen 263
  - free-trade policy 34–35, 41
  - trade to Sterling bloc, restricted 246–47
  - with СГССНК 69–70
  - with Chen Jitang 262–263

- with Chinese companies in wartime
  - Canton 244–46
- with Li Yuk Tong 67–69
- With Tung Wah leaders 70–72
- British colonialism in Singapore
  - ban GMDM 135–37
  - banishment order
    - of Hau Say Huan 285–86
    - of Jin Peigao 124–25
    - of Teh Lay Seng 137
  - classify the Chinese population 8, 41–45, 176–77
  - free trade policy 34
  - Malaya Emergency 289
- British East Indian Company 33–34
- British Imperial Preference System
  - Application in Hong Kong 260
  - Criterion for “empire products” 292–93
  - Definition of British interest 293–95
  - Exports from Hong Kong to British Markets 293–95
  - Exports of Hong Kong products to British Malaya 295
  - Ottawa Conference 1932 260
- British textile (quota) system
  - General practice 238–240, 242–44
  - Exemption in Hong Kong 240–41
- Burlingame Treaty (1868) 39
- Buy Chinese Products Movement
  - Singapore interests excluded 211–14, 224
  - May Fourth protests, Hong Kong 85
  - Nanyang Brothers' Tobacco Co. 87–88
  - Exceptions for Hong Kong 223–25
  - official agenda 206–210, 214
  - overseas Chinese expectation 210–15
  - products from Japanese occupied areas in China 224–5, 229, 270–71
  - sccc's organization 219–23
  - Shanghai industries in Hong Kong 217, 222–23, 226–27
- Cai Tingkai 蔡廷鍇 153, 253, 260, 260n28, 290
  - See also* Fujian People's Government, Guangdong Army and Nineteenth Route Army
- Canton
  - and May Fourth Movement 85
  - Arabic trade from Tang to Song 27
  - assassination of Liao Zhongkai 111–12
  - in the first united front 102–3, 101n83, 103, 105
  - base of the Southwest regime 147, 251–52
  - Canton uprising 9, 144n51
  - Ho Tung at Chinese maritime customs in Canton 71
  - Chinese Nationalist Government in Canton (Canton government) 105, 107, 109, 112, 122
  - economic competition with Hong Kong 22, 100, 211–212
  - economic ties with Hong Kong 108–9, 113–18, 214–15, 216–19, 224–26, 241
  - fall to Japan 245–46, 255, 271
  - Guangdong Merchant Corps 102–3
  - in 1905 anti-US protest 66
  - in Qing's multi-port system 32
  - in Seamen Strike 9n28, 100–101, 119
  - in Tatsu Maru incident 67
  - industrial development 22
  - Japanese occupation 245, 246
  - Kwik Djoen Eng's business 82
  - monoport of Qing 34, 34n33, 38
  - overseas Chinese investment 92–93, 111, 116, 256
  - response to the May Thirtieth Incident 104
  - Tension with the Beijing government 67–68
  - See also* Guangdong Military Government, General Guangdong-Hong Kong Strike and Boycott
- Cantonese
  - “Canton for Cantonese” 103–4
  - Cantonese in Shanghai 151–53
  - Canton-Hong Kong industrial zone 294
  - charities 93, 144n51, 157
  - distribution in the South Seas 41–45
  - first division of the Guangdong Army 260n28
  - Heung Sham Cantonese 91
  - in Chinese nationalist movements 23, 113–14, 126, 128, 250
  - in Hong Kong census 50
  - in Qing's monoport system 33n33
  - in sccc 58, 58n113, 65, 219
  - in self-strengthening movements 52–55

- Cantonese (*cont.*)
- Japan-South Seas trade 12, 15, 192, 233–37, 292
  - maritime trade before the nineteenth century 36
  - Nan Hoi Cantonese 150
  - native-place of origins in Guangdong 2, 38, 50
  - Po On Cantonese 69–70, 91
  - rally for Wang Jingwei 274
  - Sze Yap Cantonese 9n27, 38–39, 67–9, 256n16
  - trans-Pacific migration and trade 7n18, 39
  - tu-ke* fights 38–39
  - See also* Canton, Feng Rui, Guangdong, Guangdong Army, Li Yuk Tong, Wang Jingwei and Yue
- Carroll, John M. 11n33, 16n47, 109, 122n172, 294
- Cen Huang 15n46
- Chan Chor Nam 陳楚楠 56
- Chan Lau Kit-ching 10, 102, 106, 192
- Chan Lim Pak 陳廉伯
- and CMUHK 154, 214
  - businesses 186, 200
  - Commercial dispute with Wang Songxian 154–55
  - grandson of Chan Kai Uen 91
  - Guangdong Merchant Corps 102–4
  - in Japanese occupied Hong Kong 293
  - relief work 100, 150, 152–53
  - Support of the Nineteenth Route Army 154
  - See also* Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank
- Chan, Ming K. 9n28, 241n101
- Chang Pin-tsun 張彬村 27n8, 48n67
- Chao 1
- See also* Teochew
- Chaozhou 35
- See also* Chao and Teochew
- Chartered Bank 245
- Cheah Boon Kheng 293n20
- Chen Bochen 陳伯誠 280
- Chen Da 陳達 6, 6n17
- Chen Duxiu 陳獨秀 84
- Chen Gongbo 陳公博 221
- Chen Gongcun 陳共存 289n10, 291n18
- Chen Jia-rong 陳佳榮 27n7
- Chen Jiongming 陳炯明 4, 5, 20, 22, 67, 124, 146, 254
- Chen Jitang 陳濟棠
- “King of the Southern Heaven” 228, 260, 262–63
  - and Chiang Kai-shek 20, 132–33, 222, 251–55
  - and Hong Kong merchants 191–92, 284
  - and Nineteenth Route Army 153, 153n106
  - Guangdong maritime customs 211n20
  - in Guangdong Army 146–47
  - native-place of origin 260n28
  - retreat to Hong Kong 255
  - Three Years Policy Agenda 192, 265–68
  - See also* Guangdong Army, Feng Rui, Li Jishen
- Chen Kezhan 陳克振 166n2, 184n57
- Chen Mingshu 陳銘樞
- and Chan Lim Pak 153–54, 154n108
  - and Chen Jitang 251
  - and Chiang Kai-shek 20, 290
  - and Guangdong Army 146–47
  - and Nineteenth Route Army 252
  - Guangdong, development of 263–64
  - Hakka background 260n28
  - See also* Guangdong Army, Chen Jitang, Li Jishen
- Chen Qian 陳謙 100n69, 101n79, 101n80, 101n81, 150n88
- Chen Rongfang 陳榮芳 282
- Chen Shaoyu 陳紹宇 264n46, 266n54, 266n55
- Chen Shiqi 陳詩啟 211n20
- Chen Weichou 陳維周 267
- Chen Xiting 陳喜亭 125
- Chen Xiyu 陳希育 27n7, 33n29
- Chen Yi 陳儀
- and Fujian's controlled economy 283
  - as Governor of Fujian 268–70, 277
  - Challenges from Tan Kah Kee 276–77
- Chen Yixi 陳宜禧 111
- Cheong Fatt Tze 張弼士 7
- See also* Zhang Bishi
- Chere, Lewis M. 52n85
- Chesneaux, Jean 100n67, 100n68, 100n71, 101n81

- Chew Pek Leong 171
- Chiang Kai-shek 蔣介石  
and Chinese overseas  
CGCCHK 164–65  
Tan Kah Kee 132–33, 135, 275, 279,  
288, 290–91  
business protection 205, 214, 222  
and Dee Cheng Chuan 261n33  
and Fujian politics 256–57, 275–76  
and Guangdong generals and politicians  
147, 251–52, 254–55, 257, 274  
anti-leftist purge 128, 192  
challenges from within 127, 131–32,  
251–52, 254–55, 257  
Chiang files 145n58  
the rise of power 104n97, 115, 120–21  
family ties with the Soongs 133n10  
second united front 273–75  
*See also* Canton, Nanjing government, and  
GMD
- Chien Chaonan 簡照南 87–88  
*See also* Nanyang Brothers' Tobacco  
Company
- China and Southern Bank 96, 235
- China National Product Bank 210
- China's Tariff autonomy 206–8, 211–12, 214,  
222–23
- Chinese Commercial Union of Hong Kong  
(Hong Kong Wah Sheung Kun Kok) 66
- Chinese Communist Party (CCP)  
overseas mobilization 9, 10, 20  
and third-party campaigns 289–290  
founding 84  
Sun-Joffe manifesto 102  
in the first united front 103–5  
Chiang Kai-shek's anti-leftist purge  
122–3, 128, 153n106, 192  
South Seas Provisional Committee of the  
CCP 128  
with the Nineteenth Route  
Army 252–53  
Red District, expanded to western  
Fujian 256–57  
and Tan Kah Kee 281n117, 283, 288,  
291  
Second United Front 273, 275  
Secret deal with the Nineteenth Route  
Army 253
- Chinese Consulate in Singapore 26, 57, 126,  
130, 132, 223, 271, 286
- Chinese Exclusion Law 66
- Chinese General Chamber of Commerce,  
Hong Kong (CGCCHK)  
and British Imperial Preference system  
205, 211  
and Chen Jitang's Guangdong 263  
and Chinese nationalist government  
156–64, 273  
and Nineteenth Route Army 260, 263  
and *NMJH* 260  
and Shandong sojourners in Hong Kong  
after Jinan Incident 130, 148, 149  
charities for the Shanghai incident 151  
Chinese “national” interest, debate  
over 221–24, 230–31, 247  
founding 69–70, 69n139  
in General Guangdong-Hong Kong Strike  
and Boycott 110–18  
in the dispute between Chan Lim Pak and  
Wang Songxian 155–56  
in the May Fourth moment of 1919 85,  
92n43  
in the Seamen strike 100–101  
Po On compradores, connection  
with 70–72  
Prospering Commerce Working  
Committee 221  
request to be exempted from China's  
soaring tariffs 214–15  
response to the Tokyo Earthquake  
97–98  
support of Guangdong Merchant  
Corps 103  
changing leadership structure in the  
Great Depression of the 1930s  
190–203  
Tsong Sing Tsung as a member 280,  
280n112
- Chinese maritime trade before 1900  
from Qin to Five Dynasties 27  
Ming dynasty 29  
Qing dynasty 31–35  
Song and Yuan 28  
with Japanese wakō 30
- Chinese National Vanguard Corp 275, 285
- Chinese Nationality Law 58, 136

- Chinese speech-group interactions  
 British colonial policies 2  
 Divided political dispositions in the  
 1930s 250–51  
 Fights after the May Fourth movement in  
 Singapore 1–2  
 Linguistic barriers between sccc and  
 CMUHK 219  
 Lo Hsiang-lin's thesis 4–5  
*Sin Chew Jit Poh's* second annual  
 143–44  
 the controversial “barking dogs”  
 comment 140  
*tu-ke* fights 38–39  
*See also* Aw Boon Haw, Cantonese, Hakka,  
 Hokkien and Tan Kah Kee
- Chiu Chau 50  
*See also* Teochew
- Choa, G. H. 11n33, 54n92
- Choi Chi-cheung 蔡志祥 198n94
- Chongqing 163–65, 222, 272–73, 282, 286,  
 290, 293
- Chow Shou Son 周壽臣  
 and Chinese national bonds 163–64  
 business 69, 200, 272  
 in General Guangdong-Hong Kong Strike  
 and Boycott 110–1, 116, 121  
 Justice of the Peace 72, 78  
 Po On background 70  
 response to the bombing of Shanghai  
 1931 151
- Chow Siu Ki 周少歧 101, 151
- Chow Tsun Nin 周峻年 151, 156
- Chow, Charles 293
- Choy Chong 蔡昌  
 background 92, 92n40  
 business 200  
 in Guangdong's sugar reforms 265  
 in General Guangdong-Hong Kong Strike  
 and Boycott 117
- Choy Hing 蔡興 92, 200
- Chung Po-yin Stephanie 鍾寶賢 9n27, 68,  
 71n147
- Chung Shu-min 鍾淑敏 13
- Clark, Huff R. 28n10
- Clementi, Cecil 金文泰 113, 119, 136, 138
- Chinese Manufacturers' Union, Hong Kong  
 (CMUHK) 214, 216
- collaborative nationalism 11, 16n47, 19
- Comintern 84, 102, 104, 110, 147n62
- Compradore system  
 CGCCHK members 190–92  
 Changes in the 1930s 186–90  
 Eligibility for sccc chairmanship 60  
 Po On circle 70–72
- Confucian education 14, 19, 56, 56n98, 70,  
 83–84, 125, 278n105
- Controlled economy 267–73
- Daoyi Zhilue* 28–9
- Dabringhaus, Sabine 28
- Dee Cheng Chuan 李清泉 97, 257n18, 259,  
 261
- Den Kenjirō 田健治郎 94
- Deng Kaisong 鄧開頌 212n24
- Deng Yandai 鄧演達 127
- Deng Zhongxia 鄧中夏 10n28, 100n70, 101,  
 106n100, 112n124, 119n161, 292
- Dong Xi Yang Kao* 31
- Duara, Prasenjit 15–16
- Dutch  
 Dutch East Indies  
 business in Japanese occupied  
 Canton 245  
 Chinese population 34, 36, 41  
 in Japan's southward  
 expansion 94–95  
 rubber trade 169, 173–74, 179  
 sugar export to Guangdong 265–66  
 tea trade 183  
 textile market 230, 239  
 voc in Formosa 30–32  
 voc in Batavia 32, 33n29, 36  
 Anglo-Dutch Treaty 34  
 competition with the British 90  
 Hong Kong Chinese with Dutch  
 nationality 49  
*See also* Java, Kwik Djoen Eng
- economic citizenship 206, 219, 296
- Ee Ho Hean 88, 132, 134, 258
- Egypt 29
- Elvin, Mark 28
- Embeddedness 21
- ethnic division of labor 8
- Eugene Chen 陳友仁 123, 253

- Fairbank, John King 14, 24  
 Feng Rui 馮銳 264–68  
 Feng Xiaocai 馮筱才 103n89  
 first united front 9, 10, 127  
 Flynn, Dennis o. and Arturo Giráldez 31  
 Foo Ping-sheung 傅秉常 108, 117, 121  
 Formosa 30, 31, 32, 36  
 Fourth Army 147, 147n61, 153  
 Fowler, John A. 168n6, 179  
 Frank, Andre Gunder 18  
 Freedman, Maurice 8, 15  
 Fu Hua Trading Company 269, 270  
 Fu Yiling 傅衣凌 30n17  
 Fujian Development Company 282  
*Fujian lugang tongxianghui* 274, 279n107  
*See also* Hong Kong Fukienese Association  
 Fujian People's Government 252–54, 260n28, 261n33, 262, 262n39, 291  
*See also* Guangdong Army, Third-party power, Nineteenth Route Army  
 Fujian tea trade 183–85, 227–29, 269–70  
 Fung Wah Chuen 馮華川 66  
 Fuzhou (city) 35, 253, 258, 261, 268
- General Guangdong-Hong Kong Strike and Boycott  
 agenda 105–8  
 Kwik Djoen Eng's proposal 121–22  
 Liao Zhongkai, the death of 108–9  
 reactions of Chinese communities outside Hong Kong 117  
 middle-ranked merchants from Hong Kong 113–17  
 normal trade with Japan 109  
 Strike Committee 106–08, 111, 113–18, 120–23  
 the British reactions 119–122  
 the role of Chinese bourgeoisie 108–112, 116–17
- GMD  
 in first united front 104–05, 116–17, 119–20, 122  
 and Chinese overseas 9, 13, 130–39, 156, 162–65, 273–83, 285–87  
 state-buildings in the republican era 20–23  
 and Comintern 101  
 control of Fujian, the limits 10, 253, 257n18, 268–71  
 control of Guangdong, the limits 10, 252, 264–65, 271–72  
 Northern Expedition 122–23, 131, 146–47, 153, 207, 222  
 British policies in Singapore/  
 Malaya 126–27, 136–37, 227  
 British policies in Hong Kong 113, 119–20, 207  
 Committee of Wartime National Salvation Bonds 163–65  
 GMD leftists 127, 131, 147n62, 192, 253, 290  
 Second United Front 273  
 supervision of overseas nationalism 277–82  
 view of Tan Kah Kee's change 291  
*See also* Chiang Kai-shek, Chinese nationalist government in Canton, Nanjing government  
 GMDM (GMD in Malaya) 135  
 Gock Chin, Philip 郭泉 92, 117, 162, 186, 200, 293  
 Godley, Michael R. 7n18, 15n46  
 Goodman, Bryna 23, 23n23, 251n2  
 Grand Tattoo 210  
 Granovetter, Mark 21  
 Great Depression  
 Challenge to Singapore manufactures 174–75  
 challenges to the compradors in Hong Kong 190–91  
 General 21, 167, 175, 186  
 Heung Shan merchants in Hong Kong 200–203  
 Impact on Migration in labor immigrants to Singapore 175–77  
 Impact on the trans-Pacific trade 192–98  
 Great Overseas Chinese National Product Company Ltd. 210  
 Guangdong Army  
 and Chen Jiongming 4, 22  
 and the Fujian People's Government 253  
 Fourth Army in Northern Expedition 153  
 Native-places of leading generals 260n28  
 Relationship with Chiang Kai-shek's Nanjing Government 148  
 the First Division 146, 174

- Guangdong Army (*cont.*)  
 Third party force 260n26, 290–91  
*See also* Li Jishen, Chen Jitang, Third-party force
- Guangdong Food Relief Association 91–92
- Guangdong Merchant Corps 102–5
- Guangdong Military Government 102–3, 124  
*See also* General Guangdong-Hong Kong Strikes and Boycotts, Guangdong Merchant Corps, Seamen Strike
- Guangzhou tonghai yidao* (the barbarian route from Canton to the sea) 27
- Guillot, Galude 27
- Hainanese 2, 40, 43, 45, 59, 60, 65, 126, 128
- Hakka  
 and the Nineteenth Route Army 146, 259–62  
 distribution in the South Seas 42–45  
 Hakka identity 4–5, 35–36, 38  
 homeland investment 256  
 in Hong Kong census 50  
 influence of Aw Boon Haw 143–44  
 native-place and business organizations in Hong Kong 145, 158–61, 191, 279–80  
 native-place and business organizations in Singapore 59, 65, 144, 233  
 native-place of origins in South China 2, 35–36, 50  
 seaborne trade and migration, the eighteenth century 39  
*See also* Aw Boon Haw, Chinese inter speech-group interactions
- Hamashita, Takeshi 濱下武志 14, 15n45, 17n49, 18n51, 199n102
- Hamilton, Gary G. 296, 297n33
- Han Chinese civilization 4
- Hankou-Canton Railway 271
- Hao Yen-p'ing 郝延平 14, 186
- Hau Say Huan 侯西反 275, 285–87
- He Gong'gan 何公敢 261, 262
- He Xiangning 何香凝 127, 135, 136, 290
- Heng, Derek 28n12
- Hill, Emily M. 266n53, 267
- Hing Yuke Ming 幸玉銘 158
- Hirakawa Hitoshi 12n38, 218n44, 233n87, 235n89, 237n94
- Ho Fook 何福 71, 72, 190
- Ho Kai 何啟 11, 54, 55, 69, 109
- Ho Sai Kwong 何世光 71, 93, 103, 110, 111–12, 115, 190–91
- Ho Sai Wing 何世榮 71, 190
- Ho Tung, Robert 何東 71, 91, 113, 190
- Hoi Fong 50
- Hoki Rikichi 保木利吉 95
- Hokkien  
 and Chinese anti-British movements 101–22, 126–27  
 and Chinese anti-Japanese boycotts 22, 86–88, 137–38, 183, 185  
 in Chinese nationalist fundraising campaigns 12, 133–34, 138–140, 144n51, 156–57, 250  
 campaigns for saving Fujian 98–99, 258–59, 268–69, 278  
 connection with Japan's southward advance 83, 94, 96–98  
 distribution in the South Seas 42–45  
 in Tan Kah Kee's political movement 276  
 investment in real estate 256  
 maritime trade before the nineteenth century 27n8, 28–30, 37, 56  
 native-place and business organization in Hong Kong 277–80  
 native-place and business organizations in Singapore 57–60, 65, 90, 167–69, 170, 172–74  
 native-place in Fujian 2, 35  
 Rise of China-born in Singapore 60  
*See also* Baba Chinese, *NMJH*, *SCCC*, Singapore Fujian Native-Place Association, Tan Kah Kee
- Hoklo 35
- Home Saving Association for Western Fujian (*Minxi Jiuxiang Hui*) 259
- Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank and Chan Lim Pak 91  
 and Po On merchants 71n147, 78  
 and See Tiong Wah 60–1  
 and Tan Kah Kee & Co. 172–73  
 in 1919 rice shortage 93  
 in Japanese Canton 245  
 in the Great Depression of the 1930s 186, 190
- Hong Kong Fukien Chamber of Commerce 277–81, 283

- Hong Kong Fukienese Association 277, 279–81
- Hong Kong Match Factory 216, 217
- Hong Kong Singapore Hip Chun Association 270, 271
- Hong Kong Tsong Tsin Association (Xianggang Chongzheng Zonghui) 145, 164
- Hong Kong Wah Sheung Kun Kok (Xianggang huashang gongju) 66, 70
- Hong Yonghong 洪永宏 289n10, 291n18
- Horimoto Naohiko 堀本尚彦 12
- Hsin You-tien 297
- Hsu, Madeline 7n18, 15n46, 111n19
- Hu Hanmin 胡漢民 67, 104, 127, 131, 147, 153, 251–52, 293
- Hu Yu-zhieh 胡愈之 289
- Ibn Battuta 29
- Igawa Kenji 30
- India 43, 77, 89, 169
- Indian Ocean 28–29
- Industrial and Chinese Products Service Society (ICPSS) 226
- Jan George Chance 鄭紫燦 77, 192n76
- Japan's southward advance  
background 94  
cantonese merchants on High Street, Singapore 235–37  
Hokkien connections 82–3  
Hong Kong connection 199  
Indian and Arabic merchants in Singapore 235–37  
Kōbe/Ōsaka-Singapore trade 233–35  
Taiwanese Hokkien elites 96–7  
the role of Taiwan 94–6  
*See also* Kwik Djoen Eng
- Java  
early Chinese seaborne trade 29, 35, 37, 56  
Kwik Djoen Eng 82, 183  
shipping and trade with Japan 94, 97–99, 178, 183, 191  
Hokkien networks 178, 183, 191, 241, 265, 272, 292  
*See also* Dutch East Indies  
supply for Guangdong's sugar industry 265
- Jei Shu Tang 謝樹棠 113, 114
- Jiang Guangnai 蔣光鼐 153, 252–53, 260n28, 290  
*See also* Cai Tingkai, Fujian People's Government, Guangdong Army and Nineteenth Route Army
- Jin Peigao 金佩皋 124
- Jinan Incident  
background 21  
charities of the Tung Wah Hospital 148–49  
responses from Hong Kong 130, 148–49  
responses from Singapore 166  
Shandong Relief Fund, Singapore 132–35, 278, 278n103  
*See also* Tan Kah Kee: nationalist leader
- Juala Selangor 33
- Kam Shan Chong 39, 68, 100, 192, 194, 197–98, 203
- Kang Jing A 姜珍亞 211n22, 212n23
- Kang Jingpo 康靜波 278
- Kao Ling Pai 高凌白 277–79, 286
- Karakhan Manifesto 84
- Kedah 33
- Kejia 38  
*See also* Hakka
- Khong Kauw Hwe 56
- Kimura Masutarō 木村増太郎 96
- King's Chinese 7, 11, 49, 69, 272
- Ko Mu Lin 柯木林 48n67, 138n30
- Kong, H. H. 孔祥熙 208–9
- Konoe Fumimaro 近衛文磨 273
- Korea 15, 31, 70, 94, 192
- Kotewall, Robert 100–111, 116, 121, 151, 156, 248, 272, 293
- Kowloon-Canton Railway 271
- Kreta Ayer Incident 126–27
- Kwik Djoen Eng 郭春秧 82, 96, 97, 99, 121, 133, 183, 278, 292
- Lai Wenqing 賴文清 280
- Lam Mun Thin 林文田 59
- Lam Wei Fong 林維芳 59
- Lary, Diana 10n31, 20, 254n10
- Lat Pau* 1, 2, 86, 87, 88, 274
- Lau Chu Pak 劉鑄伯 69, 70, 71, 72, 84, 91, 191

- Lau Yuk Wan 劉毓芸 70, 158  
 Lee Kim So 李金賜 213–4  
 Lee Kong Chian 李光前 169, 171–73, 277  
 Lee Kung Min Knitting Factory 224, 226  
 Lee Poh Ping 8, 9, 43  
 Lee Seng Gee 李成義 172–73  
 Lee Ying-hui 李盈慧 6, 10, 16, 32, 58, 131,  
 137, 162, 256, 274, 278  
 Leo Douw 15n46  
 Leong Sow-Theng 5, 10, 16, 37–38, 131, 146,  
 230, 287  
 Leong, Stephen 275  
 Li Guangbi 李光壁 30n17  
 Li Hongzhang 李鴻章 53, 70  
 Li Jinming 李金明 31n21  
 Li Jishen 李濟琛  
 and Chen Jiongming 20, 146  
 Fourth Army 146, 153  
 House arrest 147, 147n62, 252  
 and Chiang Kai-shek 148, 154n108, 165,  
 291  
 and the Fujian People's  
 Government 253, 262  
 Third-party power 1254, 254n12, 262,  
 290  
 native-place of origin 260n28  
 Guangdong's development 263–64  
 Li Po Kwai 李葆葵 70  
 Li Yau Tsun 李幼泉 70, 110, 111, 117, 130,  
 149, 156  
 Li Yik Mui 李亦梅 70  
 Li Yuk Kai 李玉階 210  
 Li Yuk Tong 李煜堂 67, 68, 158, 186, 194,  
 200  
 Li Zongren 李宗仁 131, 147, 153, 251–52,  
 254, 255, 260  
 Liang Qianwu 梁謙武 219  
 Liang Xianfan 梁顯凡 274  
 Liao Zhongkai 廖仲凱 105, 107, 108, 111,  
 127, 135  
 Lim Boon Keng 林文慶 56–58, 86, 98,  
 123–24, 126, 127–28, 168, 259, 293  
 Lim Ho Thye Tea Chop 166, 184, 185  
 Lim How Seng 林孝勝 48, 138  
 Lim Keng Lian 林慶年 183, 185, 218, 219,  
 229, 276–77  
 Lim Kim Tian 林金殿 134, 143, 210  
 Lim Nee Soon 林義順 56, 65, 124, 125, 127,  
 135, 137, 144, 168, 170, 171, 172, 173  
 Lim Peng Mao 林秉茂 278  
 Lim Peng Siang 林秉祥 144, 174, 175, 278  
 Lim Soo Gan 林樹彥 283n125  
 Lim Yun Koy 林雲陔 153, 263  
 Lin Aimin 林藹民 279, 282  
 Lin Feng 林鳳 30  
 Lin Hsien-tang 林獻堂 97, 98, 133  
 Lin Jinzhi 林金枝 6n18, 258  
 Lin Man-houng 林滿紅 11n35, 82n2  
 Lin Sen 林森 281  
 Lingnan 35, 38, 39, 41  
 Lo Cheong Siu 71, 190, 191  
 Lo Hsiang-lin 羅香林 4, 36, 38, 260  
 Lo Man Kam 羅文錦 71, 117, 293  
 Lok Fong 50  
 Lombard, Denys 27  
 Lu Huanchu 盧煥初 110, 111  
 Lu Xiaomin 陸曉敏 212  
 Lu Xingyuan 盧興原 152  
 Lu Yan 16  
 Lui Yam Sun 雷蔭孫 112, 114, 162  
 Ma Tsui Chiu 馬敘朝 117  
 Ma Ying Piu 馬應彪 92, 200  
 Ma Yiqian 馬亦錢 99  
 Mak Lau Fong 麥留芳 8n26  
 Malacca 31, 33, 34  
 Malay Chinese Association (MCA) 289  
 Malay Communist Party (MCP) 135, 145,  
 289, 294, 294n28  
 Manchester Chamber of Commerce 180,  
 238, 242, 243  
 Manchurian Incident  
 charities of Tung Wah led by Chan Lim  
 Pak 149–53  
 responses from the sccc 138–39  
 Tsang Foo Villa Murders 149–50  
 Mandarin education  
 and Baba Chinese 8, 56  
 and Hokkien schools 86  
 impact on Singapore 42  
 Manila 30–32, 36, 67, 98  
 Mao Zedong 毛澤東 288, 290  
 Marco Polo Bridge Incident  
 CGCCCHK campaigns 158–62  
 Relief Fund Campaign of All Kowloon  
 Associations 156  
 responses from Singapore  
 bourgeoisie 145–46  
 responses from the Chinese bourgeoisie in  
 Hong Kong 156–65

- Mary S. Erbaugh 5, 5n14, 39n55
- May Fourth Movement  
 responses in Hong Kong 85–86  
 Responses in Singapore 1–2, 86–89
- McKeown, Adam 15n46
- Mecca 29
- Min 1, 2, 21, 27, 35, 145, 250, 253, 257, 258  
*See also Hokkien*
- Ministry of Industry and Commerce's  
 Exhibition of Chinese Products 210
- Minxi Jiuxiang Hui* 259
- Mo Xiuying 莫秀英 267
- Mok Kon Seng 莫幹生 187
- Mok Shiyang 莫仕揚 187
- Mok Ying Kui 莫應淮 187, 191, 221, 265–67
- Mok Zaoquan 莫藻泉 187
- Morrison, Robert 52
- Morrison Society 54
- Munn, Christopher 51n79
- Nagasaki 31, 198, 233
- Nam Pak Hong 73, 100, 111, 192, 193, 194,  
 197, 198, 199, 203, 280
- Namikata Shōichi 12n37
- Nanyō Kyōkai 波形昭一 82, 94, 96
- Nanjing Government  
 and Wang Jingwei 252  
 challenges from Fujian 251–53  
 challenges from Guangdong 254–55  
 define the boundary of Chinese national  
 interest 205–8, 210–11, 214, 221–22,  
 270  
 move to Chongqing 163  
 Establishment 131–32  
 Nanjing decade 20, 251  
 Recipient of national funds 133, 135,  
 145, 149  
 with Chinese bourgeoisie from Hong  
 Kong 130–32, 147–48, 153  
 with Chinese bourgeoisie from  
 Singapore 127, 210–11, 214, 276–77  
*See also* Chiang Kaishek, Chen Jitang, Li  
 Jishen, Fujian Incident, GMD
- Nanyang Brothers' Tobacco Company 87,  
 115, 150, 154, 186, 210
- Nanyang Geshu Fujian Tongxianghui Daibiao  
 Dahui* (NGFDD) 276
- Nanyang Huaqiao ChouzhanZuguo Nanmin  
 Shangbing Daibiao Dahui* (NQZH) 146,  
 162, 250, 273, 275–76, 283, 285
- Nanyang Minqiao jiuxianghui* (NMJH)  
 and Aw Boon Haw 261  
 and Nineteenth Route Army 259, 260–61
- Nanyang Minqiao jiuxianghui (South  
 Seas Fujian Sojourners' Home Saving  
 Association) 98, 99, 133, 257, 259,  
 260, 276, 283
- Reactions to CCP's expansion to  
 Fujian 257–59  
*See also* Zhangzhou-Longyan Railway  
 Project
- Nationalism, theories  
 imagined communities 3  
 long-distance nationalism 3
- New Culture Movement  
 and Marxism 84–85  
 in Singapore 86
- Ng Chin-keong 吳振強 28n12, 31n21,  
 32n25, 33n29
- Ngee Ann Kongsī 48, 65
- Nineteenth Route Army  
 and Chiang Kai-shek 153–54  
 and NMJH 259–260, 283  
 collapse of 268  
 land reforms 262  
 organized the Fujian People's  
 Government 252–55  
*See also* Li Jishen, Chen Jitang,  
 Guangdong, Fujian, Chiang Kai-shek,  
 Nanjing government
- Ningbo 30, 32, 33n33
- Nonini, Donald 15n46
- North Point, Hong Kong 120, 121, 122
- NQZH (Nanyang Hua Qiao Chouzhan Zuguo  
 Nanmin Shangbing Daibiao Dahui) 146,  
 162, 250, 273, 275–277, 283–85
- Oei Ik Tjoe 黃奕柱 99
- Ong, Aihwa 15n46, 206, 296
- Opium War 34, 52, 249
- Overseas Chinese Banking Corporation  
 (OCBC) 171, 172, 174
- Pan Xingnong 潘醒農 37n48, 37n50,  
 48n60, 63n2, 293n19
- Paris Peace Conference 2, 82, 84
- Peel, William 263
- Penang 7, 34, 90, 142, 144
- People's Political Consultative Conference  
 (PPCC) 290

- Perak 49, 137  
 Philip A. Kuhn 4n10, 39n57  
 Philippines 35, 56, 90, 98, 179, 247, 257, 276  
 Pickering, William A. 2  
 Po Yick Commercial Society 200  
 Post, Peter 11, 237  
 Production and People's Party 252  
   *See also* Nineteenth Route Army: Fujian  
   People's Government  
 Ptak, Roderich 27n8, 28n12  
*punti* 38  
 Purcell, Victor 8, 52, 52n84
- Quanzhou 27, 28, 29, 35  
   *See also* Zayton
- Rajeswary Ampalavanar Brown 11n35  
 Rankin, Mary B. 14n35  
 Red Sea 27, 28  
 Remer, C. F. 66n121, 105n98  
 re-Sinification 4, 8, 9  
   *See also* Confucian education  
 Riau Archipelago 33, 48  
 Rice Shortage 1919  
   Hong Kong 90–93  
   Singapore 89–90  
 Rubber industry  
   Competition with Japanese rubber  
   manufacture 177–79  
   sccc leaders 167–69  
   Slump of global rubber prices 174
- Saigon 37  
 Sakuma Shigeo 30  
 Sam Kwong Weaving Factory 230, 231  
 Schottenhammer, Angela 27, 30  
 Schwarcz, Vera 2n2  
 Seah Eu Chin 余有進 48, 49  
 Seah Liang Seah 余連城 49  
 Seamen Strike  
   Background 99–100, 102  
   Bourgeois responses 101  
 Second Revolution 67, 123  
 See Tiong Wah (Teong Wah, *See* Tong Wah or  
 Xue Zhonghua) 薛中華 59, 60, 87, 88,  
 97, 126, 144, 169  
 Selden, Mark 15n45, 17n49, 275, 276n93  
 Self-strengthening movements 25, 48, 51–55
- Shanghai  
   and Chan Lim Pak 156  
   and Hong Kong in General  
     Guangdong-Hong Kong Strike and  
     Boycott 110–111  
   British Council-General in Shanghai 122  
   and Jin Peigao 125  
   and *Nanyang Minqiao Jiuxiang Hui*  
     (NMJH) 98–99  
   and Zhang Yujie 128  
   battle of Shanghai 162  
   CCP, founding of 84  
   expansion of Hong Kong companies to  
     87, 88, 92–93, 92n49, 154, 201  
   in Anti-American boycott 66  
   in Cantonese business networks of  
     Japanese goods 199  
   industries in Shanghai 203, 205, 210,  
     214, 219–20  
   May 30 Massacre 105, 123  
   relocation of Shanghai industries to Hong  
     Kong 222–27  
   Shanghai Incident 150–51  
   Shanghaianders, Fairbank's thesis 14  
   shareholders of the Heung On company  
     from Shanghai 200n106  
 Shanghai Art School 156  
 Shanghai Chamber of Commerce 57  
 Shanghai Fire and Marine Insurance Co.  
   Ltd. 200  
 Shanghai Great China Co. Ltd. 210  
 Shanghai Guangzhao gongsuo 152, 156  
 Shanghai Guangzho gongsuo 151–52, 156  
 Shanghai Nanjing Railway  
   Administration 54  
 Shanghai World Publisher 137  
 Shangzhan (commercial wars) 53  
 Shao'guan 272  
 Sheng Gang shanghai lianhe hui 114  
*shi ye jiu guo* 19, 21, 53, 83, 89, 99, 125, 128,  
 132, 165, 204  
 Shimizu Hiroshi 12, 219, 233, 235, 237  
 Siam  
   Chinese population 41–43  
   expansion of Chinese migration in the  
     eighteenth century 32n28, 34, 37,  
     39, 56  
   rice trade 89–90, 100, 111n118

- and Singapore's transshipment trade 34, 241
- diplomatic ties with Wang Jingwei 139, 274n89
- markets of rubber-soled shoes 169, 178
- Sincere Group of Companies 89, 91, 92, 117, 200, 210, 245
- Singapore Chamber of Commerce 238
- Singapore Chinese Chamber of Commerce (SCCC)
- and anti-Japanese boycotts 87–88
  - and Japan's southward advance 97–98, 97n57, 133–34
  - and late Qing reforms 57
  - and rice shortage 1919 90
  - and Sun Yat-sen 123–27
  - fundraisings
    - related to Tan Kah Kee's nationalist campaigns 132–135, 137–38, 276–77
    - other charities 58, 86, 97, 144n51
  - in “buy Chinese products” movements 210, 213, 218–21, 223, 226, 230
  - rubber business 167–69, 173–74
  - tea business 185
  - textile business 180, 182
  - the *bang* system 58–60, 65
- Singapore Fujian Native-Place Association 48, 60, 88, 143, 258
- Singapore Improvement Trust 175
- Singapore Piece Goods Traders Guild 179n45, 179n46, 180, 180n48, 180n49, 182n53
- Sinn, Elizabeth Y. 冼玉儀 9n27, 11n33, 15n46, 39n58, 50n77, 51, 51n80, 51n83, 52n85, 66n120, 91n33
- Skinner, G. W. 8, 8n24, 8n25, 35, 37n48
- Smith, Carl T. 11n33, 50n77, 50n78, 53n88, 54n93
- Snow, Edgar 275
- Snow, Philip 293
- So Siu Chin 蘇兆徵 99, 101
- So, Billy K. L. 蘇基朗 28n9
- Song Ong Siang 宋旺相 7, 8n20, 11, 49, 49n69, 56, 63n2, 171n17, 174n32
- Support of the Fujian People's Government 253
- Song Qingling 宋慶齡 127, 133n11, 253, 290
- Southern Godown Company 96, 96n56, 98, 99, 99n64, 109, 133, 235
- Southwest Political Affairs Committee 252, 264
- Stubbs, R. E. 107, 109, 110
- Su Jiqing 蘇繼頃 29n13
- Subei 5
- Sugiyama Shinya 18n51, 180n51, 182, 240n98
- Sumatra 27, 35, 37, 178, 241
- Sun Company 91, 92, 92n40, 92n43, 117, 200, 210, 245
- Sun Fo 孫科 127
- Sun Yat-sen 孫逸仙
- and Comintern 102–4
  - and Guangdong Army 146
  - and Yuan Shikai 67
  - Asianism 55–56
  - background 5n12, 14
  - eulogy from Hong Kong 104
  - Guangdong Military Government 124
  - hu fa* movement 69, 206
  - legacies 125, 127–28, 251–52, 290, 296
  - legacy of Sun 290
  - political enlightenments in Hong Kong 52–55, 81
  - Responses from Singapore about Sun's Guangdong Military Government 123–24
  - Second Revolution 123
  - support from Chinese overseas 56–57, 57n102, 67, 68, 123–25, 185
  - Tasu Maru Incident 67
- Syria 29
- T. V. Soong 120, 133, 164n156, 207
- Ta You Bank 71
- Taiwan
- as Dutch Formosa 30–31, 32n27
  - in Hong Kong trade 198, 278
  - in Japan's southward advance 11n35, 13, 13n39, 94–97, 292
  - in South Seas Hokkien networks 99, 114, 297
  - investment in China of Taiwanese 7n18, 296
  - Koxinga (Zheng Chenggong) 31–32
  - as a metaphor in Tan Kah Kee's critiques of Fujian's governance 277

- Taiwan (*cont.*)
- Singapore Taiwan Association 228
  - sugar supply to Guangdong 266
  - supply of sugar to Guangdong's sugar industry 266
  - Taiwan *sekimin* 82–83
  - Taiwanese Hakka in anti-colonial resistance 4
  - Taiwanese tea 99n63, 166, 183, 183n54, 184, 227–29, 268
  - with late Qing reformers 55, 81
  - Tam Woon Tong 譚煥堂 158
  - Tan Ai Lay 171–72
  - Tan Boo Liat 陳武烈 48, 57, 57n101, 60
  - Tan Kah Kee 陳嘉庚
    - and Aw Boon Haw 9n26, 140–43, 145, 274, 281–82, 287
    - and CCP 275, 283n125
    - and Chinese Nationalist Government 135, 139, 275–76, 276n94, 281n117, 275–78
    - and Fujian communities in Hong Kong 278–82
    - and Hau Say Huan 285–86, 286n5
    - and Japan 97, 133
    - and sccc 57n109, 276–77
    - and Singapore Fujian Native-Place Association 60, 262
    - and Taiwanese merchants 98
    - and third-party campaigns 286, 288–291
    - and Wang Jingwei 273–74
    - British connections 45, 137, 137n29
    - Chi Mei-Amoy Causeway 291
    - family networks 170–72
    - investment in Fujian 7n18, 7n19, 57
    - nationalist leader 16n47, 130, 132, 134, 143, 144n51, 162, 250, 278n103, 288, 295–96
    - postwar politics in Malaya 289
    - reaction to the Fujian People's Government 262
    - Tan Kah Kee & Co. 140, 140n39, 141, 167–72, 175, 178–79, 179n44, 212, 214
    - Tanaka Memorial 137–38
  - Tan Keong Hee 陳恭喜 175n34
  - Tan Kim Ching 陳金鍾 25, 26, 48
  - Tan Seng Poh 陳成寶 49
  - Tan Teck Joon 陳德潤 180
  - Tan Tock Seng 陳篤生 48, 57
  - Tao Nan School 86
  - Tariff Autonomy, China 221–22
  - Tatsu Maru Incident 67
  - Teh Lay Seng 鄭螺生 137, 137n27, 139
  - Teo Eng Hock 張永福
    - and Sun Yat-sen's revolution 56, 122
    - and GMD 135, 136–37, 139
    - and Wang Jingwei 274, 292, 293n19
    - rubber industry 168–71, 179
    - social networks 171n17, 173
    - See also* Baba Chinese, GMDM, Lim Nee Soon, Tan Kah Kee and Wang Jingwei
  - Teocheu
    - social networks in Singapore 9n26, 47–48, 58n112, 64, 171n17, 172, 180, 293n19
    - charities 96, 144n51
    - distribution in the South Seas 41–45
    - homeland investment 256
    - in Chinese nationalist movements 56, 167, 219, 295
    - in Feng Rui's sugar reforms 266
    - in Hong Kong census 49
    - maritime trade and migration before the nineteenth century 37
    - Native-place of origins in Guangdong 2, 5n12, 35, 38
    - business networks in Hong Kong 191–94
    - rise of China-born Teocheu in Singapore 65
    - trade of British piece-goods 180–82
    - See also* Teo Eng Hock, Teocheu, Singapore Piece Goods Traders' Guild
  - Teocheu Textile Commerce Bureau 180
    - See also* Teocheu, Singapore Piece Goods Traders' Guild
  - Thean Hock Keong 48, 57, 60
  - Third-party campaigns
    - China Democratic League (CDL) 289
    - China Democratic Political Groups League 290
    - in Guangdong and Guangxi 252
    - in Hong Kong 253–55
    - Zhonghua minzu geming tongmeng* (Revolutionary alliance of the Zhonghua people) 254
  - Tian Chu MSG Manufacturer 223
  - Tian Rukang 田汝康 31
  - Tjhung Sie-gan 莊西言 275, 281

- Toh Kee Cheung 杜其章 156, 157, 279  
 Toh Sze Tuan 杜四端 157, 278  
 Tokyo Earthquake 97–98  
 Tong King-sing 唐景星 53  
 Tongde Reading Society 135  
 Trade of British Piece Goods 179–82  
 Transnationalism  
   definition 15, 16  
   dilemma in the postwar politics 291  
 Tremml, Birgit M. 30  
 Tsai Jung-fang 蔡榮芳 11n33, 16n47,  
   66n122, 67n126, 111n121  
 Tsang, Steve 20, 20n57  
 Tsong Sing Tsung 莊成宗  
   And Guangdong's sugar project 265–67  
   and NGFDD 277, 280, 280n112  
   and Zheng Yushu 281, 283n125  
*tu-ke* See punti  
 Tung Wah Hospital 11, 20, 50, 51, 66, 69,  
   71–72, 80, 91, 98, 100, 101, 103, 110, 112, 115,  
   117, 148–57, 162, 165, 186, 203, 273, 278  
 Turnbull, Mary A. 3, 3n6, 11n34, 127n189,  
   127n190, 138n30, 174n29  
 Twenty-One Demands 1, 84, 97  
 Tyau, Phillip 勺作謙 206
- Uchida Kakichi 内田嘉吉 94  
 Unekawa Shizuo 畝川鎮夫 94  
 United Malays National Organization  
   (UMNO) 289  
 United Meeting of All Native-Place Chambers  
   of Commerce (Hong Kong) 113–15, 117
- Vaughan, Daniel 2–3
- Wang Daiyuan 汪大淵 28–29  
 Wang Gungwu 王庚武 4, 10, 11, 26, 27, 295  
 Wang Jingwei 汪精衛 67, 104, 117, 122, 127,  
   131, 139, 147, 251–52, 254, 273–75, 292–293  
 Wang Jiyuan 王濟遠 156, 157, 279  
 Wang Songxian 王頌獻 154  
 Wei Yuk 韋玉 68, 83  
 Wing On Group of Companies 7, 91, 92, 117,  
   162, 193, 200, 201, 202, 210, 236, 245  
 Wokou 30  
 Wong Kee Hi 黃季熙 113, 115  
 Wong Kwong Tin 黃廣田 113, 186, 205, 215  
 Wong Lin Ken 34n37, 34n38, 179n45,  
   241n100
- Wong Mao Lin 黃茂林 158  
 World War I 1, 89, 94, 96, 201  
 World-economy  
   theory of Fernand Braudel 17  
   of South China-South Seas 18–19  
   long sixteenth century 29–32  
 Wu, C. C. 伍朝樞 118, 118n153, 118n156, 127  
 Wu Hanzhen 吳涵真 163, 164, 165  
 Wu Pei-fu 吳佩孚 122  
 Wu Tien-cheng 吳鐵城 154  
 Wu Tingfang 伍廷芳 54
- Xianggang Chongzheng Zonghui* 145, 161  
 Xie Chongguang 謝重光 35n41  
 Xu Xueyu 徐學禹 268, 276, 276n94  
 Xue Dubi 薛篤弼 208  
 Xue Fucheng 薛福成 25, 26, 47  
 Xue Moucheng 薛謀成 253n6
- Yamaoka Yuka 山岡由佳 199, 233  
*yanghang* 39, 186, 187n68, 190n70, 191, 200  
 Yangzi areas 14, 22, 25, 34, 38, 39  
 Ye Taihen 葉苔痕 277  
 Ye Ting 葉挺 147, 253  
 Yellow River 4, 27  
 Yen Ch'ing-hwang 顏清煌 4n10, 43n64,  
   48n67, 56n97, 56n99, 65n119, 131n4,  
   133n10  
 Yeo Chan Boon 楊纘文 182  
 Yong Ch'ing-fatt 楊建發 7n18, 10n30,  
   57n101, 59n112, 133n10, 134n2, 140n39,  
   171n17, 172n20, 174n32, 286n5, 288–89  
 Yu Hanmou 余漢謀 254, 255  
 Yuan Shikai 67, 70, 251  
 Yue 1, 2, 27, 38, 125, 264  
   *See also* Guangdong and Cantonese
- Yuegang 30, 35  
 Yung Wing 容閎 52, 53, 54, 55, 70, 81  
 Yuntaishan 32
- Zayton 28  
   *See also* Quanzhou  
 Zhang Xie 張燮 31  
 Zhang Yujie 張玉階 128  
 Zhang Zhongli 張仲禮 186, 187n66  
 Zhangzhou 29–30, 183, 199, 259  
 Zhangzhou-Longyan Railway Project 98,  
   257, 261–62  
 Zhejiang clique 277

- Zheng Chenggong (Koxinga) 鄭成功  
 (國姓爺) 31-32
- Zheng Guanying 鄭觀應 53
- Zheng He 鄭和 29
- Zheng Quanbei 鄭全備 253n6
- Zheng Yushu 鄭玉書 279-81
- Zheng Zhilong 鄭芝龍 31
- Zheng, Victor 71, 293, 294
- Zhou Zhaojing 周昭京 48n68, 65n119
- Zhuang Weiji 莊為璣 6n18, 258
- Zuo Zongtang 左宗棠 25