

BLURRING THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN *HUAQIAO* AND *HUAREN*: China's Changing Policy towards the Chinese Overseas

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In 2015 there were two important events regarding Beijing's policy towards the Chinese overseas. One was the World Overseas Chinese Businessmen and Industrialists Conference in Beijing and the other was the announcement of the *Huayi* Card, specially designed for foreign citizens of Chinese descent working and residing in China. These events clearly manifest Beijing's "new policy" towards the Chinese overseas. Nevertheless, when examined closely, this policy change can be seen to have taken place much earlier, as reflected in previous events.

This chapter examines both the World Overseas Chinese Businessmen and Industrialists Conference and the *Huayi* Card, and the new policy's impact on the Chinese overseas, with special reference to Southeast Asia. It also explains when and why Beijing began to change its policy towards the Chinese overseas.

Clear Distinction between *Huaqiao* and *Huaren*

Beijing's policy towards Chinese overseas has been changing. During the Deng Xiaoping period, the distinction between *huaqiao* (华侨 Chinese citizens overseas) and *huaren* (华人 foreign citizens of Chinese descent) was quite clear.

After the resurgence of Deng Xiaoping, China promulgated the first PRC Citizenship (Nationality) Law in 1980, that stipulates that China only recognizes single citizenship. Once a Chinese overseas becomes the citizen of another country

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voluntarily, he or she ceases to be a citizen of the People's Republic of China. The clear distinction between Chinese nationals and foreigners resolved the historical problem of dual nationality of the Chinese overseas.

Nevertheless, with the modernization of China and globalization, there have been waves of new Chinese migrations, known as *xin yimin*. But the destinations of the new migrants have been developed countries (especially in the West) rather than the developing countries of Southeast Asia (except Singapore). These new migrants proposed that China should revive the dual nationality policy for ethnic Chinese, as such was being practised in the West. The proposal was debated by the China's People's Consultative Body, but the 1980 Chinese Nationality Law remained unamended. Apparently the Chinese government felt the present citizenship law served Beijing's national interests well.

The most striking example of the distinction between China's nationals and foreigners can be seen in Beijing's attitude towards the anti-ethnic Chinese riots that took place in Indonesia in May 1998, which affected many Chinese Indonesians. Looting, burning, and the rape of Chinese women took place, which led to protests against Jakarta by the international Chinese community. However, Beijing did not make any comment or take any action until July 1998, when it stated that it was concerned with the tragic encounters of many Chinese Indonesians and expected that the Indonesian authorities would be able to protect its nationals regardless of their ethnicity.¹

The reasons for Beijing's inaction in the Indonesian case remain speculative. Some are of the opinion that Beijing wanted to show the world that China would not interfere in the domestic affairs of a foreign country, as those affected for the most part were not Chinese citizens. In addition, Indonesia was friendly to the People's Republic of China (PRC), and was important to Beijing for reasons of international diplomacy. Others argued that Beijing during that time was not yet ready to conduct an active foreign policy. Whatever the reasons, it is clear that China's behaviour followed strictly China's single citizenship policy.

Beijing's Changing Policy

Blurring the Distinction

Beijing's policy towards the Chinese overseas started to change after the 1998 anti-ethnic Chinese riots in Indonesia. The change began in 2001 when Beijing revitalized the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office (OCAO, also known in Chinese as *Qiaoban*) and the Federation of Returned Overseas Chinese Associations (FROCA,

also known as *Qiaolian*). FROCA established the honorary positions of “Overseas Advisors” (*haiwai guwen*) and “Overseas Committee Members” (*haiwai weiyuan*) for the Chinese overseas. There were initially only 31 overseas advisors and overseas committee members.² But by December 2013 the federation had invited 581 such members, representing 94 countries. The majority of the advisors and committee members are *huaren*, not *huaqiao*. Legally speaking, the semi-official FROCA is for the *huaqiao* on the mainland, but *huaren* have also been included in this group, resulting in some criticism among *huaren* in Southeast Asia and scholars in China.³

More significant was the establishment of the Conference of World Federation of Huaqiao Huaren Associations (CWFHHA) by OCAO in the same year (2001). Soon after its establishment, the first conference was held in 2001. By 2014 there had been seven such conferences. In 2012, at the sixth conference, there were 550 participants from 109 countries and areas. By 2014, when the seventh conference was held, there were over 500 participants from 119 countries and areas.⁴ At the 2014 conference President Xi Jinping made a speech referring to overseas Chinese as members of the “Zhonghua big family” (中华大家庭). When he addressed the meeting he used the term “*haiwai qiaobao*” (海外侨胞, overseas compatriots) rather than “*haiwai huaren*” (海外华人, Chinese overseas),⁵ but the fact is that the occasion was the world *huaqiao* and *huaren* conference, not a *huaqiao* gathering.

The change of policy may have been closely linked with the rise of China and the large numbers of Chinese migrants. Beijing started to realize that China had industrialized and been transformed into the “World Factory”. It required new markets and raw materials from all over the world. Moreover, China also had surplus capital that needed investment opportunities. Not surprisingly, China has carried out intensive economic activities overseas for the last two decades. In 2013 it proposed its “One Belt, One Road” strategy, which is one way to address its economic problems.

Significantly, overseas Chinese have also been considered as socio-political and economic capital for rising China. In the last few decades a large number of Chinese have migrated to developed countries, and they have become an important asset for China. However, Beijing also views the well-established ethnic Chinese as equally useful. Not surprisingly, China would like to mobilize Chinese overseas, regardless of their citizenship, to serve the national interests of China. The foreign policy behaviour of China since 2006 has shown its changing attitude to the Chinese overseas.

The Solomon Islands

In April 2006 an anti-ethnic Chinese riot took place that resulted in the “exodus” of ethnic Chinese from this Pacific Islands country. A few hundred Chinese, both local citizens and citizens of Taiwan, were affected. Beijing’s embassy in nearby Papua New Guinea offered protection and repatriation to these ethnic Chinese, regardless of their citizenship, and more than five hundred of them were flown to Hong Kong and Guangdong to be resettled.⁶ It should be noted that the Solomon Islands recognized Taiwan (ROC), and had no diplomatic ties with the PRC. The PRC’s actions aimed to show that it was capable of offering protection to and assistance for overseas Chinese, whilst Taiwan had failed to do so. This intervention has been termed the “Solomon Model”⁷ by mainland Chinese scholars. Such a model though is unlikely to be applied to the countries of Southeast Asia, as it would be both costly and would affect Beijing’s international standing. Nevertheless, the implementation of the “Solomon model” demonstrates a deviation from Beijing’s foreign policy of the past. People have begun to wonder whether protecting Chinese overseas regardless of their citizenship is now a norm rather than an exception adopted only when it suits China’s national interests.

Beijing Olympics and Tibet

Including *huaren* in the category of *huaqiao* or, at least, linking *huaqiao* and *huaren* in domestic and foreign policy has become more obvious since 2006. In 2007, for instance, the then President of China, Hu Jintao, at one of the Chinese entrepreneurs gatherings, stated that although *huaqiao* and *huaren* were overseas, their “hearts are still linked to the Homeland”.⁸ He appealed to them to foster the unification of China and Taiwan. The following year, when Beijing hosted the Olympics, the government stressed the concept of the “Chinese Nation”, and included *huaren* as part of the Chinese Nation. Beijing appealed to ethnic Chinese all over the world — regardless of their citizenship — to protect the Olympic torch relay, to become Olympic volunteers so that the Beijing Olympics would be successful, and to help “realize the great revival of [the] Chinese Nation”.⁹

The success of the Beijing Olympics was crucial for China, as it symbolized the rise of China as a modern and powerful state in the world. The torch relay was part and parcel of the Olympic Games. It was unfortunate that this was linked to the Tibetan issue. In early 2008 an incident occurred that may be seen as a precursor to the troubled run up to the opening of the Beijing Olympics. Following a demonstration on 10 March (the forty-ninth anniversary of the 1959

failed Tibetan uprising) carried out by monks from the various monasteries in Lhasa, large-scale riots spread to the western part of China. This eventually culminated on 14 March 2008 in open attacks on non-ethnic Tibetans and the looting of shops owned by Han Chinese in Lhasa. The problem of Tibet thus regained international attention. This posed a challenge for the Beijing authorities — who refuse to recognize the sovereignty of Tibet.

In Beijing's view, Tibet is part of China, and any attempt to gain independence will not be tolerated. However, the Tibetans-in-exile used the "Olympics Opportunity" to put forward their demands to Beijing. Anti-Beijing demonstrations took place in many countries, especially in the West. Tibetans-in-exile and their supporters were particularly active during the Olympic torch relay from Greece to China, which passed through a number of the world's major cities. Chinese embassies organized *huaqiao* and *huaren* to protect the torch relay, and condemned those who obstructed its smooth journey. It seems that Beijing saw the success of the Olympic Games as not only linked to the prestige of China but also the territorial integrity of the PRC, as the interference came from what it saw as "splitist pro-Tibetan groups" and their supporters. Of course, the PRC also projected the Beijing Olympics as the symbol of success of the Chinese people in general, regardless of their citizenship. Indeed, many *huaren* (including those in Southeast Asia) were enthusiastic in assisting Beijing, and some even served as volunteers to help Beijing during the Olympics.

In recent years this kind of thinking, that is the lumping of *huaqiao* and *huaren* together, has become more obvious in China. The Beijing director of OCAO, Li Yinze, made a speech in April 2012 at the Chinese Chamber of Commerce in Jakarta, urging young Chinese Indonesians to learn "Hanyu" (Han Language) "in order to strengthen their identification with the Chinese Nation".¹⁰ The Chairperson of OCAO, Qiu Yuanping, also gave a speech at the Perhimpunan INTI (Indonesians of Chinese Descent Association). She commented that "The ancestral land [of the Chinese] will never forget the major contribution of the *huaqiao huaren* overseas, China will always be the strong backer of the people of Chinese descent overseas."¹¹

This habit of not differentiating *huaqiao* and *huaren* is worrying. At Beijing's "World *Huaqiao Huaren* Businessmen and Industrialists Conference", China's top leaders in their speeches referred to "*huashang*" (ethnic Chinese businessmen or foreign businessmen of Chinese descent) as "*qiaoshang*" (Chinese businessmen overseas), ignoring citizenship. They also called *haiwai huaren* (Chinese overseas) as *haiwai qiaobao* (overseas compatriots), attempting to return to past practices.

The World Overseas Chinese Businessmen and Industrialists Conference

China held its first “World Overseas Chinese [huaqiao huaren] Businessmen and Industrialists Conference” (世界华侨华人工商大会) in Beijing on 6–7 July 2015. According to the Chinese report, over three hundred overseas guests from seventy-nine countries and areas participated in the conference, and China’s Prime Minister Li Keqiang met them at the People’s Great Hall and delivered a speech. The official Chinese report only mentioned the name of a Thai “overseas Chinese businessman”,¹² Xie Guoming (Thai name: Dhanin Chearavanont) of the Charoen Pokphand Group (better known as the CP Group), who also made a speech at the conference. No other names of Chinese entrepreneurs were mentioned in the Chinese report. However, from the CCTV video clips of Li Keqiang’s speech,¹³ one can see that the majority of Chinese tycoons from Southeast Asia were present at the conference.

Beijing’s Huashang Conference

This conference was jointly organized by OCAO, the State Council, and China’s Overseas Exchange Association. It was held after China proposed its “One Belt, One Road” programme. Wang Xiaotao, the Vice-Chairman of the State Development and Reform Committee, gave a speech entitled “To exhibit the function of *huaqiao huaren*, to assist ‘One Belt, One Road’ development”. The Chairperson of OCAO, Qiu Yuanping, also made a speech, noting that “Overseas Chinese made major contribution to the country where they reside and to China’s development; according to incomplete statistics, the capital of overseas Chinese businessmen (*qiaoshang*)¹⁴ were about \$5000 billion.”¹⁵ She went on to say that “China for *huaqiao huaren* is the root of the nation, the soul of the culture, and also ... the big stage for them to realize their dreams.”

China’s Premier Li Keqiang met all the participants and told them:

60 million overseas compatriots (*haiwai qiaobao*) are important members of the large Chinese Nation (*Zhonghua minzu*). Generation after generation of *huaqiao* and *huaren*, their feelings are still linked to the homeland, their hearts are tied to Zhonghua,... they have made special and important contributions to the independence and liberation of the Chinese Nation, the reform, opening and modernization of China.¹⁶

He expressed three expectations from *huaqiao huaren*:

Firstly, to be the “New Effective Forces” in fostering the economic transformation and development of China, and to widely and deeply participate in the economic construction of China.... Secondly, to build a “Rainbow Bridge” for the economic cooperation between China and foreign countries, so that the “One Belt One Road” constructions will be pushed ahead.... Thirdly, to establish a “New Image” of Chinese entrepreneurs to reflect the traditional good virtue of the Chinese Nation, i.e. to live in harmony with the local population where they live, to be sincere, honest and law-abiding when doing business, and to take social responsibility.¹⁷

The World Chinese Entrepreneurs Convention

In 1991, international Chinese entrepreneurs, under the leadership of the Chinese Chambers of Commerce and Industry of Singapore, Bangkok, and Hong Kong, established the “World Chinese Entrepreneurs Convention” (WCEC, Shijie Huashang Dahui 世界华商大会). This huashang convention was organized under the initiative of Chinese overseas.¹⁸ Its objective was to foster mutual understanding of international Chinese entrepreneurs, to build Chinese entrepreneurial networks, to foster ethnic Chinese to be integrated into local society (*luodi shenggen* 落地生根), and to contribute to the economy and development of the countries where they resided.¹⁹ This convention, which is held every two years, was first held in Singapore in August 1991. About 800 representatives from 30 countries and 75 cities participated at the event. The convention was held in Chinese and English.

The WCEC convention has provided Chinese entrepreneurs with forums and networks so that they have been able to contribute to the countries where they reside. The convention has been held thirteen times, with the most recent event taking place in September 2015 in Bali, Indonesia. In the short twenty-five years of its existence, two conventions have been held in China; in 2001 in Nanking (Nanjing) and in 2013 in Chengdu. However, it appears that the WCEC convention has not satisfied the needs of a rising China; Beijing felt it necessary to run its own overseas Chinese entrepreneurs conference. The Thai Chinese tycoon Xie Guomin noted that Beijing’s conference is “the Diplomacy of Big Country” (*daguo waijiao*).

Indeed, this is the “Diplomacy of Big Country” which aims to serve the interests of China rather than the Chinese overseas. Even prior to the July

conference in Beijing, Zhuang Rongwen, the deputy chairman of OCAO, stated that the Beijing conference aimed to establish the organization of international Chinese entrepreneurs to lead the Chinese businessmen overseas to participate in China's development, especially the "One Belt, One Road" programme.²⁰ Li Keqiang openly admitted that he would like Chinese entrepreneurs to be the "New Effective Forces" (*shengli jun*) of China's economic transformation and development. In other words, it is meant to first serve the interests of China and to establish the new image of Chinese entrepreneurs; mutual wins come second, and the idea of maintaining harmonious relations with local populations comes third.

Apparently he was addressing Chinese nationals, but the majority of the entrepreneurs who participated at the conference were foreign nationals of Chinese descent. To ask foreign nationals to first serve the interests of China appears unreasonable; it would also put some participants in an awkward position. In the same year Beijing also announced a new project that would give Chinese overseas a special green card designed for them.

Huayi Card

On 5 December 2015, *Ming Bao*, a major Chinese language daily in Hong Kong, reported that on 27 November 2015, Guo Hong 郭洪, the director of the management committee of the Zhong Guan Cun 中关村 (known as the "Silicon Valley of China", located in Beijing), had made the unexpected announcement of a pilot project known as the *Huayi Card* (*Huayi Ka* 华裔卡) system.²¹ According to the announcement, the card would be issued to any qualified person of Chinese origin so that he or she could stay in China as a permanent resident and enjoy almost all the privileges of a Chinese citizen. Possessing the card would be different from having the status of dual nationality, as the cardholder would not have the right to vote in local elections or to run for office.

According to the report the project was introduced because of China's need to recruit more professionals for high technology and economic development. The idea came from the Indian practice of issuing two types of identity cards for Indians overseas, known as Persons of Indian Origin (PIOs) cards and Overseas Citizens of India (OCI) cards.²² According to the report, after the introduction of these two card systems, as of 2010 some four million OCIs and seven million POIs had returned to India to work.²³

The report also said that between 1978 and 2005, US\$622.4 billion worth of investments were injected into the Chinese economy, of which 67 per cent came from the Chinese overseas. Some 550,000 companies with foreign capital had been

registered during the same period, of which 70 per cent were owned by ethnic Chinese. In Zhong Guan Cun there were two million entrepreneurs (*chuangye renshi* 创业人士), but foreign nationals and “returned overseas Chinese” constituted only 1.5 per cent of the total. In California’s Silicon Valley, some 36 per cent of entrepreneurs are from overseas.

It was reported that, after the reform era in China, about seven million Chinese had migrated, and there were more than a million Chinese students overseas. The report noted that there were about “60 million overseas Chinese all over the world” as of 2015, of which about four million were entrepreneurs. These are the targets of the *Huayi* Card policy.

In the approximately ten years since China introduced its Green Card permanent residency system, it has issued fewer than ten thousand of them, including to people of Chinese origin. China’s appears to be the hardest Green Card in the world to obtain. The *Huayi* Card system is meant to help ease the problem of obtaining some sort of status in China for the Chinese overseas. Many Chinese new migrants in the West would like to have dual nationality status, and the *Huayi* Card is a form of compromise. Some have even argued that the *Huayi* Card is the prelude to the introduction of a dual nationality law in China. The difference between the Green Card and *Huayi* Card is that the former is ethnicity-blind, while the latter is based on ethnicity.

The announcement caused a lot of confusion. Some thought that the *Huayi* Card had already been introduced, but the authorities said that this was not the case, that it would only be a pilot, and that it would be tried out in 2016. Presumably the system would be tested on a small group of foreign Chinese first, and, if the results were promising, would then be implemented on a larger scale.

It seems that Beijing has now started thinking along the lines of ethnicity. Observers may hastily conclude that China is advocating Chinese transnationalism. But the term *huayi* has not been clearly defined. Is the term used to refer to Han Chinese only, or to both Han and non-Han Chinese overseas? In any case, the *Huayi* Card system will have a tremendous impact on the Chinese overseas in Southeast Asia and beyond, as their loyalties to their host countries may come under suspicion. Owing to its sensitivity there were suggestions that the card be tried out in Canada first, where dual nationality is allowed and the issue of Chinese ethnicity is not sensitive.

The *Huayi* Card system was criticized by many observers who understand the Chinese overseas situation, especially in Southeast Asia. In China, Professor Liang Yingming of Peking University commented on its shortcomings and the risks associated with adopting the ethnic principle in issuing permanent residency

rights.²⁴ The Chinese press in Singapore also published reports that were unflattering of the *Huayi Card*.²⁵ Probably due to such criticism, OCAO has had second thoughts about introducing the system for the moment. The Director of OCAO, Qiu Yuanping, announced on 8 March 2016 that the report concerning the *Huayi Card* was untrue.²⁶ There was later a similar report that quoted her as saying that OCAO did not have any plans to issue *Huayi Cards*. However, OCAO would amend the existing regulations to make it easier for foreigners of Chinese descent (*waiji huaren*) to obtain permanent resident status and enjoy other facilities in China.²⁷ In other words, the scheme has been shelved for the time being.

Concluding Remarks

Beijing's "World Huaqiao Huashang Businessmen and Industrialists Conference" cannot be separated from the rise of China. Beijing believes that the realization of "One Belt, One Road" requires the assistance and support of international Chinese entrepreneurs, hence the necessity for such a conference. Perhaps Beijing thought that because the existing "World Chinese Entrepreneurs Convention" was not initiated and controlled by China, it was unable to fulfil China's requirements, and so the country had to establish its own conference. This action creates the impression that Beijing cannot accept the "World Chinese Entrepreneurs Convention" initiated by the Chinese overseas.

More significant than this is Beijing's changing policy towards the Chinese overseas as reflected in the approach and terms used to refer to ethnic Chinese outside China. In the past, *huaqiao* and *huaren* have been widely used to distinguish China's citizens overseas and foreign citizens of Chinese descent. The 1980 Citizenship Law in fact stresses this distinction, and the law remains unamended. However, in recent practice the terms have been used together, and *haiwai huaren* (Chinese overseas) is often replaced with *haiwai qiaobao* (overseas compatriots) in the PRC leaders' speeches. This may have more significant implications for international politics and diplomacy. China should respect ethnic Chinese who have become foreign nationals. Otherwise, foreign citizens of Chinese descent would always come under suspicion by the people of their adopted country — especially in Southeast Asia — of still being loyal to China and not to their adopted country. In the long run this would be in the interests of neither China nor ethnic Chinese, as it would raise ethnic tension and destabilize Southeast Asia.

The introduction of this policy has not yet led to an official response from any Southeast Asian government, as they are currently busy with their own problems and economic development. China, as an economic power, is able to help

many Southeast Asian states in temporarily solving domestic economic problems, including infrastructure development. However, when there is an economic crisis, Southeast Asians may refocus their attention on the Chinese minorities again.

Notes

1. For a brief discussion of Beijing's attitude towards the 1998 anti-Chinese violence, see Leo Suryadinata, "Postscript", *China and the ASEAN States: The Ethnic Chinese Dimension* (Singapore: Marshall Cavendish, 2005); See also Shee Poon Kim, "China Responses to the May 1998 Anti-Chinese Riots in Indonesia", *EAI Working Paper*, no. 37, 24 March 2000.
2. <<http://www.guojiribao.com/shtml/gjrb/20131209/141504.shtml>> (accessed 2 April 2015).
3. The most outspoken critics have been scholars from Peking University; namely, the late Professor Zhou Nanjing and Professor Liang Yingming. Both are returned overseas Chinese from Indonesia.
4. The 7th Conference for Friendship of Overseas Chinese Associations, *People's Daily*, 7 June 2014 <<http://www.chinaqw.com/z/2014/sjhqhrstlydh/index.html>>.
5. "Xi Jinping Meets with the Seventh World Chinese Friendship Organization" <<http://pic.people.com.cn/n/2014/0607/c1016-25116878.html>> (accessed 23 July 2015).
6. For a study of the event, see Grace Chew Chye Lay, "The April 2006 Riots in the Solomon Islands", *CHC Bulletin*, 7 May and 8 November 2006, pp. 11–21.
7. The term "Solomon Model" (*Suo-luo-men moshi*) was used in an article written by a PRC scholar. See Hao Mengfei, "Qiaomin liyi, lingshi baohu, guojia liyi" [Citizen's interest, consul's protection, national interest], in *Zhongguo guojia liyi yu yingxiang* [China's national interests and influence], edited by Hu Jia (Beijing: Shishi chubanshe, 2006), p. 152.
8. "Hu Jintao haozhao huaqiao huaren wei tongyi gongtong fendou [Hu Jintao urged huaqiao and huaren to jointly strive for unification]", 2 June 2007 <<http://hk.crntt.com/crn-webapp/doc/docDetailCreate.jsp?coluid=7&kindid=0&docid=100392804>>.
9. For a brief discussion on the Olympics and China, see Leo Suryadinata, "A New Orientation in China's Policy towards Chinese Overseas? Beijing Olympic Games Fervour as a Case Study", *CHC Bulletin*, no. 12 (November 2008): 1–4; Yong Pow Ang, "Angry China Fuels Fear", *CHC Bulletin*, no. 12 (November 2008): 5–6.
10. Beijing shi qiaoban zhuren Li Yinze fang Yinni jianghua yinqi qiaojie buan [The speech of Beijing Qiaoban director Li Yinze caused worries among the Chinese community]", *Guoji Ribao*, 21 April 2012.
11. See *Guoji Ribao*, 19 September 2014.
12. The term used is "*Qiaoshang*" (侨商), not *Huashang* (华商), indicating that he is a *huaqiao* (Chinese national residing overseas). In fact he is a *huaren* (foreign citizen of Chinese descent).

13. “Li Keqiang Will Meet with the Representatives of the Inaugural Overseas Chinese Merchant Conference [新闻联播] 李克强会见首届华侨华人工商大会全体代表”, CCTV, 7 June 2015 <<http://www.yangshi13.com/cctv/xinwenlianbo/2015/0706/28389.html>>.
14. The original meaning of “*Qiaoshang*” is compatriot businessmen.
15. “The First Overseas Chinese Conference Opened with Overseas Chinese Capital of over USD 5 Trillion”, *Guancha.cn*, 7 July 2015 <http://www.guancha.cn/Industry/2015_07_07_325893.shtml>.
16. “Li Keqiang Meets with All the Representatives of the First World Chinese Chamber of Commerce and Industry”, *SZnews*, 7 July 2015 <http://www.sznews.com/content/2015-07/07/content_11861357.htm>.
17. *Ibid.*
18. The common secretariat was established in these three Chinese Chambers of Commerce in rotation. The term of the secretariat is six years.
19. Welcome address by Mr Tan Eng Joo at the first World Chinese Entrepreneurs Convention: A Global Network (首届世界华商大会专辑: 环球网络), Singapore Chinese Chamber of Commerce and Industry, 10–12 August 1991, pp. 18–19.
20. “The First Overseas Chinese Business Conference will be held in Beijing in July”, *Chinanews*, 29 June 2015 <<http://www.chinanews.com/hr/2015/06-29/7372290.shtml>>.
21. See “Zhongguo shixing huayi ka, zhenshi chengren shuangchong guoji 中国试行“华裔卡” 真实承认双重国籍 [China’s implementation of the “Green cards for those of Chinese origin” is an act of recognizing dual citizenship]”, *MingPaoCanada*, 5 December 2015 <http://www.mingpaocanada.com/tor/htm/News/20151205/taa1_r.htm>. The discussion in this section is mainly based on this report.
22. For Chinese studies on PIO and OCI, see Zhang Yinglong (张应龙) and Huang Chaohui (黄朝辉), *Yindu qiaomin zhengce yanjiu 印度侨民政策研究 [A study of Indian national policy]*, in *jingwai huaren guoji wenti taolunji 境外华人国籍问题讨论辑*, edited by Zhou Nanjing 周南京 (Hong Kong, 2005), pp. 290–311; Qiu Li Ben 丘立本, “Yindu Guoji yimin yu qiaowu gongzuo de lishi yu xianzhuang 印度国籍与侨务工作的历史与现状 [Indian citizenship and overseas Chinese affairs: Past and present]”, *Huaqiao huaren lishi yanjiu 华侨华人历史研究 [Overseas Chinese historical studies]*, no. 1 (March 2012): 24–35. According to these studies the Indian government introduced the PIO card in March 1999 and the OCI card in January 2003. Both cards have a common feature, i.e., the cardholders do not have political rights in India. The PIO card was merged into the OCI card on 9 January 2015. See Indian Ministry of Home Affairs announcement at <http://mha1.nic.in/pdfs/Merge_PIO_OCI.pdf> (accessed 5 February 2016).
23. The *Ming Bao* report (see note 21) cited figures of forty million OCI and seventy million POI, which seem unrealistically high.
24. “Beida jiaoshou liang yingming: zhongguo yao lizhi kandai haiwai huaren lichang 北大教授梁英明: 中国要理智看待海外华人立场 [PKU Professor Liang Yingming:

- China should treat overseas Chinese with rational attitude]”, *Lianhe Zaobao* 《联合早报》, 22 February 2016.
25. For instance, “Bendi xuezhe: mohu huaqiao huaren jixian 本地学者：模糊华侨华人界限 [Local scholars: Blur the boundaries of overseas Chinese]”, *Lianhe Zaobao*, 《联合早报》, 19 February 2016.
26. “Qiu Yuanping huiying qiaojie guanzhu redian: Huayika baodao bushushi, 裘援平回应侨界关注热点：“华裔卡”报道不属实 [Qiu Yuanping responds to overseas Chinese concern: “Chinese card” report is not true]”, *Chinanews*, 10 March 2016 <<http://www.chinanews.com/gn2016/03-10/7792404>>.
27. “Guowuyuan qiaoban zhuren Qiu Yuanping: muqian hai wei kaolii chutai huayika 国务院侨办主任裘援平：目前还未考虑出台华裔卡 [Qiu Yuping, director of the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office of the State Council: Has not yet considered the introduction of Chinese cards], *China Daily* <http://cn.chinadaily.com.cn/.../2016/content_23844522 ht...>.

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